When netlink sockets are used to convey data that is in a namespace
we need a way to select a subset of the listening sockets to deliver
the packet to. For the network namespace we have been doing this
by only transmitting packets in the correct network namespace.
For data belonging to other namespaces netlink_bradcast_filtered
provides a mechanism that allows us to examine the destination
socket and to decide if we should transmit the specified packet
to it.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Currently, ENOBUFS errors are reported to the socket via
netlink_set_err() even if NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS is set. However,
that should not happen. This fixes this problem and it changes the
prototype of netlink_set_err() to return the number of sockets that
have set the NETLINK_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS socket option. This return
value is used in the next patch in these bugfix series.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This cleanup patch puts struct/union/enum opening braces,
in first line to ease grep games.
struct something
{
becomes :
struct something {
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Similar to commit d136f1bd36,
there's a bug when unregistering a generic netlink family,
which is caught by the might_sleep() added in that commit:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:183
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1510, name: rmmod
2 locks held by rmmod/1510:
#0: (genl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8138283b>] genl_unregister_family+0x2b/0x130
#1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8138270c>] __genl_unregister_mc_group+0x1c/0x120
Pid: 1510, comm: rmmod Not tainted 2.6.31-wl #444
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81044ff9>] __might_sleep+0x119/0x150
[<ffffffff81380501>] netlink_table_grab+0x21/0x100
[<ffffffff813813a3>] netlink_clear_multicast_users+0x23/0x60
[<ffffffff81382761>] __genl_unregister_mc_group+0x71/0x120
[<ffffffff81382866>] genl_unregister_family+0x56/0x130
[<ffffffffa0007d85>] nl80211_exit+0x15/0x20 [cfg80211]
[<ffffffffa000005a>] cfg80211_exit+0x1a/0x40 [cfg80211]
Fix in the same way by grabbing the netlink table lock
before doing rcu_read_lock().
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since my commits introducing netns awareness into
genetlink we can get this problem:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: modprobe/1178/0x00000002
2 locks held by modprobe/1178:
#0: (genl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8135ee1a>] genl_register_mc_grou
#1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8135eeb5>] genl_register_mc_g
Pid: 1178, comm: modprobe Not tainted 2.6.31-rc8-wl-34789-g95cb731-dirty #
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8103e285>] __schedule_bug+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81403138>] schedule+0x108/0x588
[<ffffffff8135b131>] netlink_table_grab+0xa1/0xf0
[<ffffffff8135c3a7>] netlink_change_ngroups+0x47/0x100
[<ffffffff8135ef0f>] genl_register_mc_group+0x12f/0x290
because I overlooked that netlink_table_grab() will
schedule, thinking it was just the rwlock. However,
in the contention case, that isn't actually true.
Fix this by letting the code grab the netlink table
lock first and then the RCU for netns protection.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Consitfy nlmsghdr arguments to a couple of functions as preparation
for the next patch, which will constify the netlink message data in
all nfnetlink users.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
This patch adds the NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS socket flag. This flag can
be used by unicast and broadcast listeners to avoid receiving
ENOBUFS errors.
Generally speaking, ENOBUFS errors are useful to notify two things
to the listener:
a) You may increase the receiver buffer size via setsockopt().
b) You have lost messages, you may be out of sync.
In some cases, ignoring ENOBUFS errors can be useful. For example:
a) nfnetlink_queue: this subsystem does not have any sort of resync
method and you can decide to ignore ENOBUFS once you have set a
given buffer size.
b) ctnetlink: you can use this together with the socket flag
NETLINK_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR to stop getting ENOBUFS errors as
you do not need to resync (packets whose event are not delivered
are drop to provide reliable logging and state-synchronization).
Moreover, the use of NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS also reduces a "go up, go down"
effect in terms of performance which is due to the netlink congestion
control when the listener cannot back off. The effect is the following:
1) throughput rate goes up and netlink messages are inserted in the
receiver buffer.
2) Then, netlink buffer fills and overruns (set on nlk->state bit 0).
3) While the listener empties the receiver buffer, netlink keeps
dropping messages. Thus, throughput goes dramatically down.
4) Then, once the listener has emptied the buffer (nlk->state
bit 0 is set off), goto step 1.
This effect is easy to trigger with netlink broadcast under heavy
load, and it is more noticeable when using a big receiver buffer.
You can find some results in [1] that show this problem.
[1] http://1984.lsi.us.es/linux/netlink/
This patch also includes the use of sk_drop to account the number of
netlink messages drop due to overrun. This value is shown in
/proc/net/netlink.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR which is a netlink
socket option that the listener can set to make netlink_broadcast()
return errors in the delivery to the caller. This option is useful
if the caller of netlink_broadcast() do something with the result
of the message delivery, like in ctnetlink where it drops a network
packet if the event delivery failed, this is used to enable reliable
logging and state-synchronization. If this socket option is not set,
netlink_broadcast() only reports ESRCH errors and silently ignore
ENOBUFS errors, which is what most netlink_broadcast() callers
should do.
This socket option is based on a suggestion from Patrick McHardy.
Patrick McHardy can exchange this patch for a beer from me ;).
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A netlink attribute padding of zero triggers this sparse warning:
include/linux/netlink.h:245:8: warning: memset with byte count of 0
Avoid the memset when the size parameter is constant and requires no padding.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Previously I added sessionid output to all audit messages where it was
available but we still didn't know the sessionid of the sender of
netlink messages. This patch adds that information to netlink messages
so we can audit who sent netlink messages.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Normally during a dump the key of the last dumped entry is used for
continuation, but since lock is dropped it might be lost. In that case
fallback to the old counter based N^2 behaviour. This means the dump
will end up skipping some routes which matches what FIB_HASH does.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Create a specific helper for netlink kernel socket disposal. This just
let the code look better and provides a ground for proper disposal
inside a namespace.
Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit ed6dcf4a in the history.git tree broke netlink_unicast timeouts
by moving the schedule_timeout() call to a new function that doesn't
propagate the remaining timeout back to the caller. This means on each
retry we start with the full timeout again.
ipc/mqueue.c seems to actually want to wait indefinitely so this
behaviour is retained.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch make processing netlink user -> kernel messages synchronious.
This change was inspired by the talk with Alexey Kuznetsov about current
netlink messages processing. He says that he was badly wrong when introduced
asynchronious user -> kernel communication.
The call netlink_unicast is the only path to send message to the kernel
netlink socket. But, unfortunately, it is also used to send data to the
user.
Before this change the user message has been attached to the socket queue
and sk->sk_data_ready was called. The process has been blocked until all
pending messages were processed. The bad thing is that this processing
may occur in the arbitrary process context.
This patch changes nlk->data_ready callback to get 1 skb and force packet
processing right in the netlink_unicast.
Kernel -> user path in netlink_unicast remains untouched.
EINTR processing for in netlink_run_queue was changed. It forces rtnl_lock
drop, but the process remains in the cycle until the message will be fully
processed. So, there is no need to use this kludges now.
Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
netlink_sendskb does not use third argument. Clean it and save a couple of
bytes.
Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This change allows the generic attribute interface to be used within
the netfilter subsystem where this flag was initially introduced.
The byte-order flag is yet unused, it's intended use is to
allow automatic byte order convertions for all atomic types.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Each netlink socket will live in exactly one network namespace,
this includes the controlling kernel sockets.
This patch updates all of the existing netlink protocols
to only support the initial network namespace. Request
by clients in other namespaces will get -ECONREFUSED.
As they would if the kernel did not have the support for
that netlink protocol compiled in.
As each netlink protocol is updated to be multiple network
namespace safe it can register multiple kernel sockets
to acquire a presence in the rest of the network namespaces.
The implementation in af_netlink is a simple filter implementation
at hash table insertion and hash table look up time.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Allow kicking listeners out of a multicast group when necessary
(for example if that group is going to be removed.)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Allow changing the number of groups for a netlink family
after it has been created, use RCU to protect the listeners
bitmap keeping netlink_has_listeners() lock-free.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
People treating the *_pid fields in netlink as a process ID has caused
endless confusion over the years. The fact that our own netlink.h
does this only adds to the confusion.
So here is a patch to change the comments to refer to it as the port
ID which hopefully will make it clear what the purpose of the fields
really is.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Switch cb_lock to mutex and allow netlink kernel users to override it
with a subsystem specific mutex for consistent locking in dump callbacks.
All netlink_dump_start users have been audited not to rely on any
side-effects of the previously used spinlock.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
For the common "(struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data" sequence, so that we reduce the
number of direct accesses to skb->data and for consistency with all the other
cast skb member helpers.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
So that it is also an offset from skb->head, reduces its size from 8 to 4 bytes
on 64bit architectures, allowing us to combine the 4 bytes hole left by the
layer headers conversion, reducing struct sk_buff size to 256 bytes, i.e. 4
64byte cachelines, and since the sk_buff slab cache is SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN...
:-)
Many calculations that previously required that skb->{transport,network,
mac}_header be first converted to a pointer now can be done directly, being
meaningful as offsets or pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is the transport code for public key functionality in eCryptfs. It
manages encryption/decryption request queues with a transport mechanism.
Currently, netlink is the only implemented transport.
Each inode has a unique File Encryption Key (FEK). Under passphrase, a File
Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) is generated from a salt/passphrase
combo on mount. This FEKEK encrypts each FEK and writes it into the header of
each file using the packet format specified in RFC 2440. This is all
symmetric key encryption, so it can all be done via the kernel crypto API.
These new patches introduce public key encryption of the FEK. There is no
asymmetric key encryption support in the kernel crypto API, so eCryptfs pushes
the FEK encryption and decryption out to a userspace daemon. After
considering our requirements and determining the complexity of using various
transport mechanisms, we settled on netlink for this communication.
eCryptfs stores authentication tokens into the kernel keyring. These tokens
correlate with individual keys. For passphrase mode of operation, the
authentication token contains the symmetric FEKEK. For public key, the
authentication token contains a PKI type and an opaque data blob managed by
individual PKI modules in userspace.
Each user who opens a file under an eCryptfs partition mounted in public key
mode must be running a daemon. That daemon has the user's credentials and has
access to all of the keys to which the user should have access. The daemon,
when started, initializes the pluggable PKI modules available on the system
and registers itself with the eCryptfs kernel module. Userspace utilities
register public key authentication tokens into the user session keyring.
These authentication tokens correlate key signatures with PKI modules and PKI
blobs. The PKI blobs contain PKI-specific information necessary for the PKI
module to carry out asymmetric key encryption and decryption.
When the eCryptfs module parses the header of an existing file and finds a Tag
1 (Public Key) packet (see RFC 2440), it reads in the public key identifier
(signature). The asymmetrically encrypted FEK is in the Tag 1 packet;
eCryptfs puts together a decrypt request packet containing the signature and
the encrypted FEK, then it passes it to the daemon registered for the
current->euid via a netlink unicast to the PID of the daemon, which was
registered at the time the daemon was started by the user.
The daemon actually just makes calls to libecryptfs, which implements request
packet parsing and manages PKI modules. libecryptfs grabs the public key
authentication token for the given signature from the user session keyring.
This auth tok tells libecryptfs which PKI module should receive the request.
libecryptfs then makes a decrypt() call to the PKI module, and it passes along
the PKI block from the auth tok. The PKI uses the blob to figure out how it
should decrypt the data passed to it; it performs the decryption and passes
the decrypted data back to libecryptfs. libecryptfs then puts together a
reply packet with the decrypted FEK and passes that back to the eCryptfs
module.
The eCryptfs module manages these request callouts to userspace code via
message context structs. The module maintains an array of message context
structs and places the elements of the array on two lists: a free and an
allocated list. When eCryptfs wants to make a request, it moves a msg ctx
from the free list to the allocated list, sets its state to pending, and fires
off the message to the user's registered daemon.
When eCryptfs receives a netlink message (via the callback), it correlates the
msg ctx struct in the alloc list with the data in the message itself. The
msg->index contains the offset of the array of msg ctx structs. It verifies
that the registered daemon PID is the same as the PID of the process that sent
the message. It also validates a sequence number between the received packet
and the msg ctx. Then, it copies the contents of the message (the reply
packet) into the msg ctx struct, sets the state in the msg ctx to done, and
wakes up the process that was sleeping while waiting for the reply.
The sleeping process was whatever was performing the sys_open(). This process
originally called ecryptfs_send_message(); it is now in
ecryptfs_wait_for_response(). When it wakes up and sees that the msg ctx
state was set to done, it returns a pointer to the message contents (the reply
packet) and returns. If all went well, this packet contains the decrypted
FEK, which is then copied into the crypt_stat struct, and life continues as
normal.
The case for creation of a new file is very similar, only instead of a decrypt
request, eCryptfs sends out an encrypt request.
> - We have a great clod of key mangement code in-kernel. Why is that
> not suitable (or growable) for public key management?
eCryptfs uses Howells' keyring to store persistent key data and PKI state
information. It defers public key cryptographic transformations to userspace
code. The userspace data manipulation request really is orthogonal to key
management in and of itself. What eCryptfs basically needs is a secure way to
communicate with a particular daemon for a particular task doing a syscall,
based on the UID. Nothing running under another UID should be able to access
that channel of communication.
> - Is it appropriate that new infrastructure for public key
> management be private to a particular fs?
The messaging.c file contains a lot of code that, perhaps, could be extracted
into a separate kernel service. In essence, this would be a sort of
request/reply mechanism that would involve a userspace daemon. I am not aware
of anything that does quite what eCryptfs does, so I was not aware of any
existing tools to do just what we wanted.
> What happens if one of these daemons exits without sending a quit
> message?
There is a stale uid<->pid association in the hash table for that user. When
the user registers a new daemon, eCryptfs cleans up the old association and
generates a new one. See ecryptfs_process_helo().
> - _why_ does it use netlink?
Netlink provides the transport mechanism that would minimize the complexity of
the implementation, given that we can have multiple daemons (one per user). I
explored the possibility of using relayfs, but that would involve having to
introduce control channels and a protocol for creating and tearing down
channels for the daemons. We do not have to worry about any of that with
netlink.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The destination PID is passed directly to netlink_unicast()
respectively netlink_multicast().
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Account for the netlink message header size directly in nlmsg_new()
instead of relying on the caller calculate it correctly.
Replaces error handling of message construction functions when
constructing notifications with bug traps since a failure implies
a bug in calculating the size of the skb.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch formally adds support for the posting of FC events via netlink.
It is a followup to the original RFC at:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-scsi&m=114530667923464&w=2
and the initial posting at:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-scsi&m=115507374832500&w=2
The patch has been updated to optimize the send path, per the discussions
in the initial posting.
Per discussions at the Storage Summit and at OLS, we are to use netlink for
async events from transports. Also per discussions, to avoid a netlink
protocol per transport, I've create a single NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT protocol,
which can then be used by all transports.
This patch:
- Creates new files scsi_netlink.c and scsi_netlink.h, which contains the
single and shared definitions for the SCSI Transport. It is tied into the
base SCSI subsystem intialization.
Contains a single interface routine, scsi_send_transport_event(), for a
transport to send an event (via multicast to a protocol specific group).
- Creates a new scsi_netlink_fc.h file, which contains the FC netlink event
messages
- Adds 3 new routines to the fc transport:
fc_get_event_number() - to get a FC event #
fc_host_post_event() - to send a simple FC event (32 bits of data)
fc_host_post_vendor_event() - to send a Vendor unique event, with
arbitrary amounts of data.
Note: the separation of event number allows for a LLD to send a standard
event, followed by vendor-specific data for the event.
Note: This patch assumes 2 prior fc transport patches have been installed:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-scsi&m=115555807316329&w=2http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-scsi&m=115581614930261&w=2
Sorry - next time I'll do something like making these individual
patches of the same posting when I know they'll be posted closely
together.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <James.Smart@emulex.com>
Tidy up configuration not to make SCSI always select NET
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@SteelEye.com>
The below patch should be applied after the inode and ipc sid patches.
This patch is a reworking of Tim's patch that has been updated to match
the inode and ipc patches since its similar.
[updated:
> Stephen Smalley also wanted to change a variable from isec to tsec in the
> user sid patch. ]
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Keep a bitmask of multicast groups with subscribed listeners to let
netlink users check for listeners before generating multicast
messages.
Queries don't perform any locking, which may result in false
positives, it is guaranteed however that any new subscriptions are
visible before bind() or setsockopt() return.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
ACKed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim<hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
netlink overrun was broken while improvement of netlink.
Destination socket is used in the place where it was meant to be source socket,
so that now overrun is never sent to user netlink sockets, when it should be,
and it even can be set on kernel socket, which results in complete deadlock
of rtnetlink.
Suggested fix is to restore status quo passing source socket as additional
argument to netlink_attachskb().
A little explanation: overrun is set on a socket, when it failed
to receive some message and sender of this messages does not or even
have no way to handle this error. This happens in two cases:
1. when kernel sends something. Kernel never retransmits and cannot
wait for buffer space.
2. when user sends a broadcast and the message was not delivered
to some recipients.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduces a new type-safe interface for netlink message and
attributes handling. The interface is fully binary compatible
with the old interface towards userspace. Besides type safety,
this interface features attribute validation capabilities,
simplified message contstruction, and documentation.
The resulting netlink code should be smaller, less error prone
and easier to understand.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t;
- replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly
the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change
generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with
typedef) and documents what's going on far better.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Kernel connector - new userspace <-> kernel space easy to use
communication module which implements easy to use bidirectional
message bus using netlink as it's backend. Connector was created to
eliminate complex skb handling both in send and receive message bus
direction.
Connector driver adds possibility to connect various agents using as
one of it's backends netlink based network. One must register
callback and identifier. When driver receives special netlink message
with appropriate identifier, appropriate callback will be called.
From the userspace point of view it's quite straightforward:
socket();
bind();
send();
recv();
But if kernelspace want to use full power of such connections, driver
writer must create special sockets, must know about struct sk_buff
handling... Connector allows any kernelspace agents to use netlink
based networking for inter-process communication in a significantly
easier way:
int cn_add_callback(struct cb_id *id, char *name, void (*callback) (void *));
void cn_netlink_send(struct cn_msg *msg, u32 __groups, int gfp_mask);
struct cb_id
{
__u32 idx;
__u32 val;
};
idx and val are unique identifiers which must be registered in
connector.h for in-kernel usage. void (*callback) (void *) - is a
callback function which will be called when message with above idx.val
will be received by connector core.
Using connector completely hides low-level transport layer from it's
users.
Connector uses new netlink ability to have many groups in one socket.
[ Incorporating many cleanups and fixes by myself and
Andrew Morton -DaveM ]
Signed-off-by: Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP/NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP are used to join/leave
groups, NETLINK_PKTINFO is used to enable nl_pktinfo control messages
for received packets to get the extended destination group number.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Using the group number allows increasing the number of groups without
beeing limited by the size of the bitmask. It introduces one limitation
for netlink users: messages can't be broadcasted to multiple groups anymore,
however this feature was never used inside the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Next changeset will rename tcp_diag.[ch] to inet_diag.[ch].
I'm taking this longer route so as to easy review, making clear the changes
made all along the way.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- Remove bogus code for compiling netlink as module
- Add module refcounting support for modules implementing a netlink
protocol
- Add support for autoloading modules that implement a netlink protocol
as soon as someone opens a socket for that protocol
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
NETLINK_ARPD is unused, allocate it to the Open-iSCSI folks.
NETLINK_ROUTE6 and NETLINK_TAPBASE are no longer used, delete
them.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Eric W. Biederman