In dump_rawmsg, the length field from a received data package was
used unscrutinized, allowing an attacker to control the size of the
allocated buffer and the number of times the output loop iterates.
Fix by limiting to a reasonable value.
Spotted with Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In gigaset_isdn_regdev, the name field may not have a null terminator
if the source string's length is equal to the buffer size.
Fix by zero filling the structure and excluding the last byte of the
name field from the copy.
Spotted with Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If we take the unsupported supplementary service notification mask
path, we end up falling through and overwriting the error code.
Insert a break statement to skip the remainder of the switch case
and proceed to sending the reply message.
Spotted with Coverity.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Luwei Zhou says:
====================
Enable FEC pps feather
Change from v2 to v3:
-Using the default channel 0 to be PPS channel not PTP_PIN_SET/GETFUNC interface.
-Using the linux definition of NSEC_PER_SEC.
Change from v1 to v2:
- Fix the potential 32-bit multiplication overflow issue.
- Optimize the hareware adjustment code to improve efficiency as Richard suggested
- Use ptp PTP_PIN_SET/GETFUNC interface to set PPS channel not device tree
and add PTP_PF_PPS enumeration
- Modify comments style
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
FEC ptp timer has 4 channel compare/trigger function. It can be used to
enable pps output.
The pulse would be ouput high exactly on N second. The pulse ouput high
on compare event mode is used to produce pulse per second. The pulse
width would be one cycle based on ptp timer clock source.Since 31-bit
ptp hardware timer is used, the timer will wrap more than 2 seconds. We
need to reload the compare compare event about every 1 second.
Signed-off-by: Luwei Zhou <b45643@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The FEC IP supports hardware adjustment for ptp timer. Refer to the description of
ENET_ATCOR and ENET_ATINC registers in the spec about the hardware adjustment. This
patch uses hardware support to adjust the ptp offset and frequency on the slave side.
Signed-off-by: Luwei Zhou <b45643@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <b38611@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When ptp switches from software adjustment to hardware ajustment, linux ptp can't converge.
It is caused by the IP limit. Hardware adjustment logcial have issue when ptp counter
runs over 0x80000000(31 bit counter). The internal IP reference manual already remove 32bit
free-running count support. This patch replace the 32-bit PTP timer with 31-bit.
Signed-off-by: Luwei Zhou <b45643@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
1.
JIT compiler using multi-pass approach to converge to final image size,
since x86 instructions are variable length. It starts with large
gaps between instructions (so some jumps may use imm32 instead of imm8)
and iterates until total program size is the same as in previous pass.
This algorithm works only if program size is strictly decreasing.
Programs that use LD_ABS insn need additional code in prologue, but it
was not emitted during 1st pass, so there was a chance that 2nd pass would
adjust imm32->imm8 jump offsets to the same number of bytes as increase in
prologue, which may cause algorithm to erroneously decide that size converged.
Fix it by always emitting largest prologue in the first pass which
is detected by oldproglen==0 check.
Also change error check condition 'proglen != oldproglen' to fail gracefully.
2.
while staring at the code realized that 64-byte buffer may not be enough
when 1st insn is large, so increase it to 128 to avoid buffer overflow
(theoretical maximum size of prologue+div is 109) and add runtime check.
Fixes: 622582786c ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT")
Reported-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Tested-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
TCP Small Queues (tcp_tsq_handler()) can hold one reference on
sk->sk_wmem_alloc, preventing skb->ooo_okay being set.
We should relax test done to set skb->ooo_okay to take care
of this extra reference.
Minimal truesize of skb containing one byte of payload is
SKB_TRUESIZE(1)
Without this fix, we have more chance locking flows into the wrong
transmit queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If the skb is not dropped afterwards we should run consume_skb instead
kfree_skb. Inside of function skb_unshare we do always a kfree_skb,
doesn't depend if skb_copy failed or was successful.
This patch switch this behaviour like skb_share_check, if allocation of
sk_buff failed we use kfree_skb otherwise consume_skb.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This change adds support for skb->xmit_more based on the changes that were
made to igb to support the feature. The main changes are moving up the
check for maybe_stop_tx so that we can check netif_xmit_stopped to determine
if we must write the tail because we can add no further buffers.
Acked-by: Matthew Vick <matthew.vick@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Both ceph_update_writeable_page and ceph_setattr will verify file size
with max size ceph supported.
There are two caller for ceph_update_writeable_page, ceph_write_begin and
ceph_page_mkwrite. For ceph_write_begin, we have already verified the size in
generic_write_checks of ceph_write_iter; for ceph_page_mkwrite, we have no
chance to change file size when mmap. Likewise we have already verified the size
in inode_change_ok when we call ceph_setattr.
So let's remove the redundant code for max file size verification.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
ceph_find_inode() may wait on freeing inode, using it inside the s_mutex
may cause deadlock. (the freeing inode is waiting for OSD read reply, but
dispatch thread is blocked by the s_mutex)
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Following sequence of events can happen.
- Client releases an inode, queues cap release message.
- A 'lookup' reply brings the same inode back, but the reply
doesn't contain xattrs because MDS didn't receive the cap release
message and thought client already has up-to-data xattrs.
The fix is force sending a getattr request to MDS if xattrs_version
is 0. The getattr mask is set to CEPH_STAT_CAP_XATTR, so MDS knows client
does not have xattr.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
max_discard_sectors must be set for the queue to support discard.
Operations implementing discard for rbd zero data, so report that.
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
Only allocate two osd ops for discard requests, since the
preallocation hint is only added for regular writes. Use
rbd_img_obj_request_fill() to recreate the original write or discard
osd operations, isolating that logic to one place, and change the
assert in rbd_osd_req_create_copyup() to accept discard requests as
well.
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
rbd_img_request_fill() creates a ceph_osd_request and has logic for
adding the appropriate osd ops to it based on the request type and
image properties.
For layered images, the original rbd_obj_request is resent with a
copyup operation in front, using a new ceph_osd_request. The logic for
adding the original operations should be the same as when first
sending them, so move it to a helper function.
op_type only needs to be checked once, so create a helper for that as
well and call it outside the loop in rbd_img_request_fill().
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
Discard requests are a form of write, so they should go through the
same process as plain write requests and trigger copy-on-write for
layered images.
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
Discard may try to delete an object from a non-layered image that does not exist.
If this occurs, the image already has no data in that range, so change the
result to success.
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
Discards take a reference to the snapshot context of an image when
they are created. This reference needs to be cleaned up when the
request is done just as it is for regular writes.
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
In rbd_img_request_fill() the image size is only checked to determine
whether we can truncate an object instead of zeroing it for discard
requests. Take rbd_dev->header_rwsem while reading the image size, and
move this read into the discard check, so that non-discard ops don't
need to take the semaphore in this function.
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
This patch add the discard support for rbd driver.
There are three types operation in the driver:
1. The objects would be removed if they completely contained
within the discard range.
2. The objects would be truncated if they partly contained within
the discard range, and align with their boundary.
3. Others would be zeroed.
A discard request from blkdev_issue_discard() is defined which
REQ_WRITE and REQ_DISCARD both marked and no data, so we must
check the REQ_DISCARD first when getting the request type.
This resolve:
http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/190
[ Ilya Dryomov: This is incomplete and somewhat buggy, see follow up
commits by Josh Durgin for refinements and fixes which weren't
folded in to preserve authorship. ]
Signed-off-by: Guangliang Zhao <lucienchao@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
It could only handle the read and write operations now,
extend it for the coming discard support.
Signed-off-by: Guangliang Zhao <lucienchao@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
It need to copyup the parent's content when layered writing,
but an entire object write would overwrite it, so skip it.
Signed-off-by: Guangliang Zhao <lucienchao@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
These fields may both change while the image is mapped if a snapshot
is created or deleted or the image is resized. They are guarded by
rbd_dev->header_rwsem, so hold that while reading them, and store a
local copy to refer to outside of the critical section. The local copy
will stay consistent since the snapshot context is reference counted,
and the mapping size is just a u64. This prevents torn loads from
giving us inconsistent values.
Move reading header.snapc into the caller of rbd_img_request_create()
so that we only need to take the semaphore once. The read-only caller,
rbd_parent_request_create() can just pass NULL for snapc, since the
snapshot context is only relevant for writes.
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
Trying to map an image out of a pool for which we don't have an 'x'
permission bit fails with -ERANGE from ceph_extract_encoded_string()
due to an unsigned vs signed bug. Fix it and get rid of the -EINVAL
sink, thus propagating rbd::get_id cls method errors. (I've seen
a bunch of unexplained -ERANGE reports, I bet this is it).
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
queue_work() doesn't "fail to queue", it returns false if work was
already on a queue, which can't happen here since we allocate
event_work right before we queue it. So don't bother at all.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
we may corrupt waiting list if a request in the waiting list is kicked.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Use the more common pr_warn.
Other miscellanea:
o Coalesce formats
o Realign arguments
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
So the recovering MDS does not need to fetch these ununsed inodes during
cache rejoin. This may reduce MDS recovery time.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
If the state variable is krealloced successfully, map->osd_state will be
freed, once following two reallocation failed, and exit the function
without resetting map->osd_state, map->osd_state become a wild pointer.
fix it by resetting them after krealloc successfully.
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <roy.qing.li@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
We want "cbc(aes)" algorithm, so select CRYPTO_CBC too, not just
CRYPTO_AES. Otherwise on !CRYPTO_CBC kernels we fail rbd map/mount
with
libceph: error -2 building auth method x request
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Both not yet registered (r_linger && list_empty(&r_linger_item)) and
registered linger requests should use the new tid on resend to avoid
the dup op detection logic on the OSDs, yet we were doing this only for
"registered" case. Factor out and simplify the "registered" logic and
use the new helper for "not registered" case as well.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8806
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
reproduce:
make ARCH=arm C=1 2>fec.txt drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.o
cat fec.txt
sparse warnings:
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c:2916:12: warning: context imbalance
in 'fec_set_features' - different lock contexts for basic block
Christopher Li suggest to change as below:
if (need_lock) {
lock();
do_something_real();
unlock();
} else {
do_something_real();
}
Reported-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Christopher Li <sparse@chrisli.org>
Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <B38611@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
Here are some SCTP fixes.
[ Note, immediate workaround would be to disable ASCONF (it
is sysctl disabled by default). It is actually only used
together with chunk authentication. ]
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.
Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit 6f4c618ddb ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: Unable to send and receive Ethernet packets with Micrel PHY.
Affected devices:
KSZ8031RNL (commercial temp)
KSZ8031RNLI (industrial temp)
Description:
PHY device is correctly detected during probe.
PHY power-up default is 25MHz crystal clock input
and output 50MHz RMII clock to MAC.
Reconfiguration of PHY to input 50MHz RMII clock from MAC
causes PHY to become unresponsive if clock source is changed
after Operation Mode Strap Override (OMSO) register setup.
Cause:
Long lead times on parts where clock setup match circuit design
forces the usage of similar parts with wrong default setup.
Solution:
Swapped KSZ8031 register setup and added phy_write return code validation.
Tested with Freescale i.MX28 Fast Ethernet Controler (fec).
Signed-off-by: Bruno Thomsen <bth@kamstrup.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
REQ_KERNEL is no longer used. Remove it and drop the redundant uio
argument to nfs_file_direct_{read,write}.
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Now perf_session doesn't require that the evsels in its evlist are hists
containing ones.
Tools that are hists based and want to do per evsel events_stats
updates, if at some point this turns into a necessity, should do it in
the tool specific code, keeping the session class hists agnostic.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jean Pihet <jean.pihet@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-cli1bgwpo82mdikuhy3djsuy@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
When creating or moving a memslot, make sure the IPA space is within the
addressable range of the guest. Otherwise, user space can create too
large a memslot and KVM would try to access potentially unallocated page
table entries when inserting entries in the Stage-2 page tables.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
This patch adds the necessary support for all host kernel PGSIZE and
VA_SPACE configuration options for both EL2 and the Stage-2 page tables.
However, for 40bit and 42bit PARange systems, the architecture mandates
that VTCR_EL2.SL0 is maximum 1, resulting in fewer levels of stage-2
pagge tables than levels of host kernel page tables. At the same time,
systems with a PARange > 42bit, we limit the IPA range by always setting
VTCR_EL2.T0SZ to 24.
To solve the situation with different levels of page tables for Stage-2
translation than the host kernel page tables, we allocate a dummy PGD
with pointers to our actual inital level Stage-2 page table, in order
for us to reuse the kernel pgtable manipulation primitives. Reproducing
all these in KVM does not look pretty and unnecessarily complicates the
32-bit side.
Systems with a PARange < 40bits are not yet supported.
[ I have reworked this patch from its original form submitted by
Jungseok to take the architecture constraints into consideration.
There were too many changes from the original patch for me to
preserve the authorship. Thanks to Catalin Marinas for his help in
figuring out a good solution to this challenge. I have also fixed
various bugs and missing error code handling from the original
patch. - Christoffer ]
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jungseok Lee <jungseoklee85@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Replaced the use of a Variable Length Array In Struct (VLAIS) with a C99
compliant equivalent. This patch allocates the appropriate amount of memory
using a char array using the SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK macro.
The new code can be compiled with both gcc and clang.
Signed-off-by: Jan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Charlebois <charlebm@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: pageexec@freemail.hu
Tilman Schmidt