The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined
reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP:
security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot':
security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type
security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This patch adds the following structure:
struct netlink_kernel_cfg {
unsigned int groups;
void (*input)(struct sk_buff *skb);
struct mutex *cb_mutex;
};
That can be passed to netlink_kernel_create to set optional configurations
for netlink kernel sockets.
I've populated this structure by looking for NULL and zero parameters at the
existing code. The remaining parameters that always need to be set are still
left in the original interface.
That includes optional parameters for the netlink socket creation. This allows
easy extensibility of this interface in the future.
This patch also adapts all callers to use this new interface.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is a cleanup. Use NFPROTO_* for consistency with other
netfilter code.
Signed-off-by: Alban Crequy <alban.crequy@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier.martinez@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Sanders <vincent.sanders@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Pull vfs changes from Al Viro.
"A lot of misc stuff. The obvious groups:
* Miklos' atomic_open series; kills the damn abuse of
->d_revalidate() by NFS, which was the major stumbling block for
all work in that area.
* ripping security_file_mmap() and dealing with deadlocks in the
area; sanitizing the neighborhood of vm_mmap()/vm_munmap() in
general.
* ->encode_fh() switched to saner API; insane fake dentry in
mm/cleancache.c gone.
* assorted annotations in fs (endianness, __user)
* parts of Artem's ->s_dirty work (jff2 and reiserfs parts)
* ->update_time() work from Josef.
* other bits and pieces all over the place.
Normally it would've been in two or three pull requests, but
signal.git stuff had eaten a lot of time during this cycle ;-/"
Fix up trivial conflicts in Documentation/filesystems/vfs.txt (the
'truncate_range' inode method was removed by the VM changes, the VFS
update adds an 'update_time()' method), and in fs/btrfs/ulist.[ch] (due
to sparse fix added twice, with other changes nearby).
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (95 commits)
nfs: don't open in ->d_revalidate
vfs: retry last component if opening stale dentry
vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): don't throw away file on error
vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): inline __dentry_open()
vfs: do_dentry_open(): don't put filp
vfs: split __dentry_open()
vfs: do_last() common post lookup
vfs: do_last(): add audit_inode before open
vfs: do_last(): only return EISDIR for O_CREAT
vfs: do_last(): check LOOKUP_DIRECTORY
vfs: do_last(): make ENOENT exit RCU safe
vfs: make follow_link check RCU safe
vfs: do_last(): use inode variable
vfs: do_last(): inline walk_component()
vfs: do_last(): make exit RCU safe
vfs: split do_lookup()
Btrfs: move over to use ->update_time
fs: introduce inode operation ->update_time
reiserfs: get rid of resierfs_sync_super
reiserfs: mark the superblock as dirty a bit later
...
Pull second pile of signal handling patches from Al Viro:
"This one is just task_work_add() series + remaining prereqs for it.
There probably will be another pull request from that tree this
cycle - at least for helpers, to get them out of the way for per-arch
fixes remaining in the tree."
Fix trivial conflict in kernel/irq/manage.c: the merge of Andrew's pile
had brought in commit 97fd75b7b8 ("kernel/irq/manage.c: use the
pr_foo() infrastructure to prefix printks") which changed one of the
pr_err() calls that this merge moves around.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal:
keys: kill task_struct->replacement_session_keyring
keys: kill the dummy key_replace_session_keyring()
keys: change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add()
genirq: reimplement exit_irq_thread() hook via task_work_add()
task_work_add: generic process-context callbacks
avr32: missed _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME on one of do_notify_resume callers
parisc: need to check NOTIFY_RESUME when exiting from syscall
move key_repace_session_keyring() into tracehook_notify_resume()
TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME is defined on all targets now
A cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector after
changes made to support CMA in an earlier patch.
Rather than having an additional check_access parameter to these
functions, the first paramater type is overloaded to allow the caller to
specify CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY which means check that the contents of the iovec
are valid, but do not check the memory that they point to. This is used
by process_vm_readv/writev where we need to validate that a iovec passed
to the syscall is valid but do not want to check the memory that it points
to at this point because it refers to an address space in another process.
Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Both kernel/sys.c && security/keys/request_key.c where inlining the exact
same code as call_usermodehelper_fns(); So simply convert these sites to
directly use call_usermodehelper_fns().
Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This allocation may be large. The code is probing to see if it will
succeed and if not, it falls back to vmalloc(). We should suppress any
page-allocation failure messages when the fallback happens.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
a) %d does _not_ produce a page worth of output
b) snprintf() doesn't return negatives - it used to in old glibc, but
that's the kernel...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix some sparse warnings in the keyrings code:
(1) compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() should be static.
(2) There were a couple of places where a pointer was being compared against
integer 0 rather than NULL.
(3) keyctl_instantiate_key_common() should not take a __user-labelled iovec
pointer as the caller must have copied the iovec to kernel space.
(4) __key_link_begin() takes and __key_link_end() releases
keyring_serialise_link_sem under some circumstances and so this should be
declared.
Note that adding __acquires() and __releases() for this doesn't help cure
the warnings messages - something only commenting out both helps.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add() and move
key_replace_session_keyring() logic into task_work->func().
Note that we do task_work_cancel() before task_work_add() to ensure that
only one work can be pending at any time. This is important, we must not
allow user-space to abuse the parent's ->task_works list.
The callback, replace_session_keyring(), checks PF_EXITING. I guess this
is not really needed but looks better.
As a side effect, this fixes the (unlikely) race. The callers of
key_replace_session_keyring() and keyctl_session_to_parent() lack the
necessary barriers, the parent can miss the request.
Now we can remove task_struct->replacement_session_keyring and related
code.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
"This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
implementation.
Highlights:
- Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.
- Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.
- All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add
an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
uids remains the same.
- With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
better than it is today.
- For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
operationally with the user namespace enabled.
- The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
164ns per stat operation).
- (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
entertaining failures in userspace.
- If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
handle the case where setuid fails.
- If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS
experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
can't map.
- Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
userns: Silence silly gcc warning.
cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
...
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
"cgroup file type addition / removal is updated so that file types are
added and removed instead of individual files so that dynamic file
type addition / removal can be implemented by cgroup and used by
controllers. blkio controller changes which will come through block
tree are dependent on this. Other changes include res_counter cleanup
and disallowing kthread / PF_THREAD_BOUND threads to be attached to
non-root cgroups.
There's a reported bug with the file type addition / removal handling
which can lead to oops on cgroup umount. The issue is being looked
into. It shouldn't cause problems for most setups and isn't a
security concern."
Fix up trivial conflict in Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt
* 'for-3.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (21 commits)
res_counter: Account max_usage when calling res_counter_charge_nofail()
res_counter: Merge res_counter_charge and res_counter_charge_nofail
cgroups: disallow attaching kthreadd or PF_THREAD_BOUND threads
cgroup: remove cgroup_subsys->populate()
cgroup: get rid of populate for memcg
cgroup: pass struct mem_cgroup instead of struct cgroup to socket memcg
cgroup: make css->refcnt clearing on cgroup removal optional
cgroup: use negative bias on css->refcnt to block css_tryget()
cgroup: implement cgroup_rm_cftypes()
cgroup: introduce struct cfent
cgroup: relocate __d_cgrp() and __d_cft()
cgroup: remove cgroup_add_file[s]()
cgroup: convert memcg controller to the new cftype interface
memcg: always create memsw files if CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR_SWAP
cgroup: convert all non-memcg controllers to the new cftype interface
cgroup: relocate cftype and cgroup_subsys definitions in controllers
cgroup: merge cft_release_agent cftype array into the base files array
cgroup: implement cgroup_add_cftypes() and friends
cgroup: build list of all cgroups under a given cgroupfs_root
cgroup: move cgroup_clear_directory() call out of cgroup_populate_dir()
...
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"New notable features:
- The seccomp work from Will Drewry
- PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski
- Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler
- Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook"
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path
apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined
ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name
KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()
Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
Smack: recursive tramsmute
Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .
KEYS: Add invalidation support
KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list
KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction
KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration
KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile
KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig
KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat
Yama: remove an unused variable
samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros
Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
...
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/955892
All failures from __d_path where being treated as disconnected paths,
however __d_path can also fail when the generated pathname is too long.
The initial ENAMETOOLONG error was being lost, and ENAMETOOLONG was only
returned if the subsequent dentry_path call resulted in that error. Other
wise if the path was split across a mount point such that the dentry_path
fit within the buffer when the __d_path did not the failure was treated
as a disconnected path.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/978038
also affects apparmor portion of
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/987371
The unconfined profile is not stored in the regular profile list, but
change_profile and exec transitions may want access to it when setting
up specialized transitions like switch to the unconfined profile of a
new policy namespace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When IMA was first upstreamed, the bprm filename and interp were
always the same. Currently, the bprm->filename and bprm->interp
are the same, except for when only bprm->interp contains the
interpreter name. So instead of using the bprm->filename as
the IMA filename hint in the measurement list, we could replace
it with bprm->interp, but this feels too fragil.
The following patch is not much better, but at least there is some
indication that sometimes we're passing the filename and other times
the interpreter name.
Reported-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Don't bother checking for NULL key pointer in key_validate() as all of the
places that call it will crash anyway if the relevant key pointer is NULL by
the time they call key_validate(). Therefore, the checking must be done prior
to calling here.
Whilst we're at it, simplify the key_validate() function a bit and mark its
argument const.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
V4 updated to current linux-security#next
Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Modern application runtime environments like to use
naming schemes that are structured and generated without
human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23
characters for a label name is perfectly rational for
human use there have been complaints that the limit is
a problem in environments where names are composed from
a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution
channel and application name. Names like
softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats
are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long
label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255
characters instead of the old 23.
The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters
was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets.
This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too
large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication
that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination
between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label
names consistent.
The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating
administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be
changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones
have been introduced.
The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed
and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO
header is now computed when a label is imported rather than
on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack
label is now allocated separately from the containing structure,
allowing for larger strings.
Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four
of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified
in fixed length arrays.
The access interface is supplemented with the check interface:
access "Subject Object rwxat"
access2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface:
load "Subject Object rwxat"
load2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface:
load-self "Subject Object rwxat"
load-self2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface:
cipso "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Dave Chinner wrote:
> Yes, because you have no idea what the calling context is except
> for the fact that is from somewhere inside filesystem code and the
> filesystem could be holding locks. Therefore, GFP_NOFS is really the
> only really safe way to allocate memory here.
I see. Thank you.
I'm not sure, but can call trace happen where somewhere inside network
filesystem or stackable filesystem code with locks held invokes operations that
involves GFP_KENREL memory allocation outside that filesystem?
----------
[PATCH] SMACK: Fix incorrect GFP_KERNEL usage.
new_inode_smack() which can be called from smack_inode_alloc_security() needs
to use GFP_NOFS like SELinux's inode_alloc_security() does, for
security_inode_alloc() is called from inode_init_always() and
inode_init_always() is called from xfs_inode_alloc() which is using GFP_NOFS.
smack_inode_init_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like
selinux_inode_init_security() does, for initxattrs() callback function (e.g.
btrfs_initxattrs()) which is called from security_inode_init_security() is
using GFP_NOFS.
smack_audit_rule_match() needs to use GFP_ATOMIC, for
security_audit_rule_match() can be called from audit_filter_user_rules() and
audit_filter_user_rules() is called from audit_filter_user() with RCU read lock
held.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
The transmuting directory feature of Smack requires that
the transmuting attribute be explicitly set in all cases.
It seems the users of this facility would expect that the
transmuting attribute be inherited by subdirectories that
are created in a transmuting directory. This does not seem
to add any additional complexity to the understanding of
how the system works.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
When checking capabilities, the question we want to be asking is "does
current() have the capability in the child's namespace?"
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The pathname of /usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy seen from Ubuntu 12.04 Live CD is
squashfs:/usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy rather than /usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy .
Therefore, we need to accept manager programs which do not start with / .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add support for invalidating a key - which renders it immediately invisible to
further searches and causes the garbage collector to immediately wake up,
remove it from keyrings and then destroy it when it's no longer referenced.
It's better not to do this with keyctl_revoke() as that marks the key to start
returning -EKEYREVOKED to searches when what is actually desired is to have the
key refetched.
To invalidate a key the caller must be granted SEARCH permission by the key.
This may be too strict. It may be better to also permit invalidation if the
caller has any of READ, WRITE or SETATTR permission.
The primary use for this is to evict keys that are cached in special keyrings,
such as the DNS resolver or an ID mapper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Do an LRU discard in keyrings that are full rather than returning ENFILE. To
perform this, a time_t is added to the key struct and updated by the creation
of a link to a key and by a key being found as the result of a search. At the
completion of a successful search, the keyrings in the path between the root of
the search and the first found link to it also have their last-used times
updated.
Note that discarding a link to a key from a keyring does not necessarily
destroy the key as there may be references held by other places.
An alternate discard method that might suffice is to perform FIFO discard from
the keyring, using the spare 2-byte hole in the keylist header as the index of
the next link to be discarded.
This is useful when using a keyring as a cache for DNS results or foreign
filesystem IDs.
This can be tested by the following. As root do:
echo 1000 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
kr=`keyctl newring foo @s`
for ((i=0; i<2000; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a $kr; done
Without this patch ENFILE should be reported when the keyring fills up. With
this patch, the keyring discards keys in an LRU fashion. Note that the stored
LRU time has a granularity of 1s.
After doing this, /proc/key-users can be observed and should show that most of
the 2000 keys have been discarded:
[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/key-users
0: 517 516/516 513/1000 5249/20000
The "513/1000" here is the number of quota-accounted keys present for this user
out of the maximum permitted.
In /proc/keys, the keyring shows the number of keys it has and the number of
slots it has allocated:
[root@andromeda ~]# grep foo /proc/keys
200c64c4 I--Q-- 1 perm 3b3f0000 0 0 keyring foo: 509/509
The maximum is (PAGE_SIZE - header) / key pointer size. That's typically 509
on a 64-bit system and 1020 on a 32-bit system.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Make use of the previous patch that makes the garbage collector perform RCU
synchronisation before destroying defunct keys. Key pointers can now be
replaced in-place without creating a new keyring payload and replacing the
whole thing as the discarded keys will not be destroyed until all currently
held RCU read locks are released.
If the keyring payload space needs to be expanded or contracted, then a
replacement will still need allocating, and the original will still have to be
freed by RCU.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Make the keys garbage collector invoke synchronize_rcu() prior to destroying
keys with a zero usage count. This means that a key can be examined under the
RCU read lock in the safe knowledge that it won't get deallocated until after
the lock is released - even if its usage count becomes zero whilst we're
looking at it.
This is useful in keyring search vs key link. Consider a keyring containing a
link to a key. That link can be replaced in-place in the keyring without
requiring an RCU copy-and-replace on the keyring contents without breaking a
search underway on that keyring when the displaced key is released, provided
the key is actually destroyed only after the RCU read lock held by the search
algorithm is released.
This permits __key_link() to replace a key without having to reallocate the key
payload. A key gets replaced if a new key being linked into a keyring has the
same type and description.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Announce the (un)registration of a key type in the core key code rather than
in the callers.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Reorganise the keys directory Makefile to put all the core bits together and
the type-specific bits after.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
This patch removes ip_queue support which was marked as obsolete
years ago. The nfnetlink_queue modules provides more advanced
user-space packet queueing mechanism.
This patch also removes capability code included in SELinux that
refers to ip_queue. Otherwise, we break compilation.
Several warning has been sent regarding this to the mailing list
in the past month without anyone rising the hand to stop this
with some strong argument.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Merge tag 'v3.4-rc5' into next
Linux 3.4-rc5
Merge to pull in prerequisite change for Smack:
86812bb0de
Requested by Casey.
- Use uid_eq when comparing kuids
Use gid_eq when comparing kgids
- Use make_kuid(user_ns, 0) to talk about the user_namespace root uid
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users
of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make
in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and
CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile
and behave correctly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
As a first step to converting struct cred to be all kuid_t and kgid_t
values convert the group values stored in group_info to always be
kgid_t values. Unless user namespaces are used this change should
have no effect.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Transform userns->creator from a user_struct reference to a simple
kuid_t, kgid_t pair.
In cap_capable this allows the check to see if we are the creator of
a namespace to become the classic suser style euid permission check.
This allows us to remove the need for a struct cred in the mapping
functions and still be able to dispaly the user namespace creators
uid and gid as 0.
- Remove the now unnecessary delayed_work in free_user_ns.
All that is left for free_user_ns to do is to call kmem_cache_free
and put_user_ns. Those functions can be called in any context
so call them directly from free_user_ns removing the need for delayed work.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
GCC complains that we don't use "one" any more after 389da25f93 "Yama:
add additional ptrace scopes".
security/yama/yama_lsm.c:322:12: warning: ?one? defined but not used
[-Wunused-variable]
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This expands the available Yama ptrace restrictions to include two more
modes. Mode 2 requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE for PTRACE_ATTACH, and mode 3
completely disables PTRACE_ATTACH (and locks the sysctl).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add missing "personality.h"
security/commoncap.c: In function 'cap_bprm_set_creds':
security/commoncap.c:510: error: 'PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/commoncap.c:510: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
security/commoncap.c:510: error: for each function it appears in.)
Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi <jhbird.choi@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
A kernel with Smack enabled will fail if tmpfs has xattr support.
Move the initialization of predefined Smack label
list entries to the LSM initialization from the
smackfs setup. This became an issue when tmpfs
acquired xattr support, but was never correct.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add support for AppArmor to explicitly fail requested domain transitions
if NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and the task is not unconfined.
Transitions from unconfined are still allowed because this always results
in a reduction of privileges.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
v18: new acked-by, new description
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This fixes builds where CONFIG_AUDIT is not defined and
CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK=y.
This got introduced by the stack-usage reducation commit 48c62af68a
("LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union").
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
avc_add_callback now just used for registering reset functions
in initcalls, and the callback functions just did reset operations.
So, reducing the arguments to only one event is enough now.
Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
avc_add_callback now only called from initcalls, so replace the
weak GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL, and mark this function __init
to make a warning when not been called from initcalls.
Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We no longer need the distinction. We only need data after we decide to do an
audit. So turn the "late" audit data into just "data" and remove what we
currently have as "data".
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles?
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We did a lot of work to shrink the common_audit_data. Add a BUILD_BUG_ON
so future programers (let's be honest, probably me) won't do something
foolish like make it large again!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
There are no legitimate users. Always use current and get back some stack
space for the common_audit_data.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
apparmor is the only LSM that uses the common_audit_data tsk field.
Instead of making all LSMs pay for the stack space move the aa usage into
the apparmor_audit_data.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
selinux_inode_has_perm is a hot path. Instead of declaring the
common_audit_data on the stack move it to a noinline function only used in
the rare case we need to send an audit message.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data.
Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit
message there is little need to set it up in the hot path. This patch
splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(),
avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit(). But we take care of setting
up to audit between required() and the actual audit call. Thus saving
measurable time in a hot path.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the
number of entries in these arrays to 0. If we error out and then get back
into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief
that they are non-zero length.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
cc: stable@kernel.org
I'm not really sure what the idea behind the sel_div function is, but it's
useless. Since a and b are both unsigned, it's impossible for a % b < 0.
That means that part of the function never does anything. Thus it's just a
normal /. Just do that instead. I don't even understand what that operation
was supposed to mean in the signed case however....
If it was signed:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((-2 / 4) - ((-2 % 4) < 0))
((0) - ((-2) < 0))
((0) - (1))
(-1)
What actually happens:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((18446744073709551614 / 4) - ((18446744073709551614 % 4) < 0))
((4611686018427387903) - ((2 < 0))
(4611686018427387903 - 0)
((unsigned int)4611686018427387903)
(4294967295)
Neither makes a whole ton of sense to me. So I'm getting rid of the
function entirely.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It's possible that the caller passed a NULL for scontext. However if this
is a defered mapping we might still attempt to call *scontext=kstrdup().
This is bad. Instead just return the len.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We know that some yum operation is causing CAP_MAC_ADMIN failures. This
implies that an RPM is laying down (or attempting to lay down) a file with
an invalid label. The problem is that we don't have any information to
track down the cause. This patch will cause such a failure to report the
failed label in an SELINUX_ERR audit message. This is similar to the
SELINUX_ERR reports on invalid transitions and things like that. It should
help run down problems on what is trying to set invalid labels in the
future.
Resulting records look something like:
type=AVC msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): avc: denied { mac_admin } for pid=2594 comm="chcon" capability=33 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=capability2
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): op=setxattr invalid_context=unconfined_u:object_r:hello:s0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): arch=c000003e syscall=188 success=no exit=-22 a0=a2c0e0 a1=390341b79b a2=a2d620 a3=1f items=1 ppid=2519 pid=2594 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="chcon" exe="/usr/bin/chcon" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=CWD msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): cwd="/root" type=PATH msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): item=0 name="test" inode=785879 dev=fc:03 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In RH BZ 578841 we realized that the SELinux sandbox program was allowed to
truncate files outside of the sandbox. The reason is because sandbox
confinement is determined almost entirely by the 'open' permission. The idea
was that if the sandbox was unable to open() files it would be unable to do
harm to those files. This turns out to be false in light of syscalls like
truncate() and chmod() which don't require a previous open() call. I looked
at the syscalls that did not have an associated 'open' check and found that
truncate(), did not have a seperate permission and even if it did have a
separate permission such a permission owuld be inadequate for use by
sandbox (since it owuld have to be granted so liberally as to be useless).
This patch checks the OPEN permission on truncate. I think a better solution
for sandbox is a whole new permission, but at least this fixes what we have
today.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Because Fedora shipped userspace based on my development tree we now
have policy version 27 in the wild defining only default user, role, and
range. Thus to add default_type we need a policy.28.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to
determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or
mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This
patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role,
and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either
the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can
either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or
it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file)
examples always are done with
directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512
process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
[no rule]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none
[default user source]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source
[default user target]
system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target
[default role source]
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source
[default role target]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target
[default range source low]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low
[default range source high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high
[default range source low-high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high
[default range target low]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low
[default range target high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high
[default range target low-high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
There is no reason the DAC perms on reading the policy file need to be root
only. There are selinux checks which should control this access.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
I am about to remove the struct user_namespace reference from struct user_struct.
So keep an explicit track of the parent user namespace.
Take advantage of this new reference and replace instances of user_ns->creator->user_ns
with user_ns->parent.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference
so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete
with reference counting.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Optimize performance and prepare for the removal of the user_ns reference
from user_struct. Remove the slow long walk through cred->user->user_ns and
instead go straight to cred->user_ns.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.
So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Instead of declaring the entire selinux_audit_data on the stack when we
start an operation on declare it on the stack if we are going to use it.
We know it's usefulness at the end of the security decision and can declare
it there.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Convert debug, freezer, cpuset, cpu_cgroup, cpuacct, net_prio, blkio,
net_cls and device controllers to use the new cftype based interface.
Termination entry is added to cftype arrays and populate callbacks are
replaced with cgroup_subsys->base_cftypes initializations.
This is functionally identical transformation. There shouldn't be any
visible behavior change.
memcg is rather special and will be converted separately.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <paul@paulmenage.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Pull second try at vfs part d#2 from Al Viro:
"Miklos' first series (with do_lookup() rewrite split into edible
chunks) + assorted bits and pieces.
The 'untangling of do_lookup()' series is is a splitup of what used to
be a monolithic patch from Miklos, so this series is basically "how do
I convince myself that his patch is correct (or find a hole in it)".
No holes found and I like the resulting cleanup, so in it went..."
Changes from try 1: Fix a boot problem with selinux, and commit messages
prettied up a bit.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (24 commits)
vfs: fix out-of-date dentry_unhash() comment
vfs: split __lookup_hash
untangling do_lookup() - take __lookup_hash()-calling case out of line.
untangling do_lookup() - switch to calling __lookup_hash()
untangling do_lookup() - merge d_alloc_and_lookup() callers
untangling do_lookup() - merge failure exits in !dentry case
untangling do_lookup() - massage !dentry case towards __lookup_hash()
untangling do_lookup() - get rid of need_reval in !dentry case
untangling do_lookup() - eliminate a loop.
untangling do_lookup() - expand the area under ->i_mutex
untangling do_lookup() - isolate !dentry stuff from the rest of it.
vfs: move MAY_EXEC check from __lookup_hash()
vfs: don't revalidate just looked up dentry
vfs: fix d_need_lookup/d_revalidate order in do_lookup
ext3: move headers to fs/ext3/
migrate ext2_fs.h guts to fs/ext2/ext2.h
new helper: ext2_image_size()
get rid of pointless includes of ext2_fs.h
ext2: No longer export ext2_fs.h to user space
mtdchar: kill persistently held vfsmount
...
Now that all the slow-path code is gone from these functions, we can
inline them into the main caller - avc_has_perm_flags().
Now the compiler can see that 'avc' is allocated on the stack for this
case, which helps register pressure a bit. It also actually shrinks the
total stack frame, because the stack frame that avc_has_perm_flags()
always needed (for that 'avc' allocation) is now sufficient for the
inlined functions too.
Inlining isn't bad - but mindless inlining of cold code (see the
previous commit) is.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The selinux AVC paths remain some of the hottest (and deepest) codepaths
at filename lookup time, and we make it worse by having the slow path
cases take up I$ and stack space even when they don't trigger. Gcc
tends to always want to inline functions that are just called once -
never mind that this might make for slower and worse code in the caller.
So this tries to improve on it a bit by making the slow-path cases
explicitly separate functions that are marked noinline, causing gcc to
at least no longer allocate stack space for them unless they are
actually called. It also seems to help register allocation a tiny bit,
since gcc now doesn't take the slow case code into account.
Uninlining the slow path may also allow us to inline the remaining hot
path into the one caller that actually matters: avc_has_perm_flags().
I'll have to look at that separately, but both avc_audit() and
avc_has_perm_noaudit() are now small and lean enough that inlining them
may make sense.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86:
32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel
syscalls.
This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address
space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address
space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc."
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c}
* 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo
x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format
x32: Add ptrace for x32
x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t
x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates
x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls
x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect
x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old
x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once
x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks
fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally
fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable
x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO
x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code
x32: Add x32 VDSO support
x32: Allow x32 to be configured
x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables
x32: Handle process creation
x32: Signal-related system calls
x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h>
...
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Merge tag 'split-asm_system_h-for-linus-20120328' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-asm_system
Pull "Disintegrate and delete asm/system.h" from David Howells:
"Here are a bunch of patches to disintegrate asm/system.h into a set of
separate bits to relieve the problem of circular inclusion
dependencies.
I've built all the working defconfigs from all the arches that I can
and made sure that they don't break.
The reason for these patches is that I recently encountered a circular
dependency problem that came about when I produced some patches to
optimise get_order() by rewriting it to use ilog2().
This uses bitops - and on the SH arch asm/bitops.h drags in
asm-generic/get_order.h by a circuituous route involving asm/system.h.
The main difficulty seems to be asm/system.h. It holds a number of
low level bits with no/few dependencies that are commonly used (eg.
memory barriers) and a number of bits with more dependencies that
aren't used in many places (eg. switch_to()).
These patches break asm/system.h up into the following core pieces:
(1) asm/barrier.h
Move memory barriers here. This already done for MIPS and Alpha.
(2) asm/switch_to.h
Move switch_to() and related stuff here.
(3) asm/exec.h
Move arch_align_stack() here. Other process execution related bits
could perhaps go here from asm/processor.h.
(4) asm/cmpxchg.h
Move xchg() and cmpxchg() here as they're full word atomic ops and
frequently used by atomic_xchg() and atomic_cmpxchg().
(5) asm/bug.h
Move die() and related bits.
(6) asm/auxvec.h
Move AT_VECTOR_SIZE_ARCH here.
Other arch headers are created as needed on a per-arch basis."
Fixed up some conflicts from other header file cleanups and moving code
around that has happened in the meantime, so David's testing is somewhat
weakened by that. We'll find out anything that got broken and fix it..
* tag 'split-asm_system_h-for-linus-20120328' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-asm_system: (38 commits)
Delete all instances of asm/system.h
Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h
Add #includes needed to permit the removal of asm/system.h
Move all declarations of free_initmem() to linux/mm.h
Disintegrate asm/system.h for OpenRISC
Split arch_align_stack() out from asm-generic/system.h
Split the switch_to() wrapper out of asm-generic/system.h
Move the asm-generic/system.h xchg() implementation to asm-generic/cmpxchg.h
Create asm-generic/barrier.h
Make asm-generic/cmpxchg.h #include asm-generic/cmpxchg-local.h
Disintegrate asm/system.h for Xtensa
Disintegrate asm/system.h for Unicore32 [based on ver #3, changed by gxt]
Disintegrate asm/system.h for Tile
Disintegrate asm/system.h for Sparc
Disintegrate asm/system.h for SH
Disintegrate asm/system.h for Score
Disintegrate asm/system.h for S390
Disintegrate asm/system.h for PowerPC
Disintegrate asm/system.h for PA-RISC
Disintegrate asm/system.h for MN10300
...
Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing
it. Performed with the following command:
perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>' *`
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fix failure in aa_change_onexec api when the request is made from a confined
task. This failure was caused by two problems
The AA_MAY_ONEXEC perm was not being mapped correctly for this case.
The executable name was being checked as second time instead of using the
requested onexec profile name, which may not be the same as the exec
profile name. This mistake can not be exploited to grant extra permission
because of the above flaw where the ONEXEC permission was not being mapped
so it will not be granted.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/963756
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
selinux/xfrm.h needs to #include net/flow.h or else suffer:
In file included from security/selinux/ss/services.c:69:0:
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h: In function 'selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload':
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: error: 'flow_cache_genid' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
No functional changes. It is not sane to use UMH_KILLABLE with enum
umh_wait, but obviously we do not want another argument in
call_usermodehelper_* helpers. Kill this enum, use the plain int.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
New features include:
- Add NFS client support for containers.
This should enable most of the necessary functionality, including
lockd support, and support for rpc.statd, NFSv4 idmapper and
RPCSEC_GSS upcalls into the correct network namespace from
which the mount system call was issued.
- NFSv4 idmapper scalability improvements
Base the idmapper cache on the keyring interface to allow concurrent
access to idmapper entries. Start the process of migrating users from
the single-threaded daemon-based approach to the multi-threaded
request-key based approach.
- NFSv4.1 implementation id.
Allows the NFSv4.1 client and server to mutually identify each other
for logging and debugging purposes.
- Support the 'vers=4.1' mount option for mounting NFSv4.1 instead of
having to use the more counterintuitive 'vers=4,minorversion=1'.
- SUNRPC tracepoints.
Start the process of adding tracepoints in order to improve debugging
of the RPC layer.
- pNFS object layout support for autologin.
Important bugfixes include:
- Fix a bug in rpc_wake_up/rpc_wake_up_status that caused them to fail
to wake up all tasks when applied to priority waitqueues.
- Ensure that we handle read delegations correctly, when we try to
truncate a file.
- A number of fixes for NFSv4 state manager loops (mostly to do with
delegation recovery).
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.4-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull NFS client updates for Linux 3.4 from Trond Myklebust:
"New features include:
- Add NFS client support for containers.
This should enable most of the necessary functionality, including
lockd support, and support for rpc.statd, NFSv4 idmapper and
RPCSEC_GSS upcalls into the correct network namespace from which
the mount system call was issued.
- NFSv4 idmapper scalability improvements
Base the idmapper cache on the keyring interface to allow
concurrent access to idmapper entries. Start the process of
migrating users from the single-threaded daemon-based approach to
the multi-threaded request-key based approach.
- NFSv4.1 implementation id.
Allows the NFSv4.1 client and server to mutually identify each
other for logging and debugging purposes.
- Support the 'vers=4.1' mount option for mounting NFSv4.1 instead of
having to use the more counterintuitive 'vers=4,minorversion=1'.
- SUNRPC tracepoints.
Start the process of adding tracepoints in order to improve
debugging of the RPC layer.
- pNFS object layout support for autologin.
Important bugfixes include:
- Fix a bug in rpc_wake_up/rpc_wake_up_status that caused them to
fail to wake up all tasks when applied to priority waitqueues.
- Ensure that we handle read delegations correctly, when we try to
truncate a file.
- A number of fixes for NFSv4 state manager loops (mostly to do with
delegation recovery)."
* tag 'nfs-for-3.4-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (224 commits)
NFS: fix sb->s_id in nfs debug prints
xprtrdma: Remove assumption that each segment is <= PAGE_SIZE
xprtrdma: The transport should not bug-check when a dup reply is received
pnfs-obj: autologin: Add support for protocol autologin
NFS: Remove nfs4_setup_sequence from generic rename code
NFS: Remove nfs4_setup_sequence from generic unlink code
NFS: Remove nfs4_setup_sequence from generic read code
NFS: Remove nfs4_setup_sequence from generic write code
NFS: Fix more NFS debug related build warnings
SUNRPC/LOCKD: Fix build warnings when CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG is undefined
nfs: non void functions must return a value
SUNRPC: Kill compiler warning when RPC_DEBUG is unset
SUNRPC/NFS: Add Kbuild dependencies for NFS_DEBUG/RPC_DEBUG
NFS: Use cond_resched_lock() to reduce latencies in the commit scans
NFSv4: It is not safe to dereference lsp->ls_state in release_lockowner
NFS: ncommit count is being double decremented
SUNRPC: We must not use list_for_each_entry_safe() in rpc_wake_up()
Try using machine credentials for RENEW calls
NFSv4.1: Fix a few issues in filelayout_commit_pagelist
NFSv4.1: Clean ups and bugfixes for the pNFS read/writeback/commit code
...
avc_audit() did a lot of jumping around and had a big stack frame, all
for the uncommon case.
Split up the uncommon case (which we really can't make go fast anyway)
into its own slow function, and mark the conditional branches
appropriately for the common likely case.
This causes avc_audit() to no longer show up as one of the hottest
functions on the branch profiles (the new "perf -b" thing), and makes
the cycle profiles look really nice and dense too.
The whole audit path is still annoyingly very much one of the biggest
costs of name lookup, so these things are worth optimizing for. I wish
we could just tell people to turn it off, but realistically we do need
it: we just need to make sure that the overhead of the necessary evil is
as low as possible.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull vfs pile 1 from Al Viro:
"This is _not_ all; in particular, Miklos' and Jan's stuff is not there
yet."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (64 commits)
ext4: initialization of ext4_li_mtx needs to be done earlier
debugfs-related mode_t whack-a-mole
hfsplus: add an ioctl to bless files
hfsplus: change finder_info to u32
hfsplus: initialise userflags
qnx4: new helper - try_extent()
qnx4: get rid of qnx4_bread/qnx4_getblk
take removal of PF_FORKNOEXEC to flush_old_exec()
trim includes in inode.c
um: uml_dup_mmap() relies on ->mmap_sem being held, but activate_mm() doesn't hold it
um: embed ->stub_pages[] into mmu_context
gadgetfs: list_for_each_safe() misuse
ocfs2: fix leaks on failure exits in module_init
ecryptfs: make register_filesystem() the last potential failure exit
ntfs: forgets to unregister sysctls on register_filesystem() failure
logfs: missing cleanup on register_filesystem() failure
jfs: mising cleanup on register_filesystem() failure
make configfs_pin_fs() return root dentry on success
configfs: configfs_create_dir() has parent dentry in dentry->d_parent
configfs: sanitize configfs_create()
...
Pull security subsystem updates for 3.4 from James Morris:
"The main addition here is the new Yama security module from Kees Cook,
which was discussed at the Linux Security Summit last year. Its
purpose is to collect miscellaneous DAC security enhancements in one
place. This also marks a departure in policy for LSM modules, which
were previously limited to being standalone access control systems.
Chromium OS is using Yama, and I believe there are plans for Ubuntu,
at least.
This patchset also includes maintenance updates for AppArmor, TOMOYO
and others."
Fix trivial conflict in <net/sock.h> due to the jumo_label->static_key
rename.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
AppArmor: Fix location of const qualifier on generated string tables
TOMOYO: Return error if fails to delete a domain
AppArmor: add const qualifiers to string arrays
AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy
TOMOYO: Return appropriate value to poll().
AppArmor: Move path failure information into aa_get_name and rename
AppArmor: Update dfa matching routines.
AppArmor: Minor cleanup of d_namespace_path to consolidate error handling
AppArmor: Retrieve the dentry_path for error reporting when path lookup fails
AppArmor: Add const qualifiers to generated string tables
AppArmor: Fix oops in policy unpack auditing
AppArmor: Fix error returned when a path lookup is disconnected
KEYS: testing wrong bit for KEY_FLAG_REVOKED
TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.
security: fix ima kconfig warning
AppArmor: Fix the error case for chroot relative path name lookup
AppArmor: fix mapping of META_READ to audit and quiet flags
AppArmor: Fix underflow in xindex calculation
AppArmor: Fix dropping of allowed operations that are force audited
AppArmor: Add mising end of structure test to caps unpacking
...
Pull kmap_atomic cleanup from Cong Wang.
It's been in -next for a long time, and it gets rid of the (no longer
used) second argument to k[un]map_atomic().
Fix up a few trivial conflicts in various drivers, and do an "evil
merge" to catch some new uses that have come in since Cong's tree.
* 'kmap_atomic' of git://github.com/congwang/linux: (59 commits)
feature-removal-schedule.txt: schedule the deprecated form of kmap_atomic() for removal
highmem: kill all __kmap_atomic() [swarren@nvidia.com: highmem: Fix ARM build break due to __kmap_atomic rename]
drbd: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
zcache: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
gma500: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
dm: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
tomoyo: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
sunrpc: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
rds: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
net: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
mm: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
lib: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
power: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
kdb: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
udf: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
ubifs: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
squashfs: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
reiserfs: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
ocfs2: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
ntfs: remove the second argument of k[un]map_atomic()
...
Pull cgroup changes from Tejun Heo:
"Out of the 8 commits, one fixes a long-standing locking issue around
tasklist walking and others are cleanups."
* 'for-3.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
cgroup: Walk task list under tasklist_lock in cgroup_enable_task_cg_list
cgroup: Remove wrong comment on cgroup_enable_task_cg_list()
cgroup: remove cgroup_subsys argument from callbacks
cgroup: remove extra calls to find_existing_css_set
cgroup: replace tasklist_lock with rcu_read_lock
cgroup: simplify double-check locking in cgroup_attach_proc
cgroup: move struct cgroup_pidlist out from the header file
cgroup: remove cgroup_attach_task_current_cg()
Call sequence:
tomoyo_write_domain() --> tomoyo_delete_domain()
In 'tomoyo_delete_domain', return -EINTR if locking attempt is
interrupted by signal.
At present it returns success to its caller 'tomoyo_write_domain()'
even though domain is not deleted. 'tomoyo_write_domain()' assumes
domain is deleted and returns success to its caller. This is wrong behaviour.
'tomoyo_write_domain' should return error from tomoyo_delete_domain() to its
caller.
Signed-off-by: Santosh Nayak <santoshprasadnayak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add the base support for the new policy extensions. This does not bring
any additional functionality, or change current semantics.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
"struct file_operations"->poll() expects "unsigned int" return value.
All files in /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory other than
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query and /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit should
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM rather than -ENOSYS.
Also, /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query and /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit
should return POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM rather than 0 when there is no data to read.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Move the path name lookup failure messages into the main path name lookup
routine, as the information is useful in more than just aa_path_perm.
Also rename aa_get_name to aa_path_name as it is not getting a reference
counted object with a corresponding put fn.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Update aa_dfa_match so that it doesn't result in an input string being
walked twice (once to get its length and another time to match)
Add a single step functions
aa_dfa_next
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
When __d_path and d_absolute_path fail due to the name being outside of
the current namespace no name is reported. Use dentry_path to provide
some hint as to which file was being accessed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Post unpacking of policy a verification pass is made on x transition
indexes. When this fails a call to audit_iface is made resulting in an
oops, because audit_iface is expecting a valid buffer position but
since the failure comes from post unpack verification there is none.
Make the position argument optional so that audit_iface can be called
from post unpack verification.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The returning of -ESATLE when a path lookup fails as disconnected is wrong.
Since AppArmor is rejecting the access return -EACCES instead.
This also fixes a bug in complain (learning) mode where disconnected paths
are denied because -ESTALE errors are not ignored causing failures that
can change application behavior.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The test for "if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {"
should actually testing that the (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) bit is set.
The current code actually checks for KEY_FLAG_DEAD.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The keyctl_set_timeout function isn't exported to other parts of the
kernel, but I want to use it for the NFS idmapper. I already have the
key, but I wanted a generic way to set the timeout.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Userspace can pass in arbitrary combinations of MS_* flags to mount().
If both MS_BIND and one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE are
passed, device name which should be checked for MS_BIND was not checked because
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE had higher priority than MS_BIND.
If both one of MS_BIND/MS_MOVE and MS_REMOUNT are passed, device name which
should not be checked for MS_REMOUNT was checked because MS_BIND/MS_MOVE had
higher priority than MS_REMOUNT.
Fix these bugs by changing priority to MS_REMOUNT -> MS_BIND ->
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE -> MS_MOVE as with do_mount() does.
Also, unconditionally return -EINVAL if more than one of
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE is passed so that TOMOYO will not
generate inaccurate audit logs, for commit 7a2e8a8f "VFS: Sanity check mount
flags passed to change_mnt_propagation()" clarified that these flags must be
exclusively passed.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Fix IMA kconfig warning on non-X86 architectures:
warning: (IMA) selects TCG_TIS which has unmet direct dependencies
(TCG_TPM && X86)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When a chroot relative pathname lookup fails it is falling through to
do a d_absolute_path lookup. This is incorrect as d_absolute_path should
only be used to lookup names for namespace absolute paths.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
The mapping of AA_MAY_META_READ for the allow mask was also being mapped
to the audit and quiet masks. This would result in some operations being
audited when the should not.
This flaw was hidden by the previous audit bug which would drop some
messages that where supposed to be audited.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
If the xindex value stored in the accept tables is 0, the extraction of
that value will result in an underflow (0 - 4).
In properly compiled policy this should not happen for file rules but
it may be possible for other rule types in the future.
To exploit this underflow a user would have to be able to load a corrupt
policy, which requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN, overwrite system policy in kernel
memory or know of a compiler error resulting in the flaw being present
for loaded policy (no such flaw is known at this time).
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
The audit permission flag, that specifies an audit message should be
provided when an operation is allowed, was being ignored in some cases.
This is because the auto audit mode (which determines the audit mode from
system flags) was incorrectly assigned the same value as audit mode. The
shared value would result in messages that should be audited going through
a second evaluation as to whether they should be audited based on the
auto audit, resulting in some messages being dropped.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
The unpacking of struct capsx is missing a check for the end of the
caps structure. This can lead to unpack failures depending on what else
is packed into the policy file being unpacked.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Since the parser needs to know which rlimits are known to the kernel,
export the list via a mask file in the "rlimit" subdirectory in the
securityfs "features" directory.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Create the "file" directory in the securityfs for tracking features
related to files.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This adds the "features" subdirectory to the AppArmor securityfs
to display boolean features flags and the known capability mask.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Use a file tree structure to represent the AppArmor securityfs.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Replace the fd_sets in struct fdtable with an array of unsigned longs and then
use the standard non-atomic bit operations rather than the FD_* macros.
This:
(1) Removes the abuses of struct fd_set:
(a) Since we don't want to allocate a full fd_set the vast majority of the
time, we actually, in effect, just allocate a just-big-enough array of
unsigned longs and cast it to an fd_set type - so why bother with the
fd_set at all?
(b) Some places outside of the core fdtable handling code (such as
SELinux) want to look inside the array of unsigned longs hidden inside
the fd_set struct for more efficient iteration over the entire set.
(2) Eliminates the use of FD_*() macros in the kernel completely.
(3) Permits the __FD_*() macros to be deleted entirely where not exposed to
userspace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174954.23314.48147.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The audit res field ususally indicates success with a 1 and 0 for a
failure. So make IMA do it the same way.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
For a process to entirely disable Yama ptrace restrictions, it can use
the special PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY pid to indicate that any otherwise allowed
process may ptrace it. This is stronger than calling PR_SET_PTRACER with
pid "1" because it includes processes in external pid namespaces. This is
currently needed by the Chrome renderer, since its crash handler (Breakpad)
runs external to the renderer's pid namespace.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single function.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing
an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the
task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The argument is not used at all, and it's not necessary, because
a specific callback handler of course knows which subsys it
belongs to.
Now only ->pupulate() takes this argument, because the handlers of
this callback always call cgroup_add_file()/cgroup_add_files().
So we reduce a few lines of code, though the shrinking of object size
is minimal.
16 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-)
text data bss dec hex filename
5486240 656987 7039960 13183187 c928d3 vmlinux.o.orig
5486170 656987 7039960 13183117 c9288d vmlinux.o
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
* git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
CIFS: Rename *UCS* functions to *UTF16*
[CIFS] ACL and FSCACHE support no longer EXPERIMENTAL
[CIFS] Fix build break with multiuser patch when LANMAN disabled
cifs: warn about impending deprecation of legacy MultiuserMount code
cifs: fetch credentials out of keyring for non-krb5 auth multiuser mounts
cifs: sanitize username handling
keys: add a "logon" key type
cifs: lower default wsize when unix extensions are not used
cifs: better instrumentation for coalesce_t2
cifs: integer overflow in parse_dacl()
cifs: Fix sparse warning when calling cifs_strtoUCS
CIFS: Add descriptions to the brlock cache functions
Replace the rcu_assign_pointer() calls with rcu_assign_keypointer().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix ima_policy.c sparse "warning: dereference of noderef expression"
message, by accessing cred->uid using current_cred().
Changelog v1:
- Change __cred to just cred (based on David Howell's comment)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The kernel contains some special internal keyrings, for instance the DNS
resolver keyring :
2a93faf1 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .dns_resolver: empty
It would occasionally be useful to allow the contents of such keyrings to be
flushed by root (cache invalidation).
Allow a flag to be set on a keyring to mark that someone possessing the
sysadmin capability can clear the keyring, even without normal write access to
the keyring.
Set this flag on the special keyrings created by the DNS resolver, the NFS
identity mapper and the CIFS identity mapper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
For CIFS, we want to be able to store NTLM credentials (aka username
and password) in the keyring. We do not, however want to allow users
to fetch those keys back out of the keyring since that would be a
security risk.
Unfortunately, due to the nuances of key permission bits, it's not
possible to do this. We need to grant search permissions so the kernel
can find these keys, but that also implies permissions to read the
payload.
Resolve this by adding a new key_type. This key type is essentially
the same as key_type_user, but does not define a .read op. This
prevents the payload from ever being visible from userspace. This
key type also vets the description to ensure that it's "qualified"
by checking to ensure that it has a ':' in it that is preceded by
other characters.
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Paul Mundt