Commit Graph

258 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Peilin Ye f482aa9865 audit, io_uring, io-wq: Fix memory leak in io_sq_thread() and io_wqe_worker()
Currently @audit_context is allocated twice for io_uring workers:

  1. copy_process() calls audit_alloc();
  2. io_sq_thread() or io_wqe_worker() calls audit_alloc_kernel() (which
     is effectively audit_alloc()) and overwrites @audit_context,
     causing:

  BUG: memory leak
  unreferenced object 0xffff888144547400 (size 1024):
<...>
    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
      00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
      00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    backtrace:
      [<ffffffff8135cfc3>] audit_alloc+0x133/0x210
      [<ffffffff81239e63>] copy_process+0xcd3/0x2340
      [<ffffffff8123b5f3>] create_io_thread+0x63/0x90
      [<ffffffff81686604>] create_io_worker+0xb4/0x230
      [<ffffffff81686f68>] io_wqe_enqueue+0x248/0x3b0
      [<ffffffff8167663a>] io_queue_iowq+0xba/0x200
      [<ffffffff816768b3>] io_queue_async+0x113/0x180
      [<ffffffff816840df>] io_req_task_submit+0x18f/0x1a0
      [<ffffffff816841cd>] io_apoll_task_func+0xdd/0x120
      [<ffffffff8167d49f>] tctx_task_work+0x11f/0x570
      [<ffffffff81272c4e>] task_work_run+0x7e/0xc0
      [<ffffffff8125a688>] get_signal+0xc18/0xf10
      [<ffffffff8111645b>] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2b/0x730
      [<ffffffff812ea44e>] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x5e/0x180
      [<ffffffff844ae1b2>] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x20
      [<ffffffff844a7e80>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80

Then,

  3. io_sq_thread() or io_wqe_worker() frees @audit_context using
     audit_free();
  4. do_exit() eventually calls audit_free() again, which is okay
     because audit_free() does a NULL check.

As suggested by Paul Moore, fix it by deleting audit_alloc_kernel() and
redundant audit_free() calls.

Fixes: 5bd2182d58 ("audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring")
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220803222343.31673-1-yepeilin.cs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2022-08-04 08:33:54 -06:00
Xiu Jianfeng 546093206b audit: make is_audit_feature_set() static
Currently nobody use is_audit_feature_set() outside this file, so make
it static.

Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-06-13 14:08:57 -04:00
Julian Orth 69e9cd66ae audit,io_uring,io-wq: call __audit_uring_exit for dummy contexts
Not calling the function for dummy contexts will cause the context to
not be reset. During the next syscall, this will cause an error in
__audit_syscall_entry:

	WARN_ON(context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED);
	WARN_ON(context->name_count);
	if (context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED || context->name_count) {
		audit_panic("unrecoverable error in audit_syscall_entry()");
		return;
	}

These problematic dummy contexts are created via the following call
chain:

       exit_to_user_mode_prepare
    -> arch_do_signal_or_restart
    -> get_signal
    -> task_work_run
    -> tctx_task_work
    -> io_req_task_submit
    -> io_issue_sqe
    -> audit_uring_entry

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5bd2182d58 ("audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring")
Signed-off-by: Julian Orth <ju.orth@gmail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-05-17 15:03:36 -04:00
Linus Torvalds d2fac0afe8 audit/stable-5.16 PR 20211101
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "Add some additional audit logging to capture the openat2() syscall
  open_how struct info.

  Previous variations of the open()/openat() syscalls allowed audit
  admins to inspect the syscall args to get the information contained in
  the new open_how struct used in openat2()"

* tag 'audit-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: return early if the filter rule has a lower priority
  audit: add OPENAT2 record to list "how" info
  audit: add support for the openat2 syscall
  audit: replace magic audit syscall class numbers with macros
  lsm_audit: avoid overloading the "key" audit field
  audit: Convert to SPDX identifier
  audit: rename struct node to struct audit_node to prevent future name collisions
2021-11-01 21:17:39 -07:00
Richard Guy Briggs 571e5c0efc audit: add OPENAT2 record to list "how" info
Since the openat2(2) syscall uses a struct open_how pointer to communicate
its parameters they are not usefully recorded by the audit SYSCALL record's
four existing arguments.

Add a new audit record type OPENAT2 that reports the parameters in its
third argument, struct open_how with fields oflag, mode and resolve.

The new record in the context of an event would look like:
time->Wed Mar 17 16:28:53 2021
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): proctitle=
  73797363616C6C735F66696C652F6F70656E617432002F746D702F61756469742D
  7465737473756974652D737641440066696C652D6F70656E617432
type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=1 name="file-openat2"
  inode=29 dev=00:1f mode=0100600 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE
  cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184):
  item=0 name="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests"
  inode=25 dev=00:1f mode=040700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT
  cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(1616012933.531:184):
  cwd="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests"
type=OPENAT2 msg=audit(1616012933.531:184):
  oflag=0100302 mode=0600 resolve=0xa
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): arch=c000003e syscall=437
  success=yes exit=4 a0=3 a1=7ffe315f1c53 a2=7ffe315f1550 a3=18
  items=2 ppid=528 pid=540 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0
  fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm="openat2"
  exe="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests/syscalls_file/openat2"
  subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
  key="testsuite-1616012933-bjAUcEPO"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d23fbb89186754487850367224b060e26f9b7181.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
[PM: tweak subject, wrap example, move AUDIT_OPENAT2 to 1337]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-10-04 12:09:27 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs 42f355ef59 audit: replace magic audit syscall class numbers with macros
Replace audit syscall class magic numbers with macros.

This required putting the macros into new header file
include/linux/audit_arch.h since the syscall macros were
included for both 64 bit and 32 bit in any compat code, causing
redefinition warnings.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2300b1083a32aade7ae7efb95826e8f3f260b1df.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
[PM: renamed header to audit_arch.h after consulting with Richard]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-10-01 16:41:33 -04:00
Paul Moore 5bd2182d58 audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
This patch adds basic auditing to io_uring operations, regardless of
their context.  This is accomplished by allocating audit_context
structures for the io-wq worker and io_uring SQPOLL kernel threads
as well as explicitly auditing the io_uring operations in
io_issue_sqe().  Individual io_uring operations can bypass auditing
through the "audit_skip" field in the struct io_op_def definition for
the operation; although great care must be taken so that security
relevant io_uring operations do not bypass auditing; please contact
the audit mailing list (see the MAINTAINERS file) with any questions.

The io_uring operations are audited using a new AUDIT_URINGOP record,
an example is shown below:

  type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1631800225.981:37289):
    uring_op=19 success=yes exit=0 items=0 ppid=15454 pid=15681
    uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0
    subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
    key=(null)

Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for review and feedback.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-09-19 22:10:44 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs 6d915476e6 audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules present
When there are no audit rules registered, mandatory records (config,
etc.) are missing their accompanying records (syscall, proctitle, etc.).

This is due to audit context dummy set on syscall entry based on absence
of rules that signals that no other records are to be printed.  Clear the dummy
bit if any record is generated, open coding this in audit_log_start().

The proctitle context and dummy checks are pointless since the
proctitle record will not be printed if no syscall records are printed.

The fds array is reset to -1 after the first syscall to indicate it
isn't valid any more, but was never set to -1 when the context was
allocated to indicate it wasn't yet valid.

Check ctx->pwd in audit_log_name().

The audit_inode* functions can be called without going through
getname_flags() or getname_kernel() that sets audit_names and cwd, so
set the cwd in audit_alloc_name() if it has not already been done so due to
audit_names being valid and purge all other audit_getcwd() calls.

Revert the LSM dump_common_audit_data() LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* cases from the
ghak96 patch since they are no longer necessary due to cwd coverage in
audit_alloc_name().

Thanks to bauen1 <j2468h@googlemail.com> for reporting LSM situations in
which context->cwd is not valid, inadvertantly fixed by the ghak96 patch.

Please see upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/120
This is also related to upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-10-27 21:02:57 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs f1d9b23cab audit: purge audit_log_string from the intra-kernel audit API
audit_log_string() was inteded to be an internal audit function and
since there are only two internal uses, remove them.  Purge all external
uses of it by restructuring code to use an existing audit_log_format()
or using audit_log_format().

Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/84

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-21 11:12:31 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs d7481b24b8 audit: issue CWD record to accompany LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records
The LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records for PATH, FILE, IOCTL_OP, DENTRY and INODE
are incomplete without the task context of the AUDIT Current Working
Directory record.  Add it.

This record addition can't use audit_dummy_context to determine whether
or not to store the record information since the LSM_AUDIT_DATA_*
records are initiated by various LSMs independent of any audit rules.
context->in_syscall is used to determine if it was called in user
context like audit_getname.

Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96

Adapted from Vladis Dronov's v2 patch.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-08 19:02:11 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs 9fc54012d7 audit: remove unused !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL __audit_inode* stubs
Added 14 years ago in commit 73241ccca0 ("[PATCH] Collect more inode
information during syscall processing.") but never used however
needlessly churned no less than 10 times since.  Remove the unused
__audit_inode* stubs in the !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-01 13:34:17 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs 142240398e audit: add gfp parameter to audit_log_nfcfg
Fixed an inconsistent use of GFP flags in nft_obj_notify() that used
GFP_KERNEL when a GFP flag was passed in to that function.  Given this
allocated memory was then used in audit_log_nfcfg() it led to an audit
of all other GFP allocations in net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c and a
modification of audit_log_nfcfg() to accept a GFP parameter.

Reported-by: Dan Carptenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-06-29 19:14:47 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs 8e6cf365e1 audit: log nftables configuration change events
iptables, ip6tables, arptables and ebtables table registration,
replacement and unregistration configuration events are logged for the
native (legacy) iptables setsockopt api, but not for the
nftables netlink api which is used by the nft-variant of iptables in
addition to nftables itself.

Add calls to log the configuration actions in the nftables netlink api.

This uses the same NETFILTER_CFG record format but overloads the table
field.

  type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.878:162) : table=?:0;?:0 family=unspecified entries=2 op=nft_register_gen pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
  ...
  type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.878:162) : table=firewalld:1;?:0 family=inet entries=0 op=nft_register_table pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
  ...
  type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;filter_FORWARD:85 family=inet entries=8 op=nft_register_chain pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
  ...
  type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;filter_FORWARD:85 family=inet entries=101 op=nft_register_rule pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
  ...
  type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;__set0:87 family=inet entries=87 op=nft_register_setelem pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
  ...
  type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;__set0:87 family=inet entries=0 op=nft_register_set pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld

For further information please see issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/124

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-06-23 20:25:16 -04:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva 0090c1edeb audit: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:

struct foo {
        int stuff;
        struct boo array[];
};

By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.

Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:

"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]

sizeof(flexible-array-member) triggers a warning because flexible array
members have incomplete type[1]. There are some instances of code in
which the sizeof operator is being incorrectly/erroneously applied to
zero-length arrays and the result is zero. Such instances may be hiding
some bugs. So, this work (flexible-array member conversions) will also
help to get completely rid of those sorts of issues.

This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.

[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 7649773293 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-05-07 22:49:28 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs a45d88530b netfilter: add audit table unregister actions
Audit the action of unregistering ebtables and x_tables.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/44

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-28 18:11:36 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs c4dad0aab3 audit: tidy and extend netfilter_cfg x_tables
NETFILTER_CFG record generation was inconsistent for x_tables and
ebtables configuration changes.  The call was needlessly messy and there
were supporting records missing at times while they were produced when
not requested.  Simplify the logging call into a new audit_log_nfcfg
call.  Honour the audit_enabled setting while more consistently
recording information including supporting records by tidying up dummy
checks.

Add an op= field that indicates the operation being performed (register
or replace).

Here is the enhanced sample record:
  type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(1580905834.919:82970): table=filter family=2 entries=83 op=replace

Generate audit NETFILTER_CFG records on ebtables table registration.
Previously this was being done for x_tables registration and replacement
operations and ebtables table replacement only.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/25
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/35
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/43

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-28 17:52:42 -04:00
Kees Cook 245d73698e audit: Report suspicious O_CREAT usage
This renames the very specific audit_log_link_denied() to
audit_log_path_denied() and adds the AUDIT_* type as an argument. This
allows for the creation of the new AUDIT_ANOM_CREAT that can be used to
report the fifo/regular file creation restrictions that were introduced
in commit 30aba6656f ("namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and
regular files").

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-10-03 13:59:29 -04:00
Al Viro fbb7d9d56d kill LOOKUP_NO_EVAL, don't bother including namei.h from audit.h
The former has no users left; the latter was only to get LOOKUP_...
values to remapper in audit_inode() and that's an ex-parrot now.

All places that use symbols from namei.h include it either directly
or (in a few cases) via a local header, like fs/autofs/autofs_i.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-08-30 21:29:32 -04:00
Al Viro c9b07eab0c audit_inode(): switch to passing AUDIT_INODE_...
don't bother with remapping LOOKUP_... values - all callers pass
constants and we can just as well pass the right ones from the
very beginning.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-07-21 18:24:46 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 61fc5771f5 audit/stable-5.3 PR 20190702
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "This pull request is a bit early, but with some vacation time coming
  up I wanted to send this out now just in case the remote Internet Gods
  decide not to smile on me once the merge window opens. The patchset
  for v5.3 is pretty minor this time, the highlights include:

   - When the audit daemon is sent a signal, ensure we deliver
     information about the sender even when syscall auditing is not
     enabled/supported.

   - Add the ability to filter audit records based on network address
     family.

   - Tighten the audit field filtering restrictions on string based
     fields.

   - Cleanup the audit field filtering verification code.

   - Remove a few BUG() calls from the audit code"

* tag 'audit-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: remove the BUG() calls in the audit rule comparison functions
  audit: enforce op for string fields
  audit: add saddr_fam filter field
  audit: re-structure audit field valid checks
  audit: deliver signal_info regarless of syscall
2019-07-08 18:55:42 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner 1a59d1b8e0 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 156
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version this program is distributed in the
  hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
  the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
  purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
  should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
  with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
  59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-30 11:26:35 -07:00
Richard Guy Briggs b48345aafb audit: deliver signal_info regarless of syscall
When a process signals the audit daemon (shutdown, rotate, resume,
reconfig) but syscall auditing is not enabled, we still want to know the
identity of the process sending the signal to the audit daemon.

Move audit_signal_info() out of syscall auditing to general auditing but
create a new function audit_signal_info_syscall() to take care of the
syscall dependent parts for when syscall auditing is enabled.

Please see the github kernel audit issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/111

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-05-21 22:18:25 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek 7e8eda734d ntp: Audit NTP parameters adjustment
Emit an audit record every time selected NTP parameters are modified
from userspace (via adjtimex(2) or clock_adjtime(2)). These parameters
may be used to indirectly change system clock, and thus their
modifications should be audited.

Such events will now generate records of type AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL
containing the following fields:
  - op -- which value was adjusted:
    - offset -- corresponding to the time_offset variable
    - freq   -- corresponding to the time_freq variable
    - status -- corresponding to the time_status variable
    - adjust -- corresponding to the time_adjust variable
    - tick   -- corresponding to the tick_usec variable
    - tai    -- corresponding to the timekeeping's TAI offset
  - old -- the old value
  - new -- the new value

Example records:

type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.507:7): op=status old=64 new=8256
type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.511:11): op=freq old=0 new=49180377088000

The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding
syscall records.

An overview of parameter changes that can be done via do_adjtimex()
(based on information from Miroslav Lichvar) and whether they are
audited:
  __timekeeping_set_tai_offset() -- sets the offset from the
                                    International Atomic Time
                                    (AUDITED)
  NTP variables:
    time_offset -- can adjust the clock by up to 0.5 seconds per call
                   and also speed it up or slow down by up to about
                   0.05% (43 seconds per day) (AUDITED)
    time_freq -- can speed up or slow down by up to about 0.05%
                 (AUDITED)
    time_status -- can insert/delete leap seconds and it also enables/
                   disables synchronization of the hardware real-time
                   clock (AUDITED)
    time_maxerror, time_esterror -- change error estimates used to
                                    inform userspace applications
                                    (NOT AUDITED)
    time_constant -- controls the speed of the clock adjustments that
                     are made when time_offset is set (NOT AUDITED)
    time_adjust -- can temporarily speed up or slow down the clock by up
                   to 0.05% (AUDITED)
    tick_usec -- a more extreme version of time_freq; can speed up or
                 slow down the clock by up to 10% (AUDITED)

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-04-15 18:14:01 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek 2d87a0674b timekeeping: Audit clock adjustments
Emit an audit record whenever the system clock is changed (i.e. shifted
by a non-zero offset) by a syscall from userspace. The syscalls than can
(at the time of writing) trigger such record are:
  - settimeofday(2), stime(2), clock_settime(2) -- via
    do_settimeofday64()
  - adjtimex(2), clock_adjtime(2) -- via do_adjtimex()

The new records have type AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET and contain the following
fields:
  - sec -- the 'seconds' part of the offset
  - nsec -- the 'nanoseconds' part of the offset

Example record (time was shifted backwards by ~15.875 seconds):

type=TIME_INJOFFSET msg=audit(1530616049.652:13): sec=-16 nsec=124887145

The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding
syscall records.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[PM: fixed a line width problem in __audit_tk_injoffset()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-04-15 18:10:17 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs cd108b5c51 audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
auditsc_get_stamp() and audit_serial() are internal audit functions so
move their prototypes from include/linux/audit.h to kernel/audit.h
so they are not visible to the rest of the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-07 21:44:27 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs 57d4657716 audit: ignore fcaps on umount
Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called to avoid a process hang while
it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear.

Note the comment above user_path_mountpoint_at():
 * A umount is a special case for path walking. We're not actually interested
 * in the inode in this situation, and ESTALE errors can be a problem.  We
 * simply want track down the dentry and vfsmount attached at the mountpoint
 * and avoid revalidating the last component.

This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.

Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in audit_log_fcaps()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-30 20:51:47 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs 4b7d248b3a audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
loginuid and sessionid (and audit_log_session_info) should be part of
CONFIG_AUDIT scope and not CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL since it is used in
CONFIG_CHANGE, ANOM_LINK, FEATURE_CHANGE (and INTEGRITY_RULE), none of
which are otherwise dependent on AUDITSYSCALL.

Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/104

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: tweaked subject line for better grep'ing]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-25 13:03:23 -05:00
Paul Moore 2a1fe215e7 audit: use current whenever possible
There are many places, notably audit_log_task_info() and
audit_log_exit(), that take task_struct pointers but in reality they
are always working on the current task.  This patch eliminates the
task_struct arguments and uses current directly which allows a number
of cleanups as well.

Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-26 18:41:21 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs 0fe3c7fceb audit: localize audit_log_session_info prototype
The audit_log_session_info() function is only used in kernel/audit*, so
move its prototype to kernel/audit.h

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-11-19 12:26:27 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs f7859590d9 audit: eliminate audit_enabled magic number comparison
Remove comparison of audit_enabled to magic numbers outside of audit.

Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/86

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-06-19 10:43:55 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs c0b0ae8a87 audit: use inline function to set audit context
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an
access function to set the audit context pointer for the task
rather than reaching directly into the task struct to set it.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in audit.h]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-05-14 17:45:21 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs cdfb6b341f audit: use inline function to get audit context
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an
access function to retrieve the audit context pointer for the task
rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in auditsc.c and selinuxfs.c, checkpatch.pl fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-05-14 17:24:18 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs f0b752168d audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro
Use a macro, "AUDIT_SID_UNSET", to replace each instance of
initialization and comparison to an audit session ID.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-05-14 15:56:35 -04:00
Tyler Hicks 326bee0286 seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging
Seccomp logging for "handled" actions such as RET_TRAP, RET_TRACE, or
RET_ERRNO can be very noisy for processes that are being audited. This
patch modifies the seccomp logging behavior to treat processes that are
being inspected via the audit subsystem the same as processes that
aren't under inspection. Handled actions will no longer be logged just
because the process is being inspected. Since v4.14, applications have
the ability to request logging of handled actions by using the
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag when loading seccomp filters.

With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:

  if action == RET_ALLOW:
    do not log
  else if action not in actions_logged:
    do not log
  else if action == RET_KILL:
    log
  else if action == RET_LOG:
    log
  else if filter-requests-logging:
    log
  else:
    do not log

Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-05-08 02:04:23 -04:00
Tyler Hicks ea6eca7785 seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl
The decision to log a seccomp action will always be subject to the
value of the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl, even for processes
that are being inspected via the audit subsystem, in an upcoming patch.
Therefore, we need to emit an audit record on attempts at writing to the
actions_logged sysctl when auditing is enabled.

This patch updates the write handler for the actions_logged sysctl to
emit an audit record on attempts to write to the sysctl. Successful
writes to the sysctl will result in a record that includes a normalized
list of logged actions in the "actions" field and a "res" field equal to
1. Unsuccessful writes to the sysctl will result in a record that
doesn't include the "actions" field and has a "res" field equal to 0.

Not all unsuccessful writes to the sysctl are audited. For example, an
audit record will not be emitted if an unprivileged process attempts to
open the sysctl file for reading since that access control check is not
part of the sysctl's write handler.

Below are some example audit records when writing various strings to the
actions_logged sysctl.

Writing "not-a-real-action", when the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged
sysctl previously was "kill_process kill_thread trap errno trace log",
emits this audit record:

 type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392371.454:120): op=seccomp-logging
 actions=? old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log
 res=0

If you then write "kill_process kill_thread errno trace log", this audit
record is emitted:

 type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392401.645:126): op=seccomp-logging
 actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log
 old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=1

If you then write "log log errno trace kill_process kill_thread", which
is unordered and contains the log action twice, it results in the same
actions value as the previous record:

 type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392436.354:132): op=seccomp-logging
 actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log
 old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log res=1

If you then write an empty string to the sysctl, this audit record is
emitted:

 type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392494.413:138): op=seccomp-logging
 actions=(none) old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log
 res=1

No audit records are generated when reading the actions_logged sysctl.

Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-05-08 02:03:28 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs 94b9d9b7a1 audit: remove path param from link denied function
In commit 45b578fe4c
("audit: link denied should not directly generate PATH record")
the need for the struct path *link parameter was removed.
Remove the now useless struct path argument.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-03-21 11:17:41 -04:00
Linus Torvalds f9bab2677a audit/stable-4.15 PR 20171113
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "Another relatively small pull request for audit, nine patches total.

  The only real new bit of functionality is the patch from Richard which
  adds the ability to filter records based on the filesystem type.

  The remainder are bug fixes and cleanups; the bug fix highlights
  include:

   - ensuring that we properly audit init/PID-1 (me)

   - allowing the audit daemon to shutdown the kernel/auditd connection
     cleanly by setting the audit PID to zero (Steve)"

* tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
  Audit: remove unused audit_log_secctx function
  audit: Allow auditd to set pid to 0 to end auditing
  audit: Add new syscalls to the perm=w filter
  audit: use audit_set_enabled() in audit_enable()
  audit: convert audit_ever_enabled to a boolean
  audit: don't use simple_strtol() anymore
  audit: initialize the audit subsystem as early as possible
  audit: ensure that 'audit=1' actually enables audit for PID 1
2017-11-15 13:28:48 -08:00
Casey Schaufler f7b53637c0 Audit: remove unused audit_log_secctx function
The function audit_log_secctx() is unused in the upstream kernel.
All it does is wrap another function that doesn't need wrapping.
It claims to give you the SELinux context, but that is not true if
you are using a different security module.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-11-10 16:08:47 -05:00
Steve Grubb de8cd83e91 audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access
control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to
optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask,
FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision
which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it.

It would be used something like this in user space code:

  response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT;
  write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response));

When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a
AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event
occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify
rather than DAC or MAC policy.

A sample event looks like this:

type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls"
inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901
pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:
s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2

Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call
fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel
supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capability.

Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
2017-10-10 13:18:06 +02:00
Linus Torvalds c0a3a64e72 Major additions:
- sysctl and seccomp operation to discover available actions. (tyhicks)
 - new per-filter configurable logging infrastructure and sysctl. (tyhicks)
 - SECCOMP_RET_LOG to log allowed syscalls. (tyhicks)
 - SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as the new strictest possible action.
 - self-tests for new behaviors.
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Merge tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook:
 "Major additions:

   - sysctl and seccomp operation to discover available actions
     (tyhicks)

   - new per-filter configurable logging infrastructure and sysctl
     (tyhicks)

   - SECCOMP_RET_LOG to log allowed syscalls (tyhicks)

   - SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as the new strictest possible action

   - self-tests for new behaviors"

[ This is the seccomp part of the security pull request during the merge
  window that was nixed due to unrelated problems   - Linus ]

* tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  samples: Unrename SECCOMP_RET_KILL
  selftests/seccomp: Test thread vs process killing
  seccomp: Implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS action
  seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
  seccomp: Rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL to SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
  seccomp: Action to log before allowing
  seccomp: Filter flag to log all actions except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
  seccomp: Selftest for detection of filter flag support
  seccomp: Sysctl to configure actions that are allowed to be logged
  seccomp: Operation for checking if an action is available
  seccomp: Sysctl to display available actions
  seccomp: Provide matching filter for introspection
  selftests/seccomp: Refactor RET_ERRNO tests
  selftests/seccomp: Add simple seccomp overhead benchmark
  selftests/seccomp: Add tests for basic ptrace actions
2017-09-22 16:16:41 -10:00
Deepa Dinamani b904772638 ipc: mqueue: Replace timespec with timespec64
struct timespec is not y2038 safe. Replace
all uses of timespec by y2038 safe struct timespec64.

Even though timespec is used here to represent timeouts,
replace these with timespec64 so that it facilitates
in verification by creating a y2038 safe kernel image
that is free of timespec.

The syscall interfaces themselves are not changed as part
of the patch. They will be part of a different series.

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-09-03 20:21:24 -04:00
Tyler Hicks 0ddec0fc89 seccomp: Sysctl to configure actions that are allowed to be logged
Adminstrators can write to this sysctl to set the seccomp actions that
are allowed to be logged. Any actions not found in this sysctl will not
be logged.

For example, all SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, and
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO actions would be loggable if "kill trap errno" were
written to the sysctl. SECCOMP_RET_TRACE actions would not be logged
since its string representation ("trace") wasn't present in the sysctl
value.

The path to the sysctl is:

 /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged

The actions_avail sysctl can be read to discover the valid action names
that can be written to the actions_logged sysctl with the exception of
"allow". SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions cannot be configured for logging.

The default setting for the sysctl is to allow all actions to be logged
except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW. While only SECCOMP_RET_KILL actions are
currently logged, an upcoming patch will allow applications to request
additional actions to be logged.

There's one important exception to this sysctl. If a task is
specifically being audited, meaning that an audit context has been
allocated for the task, seccomp will log all actions other than
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW despite the value of actions_logged. This exception
preserves the existing auditing behavior of tasks with an allocated
audit context.

With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:

if action == RET_ALLOW:
  do not log
else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
  log
else if audit_enabled && task-is-being-audited:
  log
else:
  do not log

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-08-14 13:46:45 -07:00
Deepa Dinamani 2115bb250f audit: Use timespec64 to represent audit timestamps
struct timespec is not y2038 safe.
Audit timestamps are recorded in string format into
an audit buffer for a given context.
These mark the entry timestamps for the syscalls.
Use y2038 safe struct timespec64 to represent the times.
The log strings can handle this transition as strings can
hold upto 1024 characters.

Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-02 10:16:05 -04:00
Paul Moore 45a0642b4d audit: kernel generated netlink traffic should have a portid of 0
We were setting the portid incorrectly in the netlink message headers,
fix that to always be 0 (nlmsg_pid = 0).

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
2017-05-02 10:16:05 -04:00
Linus Torvalds b8989bccd6 Merge branch 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "The audit changes for v4.11 are relatively small compared to what we
  did for v4.10, both in terms of size and impact.

   - two patches from Steve tweak the formatting for some of the audit
     records to make them more consistent with other audit records.

   - three patches from Richard record the name of a module on module
     load, fix the logging of sockaddr information when using
     socketcall() on 32-bit systems, and add the ability to reset
     audit's lost record counter.

   - my lone patch just fixes an annoying style nit that I was reminded
     about by one of Richard's patches.

  All these patches pass our test suite"

* 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: remove unnecessary curly braces from switch/case statements
  audit: log module name on init_module
  audit: log 32-bit socketcalls
  audit: add feature audit_lost reset
  audit: Make AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event normalized
  audit: Make AUDIT_KERNEL event conform to the specification
2017-02-21 13:25:50 -08:00
Richard Guy Briggs ca86cad738 audit: log module name on init_module
This adds a new auxiliary record MODULE_INIT to the SYSCALL event.

We get finit_module for free since it made most sense to hook this in to
load_module().

https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/7
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Module-Load-Record-Format

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
[PM: corrected links in the commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-02-13 16:17:13 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs 62bc306e20 audit: log 32-bit socketcalls
32-bit socketcalls were not being logged by audit on x86_64 systems.
Log them.  This is basically a duplicate of the call from
net/socket.c:sys_socketcall(), but it addresses the impedance mismatch
between 32-bit userspace process and 64-bit kernel audit.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/14

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-01-18 15:05:25 -05:00
Al Viro 8bd107633b audit_log_{name,link_denied}: constify struct path
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-05 19:00:38 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs 86b2efbe3a audit: add fields to exclude filter by reusing user filter
RFE: add additional fields for use in audit filter exclude rules
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/5

Re-factor and combine audit_filter_type() with audit_filter_user() to
use audit_filter_user_rules() to enable the exclude filter to
additionally filter on PID, UID, GID, AUID, LOGINUID_SET, SUBJ_*.

The process of combining the similar audit_filter_user() and
audit_filter_type() functions, required inverting the meaning and
including the ALWAYS action of the latter.

Include audit_filter_user_rules() into audit_filter(), removing
unneeded logic in the process.

Keep the check to quit early if the list is empty.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: checkpatch.pl fixes - whitespace damage, wrapped description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-06-27 11:01:00 -04:00
Peter Hurley 2e28d38ae1 tty: audit: Handle tty audit enable atomically
The audit_tty and audit_tty_log_passwd fields are actually bool
values, so merge into single memory location to access atomically.

NB: audit log operations may still occur after tty audit is disabled
which is consistent with the existing functionality

Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-01-27 16:41:04 -08:00