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Merge tag 'v6.4/vfs.acl' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull acl updates from Christian Brauner:
"After finishing the introduction of the new posix acl api last cycle
the generic POSIX ACL xattr handlers are still around in the
filesystems xattr handlers for two reasons:
(1) Because a few filesystems rely on the ->list() method of the
generic POSIX ACL xattr handlers in their ->listxattr() inode
operation.
(2) POSIX ACLs are only available if IOP_XATTR is raised. The
IOP_XATTR flag is raised in inode_init_always() based on whether
the sb->s_xattr pointer is non-NULL. IOW, the registered xattr
handlers of the filesystem are used to raise IOP_XATTR. Removing
the generic POSIX ACL xattr handlers from all filesystems would
risk regressing filesystems that only implement POSIX ACL support
and no other xattrs (nfs3 comes to mind).
This contains the work to decouple POSIX ACLs from the IOP_XATTR flag
as they don't depend on xattr handlers anymore. So it's now possible
to remove the generic POSIX ACL xattr handlers from the sb->s_xattr
list of all filesystems. This is a crucial step as the generic POSIX
ACL xattr handlers aren't used for POSIX ACLs anymore and POSIX ACLs
don't depend on the xattr infrastructure anymore.
Adressing problem (1) will require more long-term work. It would be
best to get rid of the ->list() method of xattr handlers completely at
some point.
For erofs, ext{2,4}, f2fs, jffs2, ocfs2, and reiserfs the nop POSIX
ACL xattr handler is kept around so they can continue to use
array-based xattr handler indexing.
This update does simplify the ->listxattr() implementation of all
these filesystems however"
* tag 'v6.4/vfs.acl' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
acl: don't depend on IOP_XATTR
ovl: check for ->listxattr() support
reiserfs: rework priv inode handling
fs: rename generic posix acl handlers
reiserfs: rework ->listxattr() implementation
fs: simplify ->listxattr() implementation
fs: drop unused posix acl handlers
xattr: remove unused argument
xattr: add listxattr helper
xattr: simplify listxattr helpers
KASAN reported the following issue:
[ 36.825817][ T5923] BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in v9fs_get_acl+0x1a4/0x390
[ 36.827479][ T5923] Write of size 4 at addr 9fffeb37f97f1c00 by task syz-executor798/5923
[ 36.829303][ T5923]
[ 36.829846][ T5923] CPU: 0 PID: 5923 Comm: syz-executor798 Not tainted 6.2.0-syzkaller-18302-g596b6b709632 #0
[ 36.832110][ T5923] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/21/2023
[ 36.834464][ T5923] Call trace:
[ 36.835196][ T5923] dump_backtrace+0x1c8/0x1f4
[ 36.836229][ T5923] show_stack+0x2c/0x3c
[ 36.837100][ T5923] dump_stack_lvl+0xd0/0x124
[ 36.838103][ T5923] print_report+0xe4/0x4c0
[ 36.839068][ T5923] kasan_report+0xd4/0x130
[ 36.840052][ T5923] kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2a4
[ 36.841199][ T5923] __kasan_check_write+0x2c/0x3c
[ 36.842216][ T5923] v9fs_get_acl+0x1a4/0x390
[ 36.843232][ T5923] v9fs_mount+0x77c/0xa5c
[ 36.844163][ T5923] legacy_get_tree+0xd4/0x16c
[ 36.845173][ T5923] vfs_get_tree+0x90/0x274
[ 36.846137][ T5923] do_new_mount+0x25c/0x8c8
[ 36.847066][ T5923] path_mount+0x590/0xe58
[ 36.848147][ T5923] __arm64_sys_mount+0x45c/0x594
[ 36.849273][ T5923] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0
[ 36.850421][ T5923] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x258
[ 36.851397][ T5923] do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198
[ 36.852398][ T5923] el0_svc+0x58/0x168
[ 36.853224][ T5923] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0
[ 36.854293][ T5923] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
Calling '__v9fs_get_acl' method in 'v9fs_get_acl' creates the
following chain of function calls:
__v9fs_get_acl
v9fs_fid_get_acl
v9fs_fid_xattr_get
p9_client_xattrwalk
Function p9_client_xattrwalk accepts a pointer to u64-typed
variable attr_size and puts some u64 value into it. However,
after the executing the p9_client_xattrwalk, in some circumstances
we assign the value of u64-typed variable 'attr_size' to the
variable 'retval', which we will return. However, the type of
'retval' is ssize_t, and if the value of attr_size is larger
than SSIZE_MAX, we will face the signed type overflow. If the
overflow occurs, the result of v9fs_fid_xattr_get may be
negative, but not classified as an error. When we try to allocate
an acl with 'broken' size we receive an error, but don't process
it. When we try to free this acl, we face the 'wild-memory-access'
error (because it wasn't allocated).
This patch will add new condition to the 'v9fs_fid_xattr_get'
function, so it will return an EOVERFLOW error if the 'attr_size'
is larger than SSIZE_MAX.
In this version of the patch I simplified the condition.
In previous (v2) version of the patch I removed explicit type conversion
and added separate condition to check the possible overflow and return
an error (in v1 version I've just modified the existing condition).
Tested via syzkaller.
Suggested-by: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+cb1d16facb3cc90de5fb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=fbbef66d9e4d096242f3617de5d14d12705b4659
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <ivan.orlov0322@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@kernel.org>
Remove struct posix_acl_{access,default}_handler for all filesystems
that don't depend on the xattr handler in their inode->i_op->listxattr()
method in any way. There's nothing more to do than to simply remove the
handler. It's been effectively unused ever since we introduced the new
posix acl api.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull VFS acl updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the work that builds a dedicated vfs posix acl api.
The origins of this work trace back to v5.19 but it took quite a while
to understand the various filesystem specific implementations in
sufficient detail and also come up with an acceptable solution.
As we discussed and seen multiple times the current state of how posix
acls are handled isn't nice and comes with a lot of problems: The
current way of handling posix acls via the generic xattr api is error
prone, hard to maintain, and type unsafe for the vfs until we call
into the filesystem's dedicated get and set inode operations.
It is already the case that posix acls are special-cased to death all
the way through the vfs. There are an uncounted number of hacks that
operate on the uapi posix acl struct instead of the dedicated vfs
struct posix_acl. And the vfs must be involved in order to interpret
and fixup posix acls before storing them to the backing store, caching
them, reporting them to userspace, or for permission checking.
Currently a range of hacks and duct tape exist to make this work. As
with most things this is really no ones fault it's just something that
happened over time. But the code is hard to understand and difficult
to maintain and one is constantly at risk of introducing bugs and
regressions when having to touch it.
Instead of continuing to hack posix acls through the xattr handlers
this series builds a dedicated posix acl api solely around the get and
set inode operations.
Going forward, the vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(), and vfs_set_acl()
helpers must be used in order to interact with posix acls. They
operate directly on the vfs internal struct posix_acl instead of
abusing the uapi posix acl struct as we currently do. In the end this
removes all of the hackiness, makes the codepaths easier to maintain,
and gets us type safety.
This series passes the LTP and xfstests suites without any
regressions. For xfstests the following combinations were tested:
- xfs
- ext4
- btrfs
- overlayfs
- overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts
- orangefs
- (limited) cifs
There's more simplifications for posix acls that we can make in the
future if the basic api has made it.
A few implementation details:
- The series makes sure to retain exactly the same security and
integrity module permission checks. Especially for the integrity
modules this api is a win because right now they convert the uapi
posix acl struct passed to them via a void pointer into the vfs
struct posix_acl format to perform permission checking on the mode.
There's a new dedicated security hook for setting posix acls which
passes the vfs struct posix_acl not a void pointer. Basing checking
on the posix acl stored in the uapi format is really unreliable.
The vfs currently hacks around directly in the uapi struct storing
values that frankly the security and integrity modules can't
correctly interpret as evidenced by bugs we reported and fixed in
this area. It's not necessarily even their fault it's just that the
format we provide to them is sub optimal.
- Some filesystems like 9p and cifs need access to the dentry in
order to get and set posix acls which is why they either only
partially or not even at all implement get and set inode
operations. For example, cifs allows setxattr() and getxattr()
operations but doesn't allow permission checking based on posix
acls because it can't implement a get acl inode operation.
Thus, this patch series updates the set acl inode operation to take
a dentry instead of an inode argument. However, for the get acl
inode operation we can't do this as the old get acl method is
called in e.g., generic_permission() and inode_permission(). These
helpers in turn are called in various filesystem's permission inode
operation. So passing a dentry argument to the old get acl inode
operation would amount to passing a dentry to the permission inode
operation which we shouldn't and probably can't do.
So instead of extending the existing inode operation Christoph
suggested to add a new one. He also requested to ensure that the
get and set acl inode operation taking a dentry are consistently
named. So for this version the old get acl operation is renamed to
->get_inode_acl() and a new ->get_acl() inode operation taking a
dentry is added. With this we can give both 9p and cifs get and set
acl inode operations and in turn remove their complex custom posix
xattr handlers.
In the future I hope to get rid of the inode method duplication but
it isn't like we have never had this situation. Readdir is just one
example. And frankly, the overall gain in type safety and the more
pleasant api wise are simply too big of a benefit to not accept
this duplication for a while.
- We've done a full audit of every codepaths using variant of the
current generic xattr api to get and set posix acls and
surprisingly it isn't that many places. There's of course always a
chance that we might have missed some and if so I'm sure we'll find
them soon enough.
The crucial codepaths to be converted are obviously stacking
filesystems such as ecryptfs and overlayfs.
For a list of all callers currently using generic xattr api helpers
see [2] including comments whether they support posix acls or not.
- The old vfs generic posix acl infrastructure doesn't obey the
create and replace semantics promised on the setxattr(2) manpage.
This patch series doesn't address this. It really is something we
should revisit later though.
The patches are roughly organized as follows:
(1) Change existing set acl inode operation to take a dentry
argument (Intended to be a non-functional change)
(2) Rename existing get acl method (Intended to be a non-functional
change)
(3) Implement get and set acl inode operations for filesystems that
couldn't implement one before because of the missing dentry.
That's mostly 9p and cifs (Intended to be a non-functional
change)
(4) Build posix acl api, i.e., add vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(),
and vfs_set_acl() including security and integrity hooks
(Intended to be a non-functional change)
(5) Implement get and set acl inode operations for stacking
filesystems (Intended to be a non-functional change)
(6) Switch posix acl handling in stacking filesystems to new posix
acl api now that all filesystems it can stack upon support it.
(7) Switch vfs to new posix acl api (semantical change)
(8) Remove all now unused helpers
(9) Additional regression fixes reported after we merged this into
linux-next
Thanks to Seth for a lot of good discussion around this and
encouragement and input from Christoph"
* tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (36 commits)
posix_acl: Fix the type of sentinel in get_acl
orangefs: fix mode handling
ovl: call posix_acl_release() after error checking
evm: remove dead code in evm_inode_set_acl()
cifs: check whether acl is valid early
acl: make vfs_posix_acl_to_xattr() static
acl: remove a slew of now unused helpers
9p: use stub posix acl handlers
cifs: use stub posix acl handlers
ovl: use stub posix acl handlers
ecryptfs: use stub posix acl handlers
evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change()
xattr: use posix acl api
ovl: use posix acl api
ovl: implement set acl method
ovl: implement get acl method
ecryptfs: implement set acl method
ecryptfs: implement get acl method
ksmbd: use vfs_remove_acl()
acl: add vfs_remove_acl()
...
READ/WRITE proved to be actively confusing - the meanings are
"data destination, as used with read(2)" and "data source, as
used with write(2)", but people keep interpreting those as
"we read data from it" and "we write data to it", i.e. exactly
the wrong way.
Call them ITER_DEST and ITER_SOURCE - at least that is harder
to misinterpret...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Now that 9p supports the get and set acl inode operations and the vfs
has been switched to the new posi api, 9p can simply rely on the stub
posix acl handlers. The custom xattr handlers and associated unused
helpers can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
I was recently reminded that it is not clear that p9_client_clunk()
was actually just decrementing refcount and clunking only when that
reaches zero: make it clear through a set of helpers.
This will also allow instrumenting refcounting better for debugging
next patch
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220612085330.1451496-5-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is
privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the
inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped
mounts.
The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to
translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the
ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or
the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user
namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we
either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which
direction we're translating.
Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user
namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the
superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to
handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace.
In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch
series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode()
helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let
them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix
acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend
the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass
the mount's user namespace down.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Fix race issue in fid contention.
Eric's and Greg's patch offer a mechanism to fix open-unlink-f*syscall
bug in 9p. But there is race issue in fid parallel accesses.
As Greg's patch stores all of fids from opened files into according inode,
so all the lookup fid ops can retrieve fid from inode preferentially. But
there is no mechanism to handle the fid contention issue. For example,
there are two threads get the same fid in the same time and one of them
clunk the fid before the other thread ready to discard the fid. In this
scenario, it will lead to some fatal problems, even kernel core dump.
I introduce a mechanism to fix this race issue. A counter field introduced
into p9_fid struct to store the reference counter to the fid. When a fid
is allocated from the inode or dentry, the counter will increase, and
will decrease at the end of its occupation. It is guaranteed that the
fid won't be clunked before the reference counter go down to 0, then
we can avoid the clunked fid to be used.
tests:
race issue test from the old test case:
for file in {01..50}; do touch f.${file}; done
seq 1 1000 | xargs -n 1 -P 50 -I{} cat f.* > /dev/null
open-unlink-f*syscall test:
I have tested for f*syscall include: ftruncate fstat fchown fchmod faccessat.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923141146.90046-5-jianyong.wu@arm.com
Fixes: 478ba09edc ("fs/9p: search open fids first")
Signed-off-by: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
In the iov_iter struct, separate the iterator type from the iterator
direction and use accessor functions to access them in most places.
Convert a bunch of places to use switch-statements to access them rather
then chains of bitwise-AND statements. This makes it easier to add further
iterator types. Also, this can be more efficient as to implement a switch
of small contiguous integers, the compiler can use ~50% fewer compare
instructions than it has to use bitwise-and instructions.
Further, cease passing the iterator type into the iterator setup function.
The iterator function can set that itself. Only the direction is required.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In my testing, v9fs_fid_xattr_set will return successfully even if the
backend ext4 filesystem has no space to store xattr key-value. That will
cause inconsistent behavior between front end and back end. The reason is
that lsetxattr will be triggered by p9_client_clunk, and unfortunately we
did not catch the error. This patch will catch the error to notify upper
caller.
p9_client_clunk (in 9p)
p9_client_rpc(clnt, P9_TCLUNK, "d", fid->fid);
v9fs_clunk (in qemu)
put_fid
free_fid
v9fs_xattr_fid_clunk
v9fs_co_lsetxattr
s->ops->lsetxattr
ext4_xattr_user_set (in host ext4 filesystem)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5B57EACC.2060900@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Add an additional "name" field to struct xattr_handler. When the name
is set, the handler matches attributes with exactly that name. When the
prefix is set instead, the handler matches attributes with the given
prefix and with a non-empty suffix.
This patch should avoid bugs like the one fixed in commit c361016a in
the future.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Now that the xattr handler is passed to the xattr handler operations, we
can use the same get and set operations for the user, trusted, and security
xattr namespaces. In those namespaces, we can access the full attribute
name by "reattaching" the name prefix the vfs has skipped for us. Add a
xattr_full_name helper to make this obvious in the code.
For the "system.posix_acl_access" and "system.posix_acl_default"
attributes, handler->prefix is the full attribute name; the suffix is the
empty string.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Cc: v9fs-developer@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
v9fs_fid_xattr_set is supposed to return 0 on success.
This corrects the behaviour introduced in commit
bdd5c28dcb
"9p: fix return value in case in v9fs_fid_xattr_set()"
(The function returns a negative error on error, as expected)
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
In case of error in the p9_client_write, the function v9fs_fid_xattr_set
should return its negative value, what was never being done.
In case of success it only retuned 0. Now it returns the 'offset'
variable (write_count total).
Signed-off-by: Geyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Allow requests for security.* and trusted.* xattr name spaces
to pass through to server.
The new files are 99% cut and paste from fs/9p/xattr_user.c with the
namespaces changed. It has the intended effect in superficial testing.
I do not know much detail about how these namespaces are used, but passing
them through to the server, which can decide whether to handle them or not,
seems reasonable.
I want to support a use case where an ext4 file system is mounted via 9P,
then re-exported via samba to windows clients in a cluster. Windows wants
to store xattrs such as security.NTACL. This works when ext4 directly
backs samba, but not when 9P is inserted. This use case is documented here:
http://code.google.com/p/diod/issues/detail?id=95
Signed-off-by: Jim Garlick <garlick@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Reduce object size by deduplicating formats.
Use vsprintf extension %pV.
Rename P9_DPRINTK uses to p9_debug, align arguments.
Add function for _p9_debug and macro to add __func__.
Add missing "\n"s to p9_debug uses.
Remove embedded function names as p9_debug adds it.
Remove P9_EPRINTK macro and convert use to pr_<level>.
Add and use pr_fmt and pr_<level>.
$ size fs/9p/built-in.o*
text data bss dec hex filename
62133 984 16000 79117 1350d fs/9p/built-in.o.new
67342 984 16928 85254 14d06 fs/9p/built-in.o.old
$ size net/9p/built-in.o*
text data bss dec hex filename
88792 4148 22024 114964 1c114 net/9p/built-in.o.new
94072 4148 23232 121452 1da6c net/9p/built-in.o.old
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
This patch implement fetching POSIX ACL from the server
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Venkateswararao Jujjuri <jvrao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
The ACL value is fetched as a part of inode initialization
from the server and the permission checking function use the
cached value of the ACL
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Venkateswararao Jujjuri <jvrao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
fixes:
CHECK fs/9p/xattr.c
fs/9p/xattr.c:73:6: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
fs/9p/xattr.c:135:6: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Linus Torvalds