Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings:
arch/x86/mm/init.c:81:6:
warning: no previous prototype for ‘x86_has_pat_wp’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
bool x86_has_pat_wp(void)
arch/x86/mm/init.c:86:22:
warning: no previous prototype for ‘pgprot2cachemode’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
enum page_cache_mode pgprot2cachemode(pgprot_t pgprot)
by including the respective header containing prototypes. Also fix:
arch/x86/mm/init.c:893:13:
warning: no previous prototype for ‘mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __weak mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
by making it static inline for the !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT case. This
warning happens when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is not enabled (defconfig
for example):
./arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h:80:27:
warning: inline function ‘mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem’ declared weak [-Wattributes]
static inline void __weak mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
It's ok to convert to static inline because the function is used only in
x86. Is not shared with other architectures so drop the __weak too.
[ bp: Massage and adjust __weak comments while at it. ]
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Thiel <b.thiel@posteo.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200606122629.2720-1-b.thiel@posteo.de
cpu_tlbstate is exported because various TLB-related functions need
access to it, but cpu_tlbstate is sensitive information which should
only be accessed by well-contained kernel functions and not be directly
exposed to modules.
As a first step, move __flush_tlb() out of line and hide the native
function. The latter can be static when CONFIG_PARAVIRT is disabled.
Consolidate the namespace while at it and remove the pointless extra
wrapper in the paravirt code.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092559.246130908@linutronix.de
Using a mask to represent bus DMA constraints has a set of limitations.
The biggest one being it can only hold a power of two (minus one). The
DMA mapping code is already aware of this and treats dev->bus_dma_mask
as a limit. This quirk is already used by some architectures although
still rare.
With the introduction of the Raspberry Pi 4 we've found a new contender
for the use of bus DMA limits, as its PCIe bus can only address the
lower 3GB of memory (of a total of 4GB). This is impossible to represent
with a mask. To make things worse the device-tree code rounds non power
of two bus DMA limits to the next power of two, which is unacceptable in
this case.
In the light of this, rename dev->bus_dma_mask to dev->bus_dma_limit all
over the tree and treat it as such. Note that dev->bus_dma_limit should
contain the higher accessible DMA address.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzjulienne@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Secure Encrypted Virtualization is an x86-specific feature, so it shouldn't
appear in generic kernel code because it forces non-x86 architectures to
define the sev_active() function, which doesn't make a lot of sense.
To solve this problem, add an x86 elfcorehdr_read() function to override
the generic weak implementation. To do that, it's necessary to make
read_from_oldmem() public so that it can be used outside of vmcore.c.
Also, remove the export for sev_active() since it's only used in files that
won't be built as modules.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190806044919.10622-6-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
Now that generic code doesn't reference them, move sme_active() and
sme_me_mask to x86's <asm/mem_encrypt.h>.
Also remove the export for sme_active() since it's only used in files that
won't be built as modules. sme_me_mask on the other hand is used in
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c (via __sme_set() and __psp_pa()) which can be built as a
module so its export needs to stay.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190806044919.10622-5-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
Fix various regressions:
- force unencrypted dma-coherent buffers if encryption bit can't fit
into the dma coherent mask (Tom Lendacky)
- avoid limiting request size if swiotlb is not used (me)
- fix swiotlb handling in dma_direct_sync_sg_for_cpu/device
(Fugang Duan)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQI/BAABCgApFiEEgdbnc3r/njty3Iq9D55TZVIEUYMFAl0zTvELHGhjaEBsc3Qu
ZGUACgkQD55TZVIEUYMAsQ/6AleklMsMbc1xPsYYMukmjAOUNf+nvsFG4PRs/KVn
1/Yohkxx/FN3oXZ+zZEnyd8a5u0ghwkN1WDivEhpclzbDuQP+Z+jEDmb37Oea4aJ
L6XRLQJYiFwwEA6oJ87FNVMZXK/QUo+/lnDvJg0xNW6+HiR4GAUmnqy+/KyEIRSf
SX+aiUOX4tUkwHPWyMaWvTlZ4hZgSovXwkUnR08jCwyJFezUwJBr/Yf5G6M1C10B
hPFTrREhaekXgFd5E1dwKNk5omvfihxGyVUujFZhtMvs//LP8GcFLcVtYRWM/SUZ
XpKkXxnaRC0gEm2P4/tSEGL3xl1CST/oYde74KNBQDIe0svGFS0QrP68+4zu/1ih
vaf2gHoCoJciFY2DHglw1OG/gMWW06OtdseOKe9LZXtsGA6HCVBZW4c01V5YHVQT
TMQMr0UyxJzmrxCo+LafAf9DoQxIii8WapewomwceL0TUtIDIujirzC/ieLhNPKL
L2Fk+zPtFL24IpVe52S1PngatlW4MioiyiJji1QM0RK1V68+r/nSKPBxeq9s+jR3
CfGvfhfRDd/NbZ9m66YFUaRzHL6Fpi2hMvJc9O6dgcVEYEBrL0d8J9nH42cqOlfe
OBGeCxnFNQMuBp4Tw1OZO9PjzR3+pQOb32pOWLDUUs9ed3gtdMrJYTKhw9/cLpyp
838=
=Bv+Q
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'dma-mapping-5.3-1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping
Pull dma-mapping fixes from Christoph Hellwig:
"Fix various regressions:
- force unencrypted dma-coherent buffers if encryption bit can't fit
into the dma coherent mask (Tom Lendacky)
- avoid limiting request size if swiotlb is not used (me)
- fix swiotlb handling in dma_direct_sync_sg_for_cpu/device (Fugang
Duan)"
* tag 'dma-mapping-5.3-1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping:
dma-direct: correct the physical addr in dma_direct_sync_sg_for_cpu/device
dma-direct: only limit the mapping size if swiotlb could be used
dma-mapping: add a dma_addressing_limited helper
dma-direct: Force unencrypted DMA under SME for certain DMA masks
The contents of sme_early_buffer should be cleared after
__sme_early_enc_dec() because it is used to move encrypted and decrypted
data, but since __sme_early_enc_dec() is __init this buffer simply can be
freed after init.
This saves a page that is otherwise unreferenced after init.
Reported-by: Cfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1907101318170.197432@chino.kir.corp.google.com
If a device doesn't support DMA to a physical address that includes the
encryption bit (currently bit 47, so 48-bit DMA), then the DMA must
occur to unencrypted memory. SWIOTLB is used to satisfy that requirement
if an IOMMU is not active (enabled or configured in passthrough mode).
However, commit fafadcd165 ("swiotlb: don't dip into swiotlb pool for
coherent allocations") modified the coherent allocation support in
SWIOTLB to use the DMA direct coherent allocation support. When an IOMMU
is not active, this resulted in dma_alloc_coherent() failing for devices
that didn't support DMA addresses that included the encryption bit.
Addressing this requires changes to the force_dma_unencrypted() function
in kernel/dma/direct.c. Since the function is now non-trivial and
SME/SEV specific, update the DMA direct support to add an arch override
for the force_dma_unencrypted() function. The arch override is selected
when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is set. The arch override function resides in
the arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c file and forces unencrypted DMA when either
SEV is active or SME is active and the device does not support DMA to
physical addresses that include the encryption bit.
Fixes: fafadcd165 ("swiotlb: don't dip into swiotlb pool for coherent allocations")
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[hch: moved the force_dma_unencrypted declaration to dma-mapping.h,
fold the s390 fix from Halil Pasic]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The commit
0a9fe8ca84 ("x86/mm: Validate kernel_physical_mapping_init() PTE population")
triggers this warning in SEV guests:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h:87 phys_pmd_init+0x30d/0x386
Call Trace:
kernel_physical_mapping_init+0xce/0x259
early_set_memory_enc_dec+0x10f/0x160
kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu+0x71/0x9d
start_kernel+0x1c9/0x50b
secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
A SEV guest calls kernel_physical_mapping_init() to clear the encryption
mask from an existing mapping. While doing so, it also splits large
pages into smaller.
To split a page, kernel_physical_mapping_init() allocates a new page and
updates the existing entry. The set_{pud,pmd}_safe() helpers trigger a
warning when updating an entry with a page in the present state.
Add a new kernel_physical_mapping_change() helper which uses the
non-safe variants of set_{pmd,pud,p4d}() and {pmd,pud,p4d}_populate()
routines when updating the entry.
Since kernel_physical_mapping_change() may replace an existing
entry with a new entry, the caller is responsible to flush
the TLB at the end. Change early_set_memory_enc_dec() to use
kernel_physical_mapping_change() when it wants to clear the memory
encryption mask from the page table entry.
[ bp:
- massage commit message.
- flesh out comment according to dhansen's request.
- align function arguments at opening brace. ]
Fixes: 0a9fe8ca84 ("x86/mm: Validate kernel_physical_mapping_init() PTE population")
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417154102.22613-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com
While the dma-direct code is (relatively) clean and simple we actually
have to use the swiotlb ops for the mapping on many architectures due
to devices with addressing limits. Instead of keeping two
implementations around this commit allows the dma-direct
implementation to call the swiotlb bounce buffering functions and
thus share the guts of the mapping implementation. This also
simplified the dma-mapping setup on a few architectures where we
don't have to differenciate which implementation to use.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
kvmclock defines few static variables which are shared with the
hypervisor during the kvmclock initialization.
When SEV is active, memory is encrypted with a guest-specific key, and
if the guest OS wants to share the memory region with the hypervisor
then it must clear the C-bit before sharing it.
Currently, we use kernel_physical_mapping_init() to split large pages
before clearing the C-bit on shared pages. But it fails when called from
the kvmclock initialization (mainly because the memblock allocator is
not ready that early during boot).
Add a __bss_decrypted section attribute which can be used when defining
such shared variable. The so-defined variables will be placed in the
.bss..decrypted section. This section will be mapped with C=0 early
during boot.
The .bss..decrypted section has a big chunk of memory that may be unused
when memory encryption is not active, free it when memory encryption is
not active.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář<rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536932759-12905-2-git-send-email-brijesh.singh@amd.com
With that in place the generic DMA-direct routines can be used to
allocate non-encrypted bounce buffers, and the x86 SEV case can use
the generic swiotlb ops including nice features such as using CMA
allocations.
Note that I'm not too happy about using sev_active() in DMA-direct, but
I couldn't come up with a good enough name for a wrapper to make it
worth adding.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-14-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Give the basic phys_to_dma() and dma_to_phys() helpers a __-prefix and add
the memory encryption mask to the non-prefixed versions. Use the
__-prefixed versions directly instead of clearing the mask again in
various places.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-13-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Now that set_memory_decrypted() is always available we can just call it
directly.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-12-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
All dma_ops implementations used on x86 now take care of setting their own
required GFP_ masks for the allocation. And given that the common code
now clears harmful flags itself that means we can stop the flags in all
the IOMMU implementations as well.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-10-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
These days all devices (including the ISA fallback device) have a coherent
DMA mask set, so remove the workaround.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda <mulix@mulix.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319103826.12853-3-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
There are bunch of functions in mem_encrypt.c that operate on the
identity mapping, which means they want virtual addresses to be equal to
physical one, without PAGE_OFFSET shift.
We also need to avoid paravirtualizaion call there.
Getting this done is tricky. We cannot use usual page table helpers.
It forces us to open-code a lot of things. It makes code ugly and hard
to modify.
We can get it work with the page table helpers, but it requires few
preprocessor tricks. These tricks may have side effects for the rest of
the file.
Let's isolate such functions into own translation unit.
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131135404.40692-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This pull requests contains a consolidation of the generic no-IOMMU code,
a well as the glue code for swiotlb. All the code is based on the x86
implementation with hooks to allow all architectures that aren't cache
coherent to use it. The x86 conversion itself has been deferred because
the x86 maintainers were a little busy in the last months.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQI/BAABCAApFiEEgdbnc3r/njty3Iq9D55TZVIEUYMFAlpxcVoLHGhjaEBsc3Qu
ZGUACgkQD55TZVIEUYN/Lw/+Je9teM4NPQ8lU/ncbJN/bUzCFGJ6dFt2eVX/6xs3
sfl8vBdeHt6CBM02rRNecEr31z3+orjQes5JnlEJFYeG3jumV0zCPw/zbxqjzbJ1
3n6cckLxbxzy8Ca1G/BVjHLAUX5eWp1ujn/Q4d03VKVQZhJvFYlqDbP3TrNVx7xn
k86u37p/o+ngjwX66UdZ3C4iIBF8zqy6n2kkpv4HUQtHHzPwEvliN39eNilovb56
iGOzjDX1UWHAu4xCTVnPHSG4fA4XU41NWzIN3DIVPE25lYSISSl9TFAdR8GeZA0G
0Yj6sW53pRSoUwco1ocoS44/FgrPOB5/vHIL06pABvicXBiomje1QylqcK7zAczk
esjkfPEZrmZuu99GtqFyDNKEvKKdy+aBGaTZ3y+NxsuBs+0xS2Owz1IE4Tk28xaw
xh7zn+CVdk2fJh6ZIdw5Eu9b9VN08UriqDmDzO/ylDlcNGcDi7wcxiSTEkHJ1ON/
g9nletV6f3egL0wljDcOnhCJCHTvmWEeq3z8lE55QzPzSH0hHpnGQ2WD0tKrroxz
kjOZp0TdXa4F5iysOHe2xl2sftOH0zIkBQJ+oBcK12mTaLu21+yeuCggQXJ/CBdk
1Ol7l9g9T0TDuZPfiTHt5+6jmECQs92LElWA8x7uF7Fpix3BpnafWaaSMSsosF3F
D1Y=
=Nrl9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'dma-mapping-4.16' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping
Pull dma mapping updates from Christoph Hellwig:
"Except for a runtime warning fix from Christian this is all about
consolidation of the generic no-IOMMU code, a well as the glue code
for swiotlb.
All the code is based on the x86 implementation with hooks to allow
all architectures that aren't cache coherent to use it.
The x86 conversion itself has been deferred because the x86
maintainers were a little busy in the last months"
* tag 'dma-mapping-4.16' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping: (57 commits)
MAINTAINERS: add the iommu list for swiotlb and xen-swiotlb
arm64: use swiotlb_alloc and swiotlb_free
arm64: replace ZONE_DMA with ZONE_DMA32
mips: use swiotlb_{alloc,free}
mips/netlogic: remove swiotlb support
tile: use generic swiotlb_ops
tile: replace ZONE_DMA with ZONE_DMA32
unicore32: use generic swiotlb_ops
ia64: remove an ifdef around the content of pci-dma.c
ia64: clean up swiotlb support
ia64: use generic swiotlb_ops
ia64: replace ZONE_DMA with ZONE_DMA32
swiotlb: remove various exports
swiotlb: refactor coherent buffer allocation
swiotlb: refactor coherent buffer freeing
swiotlb: wire up ->dma_supported in swiotlb_dma_ops
swiotlb: add common swiotlb_map_ops
swiotlb: rename swiotlb_free to swiotlb_exit
x86: rename swiotlb_dma_ops
powerpc: rename swiotlb_dma_ops
...
Commit bacf6b499e ("x86/mm: Use a struct to reduce parameters for SME
PGD mapping") moved some parameters into a structure.
The structure was large enough to trigger the stack protection canary in
sme_encrypt_kernel which doesn't work this early, causing reboots.
Mark sme_encrypt_kernel appropriately to not use the canary.
Fixes: bacf6b499e ("x86/mm: Use a struct to reduce parameters for SME PGD mapping")
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently the BSP microcode update code examines the initrd very early
in the boot process. If SME is active, the initrd is treated as being
encrypted but it has not been encrypted (in place) yet. Update the
early boot code that encrypts the kernel to also encrypt the initrd so
that early BSP microcode updates work.
Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110192634.6026.10452.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
In preparation for encrypting more than just the kernel, the encryption
support in sme_encrypt_kernel() needs to support 4KB page aligned
encryption instead of just 2MB large page aligned encryption.
Update the routines that populate the PGD to support non-2MB aligned
addresses. This is done by creating PTE page tables for the start
and end portion of the address range that fall outside of the 2MB
alignment. This results in, at most, two extra pages to hold the
PTE entries for each mapping of a range.
Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110192626.6026.75387.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
In preparation for encrypting more than just the kernel during early
boot processing, centralize the use of the PMD flag settings based
on the type of mapping desired. When 4KB aligned encryption is added,
this will allow either PTE flags or large page PMD flags to be used
without requiring the caller to adjust.
Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110192615.6026.14767.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
In preparation for follow-on patches, combine the PGD mapping parameters
into a struct to reduce the number of function arguments and allow for
direct updating of the next pagetable mapping area pointer.
Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110192605.6026.96206.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
phys_to_dma, dma_to_phys and dma_capable are helpers published by
architecture code for use of swiotlb and xen-swiotlb only. Drivers are
not supposed to use these directly, but use the DMA API instead.
Move these to a new asm/dma-direct.h helper, included by a
linux/dma-direct.h wrapper that provides the default linear mapping
unless the architecture wants to override it.
In the MIPS case the existing dma-coherent.h is reused for now as
untangling it will take a bit of work.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Commit d8aa7eea78 ("x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
support") changed sme_active() from an inline function that referenced
sme_me_mask to a non-inlined function in order to make the sev_enabled
variable a static variable. This function was marked EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL
because at the time the patch was submitted, sme_me_mask was marked
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL.
Commit 87df26175e ("x86/mm: Unbreak modules that rely on external
PAGE_KERNEL availability") changed sme_me_mask variable from
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL to EXPORT_SYMBOL, allowing external modules the ability
to build with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y. Now, however, with sev_active()
no longer an inline function and marked as EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL, external
modules that use the DMA API are once again broken in 4.15. Since the DMA
API is meant to be used by external modules, this needs to be changed.
Change the sme_active() and sev_active() functions from EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL
to EXPORT_SYMBOL.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171215162011.14125.7113.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Commit 7744ccdbc1 ("x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
support") as a side-effect made PAGE_KERNEL all of a sudden unavailable
to modules which can't make use of EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() symbols.
This is because once SME is enabled, sme_me_mask (which is introduced as
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL) makes its way to PAGE_KERNEL through _PAGE_ENC,
causing imminent build failure for all the modules which make use of all
the EXPORT-SYMBOL()-exported API (such as vmap(), __vmalloc(),
remap_pfn_range(), ...).
Exporting (as EXPORT_SYMBOL()) interfaces (and having done so for ages)
that take pgprot_t argument, while making it impossible to -- all of a
sudden -- pass PAGE_KERNEL to it, feels rather incosistent.
Restore the original behavior and make it possible to pass PAGE_KERNEL
to all its EXPORT_SYMBOL() consumers.
[ This is all so not wonderful. We shouldn't need that "sme_me_mask"
access at all in all those places that really don't care about that
level of detail, and just want _PAGE_KERNEL or whatever.
We have some similar issues with _PAGE_CACHE_WP and _PAGE_NOCACHE,
both of which hide a "cachemode2protval()" call, and which also ends
up using another EXPORT_SYMBOL(), but at least that only triggers for
the much more rare cases.
Maybe we could move these dynamic page table bits to be generated much
deeper down in the VM layer, instead of hiding them in the macros that
everybody uses.
So this all would merit some cleanup. But not today. - Linus ]
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Despised-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some KVM-specific custom MSRs share the guest physical address with the
hypervisor in early boot. When SEV is active, the shared physical address
must be mapped with memory encryption attribute cleared so that both
hypervisor and guest can access the data.
Add APIs to change the memory encryption attribute in early boot code.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-15-brijesh.singh@amd.com
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) does not support string I/O, so
unroll the string I/O operation into a loop operating on one element at
a time.
[ tglx: Gave the static key a real name instead of the obscure __sev ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-14-brijesh.singh@amd.com
Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is
running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active.
Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a
hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available
(CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR
(0xc0010131, bit 0).
This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the
pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are
updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is
decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly.
After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is
used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows
to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences
in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with
SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME).
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
DMA access to encrypted memory cannot be performed when SEV is active.
In order for DMA to properly work when SEV is active, the SWIOTLB bounce
buffers must be used.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>C
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-12-brijesh.singh@amd.com
Provide support for Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines a flag that is used by the kernel to determine if it is
running with SEV active.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com
A TLB flush is not required when doing in-place encryption or decryption
since the area's pagetable attributes are not being altered. To avoid
confusion between what the routine is doing and what is documented in
the AMD APM, delete the local_flush_tlb() call.
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171101165426.1388.24866.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Some routines in mem_encrypt.c are called very early in the boot process,
e.g. sme_encrypt_kernel(). When CONFIG_TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING=y is defined
the resulting branch profiling associated with the check to see if SME is
active results in a kernel crash. Disable branch profiling for
mem_encrypt.c by defining DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING before including any
header files.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@01.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929162419.6016.53390.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The SME encryption mask is for masking 64-bit pagetable entries. It
being an unsigned long works fine on X86_64 but on 32-bit builds in
truncates bits leading to Xen guests crashing very early.
And regardless, the whole SME mask handling shouldnt've leaked into
32-bit because SME is X86_64-only feature. So, first make the mask u64.
And then, add trivial 32-bit versions of the __sme_* macros so that
nothing happens there.
Reported-and-tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Fixes: 21729f81ce ("x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170907093837.76zojtkgebwtqc74@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
configuration of the default state). If memory encryption is to be
activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
"in place."
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5f0da2fd4cce63f556117549e2c89c170072209f.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating
new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping
and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is encrypted by copying it through
a temporary buffer.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c039bf9412ef95e1e6bf4fdf8facab95e00c717b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
initialized to create decrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aa2d29b78ae7d508db8881e46a3215231b9327a7.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
state and are copied early in the boot process. The early page fault
support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.
For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of
the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed
properly.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb0d430b41efefd45ee515aaf0979dcfda8b6a44.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during
the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory
encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either
an encrypted or decrypted memory area is in the proper state (for example
the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be
encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted).
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f9968e9432cd6c4b57ef245729be04ff18852225.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot()
macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.
The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO. SME does
not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption
mask from the page attribute.
Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow
creating a physical address with the encryption mask. These are used when
working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current
__va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off
of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same
virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled
for that physical location or not.
Also, an early initialization function is added for SME. If SME is active,
this function:
- Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings
with the encryption mask.
- Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask.
- Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so
that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask
applied.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.
The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Benjamin Thiel