DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU() defines srcu struct and do init at build time.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Some security modules and oprofile still uses VM_EXECUTABLE for retrieving
a task's executable file. After this patch they will use mm->exe_file
directly. mm->exe_file is protected with mm->mmap_sem, so locking stays
the same.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> [arch/tile]
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [tomoyo]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The pathname of /usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy seen from Ubuntu 12.04 Live CD is
squashfs:/usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy rather than /usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy .
Therefore, we need to accept manager programs which do not start with / .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates for 3.4 from James Morris:
"The main addition here is the new Yama security module from Kees Cook,
which was discussed at the Linux Security Summit last year. Its
purpose is to collect miscellaneous DAC security enhancements in one
place. This also marks a departure in policy for LSM modules, which
were previously limited to being standalone access control systems.
Chromium OS is using Yama, and I believe there are plans for Ubuntu,
at least.
This patchset also includes maintenance updates for AppArmor, TOMOYO
and others."
Fix trivial conflict in <net/sock.h> due to the jumo_label->static_key
rename.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
AppArmor: Fix location of const qualifier on generated string tables
TOMOYO: Return error if fails to delete a domain
AppArmor: add const qualifiers to string arrays
AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy
TOMOYO: Return appropriate value to poll().
AppArmor: Move path failure information into aa_get_name and rename
AppArmor: Update dfa matching routines.
AppArmor: Minor cleanup of d_namespace_path to consolidate error handling
AppArmor: Retrieve the dentry_path for error reporting when path lookup fails
AppArmor: Add const qualifiers to generated string tables
AppArmor: Fix oops in policy unpack auditing
AppArmor: Fix error returned when a path lookup is disconnected
KEYS: testing wrong bit for KEY_FLAG_REVOKED
TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.
security: fix ima kconfig warning
AppArmor: Fix the error case for chroot relative path name lookup
AppArmor: fix mapping of META_READ to audit and quiet flags
AppArmor: Fix underflow in xindex calculation
AppArmor: Fix dropping of allowed operations that are force audited
AppArmor: Add mising end of structure test to caps unpacking
...
Call sequence:
tomoyo_write_domain() --> tomoyo_delete_domain()
In 'tomoyo_delete_domain', return -EINTR if locking attempt is
interrupted by signal.
At present it returns success to its caller 'tomoyo_write_domain()'
even though domain is not deleted. 'tomoyo_write_domain()' assumes
domain is deleted and returns success to its caller. This is wrong behaviour.
'tomoyo_write_domain' should return error from tomoyo_delete_domain() to its
caller.
Signed-off-by: Santosh Nayak <santoshprasadnayak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
"struct file_operations"->poll() expects "unsigned int" return value.
All files in /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory other than
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query and /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit should
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM rather than -ENOSYS.
Also, /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query and /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit
should return POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM rather than 0 when there is no data to read.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Userspace can pass in arbitrary combinations of MS_* flags to mount().
If both MS_BIND and one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE are
passed, device name which should be checked for MS_BIND was not checked because
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE had higher priority than MS_BIND.
If both one of MS_BIND/MS_MOVE and MS_REMOUNT are passed, device name which
should not be checked for MS_REMOUNT was checked because MS_BIND/MS_MOVE had
higher priority than MS_REMOUNT.
Fix these bugs by changing priority to MS_REMOUNT -> MS_BIND ->
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE -> MS_MOVE as with do_mount() does.
Also, unconditionally return -EINVAL if more than one of
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE is passed so that TOMOYO will not
generate inaccurate audit logs, for commit 7a2e8a8f "VFS: Sanity check mount
flags passed to change_mnt_propagation()" clarified that these flags must be
exclusively passed.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
TOMOYO 2.5 in Linux 3.2 and later handles Unix domain socket's address.
Thus, tomoyo_correct_word2() needs to accept \000 as a valid character, or
TOMOYO 2.5 cannot handle Unix domain's abstract socket address.
Reported-by: Steven Allen <steven@stebalien.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org [3.2+]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (32 commits)
ima: fix invalid memory reference
ima: free duplicate measurement memory
security: update security_file_mmap() docs
selinux: Casting (void *) value returned by kmalloc is useless
apparmor: fix module parameter handling
Security: tomoyo: add .gitignore file
tomoyo: add missing rcu_dereference()
apparmor: add missing rcu_dereference()
evm: prevent racing during tfm allocation
evm: key must be set once during initialization
mpi/mpi-mpow: NULL dereference on allocation failure
digsig: build dependency fix
KEYS: Give key types their own lockdep class for key->sem
TPM: fix transmit_cmd error logic
TPM: NSC and TIS drivers X86 dependency fix
TPM: Export wait_for_stat for other vendor specific drivers
TPM: Use vendor specific function for status probe
tpm_tis: add delay after aborting command
tpm_tis: Check return code from getting timeouts/durations
tpm: Introduce function to poll for result of self test
...
Fix up trivial conflict in lib/Makefile due to addition of CONFIG_MPI
and SIGSIG next to CONFIG_DQL addition.
tomoyo/realpath.c needs exactly one include - that of common.h. It pulls
everything the thing needs, without doing ridiculous garbage such as trying
to include ../../fs/internal.h. If that alone doesn't scream "layering
violation", I don't know what does; and these days it's all for nothing,
since it fortunately does not use any symbols defined in there...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This adds the .gitignore file for the autogenerated TOMOYO files to keep
git from complaining after building things.
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Current tomoyo_realpath_from_path() implementation returns strange pathname
when calculating pathname of a file which belongs to lazy unmounted tree.
Use local pathname rather than strange absolute pathname in that case.
Also, this patch fixes a regression by commit 02125a82 "fix apparmor
dereferencing potentially freed dentry, sanitize __d_path() API".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
__d_path() API is asking for trouble and in case of apparmor d_namespace_path()
getting just that. The root cause is that when __d_path() misses the root
it had been told to look for, it stores the location of the most remote ancestor
in *root. Without grabbing references. Sure, at the moment of call it had
been pinned down by what we have in *path. And if we raced with umount -l, we
could have very well stopped at vfsmount/dentry that got freed as soon as
prepend_path() dropped vfsmount_lock.
It is safe to compare these pointers with pre-existing (and known to be still
alive) vfsmount and dentry, as long as all we are asking is "is it the same
address?". Dereferencing is not safe and apparmor ended up stepping into
that. d_namespace_path() really wants to examine the place where we stopped,
even if it's not connected to our namespace. As the result, it looked
at ->d_sb->s_magic of a dentry that might've been already freed by that point.
All other callers had been careful enough to avoid that, but it's really
a bad interface - it invites that kind of trouble.
The fix is fairly straightforward, even though it's bigger than I'd like:
* prepend_path() root argument becomes const.
* __d_path() is never called with NULL/NULL root. It was a kludge
to start with. Instead, we have an explicit function - d_absolute_root().
Same as __d_path(), except that it doesn't get root passed and stops where
it stops. apparmor and tomoyo are using it.
* __d_path() returns NULL on path outside of root. The main
caller is show_mountinfo() and that's precisely what we pass root for - to
skip those outside chroot jail. Those who don't want that can (and do)
use d_path().
* __d_path() root argument becomes const. Everyone agrees, I hope.
* apparmor does *NOT* try to use __d_path() or any of its variants
when it sees that path->mnt is an internal vfsmount. In that case it's
definitely not mounted anywhere and dentry_path() is exactly what we want
there. Handling of sysctl()-triggered weirdness is moved to that place.
* if apparmor is asked to do pathname relative to chroot jail
and __d_path() tells it we it's not in that jail, the sucker just calls
d_absolute_path() instead. That's the other remaining caller of __d_path(),
BTW.
* seq_path_root() does _NOT_ return -ENAMETOOLONG (it's stupid anyway -
the normal seq_file logics will take care of growing the buffer and redoing
the call of ->show() just fine). However, if it gets path not reachable
from root, it returns SEQ_SKIP. The only caller adjusted (i.e. stopped
ignoring the return value as it used to do).
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
ACKed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Commit 17fcfbd9 "TOMOYO: Add interactive enforcing mode." introduced ability
to query access decision using userspace programs. It was using global PID for
reaching policy configuration of the process. However, use of PID returns stale
policy configuration when the process's subjective credentials and objective
credentials differ. Fix this problem by allowing reaching policy configuration
via query id.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits)
TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek.
Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user
TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option.
Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access
Smack: compilation fix
Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte
Smack: domain transition protections (v3)
Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED)
Smack: Clean up comments
Smack: Repair processing of fcntl
Smack: Rule list lookup performance
Smack: check permissions from user space (v2)
TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock.
TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning.
TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock.
TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings.
target: check hex2bin result
encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result
...
Commit f23571e8 "TOMOYO: Copy directly to userspace buffer." introduced
tomoyo_flush() that flushes data to be read as soon as possible.
tomoyo_select_domain() (which is called by write()) enqueues data which meant
to be read by next read(), but previous read()'s read buffer's size was not
cleared. As a result, since 2.6.36, sequence like
char *cp = "select global-pid=1\n";
read(fd, buf1, sizeof(buf1));
write(fd, cp, strlen(cp));
read(fd, buf2, sizeof(buf2));
causes enqueued data to be flushed to buf1 rather than buf2.
Fix this bug by clearing read buffer's size upon write() request.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_{ACCEPT_ENTRY,AUDIT_LOG} introduced by commit
0e4ae0e0 "TOMOYO: Make several options configurable." were by error not used.
Reported-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit 059d84db "TOMOYO: Add socket operation restriction support" and
commit 731d37aa "TOMOYO: Allow domain transition without execve()." forgot to
update tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok() and tomoyo_del_acl() which results in
incorrect quota counting and memory leak.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
rcu_read_lock() is sufficient for calling find_task_by_pid_ns()/find_task_by_vpid().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit bd03a3e4 "TOMOYO: Add policy namespace support." introduced policy
namespace. But as of /sbin/modprobe is executed from initramfs/initrd, profiles
for target domain's namespace is not defined because /sbin/tomoyo-init is not
yet called.
Reported-by: Jamie Nguyen <jamie@tomoyolinux.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When TOMOYO started using garbage collector at commit 847b173e "TOMOYO: Add
garbage collector.", we waited for close() before kfree(). Thus, elements to be
kfree()d were queued up using tomoyo_gc_list list.
But it turned out that tomoyo_element_linked_by_gc() tends to choke garbage
collector when certain pattern of entries are queued.
Since garbage collector is no longer waiting for close() since commit 2e503bbb
"TOMOYO: Fix lockdep warning.", we can remove tomoyo_gc_list list and
tomoyo_element_linked_by_gc() by doing sequential processing.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit efe836ab "TOMOYO: Add built-in policy support." introduced
tomoyo_load_builtin_policy() but was by error called from nowhere.
Commit b22b8b9f "TOMOYO: Rename meminfo to stat and show more statistics."
introduced tomoyo_update_stat() but was by error not called from
tomoyo_assign_domain().
Also, mark tomoyo_io_printf() and tomoyo_path_permission() static functions,
as reported by "make namespacecheck".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
I got an opinion that it is difficult to use exception policy's domain
transition control directives because they need to match the pathname specified
to "file execute" directives. For example, if "file execute /bin/\*\-ls\-cat"
is given, corresponding domain transition control directive needs to be like
"no_keep_domain /bin/\*\-ls\-cat from any".
If we can specify like below, it will become more convenient.
file execute /bin/ls keep exec.realpath="/bin/ls" exec.argv[0]="ls"
file execute /bin/cat keep exec.realpath="/bin/cat" exec.argv[0]="cat"
file execute /bin/\*\-ls\-cat child
file execute /usr/sbin/httpd <apache> exec.realpath="/usr/sbin/httpd" exec.argv[0]="/usr/sbin/httpd"
In above examples, "keep" works as if keep_domain is specified, "child" works
as if "no_reset_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" and "no_keep_domain" are
specified, "<apache>" causes domain transition to <apache> domain upon
successful execve() operation.
Moreover, we can also allow transition to different domains based on conditions
like below example.
<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd
file execute /bin/bash <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd //batch-session exec.argc=2 exec.argv[1]="-c"
file execute /bin/bash <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd //root-session task.uid=0
file execute /bin/bash <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd //nonroot-session task.uid!=0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tell userland tools that this is TOMOYO 2.5.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
There was a race window that the pathname which is subjected to "file execute"
permission check when retrying via supervisor's decision because the pathname
was recalculated upon retry. Though, there is an inevitable race window even
without supervisor, for we have to calculate the symbolic link's pathname from
"struct linux_binprm"->filename rather than from "struct linux_binprm"->file
because we cannot back calculate the symbolic link's pathname from the
dereferenced pathname.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To be able to split permissions for Apache's CGI programs which are executed
without execve(), add special domain transition which is performed by writing
a TOMOYO's domainname to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain interface.
This is an API for TOMOYO-aware userland applications. However, since I expect
TOMOYO and other LSM modules to run in parallel, this patch does not use
/proc/self/attr/ interface in order to avoid conflicts with other LSM modules
when it became possible to run multiple LSM modules in parallel.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add per-entry flag which controls generation of grant logs because Xen and KVM
issues ioctl requests so frequently. For example,
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 grant_log=no
will suppress /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit even if preference says
grant_log=yes .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks for PF_INET/PF_INET6/PF_UNIX
socket's bind()/listen()/connect()/send() operations.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for checking environment variable's names.
Although TOMOYO already provides ability to check argv[]/envp[] passed to
execve() requests,
file execute /bin/sh exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]="bar"
will reject execution of /bin/sh if environment variable LD_LIBRARY_PATH is not
defined. To grant execution of /bin/sh if LD_LIBRARY_PATH is not defined,
administrators have to specify like
file execute /bin/sh exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]="/system/lib"
file execute /bin/sh exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]=NULL
. Since there are many environment variables whereas conditional checks are
applied as "&&", it is difficult to cover all combinations. Therefore, this
patch supports conditional checks that are applied as "||", by specifying like
file execute /bin/sh
misc env LD_LIBRARY_PATH exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]="/system/lib"
which means "grant execution of /bin/sh if environment variable is not defined
or is defined and its value is /system/lib".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In tomoyo_get_mode() since 2.6.36, CONFIG::file::execute was by error used in
place of CONFIG::file if CONFIG::file::execute was set to other than default.
As a result, enforcing mode was not applied in a way documentation says.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
daemonize() is only needed when a user-space task does kernel_thread().
tomoyo_gc_thread() is kthread_create()'ed and thus it doesn't need
the soon-to-be-deprecated daemonize().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit bd03a3e4 "TOMOYO: Add policy namespace support." forgot to set EOF flag
and forgot to print namespace at PREFERENCE line.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Update comments for scripts/kernel-doc and fix some of errors reported by
scripts/checkpatch.pl .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks using argv[]/envp[] of execve()
request. Hooks are in the last patch of this pathset.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks using executable file's realpath
upon execve() and symlink's target upon symlink(). Hooks are in the last patch
of this pathset.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks using file object's DAC
attributes (e.g. owner/group) when checking file's pathnames. Hooks for passing
file object's pointers are in the last patch of this pathset.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks using current thread's UID/GID
etc. in addition to pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status can be easily emulated using
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy . We can remove this interface by
updating /usr/sbin/tomoyo-setprofile utility.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
I forgot to add #ifndef in commit 0e4ae0e0 "TOMOYO: Make several options
configurable.", resulting
security/built-in.o: In function `tomoyo_bprm_set_creds':
tomoyo.c:(.text+0x4698e): undefined reference to `tomoyo_load_policy'
error.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To be able to start using enforcing mode from the early stage of boot sequence,
this patch adds support for activating access control without calling external
policy loader program. This will be useful for systems where operations which
can lead to the hijacking of the boot sequence are needed before loading the
policy. For example, you can activate immediately after loading the fixed part
of policy which will allow only operations needed for mounting a partition
which contains the variant part of policy and verifying (e.g. running GPG
check) and loading the variant part of policy. Since you can start using
enforcing mode from the beginning, you can reduce the possibility of hijacking
the boot sequence.
This patch makes several variables configurable on build time. This patch also
adds TOMOYO_loader= and TOMOYO_trigger= kernel command line option to boot the
same kernel in two different init systems (BSD-style init and systemd).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To be able to start using enforcing mode from the early stage of boot sequence,
this patch adds support for built-in policy configuration (and next patch adds
support for activating access control without calling external policy loader
program).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Show statistics such as last policy update time and last policy violation time
in addition to memory usage.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Gather string constants to one file in order to make the object size smaller.
Use unsigned type where appropriate.
read()/write() returns ssize_t.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently TOMOYO holds SRCU lock upon open() and releases it upon close()
because list elements stored in the "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" instances are
accessed until close() is called. However, such SRCU usage causes lockdep to
complain about leaving the kernel with SRCU lock held.
This patch solves the warning by holding/releasing SRCU upon each
read()/write(). This patch is doing something similar to calling kfree()
without calling synchronize_srcu(), by selectively deferring kfree() by keeping
track of the "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" instances.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TOMOYO wants to use /proc/self/ rather than /proc/$PID/ if $PID matches current
thread's process ID in order to prevent current thread from accessing other
process's information unless needed.
But since procfs can be mounted on various locations (e.g. /proc/ /proc2/ /p/
/tmp/foo/100/p/ ), TOMOYO cannot tell that whether the numeric part in the
string returned by __d_path() represents process ID or not.
Therefore, to be able to convert from $PID to self no matter where procfs is
mounted, this patch changes pathname representations for filesystems which do
not support rename() operation (e.g. proc, sysfs, securityfs).
Examples:
/proc/self/mounts => proc:/self/mounts
/sys/kernel/security/ => sys:/kernel/security/
/dev/pts/0 => devpts:/0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Mauras Olivier reported that it is difficult to use TOMOYO in LXC environments,
for TOMOYO cannot distinguish between environments outside the container and
environments inside the container since LXC environments are created using
pivot_root(). To address this problem, this patch introduces policy namespace.
Each policy namespace has its own set of domain policy, exception policy and
profiles, which are all independent of other namespaces. This independency
allows users to develop policy without worrying interference among namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
ACL group allows administrator to globally grant not only "file read"
permission but also other permissions.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit interface. This interface generates audit
logs in the form of domain policy so that /usr/sbin/tomoyo-auditd can reuse
audit logs for appending to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
interface.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Remove global preference from profile structure in order to make code simpler.
Due to this structure change, printk() warnings upon policy violation are
temporarily disabled. They will be replaced by
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit by next patch.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert "allow_..." style directives to "file ..." style directives.
By converting to the latter style, we can pack policy like
"file read/write/execute /path/to/file".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use structure for passing ACL line, in preparation for supporting policy
namespace and conditional parameters.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common structure for ACL with "struct list_head" + "atomic_t".
Use array/struct where possible.
Remove is_group from "struct tomoyo_name_union"/"struct tomoyo_number_union".
Pass "struct file"->private_data rather than "struct file".
Update some of comments.
Bring tomoyo_same_acl_head() from common.h to domain.c .
Bring tomoyo_invalid()/tomoyo_valid() from common.h to util.c .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Update (or temporarily remove) comments.
Remove or replace some of #define lines.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In order to synchronize with TOMOYO 1.8's syntax,
(1) Remove special handling for allow_read/write permission.
(2) Replace deny_rewrite/allow_rewrite permission with allow_append permission.
(3) Remove file_pattern keyword.
(4) Remove allow_read permission from exception policy.
(5) Allow creating domains in enforcing mode without calling supervisor.
(6) Add permission check for opening directory for reading.
(7) Add permission check for stat() operation.
(8) Make "cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain" behave as if
"cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking
dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing
mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request.
Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In tomoyo_correct_domain() since 2.6.36, TOMOYO was by error validating
"<kernel>" + "/foo/\" + "/bar" when "<kernel> /foo/\* /bar" was given.
As a result, legal domainnames like "<kernel> /foo/\* /bar" are rejected.
Reported-by: Hayama Yossihiro <yossi@yedo.src.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, reference to device file (e.g. /dev/sda1)
was leaking.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In tomoyo_flush(), head->r.w[0] holds pointer to string data to be printed.
But head->r.w[0] was updated only when the string data was partially
printed (because head->r.w[0] will be updated by head->r.w[1] later if
completely printed). However, regarding /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query ,
an additional '\0' is printed after the string data was completely printed.
But if free space for read buffer became 0 before printing the additional '\0',
tomoyo_flush() was returning without updating head->r.w[0]. As a result,
tomoyo_flush() forever reprints already printed string data.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
"mount --bind /path/to/file1 /path/to/file2" is legal. Therefore,
"umount /path/to/file2" is also legal. Do not automatically append trailing '/'
if pathname to be unmounted does not end with '/'.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In tomoyo_write_profile() since 2.6.34, a lock was by error missing when
replacing profile's comment line. If multiple threads attempted
echo '0-COMMENT=comment' > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile
in parallel, garbage collector will fail to kfree() the old value.
Protect the replacement using a lock. Also, keep the old value rather than
replace with empty string when out of memory error has occurred.
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Wang <wangxiaochen0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When memory used for policy exceeds the quota, tomoyo_memory_ok() return false.
In this case, tomoyo_commit_ok() must call kfree() before returning NULL.
This bug exists since 2.6.35.
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Wang <wangxiaochen0@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In tomoyo_check_open_permission() since 2.6.36, TOMOYO was by error
recalculating already calculated pathname when checking allow_rewrite
permission. As a result, memory will leak whenever a file is opened for writing
without O_APPEND flag. Also, performance will degrade because TOMOYO is
calculating pathname regardless of profile configuration.
This patch fixes the leak and performance degrade.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Protect d_unhashed(dentry) condition with d_lock. This means keeping
DCACHE_UNHASHED bit in synch with hash manipulations.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
All callers take dcache_lock just around the call to __d_path, so
take the lock into it in preparation of getting rid of dcache_lock.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Configuration files for TOMOYO 2.3 are not compatible with TOMOYO 2.2.
But current panic() message is too unfriendly and is confusing users.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If domain is NULL then &domain->list is a bogus address. Let's leave
head->r.domain NULL instead of saving an unusable pointer.
This is just a cleanup. The current code always checks head->r.eof
before dereferencing head->r.domain.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
System call entry functions sys_*() are never to be called from
general kernel code. The fact that they aren't declared in header
files should have been a clue. These functions also don't exist on
Alpha since it has sys_getxpid() instead.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit c9e69318 "TOMOYO: Allow wildcard for execute permission." changed execute
permission and domainname to accept wildcards. But tomoyo_find_next_domain()
was using pathname passed to execve() rather than pathname specified by the
execute permission. As a result, processes were not able to transit to domains
which contain wildcards in their domainnames.
This patch passes pathname specified by the execute permission back to
tomoyo_find_next_domain() so that processes can transit to domains which
contain wildcards in their domainnames.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit d74725b9 "TOMOYO: Use callback for updating entries." broke
tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok() by counting deleted entries. It needs to
count non-deleted entries.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TOMOYO does not deal offset pointer. Thus seek operation makes
no sense. Changing default seek operation from default_llseek()
to no_llseek() might break some applications. Thus, explicitly
set noop_llseek().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fit 80 columns limit.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Split tomoyo_write_profile() into several functions.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When userspace program reads policy from /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/
interface, TOMOYO uses line buffered mode. A line has at least one word.
Commit 006dacc "TOMOYO: Support longer pathname." changed a word's max length
from 4000 bytes to max kmalloc()able bytes. By that commit, a line's max length
changed from 8192 bytes to more than max kmalloc()able bytes.
Max number of words in a line remains finite. This patch changes the way of
buffering so that all words in a line are firstly directly copied to userspace
buffer as much as possible and are secondly queued for next read request.
Words queued are guaranteed to be valid until /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/
interface is close()d.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Policy editor needs to know allow_execute entries in order to build domain
transition tree. Reading all entries is slow. Thus, allow reading only
allow_execute entries.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Change list_for_each_cookie to
(1) start from current position rather than next position
(2) remove temporary cursor
(3) check that srcu_read_lock() is held
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common code for "initialize_domain"/"no_initialize_domain"/"keep_domain"/
"no_keep_domain" keywords.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Some programs behave differently depending on argv[0] passed to execve().
TOMOYO has "alias" keyword in order to allow administrators to define different
domains if requested pathname passed to execve() is a symlink. But "alias"
keyword is incomplete because this keyword assumes that requested pathname and
argv[0] are identical. Thus, remove "alias" keyword (by this patch) and add
syntax for checking argv[0] (by future patches).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common code for "path_group" and "number_group".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Now lists are accessible via array index. Aggregate reader functions using index.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Assign list id and make the lists as array of "struct list_head".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
"struct tomoyo_path_group" and "struct tomoyo_number_group" are identical.
Rename tomoyo_path_group/tomoyo_number_group to tomoyo_group and
tomoyo_path_group_member to tomoyo_path_group and
tomoyo_number_group_member to tomoyo_unmber_group.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Pass "struct list_head" to tomoyo_add_to_gc() and bring
list_del_rcu() to tomoyo_add_to_gc().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Read functions do not fail. Make them from int to void.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Keyword strings are read-only. We can directly access them to reduce code size.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If invalid combination of mount flags are given, it will be rejected later.
Thus, no need for TOMOYO to reject invalid combination of mount flags.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fix 80 columns limit.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We can use callback function since parameters are passed via
"const struct tomoyo_request_info".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To make it possible to use callback function, pass parameters via
"struct tomoyo_request_info".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
tomoyo_file_perm() and tomoyo_path_permission() are similar.
We can embed tomoyo_file_perm() into tomoyo_path_permission().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common code for elements using "struct list_head" + "bool" structure.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common code for elements using "struct list_head" + "bool" structure.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common "struct list_head" + "bool" structure.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common "struct list_head" + "bool" + "u8" structure and
use common code for elements using that structure.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch allows users to change access control mode for per-operation basis.
This feature comes from non LSM version of TOMOYO which is designed for
permitting users to use SELinux and TOMOYO at the same time.
SELinux does not care filename in a directory whereas TOMOYO does. Change of
filename can change how the file is used. For example, renaming index.txt to
.htaccess will change how the file is used. Thus, letting SELinux to enforce
read()/write()/mmap() etc. restriction and letting TOMOYO to enforce rename()
restriction is an example usage of this feature.
What is unfortunate for me is that currently LSM does not allow users to use
SELinux and LSM version of TOMOYO at the same time...
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch allows users to aggregate programs which provide similar
functionality (e.g. /usr/bin/vi and /usr/bin/emacs ).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Some applications create and execute programs dynamically. We need to accept
wildcard for execute permission because such programs contain random suffix
in their filenames. This patch loosens up regulation of string parameters.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When commit be6d3e56a6 "introduce new LSM hooks
where vfsmount is available." was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(),
only "struct file *" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed.
But length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor.
Thus, let's remove these arguments.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
security/tomoyo/common.c became too large to read.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since the behavior of the system is restricted by policy, we may need to update
policy when you update packages.
We need to update policy in the following cases.
* The pathname of files has changed.
* The dependency of files has changed.
* The access permissions required has increased.
The ideal way to update policy is to rebuild from the scratch using learning
mode. But it is not desirable to change from enforcing mode to other mode if
the system has once entered in production state. Suppose MAC could support
per-application enforcing mode, the MAC becomes useless if an application that
is not running in enforcing mode was cracked. For example, the whole system
becomes vulnerable if only HTTP server application is running in learning mode
to rebuild policy for the application. So, in TOMOYO Linux, updating policy is
done while the system is running in enforcing mode.
This patch implements "interactive enforcing mode" which allows administrators
to judge whether to accept policy violation in enforcing mode or not.
A demo movie is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9q1Jo25LPA .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
mount(2) has three string and one numeric parameters.
Split mount restriction code from security/tomoyo/file.c .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Check numeric parameters for operations that deal them
(e.g. chmod/chown/ioctl).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds numeric values grouping support, which is useful for grouping
numeric values such as file's UID, DAC's mode, ioctl()'s cmd number.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds pathname grouping support, which is useful for grouping
pathnames that cannot be represented using /\{dir\}/ pattern.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use stack memory for pending entry to reduce kmalloc() which will be kfree()d.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Some of TOMOYO's functions may sleep after mutex_lock(). If OOM-killer selected
a process which is waiting at mutex_lock(), the to-be-killed process can't be
killed. Thus, replace mutex_lock() with mutex_lock_interruptible() so that the
to-be-killed process can immediately return from TOMOYO's functions.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In Ubuntu, security_path_*() hooks are exported to Unionfs. Thus, prepare for
being called from inside VFS functions because I'm not sure whether it is safe
to use GFP_KERNEL or not.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
The original code returns a freed pointer. This function is expected to
return NULL on errors.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (52 commits)
init: Open /dev/console from rootfs
mqueue: fix typo "failues" -> "failures"
mqueue: only set error codes if they are really necessary
mqueue: simplify do_open() error handling
mqueue: apply mathematics distributivity on mq_bytes calculation
mqueue: remove unneeded info->messages initialization
mqueue: fix mq_open() file descriptor leak on user-space processes
fix race in d_splice_alias()
set S_DEAD on unlink() and non-directory rename() victims
vfs: add NOFOLLOW flag to umount(2)
get rid of ->mnt_parent in tomoyo/realpath
hppfs can use existing proc_mnt, no need for do_kern_mount() in there
Mirror MS_KERNMOUNT in ->mnt_flags
get rid of useless vfsmount_lock use in put_mnt_ns()
Take vfsmount_lock to fs/internal.h
get rid of insanity with namespace roots in tomoyo
take check for new events in namespace (guts of mounts_poll()) to namespace.c
Don't mess with generic_permission() under ->d_lock in hpfs
sanitize const/signedness for udf
nilfs: sanitize const/signedness in dealing with ->d_name.name
...
Fix up fairly trivial (famous last words...) conflicts in
drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c and security/tomoyo/realpath.c
passing *any* namespace root to __d_path() as root is equivalent
to just passing it {NULL, NULL}; no need to bother with finding
the root of our namespace in there.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Variable "atmark" is currently unused.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Al Viro