Kernel style prefers a single string over split strings when the string is
'user-visible'.
Miscellanea:
- Add a missing newline
- Realign arguments
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> [percpu]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently we have two copies of the same code which implements memory
overcommitment logic. Let's move it into mm/util.c and hence avoid
duplication. No functional changes here.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
max_map_count sysctl unrelated to scheduler. Move its bits from
include/linux/sched/sysctl.h to include/linux/mm.h.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Grazvydas Ignotas has reported a regression in remap_file_pages()
emulation.
Testcase:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define SIZE (4096 * 3)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
unsigned long *p;
long i;
p = mmap(NULL, SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < SIZE / 4096; i++)
p[i * 4096 / sizeof(*p)] = i;
if (remap_file_pages(p, 4096, 0, 1, 0)) {
perror("remap_file_pages");
return -1;
}
if (remap_file_pages(p, 4096 * 2, 0, 1, 0)) {
perror("remap_file_pages");
return -1;
}
assert(p[0] == 1);
munmap(p, SIZE);
return 0;
}
The second remap_file_pages() fails with -EINVAL.
The reason is that remap_file_pages() emulation assumes that the target
vma covers whole area we want to over map. That assumption is broken by
first remap_file_pages() call: it split the area into two vma.
The solution is to check next adjacent vmas, if they map the same file
with the same flags.
Fixes: c8d78c1823 ("mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Grazvydas Ignotas <notasas@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Grazvydas Ignotas <notasas@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.0+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Sequence vma_lock_anon_vma() - vma_unlock_anon_vma() isn't safe if
anon_vma appeared between lock and unlock. We have to check anon_vma
first or call anon_vma_prepare() to be sure that it's here. There are
only few users of these legacy helpers. Let's get rid of them.
This patch fixes anon_vma lock imbalance in validate_mm(). Write lock
isn't required here, read lock is enough.
And reorders expand_downwards/expand_upwards: security_mmap_addr() and
wrapping-around check don't have to be under anon vma lock.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Y908EjM2z=706dv4rV6dWtxTLK9nFg9_7DhRMLppBo2g@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The mmap_sem for reading in validate_mm called from expand_stack is not
enough to prevent the argumented rbtree rb_subtree_gap information to
change from under us because expand_stack may be running from other
threads concurrently which will hold the mmap_sem for reading too.
The argumented rbtree is updated with vma_gap_update under the
page_table_lock so use it in browse_rb() too to avoid false positives.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch provides a way of working around a slight regression
introduced by commit 8463833590 ("mm: rework virtual memory
accounting").
Before that commit RLIMIT_DATA have control only over size of the brk
region. But that change have caused problems with all existing versions
of valgrind, because it set RLIMIT_DATA to zero.
This patch fixes rlimit check (limit actually in bytes, not pages) and
by default turns it into warning which prints at first VmData misuse:
"mmap: top (795): VmData 516096 exceed data ulimit 512000. Will be forbidden soon."
Behavior is controlled by boot param ignore_rlimit_data=y/n and by sysfs
/sys/module/kernel/parameters/ignore_rlimit_data. For now it set to "y".
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak kernel-parameters.txt text[
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151228211015.GL2194@uranus
Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Dmitry Vyukov has reported[1] possible deadlock (triggered by his
syzkaller fuzzer):
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key);
lock(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem);
lock(&hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key);
lock(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem);
Both traces points to mm_take_all_locks() as a source of the problem.
It doesn't take care about ordering or hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key (aka
mapping->i_mmap_rwsem for hugetlb mapping) vs. i_mmap_rwsem.
huge_pmd_share() does memory allocation under hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key
and allocator can take i_mmap_rwsem if it hit reclaim. So we need to
take i_mmap_rwsem from all hugetlb VMAs before taking i_mmap_rwsem from
rest of VMAs.
The patch also documents locking order for hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Zu95tBs-0EvdiAKzUOsb4tczRRfCRTpLr4bg_OP9HuVg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When inspecting a vague code inside prctl(PR_SET_MM_MEM) call (which
testing the RLIMIT_DATA value to figure out if we're allowed to assign
new @start_brk, @brk, @start_data, @end_data from mm_struct) it's been
commited that RLIMIT_DATA in a form it's implemented now doesn't do
anything useful because most of user-space libraries use mmap() syscall
for dynamic memory allocations.
Linus suggested to convert RLIMIT_DATA rlimit into something suitable
for anonymous memory accounting. But in this patch we go further, and
the changes are bundled together as:
* keep vma counting if CONFIG_PROC_FS=n, will be used for limits
* replace mm->shared_vm with better defined mm->data_vm
* account anonymous executable areas as executable
* account file-backed growsdown/up areas as stack
* drop struct file* argument from vm_stat_account
* enforce RLIMIT_DATA for size of data areas
This way code looks cleaner: now code/stack/data classification depends
only on vm_flags state:
VM_EXEC & ~VM_WRITE -> code (VmExe + VmLib in proc)
VM_GROWSUP | VM_GROWSDOWN -> stack (VmStk)
VM_WRITE & ~VM_SHARED & !stack -> data (VmData)
The rest (VmSize - VmData - VmStk - VmExe - VmLib) could be called
"shared", but that might be strange beast like readonly-private or VM_IO
area.
- RLIMIT_AS limits whole address space "VmSize"
- RLIMIT_STACK limits stack "VmStk" (but each vma individually)
- RLIMIT_DATA now limits "VmData"
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to
exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security
vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data
which could help an attack. This is done by adding a random offset to
the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater
range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a
larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for
fragmentation.
The offset added to the mmap_base address, which provides the basis for
the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec
in arch_pick_mmap_layout() and is done via hard-coded per-arch values,
which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems. The
trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and
the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation
is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts
of entropy. This patch introduces both new Kconfig values and a sysctl
interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for
offset generation on a system.
The direct motivation for this change was in response to the
libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to
information provided by Google's project zero at:
http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html
The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically
targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the
mmap_base address in order to craft a brute-force-based attack.
Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was
limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device. The hard-coded
8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating
the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a
piece). With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy
value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of
over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more
likely to be noticed.
The introduced Kconfig and sysctl options are limited by per-arch
minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the
current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to
give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalid mmap_base
address, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the
user-space accessible virtual address space.
When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system
developer should consider that mmap_base address could be placed
anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location,
which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below the mmap_base
address such that the maximum vm_area_struct size may be reduced,
preventing very large allocations.
This patch (of 4):
ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the
mmap base address on 32 bit architectures. This value was chosen to
prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a
way as to prevent large allocations. This may not be an issue on all
platforms. Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that
platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place
the trade-off.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The following flag comparison in mmap_region makes no sense:
if (!(vm_flags & MAP_FIXED))
return -ENOMEM;
The condition is always false and thus the above "return -ENOMEM" is
never executed. The vm_flags must not be compared with MAP_FIXED flag.
The vm_flags may only be compared with VM_* flags. MAP_FIXED has the
same value as VM_MAYREAD.
Hitting the rlimit is a slow path and find_vma_intersection should
realize that there is no overlapping VMA for !MAP_FIXED case pretty
quickly.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Kwapulinski <kwapulinski.piotr@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Requiring special mappings to give a list of struct pages is
inflexible: it prevents sane use of IO memory in a special
mapping, it's inefficient (it requires arch code to initialize a
list of struct pages, and it requires the mm core to walk the
entire list just to figure out how long it is), and it prevents
arch code from doing anything fancy when a special mapping fault
occurs.
Add a .fault method as an alternative to filling in a .pages
array.
Looks-OK-to: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a26d1677c0bc7e774c33f469451a78ca31e9e6af.1451446564.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The cost of faulting in all memory to be locked can be very high when
working with large mappings. If only portions of the mapping will be used
this can incur a high penalty for locking.
For the example of a large file, this is the usage pattern for a large
statical language model (probably applies to other statical or graphical
models as well). For the security example, any application transacting in
data that cannot be swapped out (credit card data, medical records, etc).
This patch introduces the ability to request that pages are not
pre-faulted, but are placed on the unevictable LRU when they are finally
faulted in. The VM_LOCKONFAULT flag will be used together with VM_LOCKED
and has no effect when set without VM_LOCKED. Setting the VM_LOCKONFAULT
flag for a VMA will cause pages faulted into that VMA to be added to the
unevictable LRU when they are faulted or if they are already present, but
will not cause any missing pages to be faulted in.
Exposing this new lock state means that we cannot overload the meaning of
the FOLL_POPULATE flag any longer. Prior to this patch it was used to
mean that the VMA for a fault was locked. This means we need the new
FOLL_MLOCK flag to communicate the locked state of a VMA. FOLL_POPULATE
will now only control if the VMA should be populated and in the case of
VM_LOCKONFAULT, it will not be set.
Signed-off-by: Eric B Munson <emunson@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make __install_special_mapping() args order match the caller, so the
caller can pass their register args directly to callee with no touch.
For most of architectures, args (at least the first 5th args) are in
registers, so this change will have effect on most of architectures.
For -O2, __install_special_mapping() may be inlined under most of
architectures, but for -Os, it should not. So this change can get a
little better performance for -Os, at least.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When fget() fails we can return -EBADF directly.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It is still a little better to remove it, although it should be skipped
by "-O2".
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>=0A=
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
"mm->locked_vm += grow" and vm_stat_account() in acct_stack_growth() are
not safe; multiple threads using the same ->mm can do this at the same
time trying to expans different vma's under down_read(mmap_sem). This
means that one of the "locked_vm += grow" changes can be lost and we can
miss munlock_vma_pages_all() later.
Move this code into the caller(s) under mm->page_table_lock. All other
updates to ->locked_vm hold mmap_sem for writing.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Before the main loop, vma is already is NULL. There is no need to set it
to NULL again.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
For VM_PFNMAP and VM_MIXEDMAP we use vm_ops->pfn_mkwrite instead of
vm_ops->page_mkwrite to notify abort write access. This means we want
vma->vm_page_prot to be write-protected if the VMA provides this vm_ops.
A theoretical scenario that will cause these missed events is:
On writable mapping with vm_ops->pfn_mkwrite, but without
vm_ops->page_mkwrite: read fault followed by write access to the pfn.
Writable pte will be set up on read fault and write fault will not be
generated.
I found it examining Dave's complaint on generic/080:
http://lkml.kernel.org/g/20150831233803.GO3902@dastard
Although I don't think it's the reason.
It shouldn't be a problem for ext2/ext4 as they provide both pfn_mkwrite
and page_mkwrite.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add local vm_ops to avoid 80-cols mess]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yigal Korman <yigal@plexistor.com>
Acked-by: Boaz Harrosh <boaz@plexistor.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Revert commit 6dc296e7df "mm: make sure all file VMAs have ->vm_ops
set".
Will Deacon reports that it "causes some mmap regressions in LTP, which
appears to use a MAP_PRIVATE mmap of /dev/zero as a way to get anonymous
pages in some of its tests (specifically mmap10 [1])".
William Shuman reports Oracle crashes.
So revert the patch while we work out what to do.
Reported-by: William Shuman <wshuman3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We rely on vma->vm_ops == NULL to detect anonymous VMA: see
vma_is_anonymous(), but some drivers doesn't set ->vm_ops.
As a result we can end up with anonymous page in private file mapping.
That should not lead to serious misbehaviour, but nevertheless is wrong.
Let's fix by setting up dummy ->vm_ops for file mmapping if f_op->mmap()
didn't set its own.
The patch also adds sanity check into __vma_link_rb(). It will help
catch broken VMAs which inserted directly into mm_struct via
insert_vm_struct().
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add the additional "vm_flags_t vm_flags" argument to do_mmap_pgoff(),
rename it to do_mmap(), and re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff() as a simple
wrapper on top of do_mmap(). Perhaps we should update the callers of
do_mmap_pgoff() and kill it later.
This way mpx_mmap() can simply call do_mmap(vm_flags => VM_MPX) and do not
play with vm internals.
After this change mmap_region() has a single user outside of mmap.c,
arch/tile/mm/elf.c:arch_setup_additional_pages(). It would be nice to
change arch/tile/ and unexport mmap_region().
[kirill@shutemov.name: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There's no point in initializing vma->vm_pgoff if the insertion attempt
will be failing anyway. Run the checks before performing the
initialization.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
__split_vma() doesn't need out_err label, neither need initializing err.
copy_vma() can return NULL directly when kmem_cache_alloc() fails.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Test-case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <assert.h>
void *find_vdso_vaddr(void)
{
FILE *perl;
char buf[32] = {};
perl = popen("perl -e 'open STDIN,qq|/proc/@{[getppid]}/maps|;"
"/^(.*?)-.*vdso/ && print hex $1 while <>'", "r");
fread(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, perl);
fclose(perl);
return (void *)atol(buf);
}
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
int main(void)
{
void *vdso = find_vdso_vaddr();
assert(vdso);
// of course they should differ, and they do so far
printf("vdso pages differ: %d\n",
!!memcmp(vdso, vdso + PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE));
// split into 2 vma's
assert(mprotect(vdso, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ) == 0);
// force another fault on the next check
assert(madvise(vdso, 2 * PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTNEED) == 0);
// now they no longer differ, the 2nd vm_pgoff is wrong
printf("vdso pages differ: %d\n",
!!memcmp(vdso, vdso + PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE));
return 0;
}
Output:
vdso pages differ: 1
vdso pages differ: 0
This is because split_vma() correctly updates ->vm_pgoff, but the logic
in insert_vm_struct() and special_mapping_fault() is absolutely broken,
so the fault at vdso + PAGE_SIZE return the 1st page. The same happens
if you simply unmap the 1st page.
special_mapping_fault() does:
pgoff = vmf->pgoff - vma->vm_pgoff;
and this is _only_ correct if vma->vm_start mmaps the first page from
->vm_private_data array.
vdso or any other user of install_special_mapping() is not anonymous,
it has the "backing storage" even if it is just the array of pages.
So we actually need to make vm_pgoff work as an offset in this array.
Note: this also allows to fix another problem: currently gdb can't access
"[vvar]" memory because in this case special_mapping_fault() doesn't work.
Now that we can use ->vm_pgoff we can implement ->access() and fix this.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx is yet another vma parameter that vma_merge
must be aware about so that we can merge vmas back like they were
originally before arming the userfaultfd on some memory range.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.
Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.
Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.
This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.
Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The simple check for zero length memory mapping may be performed
earlier. So that in case of zero length memory mapping some unnecessary
code is not executed at all. It does not make the code less readable
and saves some CPU cycles.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Kwapulinski <kwapulinski.piotr@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The creators of the C language gave us the while keyword. Let's use
that instead of synthesizing it from if+goto.
Made possible by 6597d78339 ("mm/mmap.c: replace find_vma_prepare()
with clearer find_vma_links()").
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col overflows]
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We converted some of the usages of ACCESS_ONCE to READ_ONCE in the mm/
tree since it doesn't work reliably on non-scalar types.
This patch removes the rest of the usages of ACCESS_ONCE, and use the new
READ_ONCE API for the read accesses. This makes things cleaner, instead
of using separate/multiple sets of APIs.
Signed-off-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
__mlock_vma_pages_range() doesn't necessarily mlock pages. It depends on
vma flags. The same codepath is used for MAP_POPULATE.
Let's rename __mlock_vma_pages_range() to populate_vma_page_range().
This patch also drops mlock_vma_pages_range() references from
documentation. It has gone in cea10a19b7 ("mm: directly use
__mlock_vma_pages_range() in find_extend_vma()").
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I have constantly stumbled upon "kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:399!" after
upgrading to 3.19 and had no luck with 4.0-rc1 neither.
So, after looking into new logic introduced by commit 7a3ef208e6 ("mm:
prevent endless growth of anon_vma hierarchy"), I found chances are that
unlink_anon_vmas() is called without incrementing dst->anon_vma->degree
in anon_vma_clone() due to allocation failure. If dst->anon_vma is not
NULL in error path, its degree will be incorrectly decremented in
unlink_anon_vmas() and eventually underflow when exiting as a result of
another call to unlink_anon_vmas(). That's how "kernel BUG at
mm/rmap.c:399!" is triggered for me.
This patch fixes the underflow by dropping dst->anon_vma when allocation
fails. It's safe to do so regardless of original value of dst->anon_vma
because dst->anon_vma doesn't have valid meaning if anon_vma_clone()
fails. Besides, callers don't care dst->anon_vma in such case neither.
Also suggested by Michal Hocko, we can clean up vma_adjust() a bit as
anon_vma_clone() now does the work.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Fixes: 7a3ef208e6 ("mm: prevent endless growth of anon_vma hierarchy")
Signed-off-by: Leon Yu <chianglungyu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I noticed, that "allowed" can easily overflow by falling below 0,
because (total_vm / 32) can be larger than "allowed". The problem
occurs in OVERCOMMIT_NONE mode.
In this case, a huge allocation can success and overcommit the system
(despite OVERCOMMIT_NONE mode). All subsequent allocations will fall
(system-wide), so system become unusable.
The problem was masked out by commit c9b1d0981f
("mm: limit growth of 3% hardcoded other user reserve"),
but it's easy to reproduce it on older kernels:
1) set overcommit_memory sysctl to 2
2) mmap() large file multiple times (with VM_SHARED flag)
3) try to malloc() large amount of memory
It also can be reproduced on newer kernels, but miss-configured
sysctl_user_reserve_kbytes is required.
Fix this issue by switching to signed arithmetic here.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use min_t]
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Andrew Shewmaker <agshew@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The problem is that we check nr_ptes/nr_pmds in exit_mmap() which happens
*before* pgd_free(). And if an arch does pte/pmd allocation in
pgd_alloc() and frees them in pgd_free() we see offset in counters by the
time of the checks.
We tried to workaround this by offsetting expected counter value according
to FIRST_USER_ADDRESS for both nr_pte and nr_pmd in exit_mmap(). But it
doesn't work in some cases:
1. ARM with LPAE enabled also has non-zero USER_PGTABLES_CEILING, but
upper addresses occupied with huge pmd entries, so the trick with
offsetting expected counter value will get really ugly: we will have
to apply it nr_pmds, but not nr_ptes.
2. Metag has non-zero FIRST_USER_ADDRESS, but doesn't do allocation
pte/pmd page tables allocation in pgd_alloc(), just setup a pgd entry
which is allocated at boot and shared accross all processes.
The proposal is to move the check to check_mm() which happens *after*
pgd_free() and do proper accounting during pgd_alloc() and pgd_free()
which would bring counters to zero if nothing leaked.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Tyler Baker <tyler.baker@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Tyler Baker <tyler.baker@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Dave noticed that unprivileged process can allocate significant amount of
memory -- >500 MiB on x86_64 -- and stay unnoticed by oom-killer and
memory cgroup. The trick is to allocate a lot of PMD page tables. Linux
kernel doesn't account PMD tables to the process, only PTE.
The use-cases below use few tricks to allocate a lot of PMD page tables
while keeping VmRSS and VmPTE low. oom_score for the process will be 0.
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#define PUD_SIZE (1UL << 30)
#define PMD_SIZE (1UL << 21)
#define NR_PUD 130000
int main(void)
{
char *addr = NULL;
unsigned long i;
prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE);
for (i = 0; i < NR_PUD ; i++) {
addr = mmap(addr + PUD_SIZE, PUD_SIZE, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ,
MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
break;
}
*addr = 'x';
munmap(addr, PMD_SIZE);
mmap(addr, PMD_SIZE, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ,
MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
perror("re-mmap"), exit(1);
}
printf("PID %d consumed %lu KiB in PMD page tables\n",
getpid(), i * 4096 >> 10);
return pause();
}
The patch addresses the issue by account PMD tables to the process the
same way we account PTE.
The main place where PMD tables is accounted is __pmd_alloc() and
free_pmd_range(). But there're few corner cases:
- HugeTLB can share PMD page tables. The patch handles by accounting
the table to all processes who share it.
- x86 PAE pre-allocates few PMD tables on fork.
- Architectures with FIRST_USER_ADDRESS > 0. We need to adjust sanity
check on exit(2).
Accounting only happens on configuration where PMD page table's level is
present (PMD is not folded). As with nr_ptes we use per-mm counter. The
counter value is used to calculate baseline for badness score by
oom-killer.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We don't create non-linear mappings anymore. Let's drop code which
handles them in rmap.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
remap_file_pages(2) was invented to be able efficiently map parts of
huge file into limited 32-bit virtual address space such as in database
workloads.
Nonlinear mappings are pain to support and it seems there's no
legitimate use-cases nowadays since 64-bit systems are widely available.
Let's drop it and get rid of all these special-cased code.
The patch replaces the syscall with emulation which creates new VMA on
each remap_file_pages(), unless they it can be merged with an adjacent
one.
I didn't find *any* real code that uses remap_file_pages(2) to test
emulation impact on. I've checked Debian code search and source of all
packages in ALT Linux. No real users: libc wrappers, mentions in
strace, gdb, valgrind and this kind of stuff.
There are few basic tests in LTP for the syscall. They work just fine
with emulation.
To test performance impact, I've written small test case which
demonstrate pretty much worst case scenario: map 4G shmfs file, write to
begin of every page pgoff of the page, remap pages in reverse order,
read every page.
The test creates 1 million of VMAs if emulation is in use, so I had to
set vm.max_map_count to 1100000 to avoid -ENOMEM.
Before: 23.3 ( +- 4.31% ) seconds
After: 43.9 ( +- 0.85% ) seconds
Slowdown: 1.88x
I believe we can live with that.
Test case:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define MB (1024UL * 1024)
#define SIZE (4096 * MB)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
unsigned long *p;
long i, pass;
for (pass = 0; pass < 10; pass++) {
p = mmap(NULL, SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < SIZE / 4096; i++)
p[i * 4096 / sizeof(*p)] = i;
for (i = 0; i < SIZE / 4096; i++) {
if (remap_file_pages(p + i * 4096 / sizeof(*p), 4096,
0, (SIZE - 4096 * (i + 1)) >> 12, 0)) {
perror("remap_file_pages");
return -1;
}
}
for (i = SIZE / 4096 - 1; i >= 0; i--)
assert(p[i * 4096 / sizeof(*p)] == SIZE / 4096 - i - 1);
munmap(p, SIZE);
}
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix spello]
[sasha.levin@oracle.com: initialize populate before usage]
[sasha.levin@oracle.com: grab file ref to prevent race while mmaping]
Signed-off-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Armin Rigo <arigo@tunes.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix for BUG_ON(anon_vma->degree) splashes in unlink_anon_vmas() ("kernel
BUG at mm/rmap.c:399!") caused by commit 7a3ef208e6 ("mm: prevent
endless growth of anon_vma hierarchy")
Anon_vma_clone() is usually called for a copy of source vma in
destination argument. If source vma has anon_vma it should be already
in dst->anon_vma. NULL in dst->anon_vma is used as a sign that it's
called from anon_vma_fork(). In this case anon_vma_clone() finds
anon_vma for reusing.
Vma_adjust() calls it differently and this breaks anon_vma reusing
logic: anon_vma_clone() links vma to old anon_vma and updates degree
counters but vma_adjust() overrides vma->anon_vma right after that. As
a result final unlink_anon_vmas() decrements degree for wrong anon_vma.
This patch assigns ->anon_vma before calling anon_vma_clone().
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@amd.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Chih-Wei Huang <cwhuang@android-x86.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Daniel Forrest <dan.forrest@ssec.wisc.edu>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # to match back-porting of 7a3ef208e6
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit fee7e49d45 ("mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for
guard page") made sure that we return the error properly for stack
growth conditions. It also theorized that counting the guard page
towards the stack limit might break something, but also said "Let's see
if anybody notices".
Somebody did notice. Apparently android-x86 sets the stack limit very
close to the limit indeed, and including the guard page in the rlimit
check causes the android 'zygote' process problems.
So this adds the (fairly trivial) code to make the stack rlimit check be
against the actual real stack size, rather than the size of the vma that
includes the guard page.
Reported-and-tested-by: Chih-Wei Huang <cwhuang@android-x86.org>
Cc: Jay Foad <jay.foad@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # to match back-porting of fee7e49d45
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This lets drivers like the AMD IOMMUv2 driver handle faults a bit more
simply, rather than doing tricks with page refs and get_user_pages().
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
Cc: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@amd.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The i_mmap_mutex is a close cousin of the anon vma lock, both protecting
similar data, one for file backed pages and the other for anon memory. To
this end, this lock can also be a rwsem. In addition, there are some
important opportunities to share the lock when there are no tree
modifications.
This conversion is straightforward. For now, all users take the write
lock.
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: update fremap.c]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x86 MPX support from Thomas Gleixner:
"This enables support for x86 MPX.
MPX is a new debug feature for bound checking in user space. It
requires kernel support to handle the bound tables and decode the
bound violating instruction in the trap handler"
* 'x86-mpx-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
asm-generic: Remove asm-generic arch_bprm_mm_init()
mm: Make arch_unmap()/bprm_mm_init() available to all architectures
x86: Cleanly separate use of asm-generic/mm_hooks.h
x86 mpx: Change return type of get_reg_offset()
fs: Do not include mpx.h in exec.c
x86, mpx: Add documentation on Intel MPX
x86, mpx: Cleanup unused bound tables
x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables
x86, mpx: Decode MPX instruction to get bound violation information
x86, mpx: Add MPX-specific mmap interface
x86, mpx: Introduce VM_MPX to indicate that a VMA is MPX specific
x86, mpx: Add MPX to disabled features
ia64: Sync struct siginfo with general version
mips: Sync struct siginfo with general version
mpx: Extend siginfo structure to include bound violation information
x86, mpx: Rename cfg_reg_u and status_reg
x86: mpx: Give bndX registers actual names
x86: Remove arbitrary instruction size limit in instruction decoder
Joe Perches