This is the new syscall kexec_file_load() declaration/interface. I have
reserved the syscall number only for x86_64 so far. Other architectures
(including i386) can reserve syscall number when they enable the support
for this new syscall.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
that you can pass to mmap(). It can support sealing and avoids any
connection to user-visible mount-points. Thus, it's not subject to quotas
on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
a file-descriptor to it.
memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
be used to modify the underlying inode. Also calls like fstat() will
return proper information and mark the file as regular file. If you want
sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. Otherwise, sealing is not
supported (like on all other regular files).
Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
subject to a filesystem size limit. It is still properly accounted to
memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
accounting as all user memory.
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
call, which is a superset of OpenBSD's getentropy(2) call, for use
with userspace crypto libraries such as LibreSSL. Also add the
ability to have a kernel thread to pull entropy from hardware rng
devices into /dev/random.
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Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull randomness updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Cleanups and bug fixes to /dev/random, add a new getrandom(2) system
call, which is a superset of OpenBSD's getentropy(2) call, for use
with userspace crypto libraries such as LibreSSL.
Also add the ability to have a kernel thread to pull entropy from
hardware rng devices into /dev/random"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
hwrng: Pass entropy to add_hwgenerator_randomness() in bits, not bytes
random: limit the contribution of the hw rng to at most half
random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
hw_random: fix sparse warning (NULL vs 0 for pointer)
random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter
hwrng: add per-device entropy derating
hwrng: create filler thread
random: add_hwgenerator_randomness() for feeding entropy from devices
random: use an improved fast_mix() function
random: clean up interrupt entropy accounting for archs w/o cycle counters
random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy
random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool
random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.
The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.
This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable. In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not). However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case. And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized. Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.
SYNOPSIS
#include <linux/random.h>
int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
cryptographic uses. It should not be used for Monte Carlo
simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
probabilistic sampling.
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.
If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
will be used. Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).
The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
the following function:
int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
if (buflen > 256)
goto failure;
ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == buflen)
return 0;
failure:
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
RETURN VALUE
On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
returned. This may not be all the bytes requested by the
caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
/dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
signal.
On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.
ERRORS
EINVAL An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)
EFAULT buf is outside the accessible address space.
EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and
getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.
EINTR While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
in the signal(7) man page.
NOTES
For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
the bytes that have been requested. This is the recommended
way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.
However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime. Since it may
block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply. The
user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
would be unfriendly.
For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
bytes than requested was returned. In the case of
!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
should be careful) should check for this anyway!
Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for
/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
sufficient for all purposes. The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).
In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
filter the seccomp syscall itself.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
The io_setup takes a pointer to a context id of type aio_context_t.
This in turn is typed to a __kernel_ulong_t. We could tweak the
exported headers to define this as a 64bit quantity for specific
ABIs, but since we already have a 32bit compat shim for the x86 ABI,
let's just re-use that logic. The libaio package is also written to
expect this as a pointer type, so a compat shim would simplify that.
The io_submit func operates on an array of pointers to iocb structs.
Padding out the array to be 64bit aligned is a huge pain, so convert
it over to the existing compat shim too.
We don't convert io_getevents to the compat func as its only purpose
is to handle the timespec struct, and the x32 ABI uses 64bit times.
With this change, the libaio package can now pass its testsuite when
built for the x32 ABI.
Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1399250595-5005-1-git-send-email-vapier@gentoo.org
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
When we build an already built kernel again, arch/x86/syscalls/Makefile
and arch/x86/tools/Makefile emits "Nothing to be done for ..."
messages.
Here is the command log:
$ make defconfig
[ snip ]
$ make
[ snip ]
$ make
make[1]: Nothing to be done for `all'. <-----
make[1]: Nothing to be done for `relocs'. <-----
CHK include/config/kernel.release
CHK include/generated/uapi/linux/version.h
Besides not emitting those, "all" and "relocs" should be added to PHONY as well.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.m@jp.panasonic.com>
Acked-by: Peter Foley <pefoley2@pefoley.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1397093742-11144-1-git-send-email-yamada.m@jp.panasonic.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add new renameat2 syscall, which is the same as renameat with an added
flags argument.
Pass flags to vfs_rename() and to i_op->rename() as well.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Add the syscalls needed for supporting scheduling algorithms
with extended scheduling parameters (e.g., SCHED_DEADLINE).
In general, it makes possible to specify a periodic/sporadic task,
that executes for a given amount of runtime at each instance, and is
scheduled according to the urgency of their own timing constraints,
i.e.:
- a (maximum/typical) instance execution time,
- a minimum interval between consecutive instances,
- a time constraint by which each instance must be completed.
Thus, both the data structure that holds the scheduling parameters of
the tasks and the system calls dealing with it must be extended.
Unfortunately, modifying the existing struct sched_param would break
the ABI and result in potentially serious compatibility issues with
legacy binaries.
For these reasons, this patch:
- defines the new struct sched_attr, containing all the fields
that are necessary for specifying a task in the computational
model described above;
- defines and implements the new scheduling related syscalls that
manipulate it, i.e., sched_setattr() and sched_getattr().
Syscalls are introduced for x86 (32 and 64 bits) and ARM only, as a
proof of concept and for developing and testing purposes. Making them
available on other architectures is straightforward.
Since no "user" for these new parameters is introduced in this patch,
the implementation of the new system calls is just identical to their
already existing counterpart. Future patches that implement scheduling
policies able to exploit the new data structure must also take care of
modifying the sched_*attr() calls accordingly with their own purposes.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
[ Rewrote to use sched_attr. ]
Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
[ Removed sched_setscheduler2() for now. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1383831828-15501-3-git-send-email-juri.lelli@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
their argument types are identical to those of sys_kill and sys_mprotect
resp., so we are not doing any kind of argument validation, etc. in those -
they turn into unconditional branches to corresponding syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull signal handling cleanups from Al Viro:
"sigaltstack infrastructure + conversion for x86, alpha and um,
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE infrastructure.
Note that there are several conflicts between "unify
SS_ONSTACK/SS_DISABLE definitions" and UAPI patches in mainline;
resolution is trivial - just remove definitions of SS_ONSTACK and
SS_DISABLED from arch/*/uapi/asm/signal.h; they are all identical and
include/uapi/linux/signal.h contains the unified variant."
Fixed up conflicts as per Al.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal:
alpha: switch to generic sigaltstack
new helpers: __save_altstack/__compat_save_altstack, switch x86 and um to those
generic compat_sys_sigaltstack()
introduce generic sys_sigaltstack(), switch x86 and um to it
new helper: compat_user_stack_pointer()
new helper: restore_altstack()
unify SS_ONSTACK/SS_DISABLE definitions
new helper: current_user_stack_pointer()
missing user_stack_pointer() instances
Bury the conditionals from kernel_thread/kernel_execve series
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE: infrastructure
Conditional on CONFIG_GENERIC_SIGALTSTACK; architectures that do not
select it are completely unaffected
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
to verify the source of the module (ChromeOS) and/or use standard IMA on it
or other security hooks.
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Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux
Pull module update from Rusty Russell:
"Nothing all that exciting; a new module-from-fd syscall for those who
want to verify the source of the module (ChromeOS) and/or use standard
IMA on it or other security hooks."
* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
MODSIGN: Fix kbuild output when using default extra_certificates
MODSIGN: Avoid using .incbin in C source
modules: don't hand 0 to vmalloc.
module: Remove a extra null character at the top of module->strtab.
ASN.1: Use the ASN1_LONG_TAG and ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH constants
ASN.1: Define indefinite length marker constant
moduleparam: use __UNIQUE_ID()
__UNIQUE_ID()
MODSIGN: Add modules_sign make target
powerpc: add finit_module syscall.
ima: support new kernel module syscall
add finit_module syscall to asm-generic
ARM: add finit_module syscall to ARM
security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
module: add flags arg to sys_finit_module()
module: add syscall to load module from fd
As part of the effort to create a stronger boundary between root and
kernel, Chrome OS wants to be able to enforce that kernel modules are
being loaded only from our read-only crypto-hash verified (dm_verity)
root filesystem. Since the init_module syscall hands the kernel a module
as a memory blob, no reasoning about the origin of the blob can be made.
Earlier proposals for appending signatures to kernel modules would not be
useful in Chrome OS, since it would involve adding an additional set of
keys to our kernel and builds for no good reason: we already trust the
contents of our root filesystem. We don't need to verify those kernel
modules a second time. Having to do signature checking on module loading
would slow us down and be redundant. All we need to know is where a
module is coming from so we can say yes/no to loading it.
If a file descriptor is used as the source of a kernel module, many more
things can be reasoned about. In Chrome OS's case, we could enforce that
the module lives on the filesystem we expect it to live on. In the case
of IMA (or other LSMs), it would be possible, for example, to examine
extended attributes that may contain signatures over the contents of
the module.
This introduces a new syscall (on x86), similar to init_module, that has
only two arguments. The first argument is used as a file descriptor to
the module and the second argument is a pointer to the NULL terminated
string of module arguments.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> (merge fixes)
Pull generic execve() changes from Al Viro:
"This introduces the generic kernel_thread() and kernel_execve()
functions, and switches x86, arm, alpha, um and s390 over to them."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal: (26 commits)
s390: convert to generic kernel_execve()
s390: switch to generic kernel_thread()
s390: fold kernel_thread_helper() into ret_from_fork()
s390: fold execve_tail() into start_thread(), convert to generic sys_execve()
um: switch to generic kernel_thread()
x86, um/x86: switch to generic sys_execve and kernel_execve
x86: split ret_from_fork
alpha: introduce ret_from_kernel_execve(), switch to generic kernel_execve()
alpha: switch to generic kernel_thread()
alpha: switch to generic sys_execve()
arm: get rid of execve wrapper, switch to generic execve() implementation
arm: optimized current_pt_regs()
arm: introduce ret_from_kernel_execve(), switch to generic kernel_execve()
arm: split ret_from_fork, simplify kernel_thread() [based on patch by rmk]
generic sys_execve()
generic kernel_execve()
new helper: current_pt_regs()
preparation for generic kernel_thread()
um: kill thread->forking
um: let signal_delivered() do SIGTRAP on singlestepping into handler
...
Plumb the UAPI Kbuilds into the user header installation and checking system.
As the headers are split the entries will be transferred across from the old
Kbuild files to the UAPI Kbuild files.
The changes made in this commit are:
(1) Exported generated files (of which there are currently four) are moved to
uapi/ directories under the appropriate generated/ directory, thus we
get:
include/generated/uapi/linux/version.h
arch/x86/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd_32.h
arch/x86/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd_64.h
arch/x86/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd_x32.h
These paths were added to the build as -I flags in a previous patch.
(2) scripts/Makefile.headersinst is now given the UAPI path to install from
rather than the old path.
It then determines the old path from that and includes that Kbuild also
if it exists, thus permitting the headers to exist in either directory
during the changeover.
I also renamed the "install" variable to "installdir" as it refers to a
directory not the install program.
(3) scripts/headers_install.pl is altered to take a list of source file paths
instead of just their names so that the makefile can tell it exactly
where to find each file.
For the moment, files can be obtained from one of four places for each
output directory:
.../include/uapi/foo/
.../include/generated/uapi/foo/
.../include/foo/
.../include/generated/foo/
The non-UAPI paths will be dropped later.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Differentiate the generated UAPI and internal headers during generation such
that the UAPI headers can be installed elsewhere.
A later patch will use this to move the UAPI headers to:
arch/x86/include/generated/uapi/asm/
to make them easier to handle.
A previous patch added a -I for this path.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
32bit wrapper is lost on that; 64bit one is *not*, since
we need to arrange for full pt_regs on stack when we call
sys_execve() and we need to load callee-saved ones from
there afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Some of the arguments to {g,s}etsockopt are passed in userland pointers.
If we try to use the 64bit entry point, we end up sometimes failing.
For example, dhcpcd doesn't run in x32:
# dhcpcd eth0
dhcpcd[1979]: version 5.5.6 starting
dhcpcd[1979]: eth0: broadcasting for a lease
dhcpcd[1979]: eth0: open_socket: Invalid argument
dhcpcd[1979]: eth0: send_raw_packet: Bad file descriptor
The code in particular is getting back EINVAL when doing:
struct sock_fprog pf;
setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, &pf, sizeof(pf));
Diving into the kernel code, we can see:
include/linux/filter.h:
struct sock_fprog {
unsigned short len;
struct sock_filter __user *filter;
};
net/core/sock.c:
case SO_ATTACH_FILTER:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (optlen == sizeof(struct sock_fprog)) {
struct sock_fprog fprog;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, optval, sizeof(fprog)))
break;
ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, sk);
}
break;
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl:
54 common setsockopt sys_setsockopt
55 common getsockopt sys_getsockopt
So for x64, sizeof(sock_fprog) is 16 bytes. For x86/x32, it's 8 bytes.
This comes down to the pointer being 32bit for x32, which means we need
to do structure size translation. But since x32 comes in directly to
sys_setsockopt, it doesn't get translated like x86.
After changing the syscall table and rebuilding glibc with the new kernel
headers, dhcp runs fine in an x32 userland.
Oddly, it seems like Linus noted the same thing during the initial port,
but I guess that was missed/lost along the way:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/26/452
[ hpa: tagging for -stable since this is an ABI fix. ]
Bugzilla: https://bugs.gentoo.org/423649
Reported-by: Mads <mads@ab3.no>
Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1345320697-15713-1-git-send-email-vapier@gentoo.org
Cc: H. J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> v3.4..v3.5
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
We already use the same system call handler for i386 and x86-64, there
is absolutely no reason x32 can't use the same system call, too.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> v3.5
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-vwzk3qbcr3yjyxjg2j38vgy9@git.kernel.org
While doing the checkpoint-restore in the user space one need to determine
whether various kernel objects (like mm_struct-s of file_struct-s) are
shared between tasks and restore this state.
The 2nd step can be solved by using appropriate CLONE_ flags and the
unshare syscall, while there's currently no ways for solving the 1st one.
One of the ways for checking whether two tasks share e.g. mm_struct is to
provide some mm_struct ID of a task to its proc file, but showing such
info considered to be not that good for security reasons.
Thus after some debates we end up in conclusion that using that named
'comparison' syscall might be the best candidate. So here is it --
__NR_kcmp.
It takes up to 5 arguments - the pids of the two tasks (which
characteristics should be compared), the comparison type and (in case of
comparison of files) two file descriptors.
Lookups for pids are done in the caller's PID namespace only.
At moment only x86 is supported and tested.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up selftests, warnings]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: include errno.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86:
32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel
syscalls.
This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address
space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address
space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc."
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c}
* 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo
x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format
x32: Add ptrace for x32
x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t
x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates
x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls
x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect
x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old
x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once
x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks
fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally
fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable
x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO
x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code
x32: Add x32 VDSO support
x32: Allow x32 to be configured
x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables
x32: Handle process creation
x32: Signal-related system calls
x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h>
...
Syscall 282 was mistakenly named mq_getsetaddr instead of mq_getsetattr.
When building uClibc against the Linux kernel this would result in a
shared library that doesn't provide the mq_getattr() and mq_setattr()
functions.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@avionic-design.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1332366608-2695-2-git-send-email-thierry.reding@avionic-design.de
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> v3.3
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
X32 ptrace is a hybrid of 64bit ptrace and compat ptrace with 32bit
address and longs. It use 64bit ptrace to access the full 64bit
registers. PTRACE_PEEKUSR and PTRACE_POKEUSR are only allowed to access
segment and debug registers. PTRACE_PEEKUSR returns the lower 32bits
and PTRACE_POKEUSR zero-extends 32bit value to 64bit. It works since
the upper 32bits of segment and debug registers of x32 process are always
zero. GDB only uses PTRACE_PEEKUSR and PTRACE_POKEUSR to access
segment and debug registers.
[ hpa: changed TIF_X32 test to use !is_ia32_task() instead, and moved
the system call number to the now-unused 521 slot. ]
Signed-off-by: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1329696488-16970-1-git-send-email-hpa@zytor.com
clock_t is used mainly to give the number of jiffies a certain process
has burned. It is entirely feasible for a long-running process to
consume more than 2^32 jiffies especially in a multiprocess system.
As such, switch to a 64-bit clock_t for x32, just as we already
switched to a 64-bit time_t.
clock_t is only used in a handful of places, and as such it is really
not a very significant change. The one that has the biggest impact is
in struct siginfo, but since the *size* of struct siginfo doesn't
change (it is padded to the hilt) it is fairly easy to make this a
localized change.
This also gets rid of sys_x32_times, however since this is a pretty
late change don't compactify the system call numbers; we can reuse
system call slot 521 next time we need an x32 system call.
Reported-by: Gregory M. Lueck <gregory.m.lueck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H. J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1329696488-16970-1-git-send-email-hpa@zytor.com
Generate macros for the *kernel* code to use to refer to x32 system
calls. These have an __NR_x32_ prefix and do not include
__X32_SYSCALL_BIT.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Generate <asm/unistd_x32.h>; this exports x32 system call numbers to
user space.
[ v2: Enclose all arguments to syshdr in '' so empty arguments aren't
dropped on the floor. ]
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Split the 64-bit system calls into "64" (64-bit only) and "common"
(64-bit or x32) and add the x32 system call numbers.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
On x86, the only difference between sys_rt_sigprocmask and
sys32_rt_sigprocmask is the alignment of the data structures.
However, x86 allows data accesses with arbitrary alignment, and
therefore there is no reason for this code to be different.
Reported-by: Gregory M. Lueck <gregory.m.lueck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Allow the specified syscall offset to be symbolic, e.g. a macro. For
offset system calls, this if nothing else makes the generated code
easier to read.
Suggested-by: H. J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1321569446-20433-7-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Simplify syscallhdr.sh by letting grep sort out the ABIs that we want,
rather than relying on manual list matching. This is safe since the
ABI strings already have to consist only of characters which are valid in C
macro names.
Suggested-by: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20111118221558.GA6408@count0.beaverton.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Create a simple set of syscall tables and scripts to turn them into
both header files (unistd_*.h) and macros for generating the system
call tables.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Vivek Goyal