Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which
makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default are files without license information under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude
them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not
intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception
which is in the kernels COPYING file:
NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".
otherwise syscall usage would not be possible.
Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX
license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the
Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This ioctl does nothing to justify an _IOC_READ or _IOC_WRITE flag
because it doesn't copy anything from/to userspace to access the
argument.
Fixes: 54ebbfb160 ("tty: add TIOCGPTPEER ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Gleb Fotengauer-Malinovskiy <glebfm@altlinux.org>
Acked-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When opening the slave end of a PTY, it is not possible for userspace to
safely ensure that /dev/pts/$num is actually a slave (in cases where the
mount namespace in which devpts was mounted is controlled by an
untrusted process). In addition, there are several unresolvable
race conditions if userspace were to attempt to detect attacks through
stat(2) and other similar methods [in addition it is not clear how
userspace could detect attacks involving FUSE].
Resolve this by providing an interface for userpace to safely open the
"peer" end of a PTY file descriptor by using the dentry cached by
devpts. Since it is not possible to have an open master PTY without
having its slave exposed in /dev/pts this interface is safe. This
interface currently does not provide a way to get the master pty (since
it is not clear whether such an interface is safe or even useful).
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Valentin Rothberg <vrothberg@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This patch defines new ioctl codes TIOCGPKT, TIOCGPTLCK,
TIOCGEXCL for fetching pty's packet mode and locking state,
and exclusive mode of tty.
[ No real handlers for the codes though, this will be
addressed in another patch for easier review and
bisectability ]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CC: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Greg Kroah-Hartman