Expose the existing generic Poly1305 code via a init/update/final
library interface so that callers are not required to go through
the crypto API's shash abstraction to access it. At the same time,
make some preparations so that the library implementation can be
superseded by an accelerated arch-specific version in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation of exposing a Poly1305 library interface directly from
the accelerated x86 driver, align the state descriptor of the x86 code
with the one used by the generic driver. This is needed to make the
library interface unified between all implementations.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move the core Poly1305 routines shared between the generic Poly1305
shash driver and the Adiantum and NHPoly1305 drivers into a separate
library so that using just this pieces does not pull in the crypto
API pieces of the generic Poly1305 routine.
In a subsequent patch, we will augment this generic library with
init/update/final routines so that Poyl1305 algorithm can be used
directly without the need for using the crypto API's shash abstraction.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all users of generic ChaCha code have moved to the core library,
there is no longer a need for the generic ChaCha skcpiher driver to
export parts of it implementation for reuse by other drivers. So drop
the exports, and make the symbols static.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Wire the existing x86 SIMD ChaCha code into the new ChaCha library
interface, so that users of the library interface will get the
accelerated version when available.
Given that calls into the library API will always go through the
routines in this module if it is enabled, switch to static keys
to select the optimal implementation available (which may be none
at all, in which case we defer to the generic implementation for
all invocations).
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, our generic ChaCha implementation consists of a permute
function in lib/chacha.c that operates on the 64-byte ChaCha state
directly [and which is always included into the core kernel since it
is used by the /dev/random driver], and the crypto API plumbing to
expose it as a skcipher.
In order to support in-kernel users that need the ChaCha streamcipher
but have no need [or tolerance] for going through the abstractions of
the crypto API, let's expose the streamcipher bits via a library API
as well, in a way that permits the implementation to be superseded by
an architecture specific one if provided.
So move the streamcipher code into a separate module in lib/crypto,
and expose the init() and crypt() routines to users of the library.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all "blkcipher" algorithms have been converted to "skcipher",
remove the blkcipher algorithm type.
The skcipher (symmetric key cipher) algorithm type was introduced a few
years ago to replace both blkcipher and ablkcipher (synchronous and
asynchronous block cipher). The advantages of skcipher include:
- A much less confusing name, since none of these algorithm types have
ever actually been for raw block ciphers, but rather for all
length-preserving encryption modes including block cipher modes of
operation, stream ciphers, and other length-preserving modes.
- It unified blkcipher and ablkcipher into a single algorithm type
which supports both synchronous and asynchronous implementations.
Note, blkcipher already operated only on scatterlists, so the fact
that skcipher does too isn't a regression in functionality.
- Better type safety by using struct skcipher_alg, struct
crypto_skcipher, etc. instead of crypto_alg, crypto_tfm, etc.
- It sometimes simplifies the implementations of algorithms.
Also, the blkcipher API was no longer being tested.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_has_skcipher() and crypto_has_skcipher2() do the same thing: they
check for the availability of an algorithm of type skcipher, blkcipher,
or ablkcipher, which also meets any non-type constraints the caller
specified. And they have exactly the same prototype.
Therefore, eliminate the redundancy by removing crypto_has_skcipher()
and renaming crypto_has_skcipher2() to crypto_has_skcipher().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When algif_skcipher does a partial operation it always process data
that is a multiple of blocksize. However, for algorithms such as
CTR this is wrong because even though it can process any number of
bytes overall, the partial block must come at the very end and not
in the middle.
This is exactly what chunksize is meant to describe so this patch
changes blocksize to chunksize.
Fixes: 8ff590903d ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and
appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug
fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size().
In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel
image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same
scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules.
Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature.
This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature
verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of
calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list
and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file
hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing
the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended
signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.)
The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other
signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single
system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and
the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig)
ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig()
MODSIGN: make new include file self contained
ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request
ima: always return negative code for error
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
After starting a skcipher walk, the only way to ensure that all
resources it has tied up are released is to complete it. In some
cases, it will be useful to be able to abort a walk cleanly after
it has started, so add this ability to the skcipher walk API.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
lib/crypto/sha256.c and include/crypto/sha256_base.h define
99% identical functions to init a sha256_state struct for sha224 or
sha256 use.
This commit moves the functions from lib/crypto/sha256.c to
include/crypto/sha.h (making them static inline) and makes the
sha224/256_base_init static inline functions from
include/crypto/sha256_base.h wrappers around the now also
static inline include/crypto/sha.h functions.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The generic sha256 implementation from lib/crypto/sha256.c uses data
structs defined in crypto/sha.h, so lets move the function prototypes
there too.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add sha224 support to the lib/crypto/sha256 library code. This will allow
us to replace both the sha256 and sha224 parts of crypto/sha256_generic.c
when we remove the code duplication in further patches in this series.
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Before this commit lib/crypto/sha256.c has only been used in the s390 and
x86 purgatory code, make it suitable for generic use:
* Export interesting symbols
* Add -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS to CFLAGS_sha256.o for purgatory builds to
avoid the exports for the purgatory builds
* Add to lib/crypto/Makefile and crypto/Kconfig
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Generic crypto implementations belong under lib/crypto not directly in
lib, likewise the header should be in include/crypto, not include/linux.
Note that the code in lib/crypto/sha256.c is not yet available for
generic use after this commit, it is still only used by the s390 and x86
purgatory code. Making it suitable for generic use is done in further
patches in this series.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Another one for the cipher museum: split off DES core processing into
a separate module so other drivers (mostly for crypto accelerators)
can reuse the code without pulling in the generic DES cipher itself.
This will also permit the cipher interface to be made private to the
crypto API itself once we move the only user in the kernel (CIFS) to
this library interface.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove the old DES3 verification functions that are no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The recently added helper routine to perform key strength validation
of triple DES keys is slightly inadequate, since it comes in two versions,
neither of which are highly useful for anything other than skciphers (and
many drivers still use the older blkcipher interfaces).
So let's add a new helper and, considering that this is a helper function
that is only intended to be used by crypto code itself, put it in a new
des.h header under crypto/internal.
While at it, implement a similar helper for single DES, so that we can
start replacing the pattern of calling des_ekey() into a temp buffer
that occurs in many drivers in drivers/crypto.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add inline helper function to check key length for AES algorithms.
The key can be 128, 192 or 256 bits size.
This function is used in the generic aes implementation.
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Added inline helper functions to check authsize and assoclen for
gcm, rfc4106 and rfc4543.
These are used in the generic implementation of gcm, rfc4106 and
rfc4543.
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
IMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by
the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce
pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose.
Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already
calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that
sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which
allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info())
use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
While looking at CONFIG_PREEMPT dependencies treewide the #ifdef in
crypto_yield() matched.
CONFIG_PREEMPT and CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY are mutually exclusive so the
extra !CONFIG_PREEMPT conditional is redundant.
cond_resched() has only an effect when CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY is set,
otherwise it's a stub which the compiler optimizes out.
Remove the whole conditional.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Function definitions in headers are usually marked as 'static inline'.
Since 'inline' is missing for crypto_reportstat(), if it were not
referenced from a .c file that includes this header, it would produce
a warning.
Also, 'struct crypto_user_alg' is not declared in this header.
I included <linux/crytouser.h> instead of adding the forward declaration
as suggested [1].
Detected by compile-testing this header as a standalone unit:
./include/crypto/internal/cryptouser.h:6:44: warning: ‘struct crypto_user_alg’ declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_match(struct crypto_user_alg *p, int exact);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/crypto/internal/cryptouser.h:11:12: warning: ‘crypto_reportstat’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static int crypto_reportstat(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *in_nlh, struct nlattr **attrs)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/13/1121
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add header include guards in case they are included multiple times.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To help avoid confusion, add a comment to ghash-generic.c which explains
the convention that the kernel's implementation of GHASH uses.
Also update the Kconfig help text and module descriptions to call GHASH
a "hash function" rather than a "message digest", since the latter
normally means a real cryptographic hash function, which GHASH is not.
Cc: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently, NETLINK_CRYPTO works only in the init network namespace. It
doesn't make much sense to cut it out of the other network namespaces,
so do the minor plumbing work necessary to make it work in any network
namespace. Code inspired by net/core/sock_diag.c.
Tested using kcapi-dgst from libkcapi [1]:
Before:
# unshare -n kcapi-dgst -c sha256 </dev/null | wc -c
libkcapi - Error: Netlink error: sendmsg failed
libkcapi - Error: Netlink error: sendmsg failed
libkcapi - Error: NETLINK_CRYPTO: cannot obtain cipher information for hmac(sha512) (is required crypto_user.c patch missing? see documentation)
0
After:
# unshare -n kcapi-dgst -c sha256 </dev/null | wc -c
32
[1] https://github.com/smuellerDD/libkcapi
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
MORUS was not selected as a winner in the CAESAR competition, which
is not surprising since it is considered to be cryptographically
broken [0]. (Note that this is not an implementation defect, but a
flaw in the underlying algorithm). Since it is unlikely to be in use
currently, let's remove it before we're stuck with it.
[0] https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/172.pdf
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There are a few copies of the AES S-boxes floating around, so export
the ones from the AES library so that we can reuse them in other
modules.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The versions of the AES lookup tables that are only used during the last
round are never used outside of the driver, so there is no need to
export their symbols.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a static inline helper modeled after crypto_cbc_encrypt_walk()
that can be reused for SIMD algorithms that need to implement a
non-SIMD fallback for performing CTR encryption.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Drop aes-generic's version of crypto_aes_expand_key(), and switch to
the key expansion routine provided by the AES library. AES key expansion
is not performance critical, and it is better to have a single version
shared by all AES implementations.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Take the existing small footprint and mostly time invariant C code
and turn it into a AES library that can be used for non-performance
critical, casual use of AES, and as a fallback for, e.g., SIMD code
that needs a secondary path that can be taken in contexts where the
SIMD unit is off limits (e.g., in hard interrupts taken from kernel
context)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 5.3:
API:
- Test shash interface directly in testmgr
- cra_driver_name is now mandatory
Algorithms:
- Replace arc4 crypto_cipher with library helper
- Implement 5 way interleave for ECB, CBC and CTR on arm64
- Add xxhash
- Add continuous self-test on noise source to drbg
- Update jitter RNG
Drivers:
- Add support for SHA204A random number generator
- Add support for 7211 in iproc-rng200
- Fix fuzz test failures in inside-secure
- Fix fuzz test failures in talitos
- Fix fuzz test failures in qat"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (143 commits)
crypto: stm32/hash - remove interruptible condition for dma
crypto: stm32/hash - Fix hmac issue more than 256 bytes
crypto: stm32/crc32 - rename driver file
crypto: amcc - remove memset after dma_alloc_coherent
crypto: ccp - Switch to SPDX license identifiers
crypto: ccp - Validate the the error value used to index error messages
crypto: doc - Fix formatting of new crypto engine content
crypto: doc - Add parameter documentation
crypto: arm64/aes-ce - implement 5 way interleave for ECB, CBC and CTR
crypto: arm64/aes-ce - add 5 way interleave routines
crypto: talitos - drop icv_ool
crypto: talitos - fix hash on SEC1.
crypto: talitos - move struct talitos_edesc into talitos.h
lib/scatterlist: Fix mapping iterator when sg->offset is greater than PAGE_SIZE
crypto/NX: Set receive window credits to max number of CRBs in RxFIFO
crypto: asymmetric_keys - select CRYPTO_HASH where needed
crypto: serpent - mark __serpent_setkey_sbox noinline
crypto: testmgr - dynamically allocate crypto_shash
crypto: testmgr - dynamically allocate testvec_config
crypto: talitos - eliminate unneeded 'done' functions at build time
...
Refactor the core rc4 handling so we can move most users to a library
interface, permitting us to drop the cipher interface entirely in a
future patch. This is part of an effort to simplify the crypto API
and improve its robustness against incorrect use.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general
public license along with this program if not see http www gnu org
licenses
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 503 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190602204653.811534538@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Constify the ctx and iv arguments to crypto_chacha_init() and the
various chacha*_stream_xor() functions. This makes it clear that they
are not modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The 'chunksize' and 'walksize' properties of skcipher algorithms are
implementation details that users of the skcipher API should not be
looking at. So move their accessor functions from <crypto/skcipher.h>
to <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_skcipher_encrypt() and crypto_skcipher_decrypt() have grown to be
more than a single indirect function call. They now also check whether
a key has been set, and with CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS=y they also update the
crypto statistics. That can add up to a lot of bloat at every call
site. Moreover, these always involve a function call anyway, which
greatly limits the benefits of inlining.
So change them to be non-inline.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_aead_encrypt() and crypto_aead_decrypt() have grown to be more
than a single indirect function call. They now also check whether a key
has been set, the decryption side checks whether the input is at least
as long as the authentication tag length, and with CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS=y
they also update the crypto statistics. That can add up to a lot of
bloat at every call site. Moreover, these always involve a function
call anyway, which greatly limits the benefits of inlining.
So change them to be non-inline.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms and conditions of the gnu general public license
version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program
is distributed in the hope it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general
public license along with this program if not write to the free
software foundation inc 51 franklin st fifth floor boston ma 02110
1301 usa
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 111 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530000436.567572064@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Remove the crypto_tfm_in_queue() function, which is unused.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
kcrypto_wq is only used by cryptd, so move it into cryptd.c and change
the workqueue name from "crypto" to "cryptd".
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 requires a continuous self test of the noise
source. Up to kernel 4.8 drivers/char/random.c provided this continuous
self test. Afterwards it was moved to a location that is inconsistent
with the FIPS 140-2 requirements. The relevant patch was
e192be9d9a .
Thus, the FIPS 140-2 CTRNG is added to the DRBG when it obtains the
seed. This patch resurrects the function drbg_fips_continous_test that
existed some time ago and applies it to the noise sources. The patch
that removed the drbg_fips_continous_test was
b361476305 .
The Jitter RNG implements its own FIPS 140-2 self test and thus does not
need to be subjected to the test in the DRBG.
The patch contains a tiny fix to ensure proper zeroization in case of an
error during the Jitter RNG data gathering.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The "hmac(sha3-224-generic)" algorithm has a descsize of 368 bytes,
which is greater than HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE (360) which is only enough for
sha3-224-generic. The check in shash_prepare_alg() doesn't catch this
because the HMAC template doesn't set descsize on the algorithms, but
rather sets it on each individual HMAC transform.
This causes a stack buffer overflow when SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() is used
with hmac(sha3-224-generic).
Fix it by increasing HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE to the real maximum. Also add a
sanity check to hmac_init().
This was detected by the improved crypto self-tests in v5.2, by loading
the tcrypt module with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y enabled. I
didn't notice this bug when I ran the self-tests by requesting the
algorithms via AF_ALG (i.e., not using tcrypt), probably because the
stack layout differs in the two cases and that made a difference here.
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223
Write of size 360 at addr ffff8880651defc8 by task insmod/3689
CPU: 2 PID: 3689 Comm: insmod Tainted: G E 5.1.0-10741-g35c99ffa20edd #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x86/0xc5 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x7f/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:188
__kasan_report+0x144/0x187 mm/kasan/report.c:317
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:125
memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline]
shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223
crypto_shash_import include/crypto/hash.h:880 [inline]
hmac_import+0x184/0x240 crypto/hmac.c:102
hmac_init+0x96/0xc0 crypto/hmac.c:107
crypto_shash_init include/crypto/hash.h:902 [inline]
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9f/0xf0 crypto/shash.c:194
crypto_shash_digest+0xe9/0x1b0 crypto/shash.c:211
generate_random_hash_testvec.constprop.11+0x1ec/0x5b0 crypto/testmgr.c:1331
test_hash_vs_generic_impl+0x3f7/0x5c0 crypto/testmgr.c:1420
__alg_test_hash+0x26d/0x340 crypto/testmgr.c:1502
alg_test_hash+0x22e/0x330 crypto/testmgr.c:1552
alg_test.part.7+0x132/0x610 crypto/testmgr.c:4931
alg_test+0x1f/0x40 crypto/testmgr.c:4952
Fixes: b68a7ec1e9 ("crypto: hash - Remove VLA usage")
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove cryptd_alloc_ablkcipher() and the ability of cryptd to create
algorithms with the deprecated "ablkcipher" type.
This has been unused since commit 0e145b477d ("crypto: ablk_helper -
remove ablk_helper"). Instead, cryptd_alloc_skcipher() is used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some public key algorithms (like EC-DSA) keep in parameters field
important data such as digest and curve OIDs (possibly more for
different EC-DSA variants). Thus, just setting a public key (as
for RSA) is not enough.
Append parameters into the key stream for akcipher_set_{pub,priv}_key.
Appended data is: (u32) algo OID, (u32) parameters length, parameters
data.
This does not affect current akcipher API nor RSA ciphers (they could
ignore it). Idea of appending parameters to the key stream is by Herbert
Xu.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds a requirement to the generic 3DES implementation
such that 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) is no longer allowed in FIPS mode.
We will also provide helpers that may be used by drivers that
implement 3DES to make the same check.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cacheline_aligned is a special section. It cannot be const at the same
time because it's not read-only. It doesn't give any MMU protection.
Mark it ____cacheline_aligned to not place it in a special section,
but just align it in .rodata
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
So that the no-SIMD fallback code can be tested by the crypto
self-tests, add a macro crypto_simd_usable() which wraps may_use_simd(),
but also returns false if the crypto self-tests have set a per-CPU bool
to disable SIMD in crypto code on the current CPU.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the x86 implementations of MORUS-1280 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the x86 implementation of MORUS-640 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Update the crypto_simd module to support wrapping AEAD algorithms.
Previously it only supported skciphers. The code for each is similar.
I'll be converting the x86 implementations of AES-GCM, AEGIS, and MORUS
to use this. Currently they each independently implement the same
functionality. This will not only simplify the code, but it will also
fix the bug detected by the improved self-tests: the user-provided
aead_request is modified. This is because these algorithms currently
reuse the original request, whereas the crypto_simd helpers build a new
request in the original request's context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some arc4 cipher algorithm defines show up in two places:
crypto/arc4.c and drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.h.
Let's export them in a common header and update their users.
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY confuses newcomers to the crypto API because it
sounds like it is requesting a weak key. Actually, it is requesting
that weak keys be forbidden (for algorithms that have the notion of
"weak keys"; currently only DES and XTS do).
Also it is only one letter away from CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY, with which
it can be easily confused. (This in fact happened in the UX500 driver,
though just in some debugging messages.)
Therefore, make the intent clear by renaming it to
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch add a helper to (un)register a array of templates. The
following patches will use this helper to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Precise and non-ambiguous license information is important. The recently
added morus header files have a SPDX license identifier, which is nice, but
at the same time they have a contradictionary license boiler plate text.
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
versus
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
* Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
* any later version
Oh well.
As the other morus related files are licensed under the GPL v2 or later,
it's assumed that the boiler plate code is correct, but the SPDX license
identifier is wrong.
Fix the SPDX identifier and remove the boiler plate as it is redundant.
Fixes: 56e8e57fc3 ("crypto: morus - Add common SIMD glue code for MORUS")
Fixes: 396be41f16 ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some exported functions in af_alg.c aren't used outside of that file.
Therefore, un-export them and make them 'static'.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move the declaration of crypto_nlsk into internal/cryptouser.h. This
fixes the following sparse warning:
crypto/crypto_user_base.c:41:13: warning: symbol 'crypto_nlsk' was not declared. Should it be static?
Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
streebog_uint512::qword needs to be __le64, not u64. This fixes a large
number of sparse warnings:
crypto/streebog_generic.c:25:9: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different base types)
crypto/streebog_generic.c:25:9: expected unsigned long long
crypto/streebog_generic.c:25:9: got restricted __le64 [usertype]
[omitted many similar warnings]
No actual change in behavior.
Cc: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all "blkcipher" templates have been converted to "skcipher",
crypto_alloc_instance() is no longer used. And it's not useful any
longer as it creates an old-style weakly typed instance rather than a
new-style strongly typed instance. So remove it, and now that the name
is freed up rename crypto_alloc_instance2() to crypto_alloc_instance().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The majority of skcipher templates (including both the existing ones and
the ones remaining to be converted from the "blkcipher" API) just wrap a
single block cipher algorithm. This includes cbc, cfb, ctr, ecb, kw,
ofb, and pcbc. Add a helper function skcipher_alloc_instance_simple()
that handles allocating an skcipher instance for this common case.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove dead code related to internal IV generators, which are no longer
used since they've been replaced with the "seqiv" and "echainiv"
templates. The removed code includes:
- The "givcipher" (GIVCIPHER) algorithm type. No algorithms are
registered with this type anymore, so it's unneeded.
- The "const char *geniv" member of aead_alg, ablkcipher_alg, and
blkcipher_alg. A few algorithms still set this, but it isn't used
anymore except to show via /proc/crypto and CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG.
Just hardcode "<default>" or "<none>" in those cases.
- The 'skcipher_givcrypt_request' structure, which is never used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch removes unused dump functions for crypto_user_stats.
There are remains of the copy/paste of crypto_user_base to
crypto_user_stat and I forgot to remove them.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All crypto_stats functions use the struct xxx_request for feeding stats,
but in some case this structure could already be freed.
For fixing this, the needed parameters (len and alg) will be stored
before the request being executed.
Fixes: cac5818c25 ("crypto: user - Implement a generic crypto statistics")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6939a606a5305e9e9799@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All the 32-bit fields need to be 64-bit. In some cases, UINT32_MAX crypto
operations can be done in seconds.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Even if CRYPTO_STATS is set to n, some part of CRYPTO_STATS are
compiled.
This patch made all part of crypto_user_stat uncompiled in that case.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a generic implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash
function used in the Adiantum encryption mode.
CONFIG_NHPOLY1305 is not selectable by itself since there won't be any
real reason to enable it without also enabling Adiantum support.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Expose a low-level Poly1305 API which implements the
ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function underlying the Poly1305 MAC
and supports block-aligned inputs only.
This is needed for Adiantum hashing, which builds an εA∆U hash function
from NH and a polynomial evaluation in GF(2^{130}-5); this polynomial
evaluation is identical to the one the Poly1305 MAC does. However, the
crypto_shash Poly1305 API isn't very appropriate for this because its
calling convention assumes it is used as a MAC, with a 32-byte "one-time
key" provided for every digest.
But by design, in Adiantum hashing the performance of the polynomial
evaluation isn't nearly as critical as NH. So it suffices to just have
some C helper functions. Thus, this patch adds such functions.
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation for exposing a low-level Poly1305 API which implements
the ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function underlying the Poly1305
MAC and supports block-aligned inputs only, create structures
poly1305_key and poly1305_state which hold the limbs of the Poly1305
"r" key and accumulator, respectively.
These structures could actually have the same type (e.g. poly1305_val),
but different types are preferable, to prevent misuse.
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation for adding XChaCha12 support, rename/refactor
chacha20-generic to support different numbers of rounds. The
justification for needing XChaCha12 support is explained in more detail
in the patch "crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support".
The only difference between ChaCha{8,12,20} are the number of rounds
itself; all other parts of the algorithm are the same. Therefore,
remove the "20" from all definitions, structures, functions, files, etc.
that will be shared by all ChaCha versions.
Also make ->setkey() store the round count in the chacha_ctx (previously
chacha20_ctx). The generic code then passes the round count through to
chacha_block(). There will be a ->setkey() function for each explicitly
allowed round count; the encrypt/decrypt functions will be the same. I
decided not to do it the opposite way (same ->setkey() function for all
round counts, with different encrypt/decrypt functions) because that
would have required more boilerplate code in architecture-specific
implementations of ChaCha and XChaCha.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the
application of the XSalsa20 construction
(https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the
ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe
it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
Supporting both variants is straightforward.
Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users
to seek to any position in the stream.
I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity of separate modules.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Refactor the unkeyed permutation part of chacha20_block() into its own
function, then add hchacha20_block() which is the ChaCha equivalent of
HSalsa20 and is an intermediate step towards XChaCha20 (see
https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf). HChaCha20 skips the
final addition of the initial state, and outputs only certain words of
the state. It should not be used for streaming directly.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE to header file, so it can be reused.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Register Streebog hash function in Hash Info arrays to let IMA use
it for its purposes.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The parsed BER/DER blob obtained from user space contains a TPM_Key
structure. This structure has some information about the key as well as
the public key portion.
This patch extracts this information for future use.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Put a flag in the public_key struct to indicate if the structure is holding
a private key. The private key must be held ASN.1 encoded in the format
specified in RFC 3447 A.1.2. This is the form required by crypto/rsa.c.
The software encryption subtype's verification and query functions then
need to select the appropriate crypto function to set the key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This
include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature
already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this:
int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *enc, void *data);
int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the
encoding for verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
sparse complains thusly:
CHECK arch/x86/crypto/morus640-sse2-glue.c
arch/x86/crypto/morus640-sse2-glue.c:38:1: warning: symbol 'crypto_morus640_sse2_algs' was not declared. Should it be static?
CHECK arch/x86/crypto/morus1280-sse2-glue.c
arch/x86/crypto/morus1280-sse2-glue.c:38:1: warning: symbol 'crypto_morus1280_sse2_algs' was not declared. Should it be static?
CHECK arch/x86/crypto/morus1280-avx2-glue.c
arch/x86/crypto/morus1280-avx2-glue.c:38:1: warning: symbol 'crypto_morus1280_avx2_algs' was not declared. Should it be static?
and sparse is correct - these don't need to be global and polluting the namespace.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch implement a generic way to get statistics about all crypto
usages.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all the users of the VLA-generating SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK()
macro have been moved to SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(), we can remove
the former.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation for removal of VLAs due to skcipher requests on the stack
via SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage, this introduces the infrastructure
for the "sync skcipher" tfm, which is for handling the on-stack cases of
skcipher, which are always non-ASYNC and have a known limited request
size.
The crypto API additions:
struct crypto_sync_skcipher (wrapper for struct crypto_skcipher)
crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher()
crypto_free_sync_skcipher()
crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey()
crypto_sync_skcipher_get_flags()
crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags()
crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags()
crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize()
crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize()
crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm()
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm()
SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() (with tfm type check)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In commit 9f480faec5 ("crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for
chacha20_block()"), I had missed that chacha20_block() can be called
directly on the buffer passed to get_random_bytes(), which can have any
alignment. So, while my commit didn't break anything, it didn't fully
solve the alignment problems.
Revert my solution and just update chacha20_block() to use
put_unaligned_le32(), so the output buffer need not be aligned.
This is simpler, and on many CPUs it's the same speed.
But, I kept the 'tmp' buffers in extract_crng_user() and
_get_random_bytes() 4-byte aligned, since that alignment is actually
needed for _crng_backtrack_protect() too.
Reported-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Introduce a facility that can be used to receive a notification
callback when a new algorithm becomes available. This can be used by
existing crypto registrations to trigger a switch from a software-only
algorithm to a hardware-accelerated version.
A new CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_LOADED state is introduced to the existing crypto
notification chain, and the register/unregister functions are exported
so they can be called by subsystems outside of crypto.
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As it turns out, the AVX2 multibuffer SHA routines are currently
broken [0], in a way that would have likely been noticed if this
code were in wide use. Since the code is too complicated to be
maintained by anyone except the original authors, and since the
performance benefits for real-world use cases are debatable to
begin with, it is better to drop it entirely for the moment.
[0] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153476243825350&w=2
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
exposes a new general upper bound on crypto blocksize and alignmask
(higher than for the existing cipher limits) for VLA removal,
and introduces new checks.
At present, the highest cra_alignmask in the kernel is 63. The highest
cra_blocksize is 144 (SHA3_224_BLOCK_SIZE, 18 8-byte words). For the
new blocksize limit, I went with 160 (20 8-byte words).
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
removes the VLAs in SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK (via crypto_shash_descsize())
by using the maximum allowable size (which is now more clearly captured
in a macro), along with a few other cases. Similar limits are turned into
macros as well.
A review of existing sizes shows that SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE (64) is the
largest digest size and that sizeof(struct sha3_state) (360) is the
largest descriptor size. The corresponding maximums are reduced.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
uses the upper bounds on blocksize. Since this is always a cipher
blocksize, use the existing cipher max blocksize.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Ard Biesheuvel