Let's use the error value that is typically used if HW support is not
available when trying to load a module - this is also what systemd's
systemd-modules-load.service expects.
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Let's use the error value that is typically used if HW support is not
available when trying to load a module - this is also what systemd's
systemd-modules-load.service expects.
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Let's use the error value that is typically used if HW support is not
available when trying to load a module - this is also what systemd's
systemd-modules-load.service expects.
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
This patch fixes a complain about possible sleep during
spinlock aquired
"BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
include/crypto/algapi.h:426"
for the ctr(aes) and ctr(des) s390 specific ciphers.
Instead of using a spinlock this patch introduces a mutex
which is save to be held in sleeping context. Please note
a deadlock is not possible as mutex_trylock() is used.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
The current kernel uses improved crypto selftests. These
tests showed that the current implementation of gcm-aes-s390
is not able to deal with chunks of output buffers which are
not a multiple of 16 bytes. This patch introduces a rework
of the gcm aes s390 scatter walk handling which now is able
to handle any input and output scatter list chunk sizes
correctly.
Code has been verified by the crypto selftests, the tcrypt
kernel module and additional tests ran via the af_alg interface.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <steuer@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add support for AEAD in simd
- Add fuzz testing to testmgr
- Add panic_on_fail module parameter to testmgr
- Use per-CPU struct instead multiple variables in scompress
- Change verify API for akcipher
Algorithms:
- Convert x86 AEAD algorithms over to simd
- Forbid 2-key 3DES in FIPS mode
- Add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Drivers:
- Set output IV with ctr-aes in crypto4xx
- Set output IV in rockchip
- Fix potential length overflow with hashing in sun4i-ss
- Fix computation error with ctr in vmx
- Add SM4 protected keys support in ccree
- Remove long-broken mxc-scc driver
- Add rfc4106(gcm(aes)) cipher support in cavium/nitrox"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (179 commits)
crypto: ccree - use a proper le32 type for le32 val
crypto: ccree - remove set but not used variable 'du_size'
crypto: ccree - Make cc_sec_disable static
crypto: ccree - fix spelling mistake "protedcted" -> "protected"
crypto: caam/qi2 - generate hash keys in-place
crypto: caam/qi2 - fix DMA mapping of stack memory
crypto: caam/qi2 - fix zero-length buffer DMA mapping
crypto: stm32/cryp - update to return iv_out
crypto: stm32/cryp - remove request mutex protection
crypto: stm32/cryp - add weak key check for DES
crypto: atmel - remove set but not used variable 'alg_name'
crypto: picoxcell - Use dev_get_drvdata()
crypto: crypto4xx - get rid of redundant using_sd variable
crypto: crypto4xx - use sync skcipher for fallback
crypto: crypto4xx - fix cfb and ofb "overran dst buffer" issues
crypto: crypto4xx - fix ctr-aes missing output IV
crypto: ecrdsa - select ASN1 and OID_REGISTRY for EC-RDSA
crypto: ux500 - use ccflags-y instead of CFLAGS_<basename>.o
crypto: ccree - handle tee fips error during power management resume
crypto: ccree - add function to handle cryptocell tee fips error
...
The assembler code in arch/s390 misses proper ENDPROC statements
to properly end functions in a few places. Add them.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
With the z14 machine there came also a CPACF hardware extension
which provides a True Random Number Generator. This TRNG can
be accessed with a new subfunction code within the CPACF prno
instruction and provides random data with very high entropy.
So if there is a TRNG available, let's use it for initial seeding
and reseeding instead of the current implementation which tries
to generate entropy based on stckf (store clock fast) jitters.
For details about the amount of data needed and pulled for
seeding and reseeding there can be explaining comments in the
code found.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Here is a rework of the generate_entropy function of the pseudo random
device driver exploiting the prno CPACF instruction.
George Spelvin pointed out some issues with the existing
implementation. One point was, that the buffer used to store the stckf
values is 2 pages which are initially filled with get_random_bytes()
for each 64 byte junk produced by the function. Another point was that
the stckf values only carry entropy in the LSB and thus a buffer of
2 pages is not really needed. Then there was a comment about the use
of the kimd cpacf function without proper initialization.
The rework addresses these points and now one page is used and only
one half of this is filled with get_random_bytes() on each chunk of 64
bytes requested data. The other half of the page is filled with stckf
values exored into with an overlap of 4 bytes. This can be done due to
the fact that only the lower 4 bytes carry entropy we need. For more
details about the algorithm used, see the header of the function.
The generate_entropy() function now uses the cpacf function klmd with
proper initialization of the parameter block to perform the sha512
hash.
George also pointed out some issues with the internal buffers used for
seeding and reads. These buffers are now zeroed with memzero_implicit
after use.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org>
Suggested-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <steuer@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY confuses newcomers to the crypto API because it
sounds like it is requesting a weak key. Actually, it is requesting
that weak keys be forbidden (for algorithms that have the notion of
"weak keys"; currently only DES and XTS do).
Also it is only one letter away from CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY, with which
it can be easily confused. (This in fact happened in the UX500 driver,
though just in some debugging messages.)
Therefore, make the intent clear by renaming it to
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
'cipher' algorithms (single block ciphers) are always synchronous, so
passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask to crypto_alloc_cipher() has no
effect. Many users therefore already don't pass it, but some still do.
This inconsistency can cause confusion, especially since the way the
'mask' argument works is somewhat counterintuitive.
Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Enhance the paes_s390 kernel module to allow the paes cipher to
accept variable length key material. The key material accepted by
the paes cipher is a key blob of various types. As of today, two
key blob types are supported: CCA secure key blobs and protected
key blobs.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The return code of cpacf_kmc() is less than the number of
bytes to process in case of an error, not greater.
The crypt routines for the other cipher modes already have
this correctly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
Fixes: 2793784307 ("s390/crypt: Add protected key AES module")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Some aead algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD. But this is
redundant with the C structure type ('struct aead_alg'), and
crypto_register_aead() already sets the type flag automatically,
clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless
assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignment from all the aead algorithms.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many shash algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But this
is redundant with the C structure type ('struct shash_alg'), and
crypto_register_shash() already sets the type flag automatically,
clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless
assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignment from all the shash algorithms.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The arch_get_random_seed_long() invocation done by the random device
driver is done in interrupt context and may be invoked very very
frequently. The existing s390 arch_get_random_seed*() implementation
uses the PRNO(TRNG) instruction which produces excellent high quality
entropy but is relatively slow and thus expensive.
This fix reworks the arch_get_random_seed* implementation. It
introduces a buffer concept to decouple the delivery of random data
via arch_get_random_seed*() from the generation of new random
bytes. The buffer of random data is filled asynchronously by a
workqueue thread.
If there are enough bytes in the buffer the s390_arch_random_generate()
just delivers these bytes. Otherwise false is returned until the worker
thread refills the buffer.
The worker fills the rng buffer by pulling fresh entropy from the
high quality (but slow) true hardware random generator. This entropy
is then spread over the buffer with an pseudo random generator.
As the arch_get_random_seed_long() fetches 8 bytes and the calling
function add_interrupt_randomness() counts this as 1 bit entropy the
distribution needs to make sure there is in fact 1 bit entropy
contained in 8 bytes of the buffer. The current values pull 32 byte
entropy and scatter this into a 2048 byte buffer. So 8 byte in the
buffer will contain 1 bit of entropy.
The worker thread is rescheduled based on the charge level of the
buffer but at least with 500 ms delay to avoid too much cpu consumption.
So the max. amount of rng data delivered via arch_get_random_seed is
limited to 4Kb per second.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
The return from the crc32_le_vgfm_16/crc32c_le_vgfm_16 and the
crc32_be_vgfm_16 functions are done with "br %r14". These are indirect
branches as well and need to use execute trampolines for CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes: f19fbd5ed6 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Tests with paes-xts and debugging investigations showed
that the ciphers are not always correctly resolved.
The rules for cipher priorities seem to be:
- Ecb-aes should have a prio greater than the
generic ecb-aes.
- The mode specialized ciphers (like cbc-aes-s390)
should have a prio greater than the sum of the
more generic combinations (like cbs(aes)).
This patch adjusts the cipher priorities for the
s390 aes and paes in kernel crypto implementations.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
A kernel crash occurs when the aes_s390 kernel module is
removed on machines < z14. This only happens on kernel
version 4.15 and higher on machines not supporting MSA 8.
The reason for the crash is a unconditional
crypto_unregister_aead() invocation where no previous
crypto_register_aead() had been called. The fix now
remembers if there has been a successful registration and
only then calls the unregister function upon kernel module
remove.
The code now crashing has been introduced with
"bf7fa03 s390/crypto: add s390 platform specific aes gcm support."
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without
setting the key. To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether
a given hash algorithm is keyed or not. AF_ALG currently does this by
checking for the presence of a ->setkey() method. However, this is
actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement
->setkey() but can also be used without a key. (The CRC-32 "key" is not
actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state.
If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.)
Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which
indicates that the algorithm has a ->setkey() method, but it is not
required to be called. Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms.
The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre.
Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag
from their underlying algorithm.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
More files under arch/s390 have been tagged with the SPDX identifier,
a few of those files have a GPL license text. Remove the GPL text
as it is no longer needed.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Add the correct SPDX license to a few more files under arch/s390 and
drivers/s390 which have been missed to far.
The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used
instead of the full boiler plate text.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Now that the SPDX tag is in all arch/s390/crypto/ files, that identifies
the license in a specific and legally-defined manner. So the extra GPL
text wording can be removed as it is no longer needed at all.
This is done on a quest to remove the 700+ different ways that files in
the kernel describe the GPL license text. And there's unneeded stuff
like the address (sometimes incorrect) for the FSF which is never
needed.
No copyright headers or other non-license-description text was removed.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
It's good to have SPDX identifiers in all files to make it easier to
audit the kernel tree for correct licenses.
Update the arch/s390/crypto/ files with the correct SPDX license
identifier based on the license text in the file itself. The SPDX
identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of
the full boiler plate text.
This work is based on a script and data from Thomas Gleixner, Philippe
Ombredanne, and Kate Stewart.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Pull s390 updates from Heiko Carstens:
"Since Martin is on vacation you get the s390 pull request for the
v4.15 merge window this time from me.
Besides a lot of cleanups and bug fixes these are the most important
changes:
- a new regset for runtime instrumentation registers
- hardware accelerated AES-GCM support for the aes_s390 module
- support for the new CEX6S crypto cards
- support for FORTIFY_SOURCE
- addition of missing z13 and new z14 instructions to the in-kernel
disassembler
- generate opcode tables for the in-kernel disassembler out of a
simple text file instead of having to manually maintain those
tables
- fast memset16, memset32 and memset64 implementations
- removal of named saved segment support
- hardware counter support for z14
- queued spinlocks and queued rwlocks implementations for s390
- use the stack_depth tracking feature for s390 BPF JIT
- a new s390_sthyi system call which emulates the sthyi (store
hypervisor information) instruction
- removal of the old KVM virtio transport
- an s390 specific CPU alternatives implementation which is used in
the new spinlock code"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux: (88 commits)
MAINTAINERS: add virtio-ccw.h to virtio/s390 section
s390/noexec: execute kexec datamover without DAT
s390: fix transactional execution control register handling
s390/bpf: take advantage of stack_depth tracking
s390: simplify transactional execution elf hwcap handling
s390/zcrypt: Rework struct ap_qact_ap_info.
s390/virtio: remove unused header file kvm_virtio.h
s390: avoid undefined behaviour
s390/disassembler: generate opcode tables from text file
s390/disassembler: remove insn_to_mnemonic()
s390/dasd: avoid calling do_gettimeofday()
s390: vfio-ccw: Do not attempt to free no-op, test and tic cda.
s390: remove named saved segment support
s390/archrandom: Reconsider s390 arch random implementation
s390/pci: do not require AIS facility
s390/qdio: sanitize put_indicator
s390/qdio: use atomic_cmpxchg
s390/nmi: avoid using long-displacement facility
s390: pass endianness info to sparse
s390/decompressor: remove informational messages
...
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This patch introduces gcm(aes) support into the aes_s390 kernel module.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
The s390_paes and the s390_aes kernel module used just one
config symbol CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES. As paes has a dependency
to PKEY and this requires ZCRYPT the aes module also had
a dependency to the zcrypt device driver which is not true.
Fixed by introducing a new config symbol CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES
which has dependencies to PKEY and ZCRYPT. Removed the
dependency for the aes module to ZCRYPT.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Add missing include statements to make sure that prototypes match
implementation. As reported by sparse:
arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c:18:1:
warning: symbol 's390_arch_random_available' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/s390/kernel/traps.c:279:13: warning:
symbol 'trap_init' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
For automatic module loading (e.g. as it is used with cryptsetup)
an alias "paes" for the paes_s390 kernel module is needed.
Correct the paes_s390 module alias from "aes-all" to "paes".
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
This patch introduces s390 specific arch random functionality.
There exists a generic kernel API for arch specific random
number implementation (see include/linux/random.h). Here
comes the header file and a very small static code part
implementing the arch_random_* API based on the TRNG
subfunction coming with the reworked PRNG instruction.
The arch random implementation hooks into the kernel
initialization and checks for availability of the TRNG
function. In accordance to the arch random API all functions
return false if the TRNG is not available. Otherwise the new
high quality entropy source provides fresh random on each
invocation.
The s390 arch random feature build is controlled via
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM. This config option located in
arch/s390/Kconfig is enabled by default and appears
as entry "s390 architectural random number generation API"
in the submenu "Processor type and features" for s390 builds.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
The PPNO (Perform Pseudorandom Number Operation) instruction
has been renamed to PRNO (Perform Random Number Operation).
To avoid confusion and conflicts with future extensions with
this instruction (like e.g. provide a true random number
generator) this patch renames all occurences in cpacf.h and
adjusts the only exploiter code which is the prng device
driver and one line in the s390 kvm feature check.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Pull s390 fixes from Martin Schwidefsky:
- four patches to get the new cputime code in shape for s390
- add the new statx system call
- a few bug fixes
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
s390: wire up statx system call
KVM: s390: Fix guest migration for huge guests resulting in panic
s390/ipl: always use load normal for CCW-type re-IPL
s390/timex: micro optimization for tod_to_ns
s390/cputime: provide archicture specific cputime_to_nsecs
s390/cputime: reset all accounting fields on fork
s390/cputime: remove last traces of cputime_t
s390: fix in-kernel program checks
s390/crypt: fix missing unlock in ctr_paes_crypt on error path
Fix up affected files that include this signal functionality via sched.h.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The ctr mode of protected key aes uses the ctrblk page if the
ctrblk_lock could be acquired. If the protected key has to be
reestablished and this operation fails the unlock for the
ctrblk_lock is missing. Add it.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
This patch introduces a new in-kernel-crypto blockcipher
called 'paes' which implements AES with protected keys.
The paes blockcipher can be used similar to the aes
blockcipher but uses secure key material to derive the
working protected key and so offers an encryption
implementation where never a clear key value is exposed
in memory.
The paes module is only available for the s390 platform
providing a minimal hardware support of CPACF enabled
with at least MSA level 3. Upon module initialization
these requirements are checked.
Includes additional contribution from Harald Freudenberger.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
The generate_entropy function used a sha256 for compacting
together 256 bits of entropy into 32 bytes hash. However, it
is questionable if a sha256 can really be used here, as
potential collisions may reduce the max entropy fitting into
a 32 byte hash value. So this batch introduces the use of
sha512 instead and the required buffer adjustments for the
calling functions.
Further more the working buffer for the generate_entropy
function has been widened from one page to two pages. So now
1024 stckf invocations are used to gather 256 bits of
entropy. This has been done to be on the save side if the
jitters of stckf values isn't as good as supposed.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
In fips mode only xts keys with 128 bit or 125 bit are allowed.
This fix extends the xts_aes_set_key function to check for these
valid key lengths in fips mode.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Triple-DES implementations will soon be required to check
for uniqueness of keys with fips mode enabled. Add checks
to ensure none of the 3 keys match.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We added some new locking but forgot to unlock on error.
Fixes: 57127645d7 ("s390/zcrypt: Introduce new SHA-512 based Pseudo Random Generator.")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Static analysis with cppcheck detected that ret is not initialized
and hence garbage is potentially being returned in the case where
prng_data->ppnows.reseed_counter <= prng_reseed_limit.
Thanks to Martin Schwidefsky for spotting a mistake in my original
fix.
Fixes: 0177db01ad ("s390/crypto: simplify return code handling")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
The double while loops of the CTR mode encryption / decryption functions
are overly complex for little gain. Simplify the functions to a single
while loop at the cost of an additional memcpy of a few bytes for every
4K page worth of data.
Adapt the other crypto functions to make them all look alike.
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
The CPACF code makes some assumptions about the availablity of hardware
support. E.g. if the machine supports KM(AES-256) without chaining it is
assumed that KMC(AES-256) with chaining is available as well. For the
existing CPUs this is true but the architecturally correct way is to
check each CPACF functions on its own. This is what the query function
of each instructions is all about.
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
The aes and the des module register multiple crypto algorithms
dependent on the availability of specific CPACF instructions.
To simplify the deregistration with crypto_unregister_alg add
an array with pointers to the successfully registered algorithms
and use it for the error handling in the init function and in
the module exit function.
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
The CPACF instructions can complete with three different condition codes:
CC=0 for successful completion, CC=1 if the protected key verification
failed, and CC=3 for partial completion.
The inline functions will restart the CPACF instruction for partial
completion, this removes the CC=3 case. The CC=1 case is only relevant
for the protected key functions of the KM, KMC, KMAC and KMCTR
instructions. As the protected key functions are not used by the
current code, there is no need for any kind of return code handling.
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Use a separate define for the decryption modifier bit instead of
duplicating the function codes for encryption / decrypton.
In addition use an unsigned type for the function code.
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
David Hildenbrand