Drop CONFIG_KASAN_TAGS_IDENTIFY and related code to simplify making
changes to the reporting code.
The dropped functionality will be restored in the following patches in
this series.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c66ba98eb237e9ed9312c19d423bbcf4ecf88f8.1662411799.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Allow enabling CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC with SW_TAGS and HW_TAGS KASAN modes.
Also adjust CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC description:
- Mention HW_TAGS support.
- Remove unneeded internal details: they have no place in Kconfig
description and are already explained in the documentation.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bfa0fdedfe25f65e5caa4e410f074ddbac7a0b59.1643047180.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, enabling CONFIG_STACKDEPOT means its stack_table will be
allocated from memblock, even if stack depot ends up not actually used.
The default size of stack_table is 4MB on 32-bit, 8MB on 64-bit.
This is fine for use-cases such as KASAN which is also a config option
and has overhead on its own. But it's an issue for functionality that
has to be actually enabled on boot (page_owner) or depends on hardware
(GPU drivers) and thus the memory might be wasted. This was raised as
an issue [1] when attempting to add stackdepot support for SLUB's debug
object tracking functionality. It's common to build kernels with
CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and enable slub_debug on boot only when needed, or
create only specific kmem caches with debugging for testing purposes.
It would thus be more efficient if stackdepot's table was allocated only
when actually going to be used. This patch thus makes the allocation
(and whole stack_depot_init() call) optional:
- Add a CONFIG_STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT flag to keep using the current
well-defined point of allocation as part of mem_init(). Make
CONFIG_KASAN select this flag.
- Other users have to call stack_depot_init() as part of their own init
when it's determined that stack depot will actually be used. This may
depend on both config and runtime conditions. Convert current users
which are page_owner and several in the DRM subsystem. Same will be
done for SLUB later.
- Because the init might now be called after the boot-time memblock
allocation has given all memory to the buddy allocator, change
stack_depot_init() to allocate stack_table with kvmalloc() when
memblock is no longer available. Also handle allocation failure by
disabling stackdepot (could have theoretically happened even with
memblock allocation previously), and don't unnecessarily align the
memblock allocation to its own size anymore.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMuHMdW=eoVzM1Re5FVoEN87nKfiLmM2+Ah7eNu2KXEhCvbZyA@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211013073005.11351-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> # stackdepot
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com>
Cc: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com>
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: fix spelling mistake and grammar in pr_err message
There is a spelling mistake of the work allocation so fix this and
re-phrase the message to make it easier to read.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015104159.11282-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() - fixup
On FLATMEM, we call page_ext_init_flatmem_late() just before
kmem_cache_init() which means stack_depot_init() (called by page owner
init) will not recognize properly it should use kvmalloc() and not
memblock_alloc(). memblock_alloc() will also not issue a warning and
return a block memory that can be invalid and cause kernel page fault when
saving stacks, as reported by the kernel test robot [1].
Fix this by moving page_ext_init_flatmem_late() below kmem_cache_init() so
that slab_is_available() is true during stack_depot_init(). SPARSEMEM
doesn't have this issue, as it doesn't do page_ext_init_flatmem_late(),
but a different page_ext_init() even later in the boot process.
Thanks to Mike Rapoport for pointing out the FLATMEM init ordering issue.
While at it, also actually resolve a checkpatch warning in stack_depot_init()
from DRM CI, which was supposed to be in the original patch already.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211014085450.GC18719@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6abd9213-19a9-6d58-cedc-2414386d2d81@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() - fixup3
Due to cd06ab2fd4 ("drm/locking: add backtrace for locking contended
locks without backoff") landing recently to -next adding a new stack depot
user in drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modeset_lock.c we need to add an appropriate
call to stack_depot_init() there as well.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2a692365-cfa1-64f2-34e0-8aa5674dce5e@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com>
Cc: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Subject: lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() - fixup4
Due to 4e66934eaa ("lib: add reference counting tracking
infrastructure") landing recently to net-next adding a new stack depot
user in lib/ref_tracker.c we need to add an appropriate call to
stack_depot_init() there as well.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/45c1b738-1a2f-5b5f-2f6d-86fab206d01c@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Slab <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In the main KASAN config option CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS is
checked for instrumentation-based modes. However, if
HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS is true all modes may still be selected.
To fix, also make the software modes depend on
CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210910084240.1215803-1-elver@google.com
Fixes: 6a63a63ff1 ("kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS")
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Cc: Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add memory corruption identification support for hardware tag-based mode.
We store one old free pointer tag and free backtrace instead of five
because hardware tag-based kasan only has 16 different tags.
If we store as many stacks as SW tag-based kasan does(5 stacks), there is
high probability to find the same tag in the stacks when out-of-bound
issues happened and we will mistake out-of-bound issue for use-after-free.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210626100931.22794-4-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com>
Suggested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Chinwen Chang <chinwen.chang@mediatek.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Cc: Nicholas Tang <nicholas.tang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "KASAN core changes for ppc64 radix KASAN", v16.
Building on the work of Christophe, Aneesh and Balbir, I've ported KASAN
to 64-bit Book3S kernels running on the Radix MMU. I've been trying this
for a while, but we keep having collisions between the kasan code in the
mm tree and the code I want to put in to the ppc tree.
This series just contains the kasan core changes that we need. There
should be no noticeable changes to other platforms.
This patch (of 4):
For annoying architectural reasons, it's very difficult to support inline
instrumentation on powerpc64.*
Add a Kconfig flag to allow an arch to disable inline. (It's a bit
annoying to be 'backwards', but I'm not aware of any way to have an arch
force a symbol to be 'n', rather than 'y'.)
We also disable stack instrumentation in this case as it does things that
are functionally equivalent to inline instrumentation, namely adding code
that touches the shadow directly without going through a C helper.
* on ppc64 atm, the shadow lives in virtual memory and isn't accessible in
real mode. However, before we turn on virtual memory, we parse the device
tree to determine which platform and MMU we're running under. That calls
generic DT code, which is instrumented. Inline instrumentation in DT
would unconditionally attempt to touch the shadow region, which we won't
have set up yet, and would crash. We can make outline mode wait for the
arch to be ready, but we can't change what the compiler inserts for inline
mode.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210624034050.511391-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE both enable KASAN stack
instrumentation, but we should only need one config, so that we remove
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE and make CONFIG_KASAN_STACK workable. see [1].
When enable KASAN stack instrumentation, then for gcc we could do no
prompt and default value y, and for clang prompt and default value n.
This patch fixes the following compilation warning:
include/linux/kasan.h:333:30: warning: 'CONFIG_KASAN_STACK' is not defined, evaluates to 0 [-Wundef]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge snafu]
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221 [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210226012531.29231-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Fixes: d9b571c885 ("kasan: fix KASAN_STACK dependency for HW_TAGS")
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There's a runtime failure when running HW_TAGS-enabled kernel built with
GCC on hardware that doesn't support MTE. GCC-built kernels always have
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK enabled, even though stack instrumentation isn't
supported by HW_TAGS. Having that config enabled causes KASAN to issue
MTE-only instructions to unpoison kernel stacks, which causes the failure.
Fix the issue by disallowing CONFIG_KASAN_STACK when HW_TAGS is used.
(The commit that introduced CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS specified proper
dependency for CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE but not for CONFIG_KASAN_STACK.)
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/59e75426241dbb5611277758c8d4d6f5f9298dac.1615215441.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Fixes: 6a63a63ff1 ("kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On a high level, this patch allows running KUnit KASAN tests with the
hardware tag-based KASAN mode.
Internally, this change reenables tag checking at the end of each KASAN
test that triggers a tag fault and leads to tag checking being disabled.
Also simplify is_write calculation in report_tag_fault.
With this patch KASAN tests are still failing for the hardware tag-based
mode; fixes come in the next few patches.
[andreyknvl@google.com: export HW_TAGS symbols for KUnit tests]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e7eeb252da408b08f0c81b950a55fb852f92000b.1613155970.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Id94dc9eccd33b23cda4950be408c27f879e474c8
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/51b23112cf3fd62b8f8e9df81026fa2b15870501.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Compiling the kernel with Kasan disables automatic 3-level vs 4-level
kernel space paging selection, because the shadow memory offset has
to be known at compile time and there is no such offset which would be
acceptable for both 3 and 4-level paging. Instead S390_4_LEVEL_PAGING
option was introduced which allowed to pick how many paging levels to
use under Kasan.
With the introduction of protected virtualization, kernel memory layout
may be affected due to ultravisor secure storage limit. This adds
additional complexity into how memory layout would look like in
combination with Kasan predefined shadow memory offsets. To simplify
this make Kasan 4-level paging default and remove Kasan 3-level paging
support.
Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Transfer all previous tests for KASAN to KUnit so they can be run more
easily. Using kunit_tool, developers can run these tests with their other
KUnit tests and see "pass" or "fail" with the appropriate KASAN report
instead of needing to parse each KASAN report to test KASAN
functionalities. All KASAN reports are still printed to dmesg.
Stack tests do not work properly when KASAN_STACK is enabled so those
tests use a check for "if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)" so they only run
if stack instrumentation is enabled. If KASAN_STACK is not enabled, KUnit
will print a statement to let the user know this test was not run with
KASAN_STACK enabled.
copy_user_test and kasan_rcu_uaf cannot be run in KUnit so there is a
separate test file for those tests, which can be run as before as a
module.
[trishalfonso@google.com: v14]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915035828.570483-4-davidgow@google.com
Signed-off-by: Patricia Alfonso <trishalfonso@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200910070331.3358048-4-davidgow@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since the kernel now requires at least Clang 10.0.1, remove any mention of
old Clang versions and simplify the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Cc: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
Cc: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200902225911.209899-7-ndesaulniers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Turn 'KASAN' into a menuconfig, to avoid cluttering its parent menu with
the suboptions if enabled. Use 'if KASAN ... endif' instead of having to
'depend on KASAN' for each entry.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200629104157.3242503-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Adds config variable CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS, which will be
true if we have a compiler that does not fail builds due to
no_sanitize_address functions. This does not yet mean they work as
intended, but for automated build-tests, this is the minimum
requirement.
For example, we require that __always_inline functions used from
no_sanitize_address functions do not generate instrumentation. On GCC <=
7 this fails to build entirely, therefore we make the minimum version
GCC 8.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200602175859.GC2604@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Patch series "kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow
memory", v11.
Currently, vmalloc space is backed by the early shadow page. This means
that kasan is incompatible with VMAP_STACK.
This series provides a mechanism to back vmalloc space with real,
dynamically allocated memory. I have only wired up x86, because that's
the only currently supported arch I can work with easily, but it's very
easy to wire up other architectures, and it appears that there is some
work-in-progress code to do this on arm64 and s390.
This has been discussed before in the context of VMAP_STACK:
- https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202009
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/22/198
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822
In terms of implementation details:
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world. The benchmarks are also a stress-test for the vmalloc
subsystem: they're not indicative of an overall 2x slowdown!
This patch (of 4):
Hook into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocate real shadow memory
to back the mappings.
Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.
Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.
We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.
To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, this code
expects that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space
will not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left unmapped.
This will require changes in arch-specific code.
This allows KASAN with VMAP_STACK, and may be helpful for architectures
that do not have a separate module space (e.g. powerpc64, which I am
currently working on). It also allows relaxing the module alignment
back to PAGE_SIZE.
Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:
- Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.
- Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
* ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
* ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=3D1)
This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world.
The full benchmark results are:
Performance
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 662004 11404956 17.23 19144610 28.92 1.68
full_fit_alloc_test 710950 12029752 16.92 13184651 18.55 1.10
long_busy_list_alloc_test 9431875 43990172 4.66 82970178 8.80 1.89
random_size_alloc_test 5033626 23061762 4.58 47158834 9.37 2.04
fix_align_alloc_test 1252514 15276910 12.20 31266116 24.96 2.05
random_size_align_alloc_te 1648501 14578321 8.84 25560052 15.51 1.75
align_shift_alloc_test 147 830 5.65 5692 38.72 6.86
pcpu_alloc_test 80732 125520 1.55 140864 1.74 1.12
Total Cycles 119240774314 763211341128 6.40 1390338696894 11.66 1.82
Sequential, 2 cpus
No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN
fix_size_alloc_test 1423150 14276550 10.03 27733022 19.49 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1754219 14722640 8.39 15030786 8.57 1.02
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11451858 52154973 4.55 107016027 9.34 2.05
random_size_alloc_test 5989020 26735276 4.46 68885923 11.50 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2050976 20166900 9.83 50491675 24.62 2.50
random_size_align_alloc_te 2858229 17971700 6.29 38730225 13.55 2.16
align_shift_alloc_test 405 6428 15.87 26253 64.82 4.08
pcpu_alloc_test 127183 151464 1.19 216263 1.70 1.43
Total Cycles 54181269392 308723699764 5.70 650772566394 12.01 2.11
fix_size_alloc_test 1420404 14289308 10.06 27790035 19.56 1.94
full_fit_alloc_test 1736145 14806234 8.53 15274301 8.80 1.03
long_busy_list_alloc_test 11404638 52270785 4.58 107550254 9.43 2.06
random_size_alloc_test 6017006 26650625 4.43 68696127 11.42 2.58
fix_align_alloc_test 2045504 20280985 9.91 50414862 24.65 2.49
random_size_align_alloc_te 2845338 17931018 6.30 38510276 13.53 2.15
align_shift_alloc_test 472 3760 7.97 9656 20.46 2.57
pcpu_alloc_test 118643 132732 1.12 146504 1.23 1.10
Total Cycles 54040011688 309102805492 5.72 651325675652 12.05 2.11
[dja@axtens.net: fixups]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120052719.7201-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D202009
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [shadow rework]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Co-developed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add memory corruption identification at bug report for software tag-based
mode. The report shows whether it is "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound"
error instead of "invalid-access" error. This will make it easier for
programmers to see the memory corruption problem.
We extend the slab to store five old free pointer tag and free backtrace,
we can check if the tagged address is in the slab record and make a good
guess if the object is more like "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound".
therefore every slab memory corruption can be identified whether it's
"use-after-free" or "out-of-bound".
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: simplify & clenup code]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3318f9d7-a760-3cc8-b700-f06108ae745f@virtuozzo.com]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821180332.11450-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
asan-stack mode still uses dangerously large kernel stacks of tens of
kilobytes in some drivers, and it does not seem that anyone is working
on the clang bug.
Turn it off for all clang versions to prevent users from accidentally
enabling it once they update to clang-9, and to help automated build
testing with clang-9.
Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38809
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190719200347.2596375-1-arnd@arndb.de
Fixes: 6baec880d7 ("kasan: turn off asan-stack for clang-8 and earlier")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Use after scope bugs detector seems to be almost entirely useless for
the linux kernel. It exists over two years, but I've seen only one
valid bug so far [1]. And the bug was fixed before it has been
reported. There were some other use-after-scope reports, but they were
false-positives due to different reasons like incompatibility with
structleak plugin.
This feature significantly increases stack usage, especially with GCC <
9 version, and causes a 32K stack overflow. It probably adds
performance penalty too.
Given all that, let's remove use-after-scope detector entirely.
While preparing this patch I've noticed that we mistakenly enable
use-after-scope detection for clang compiler regardless of
CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA setting. This is also fixed now.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20171129052106.rhgbjhhis53hkgfn@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190111185842.13978-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> [arm64]
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Building an arm64 allmodconfig kernel with clang results in over 140
warnings about overly large stack frames, the worst ones being:
drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-sitronix-st7789v.c:196:12: error: stack frame size of 20224 bytes in function 'st7789v_prepare'
drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/displays/panel-tpo-td028ttec1.c:196:12: error: stack frame size of 13120 bytes in function 'td028ttec1_panel_enable'
drivers/usb/host/max3421-hcd.c:1395:1: error: stack frame size of 10048 bytes in function 'max3421_spi_thread'
drivers/net/wan/slic_ds26522.c:209:12: error: stack frame size of 9664 bytes in function 'slic_ds26522_probe'
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c:2434:5: error: stack frame size of 8832 bytes in function 'ccp_run_cmd'
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0367.c:1005:12: error: stack frame size of 7840 bytes in function 'stv0367ter_algo'
None of these happen with gcc today, and almost all of these are the
result of a single known issue in llvm. Hopefully it will eventually
get fixed with the clang-9 release.
In the meantime, the best idea I have is to turn off asan-stack for
clang-8 and earlier, so we can produce a kernel that is safe to run.
I have posted three patches that address the frame overflow warnings
that are not addressed by turning off asan-stack, so in combination with
this change, we get much closer to a clean allmodconfig build, which in
turn is necessary to do meaningful build regression testing.
It is still possible to turn on the CONFIG_ASAN_STACK option on all
versions of clang, and it's always enabled for gcc, but when
CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is set, the option remains invisible, so
allmodconfig and randconfig builds (which are normally done with a
forced CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST) will still result in a mostly clean build.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190222222950.3997333-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38809
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit splits the current CONFIG_KASAN config option into two:
1. CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC, that enables the generic KASAN mode (the one
that exists now);
2. CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS, that enables the software tag-based KASAN mode.
The name CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS is chosen as in the future we will have
another hardware tag-based KASAN mode, that will rely on hardware memory
tagging support in arm64.
With CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS enabled, compiler options are changed to
instrument kernel files with -fsantize=kernel-hwaddress (except the ones
for which KASAN_SANITIZE := n is set).
Both CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS support both
CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE instrumentation modes.
This commit also adds empty placeholder (for now) implementation of
tag-based KASAN specific hooks inserted by the compiler and adjusts
common hooks implementation.
While this commit adds the CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS config option, this option
is not selectable, as it depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS, which we will
enable once all the infrastracture code has been added.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2550106eb8a68b10fefbabce820910b115aa853.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
By default 3-level paging is used when the kernel is compiled with
kasan support. Add 4-level paging option to support systems with more
then 3TB of physical memory and to cover 4-level paging specific code
with kasan as well.
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Building with KASAN and SLUB but without sysfs now results in a
build-time error:
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for SLUB_DEBUG
Depends on [n]: SLUB [=y] && SYSFS [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- KASAN [=y] && HAVE_ARCH_KASAN [=y] && (SLUB [=y] || SLAB [=n] && !DEBUG_SLAB [=n]) && SLUB [=y]
mm/slub.c:4565:12: error: 'list_locations' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
static int list_locations(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm/slub.c:4406:13: error: 'validate_slab_cache' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
static long validate_slab_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
This disallows that broken configuration in Kconfig.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180709154019.1693026-1-arnd@arndb.de
Fixes: dd275caf4a ("kasan: depend on CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
KASAN depends on having access to some of the accounting that SLUB_DEBUG
does; without it, there are immediate crashes [1]. So, the natural
thing to do is to make KASAN select SLUB_DEBUG.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHmME9rtoPwxUSnktxzKso14iuVCWT7BE_-_8PAC=pGw1iJnQg@mail.gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180622154623.25388-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Fixes: f9e13c0a5a ("slab, slub: skip unnecessary kasan_cache_shutdown()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We get a lot of very large stack frames using gcc-7.0.1 with the default
-fsanitize-address-use-after-scope --param asan-stack=1 options, which can
easily cause an overflow of the kernel stack, e.g.
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2434:1: warning: the frame size of 46176 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2800lib.c:5650:1: warning: the frame size of 23632 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
lib/atomic64_test.c:250:1: warning: the frame size of 11200 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2621:1: warning: the frame size of 9208 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv090x.c:3431:1: warning: the frame size of 6816 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
fs/fscache/stats.c:287:1: warning: the frame size of 6536 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes
To reduce this risk, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope is now split out
into a separate CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA Kconfig option, leading to stack
frames that are smaller than 2 kilobytes most of the time on x86_64. An
earlier version of this patch also prevented combining KASAN_EXTRA with
KASAN_INLINE, but that is no longer necessary with gcc-7.0.1.
All patches to get the frame size below 2048 bytes with CONFIG_KASAN=y
and CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA=n have been merged by maintainers now, so we can
bring back that default now. KASAN_EXTRA=y still causes lots of
warnings but now defaults to !COMPILE_TEST to disable it in
allmodconfig, and it remains disabled in all other defconfigs since it
is a new option. I arbitrarily raise the warning limit for KASAN_EXTRA
to 3072 to reduce the noise, but an allmodconfig kernel still has around
50 warnings on gcc-7.
I experimented a bit more with smaller stack frames and have another
follow-up series that reduces the warning limit for 64-bit architectures
to 1280 bytes (without CONFIG_KASAN).
With earlier versions of this patch series, I also had patches to address
the warnings we get with KASAN and/or KASAN_EXTRA, using a
"noinline_if_stackbloat" annotation.
That annotation now got replaced with a gcc-8 bugfix (see
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715) and a workaround for
older compilers, which means that KASAN_EXTRA is now just as bad as
before and will lead to an instant stack overflow in a few extreme
cases.
This reverts parts of commit 3f181b4d86 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable
-Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y"). Two patches in linux-next
should be merged first to avoid introducing warnings in an allmodconfig
build:
3cd890dbe2 ("media: dvb-frontends: fix i2c access helpers for KASAN")
16c3ada89c ("media: r820t: fix r820t_write_reg for KASAN")
Do we really need to backport this?
I think we do: without this patch, enabling KASAN will lead to
unavoidable kernel stack overflow in certain device drivers when built
with gcc-7 or higher on linux-4.10+ or any version that contains a
backport of commit c5caf21ab0. Most people are probably still on
older compilers, but it will get worse over time as they upgrade their
distros.
The warnings we get on kernels older than this should all be for code
that uses dangerously large stack frames, though most of them do not
cause an actual stack overflow by themselves.The asan-stack option was
added in linux-4.0, and commit 3f181b4d86 ("lib/Kconfig.debug:
disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y") effectively turned
off the warning for allmodconfig kernels, so I would like to see this
fix backported to any kernels later than 4.0.
I have done dozens of fixes for individual functions with stack frames
larger than 2048 bytes with asan-stack, and I plan to make sure that
all those fixes make it into the stable kernels as well (most are
already there).
Part of the complication here is that asan-stack (from 4.0) was
originally assumed to always require much larger stacks, but that
turned out to be a combination of multiple gcc bugs that we have now
worked around and fixed, but sanitize-address-use-after-scope (from
v4.10) has a much higher inherent stack usage and also suffers from at
least three other problems that we have analyzed but not yet fixed
upstream, each of them makes the stack usage more severe than it should
be.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171221134744.2295529-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
For KASAN builds:
- switch SLUB allocator to using stackdepot instead of storing the
allocation/deallocation stacks in the objects;
- change the freelist hook so that parts of the freelist can be put
into the quarantine.
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468601423-28676-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468347165-41906-3-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot
will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory
chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by
handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta
structures in the allocated memory chunks.
IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary
duplication.
Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once
KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB
to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack
bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the
mm/page_owner.c debugging facility.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t]
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add KASAN hooks to SLAB allocator.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: unified support for SLUB and SLAB
allocators" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It's recommended to have slub's user tracking enabled with CONFIG_KASAN,
because:
a) User tracking disables slab merging which improves
detecting out-of-bounds accesses.
b) User tracking metadata acts as redzone which also improves
detecting out-of-bounds accesses.
c) User tracking provides additional information about object.
This information helps to understand bugs.
Currently it is not enabled by default. Besides recompiling the kernel
with KASAN and reinstalling it, user also have to change the boot cmdline,
which is not very handy.
Enable slub user tracking by default with KASAN=y, since there is no good
reason to not do this.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: little fixes, per David]
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET is purely arch specific setting,
so it should be in arch's Kconfig file.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1435828178-10975-7-git-send-email-a.ryabinin@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The documentation shows a need for gcc > 4.9.2, but it's really >=. The
Kconfig entries don't show require versions so add them. Correct a
latter/later typo too. Also mention that gcc 5 required to catch out of
bounds accesses to global and stack variables.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables.
This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules.
Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g.
__init, __read_mostly, ...)
The idea of this is simple. Compiler increases each global variable by
redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals()
function. Information about global variable (address, size, size with
redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison
variable's redzone.
This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned
address making shadow memory handling (
kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple. Such alignment
guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond
to only one module_alloc() allocation.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is a test module doing various nasty things like out of bounds
accesses, use after free. It is useful for testing kernel debugging
features like kernel address sanitizer.
It mostly concentrates on testing of slab allocator, but we might want to
add more different stuff here in future (like stack/global variables out
of bounds accesses and so on).
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by
slub. Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as
redzone. Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by
caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object
(including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible).
We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object.
There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire
size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole
allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible.
Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's
metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer.
16TB of virtual addressed used for shadow memory. It's located in range
[ffffec0000000000 - fffffc0000000000] between vmemmap and %esp fixup
stacks.
At early stage we map whole shadow region with zero page. Latter, after
pages mapped to direct mapping address range we unmap zero pages from
corresponding shadow (see kasan_map_shadow()) and allocate and map a real
shadow memory reusing vmemmap_populate() function.
Also replace __pa with __pa_nodebug before shadow initialized. __pa with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y make external function call (__phys_addr)
__phys_addr is instrumented, so __asan_load could be called before shadow
area initialized.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andrey Konovalov