SETXATTR_CHECK policy rules assume that any algorithm listed in the
'appraise_algos' flag must be accepted when performing setxattr() on
the security.ima xattr. However nothing checks that they are
available in the current kernel. A userland application could hash
a file with a digest that the kernel wouldn't be able to verify.
However, if SETXATTR_CHECK is not in use, the kernel already forbids
that xattr write.
Verify that algorithms listed in appraise_algos are available to the
current kernel and reject the policy update otherwise. This will fix
the inconsistency between SETXATTR_CHECK and non-SETXATTR_CHECK
behaviors.
That filtering is only performed in ima_parse_appraise_algos() when
updating policies so that we do not have to pay the price of
allocating a hash object every time validate_hash_algo() is called
in ima_inode_setxattr().
Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
While users can restrict the accepted hash algorithms for the
security.ima xattr file signature when appraising said file, users
cannot restrict the algorithms that can be set on that attribute:
any algorithm built in the kernel is accepted on a write.
Define a new value for the ima policy option 'func' that restricts
globally the hash algorithms accepted when writing the security.ima
xattr.
When a policy contains a rule of the form
appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_algos=sha256,sha384,sha512
only values corresponding to one of these three digest algorithms
will be accepted for writing the security.ima xattr. Attempting to
write the attribute using another algorithm (or "free-form" data)
will be denied with an audit log message. In the absence of such a
policy rule, the default is still to only accept hash algorithms
built in the kernel (with all the limitations that entails).
Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kernel has the ability to restrict the set of hash algorithms it
accepts for the security.ima xattr when it appraises files.
Define a new IMA policy rule option "appraise_algos=", using the
mentioned mechanism to expose a user-toggable policy knob to opt-in
to that restriction and select the desired set of algorithms that
must be accepted.
When a policy rule uses the 'appraise_algos' option, appraisal of a
file referenced by that rule will now fail if the digest algorithm
employed to hash the file was not one of those explicitly listed in
the option. In its absence, any hash algorithm compiled in the
kernel will be accepted.
For example, on a system where SELinux is properly deployed, the rule
appraise func=BPRM_CHECK obj_type=iptables_exec_t \
appraise_algos=sha256,sha384
will block the execution of iptables if the xattr security.ima of its
executables were not hashed with either sha256 or sha384.
Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kernel accepts any hash algorithm as a value for the security.ima
xattr. Users may wish to restrict the accepted algorithms to only
support strong cryptographic ones.
Provide the plumbing to restrict the permitted set of hash algorithms
used for verifying file hashes and signatures stored in security.ima
xattr.
Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
By default, writes to the extended attributes security.ima will be
allowed even if the hash algorithm used for the xattr is not compiled
in the kernel (which does not make sense because the kernel would not
be able to appraise that file as it lacks support for validating the
hash).
Prevent and audit writes to the security.ima xattr if the hash algorithm
used in the new value is not available in the current kernel.
Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
MD5 is a weak digest algorithm that shouldn't be used for cryptographic
operation. It hinders the efficiency of a patch set that aims to limit
the digests allowed for the extended file attribute namely security.ima.
MD5 is no longer a requirement for IMA, nor should it be used there.
The sole place where we still use the MD5 algorithm inside IMA is setting
the ima_hash algorithm to MD5, if the user supplies 'ima_hash=md5'
parameter on the command line. With commit ab60368ab6 ("ima: Fallback
to the builtin hash algorithm"), setting "ima_hash=md5" fails gracefully
when CRYPTO_MD5 is not set:
ima: Can not allocate md5 (reason: -2)
ima: Allocating md5 failed, going to use default hash algorithm sha256
Remove the CRYPTO_MD5 dependency for IMA.
Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: include commit number in patch description for
stable.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.17
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
DM configures a block device with various target specific attributes
passed to it as a table. DM loads the table, and calls each target’s
respective constructors with the attributes as input parameters.
Some of these attributes are critical to ensure the device meets
certain security bar. Thus, IMA should measure these attributes, to
ensure they are not tampered with, during the lifetime of the device.
So that the external services can have high confidence in the
configuration of the block-devices on a given system.
Some devices may have large tables. And a given device may change its
state (table-load, suspend, resume, rename, remove, table-clear etc.)
many times. Measuring these attributes each time when the device
changes its state will significantly increase the size of the IMA logs.
Further, once configured, these attributes are not expected to change
unless a new table is loaded, or a device is removed and recreated.
Therefore the clear-text of the attributes should only be measured
during table load, and the hash of the active/inactive table should be
measured for the remaining device state changes.
Export IMA function ima_measure_critical_data() to allow measurement
of DM device parameters, as well as target specific attributes, during
table load. Compute the hash of the inactive table and store it for
measurements during future state change. If a load is called multiple
times, update the inactive table hash with the hash of the latest
populated table. So that the correct inactive table hash is measured
when the device transitions to different states like resume, remove,
rename, etc.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> # leak fix
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Back then, commit 96ae522795 ("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper
to be called in tracers") added the bpf_probe_write_user() helper in order
to allow to override user space memory. Its original goal was to have a
facility to "debug, divert, and manipulate execution of semi-cooperative
processes" under CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Write to kernel was explicitly disallowed
since it would otherwise tamper with its integrity.
One use case was shown in cf9b1199de ("samples/bpf: Add test/example of
using bpf_probe_write_user bpf helper") where the program DNATs traffic
at the time of connect(2) syscall, meaning, it rewrites the arguments to
a syscall while they're still in userspace, and before the syscall has a
chance to copy the argument into kernel space. These days we have better
mechanisms in BPF for achieving the same (e.g. for load-balancers), but
without having to write to userspace memory.
Of course the bpf_probe_write_user() helper can also be used to abuse
many other things for both good or bad purpose. Outside of BPF, there is
a similar mechanism for ptrace(2) such as PTRACE_PEEK{TEXT,DATA} and
PTRACE_POKE{TEXT,DATA}, but would likely require some more effort.
Commit 96ae522795 explicitly dedicated the helper for experimentation
purpose only. Thus, move the helper's availability behind a newly added
LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER lockdown knob so that the helper is disabled under
the "integrity" mode. More fine-grained control can be implemented also
from LSM side with this change.
Fixes: 96ae522795 ("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Rename LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ into LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL so we have naming
more consistent with a LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER option that we are adding.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Build failure in drivers/net/wwan/mhi_wwan_mbim.c:
add missing parameter (0, assuming we don't want buffer pre-alloc).
Conflict in drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_main.c between:
589918df93 ("net: dsa: sja1105: be stateless with FDB entries on SJA1105P/Q/R/S/SJA1110 too")
0fac6aa098 ("net: dsa: sja1105: delete the best_effort_vlan_filtering mode")
Follow the instructions from the commit message of the former commit
- removed the if conditions. When looking at commit 589918df93 ("net:
dsa: sja1105: be stateless with FDB entries on SJA1105P/Q/R/S/SJA1110 too")
note that the mask_iotag fields get removed by the following patch.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210805' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux fix for a problem where an error code was not being
propagated back up to userspace when a bogus SELinux policy is loaded
into the kernel"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210805' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: correct the return value when loads initial sids
It should not return 0 when SID 0 is assigned to isids.
This patch fixes it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e3e0b582c3 ("selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
[PM: remove changelog from description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add basic Kconfig, an initial (empty) af_mctp source object, and
{AF,PF}_MCTP definitions, and the required definitions for a new
protocol type.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch performs the final modification necessary to pass the buffer
measurement to callers, so that they provide a functionality similar to
ima_file_hash(). It adds the 'digest' and 'digest_len' parameters to
ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement().
These functions calculate the digest even if there is no suitable rule in
the IMA policy and, in this case, they simply return 1 before generating a
new measurement entry.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() currently
don't return a result as, unlike appraisal-related functions, the result is
not used by callers to deny an operation. Measurement-related functions
instead rely on the audit subsystem to notify the system administrator when
an error occurs.
However, ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement() are a
special case, as these are the only functions that can return a buffer
measurement (for files, there is ima_file_hash()). In a subsequent patch,
they will be modified to return the calculated digest.
In preparation to return the result of the digest calculation, this patch
modifies the return type from void to int, and returns 0 if the buffer has
been successfully measured, a negative value otherwise.
Given that the result of the measurement is still not necessary, this patch
does not modify the behavior of existing callers by processing the returned
value. For those, the return value is ignored.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (for the SELinux bits)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Buffer measurements, unlike file measurements, are not accessible after the
measurement is done, as buffers are not suitable for use with the
integrity_iint_cache structure (there is no index, for files it is the
inode number). In the subsequent patches, the measurement (digest) will be
returned directly by the functions that perform the buffer measurement,
ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement().
A caller of those functions also needs to know the algorithm used to
calculate the digest. Instead of adding the algorithm as a new parameter to
the functions, this patch provides it separately with the new function
ima_get_current_hash_algo().
Since the hash algorithm does not change after the IMA setup phase, there
is no risk of races (obtaining a digest calculated with a different
algorithm than the one returned).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: annotate ima_hash_algo as __ro_after_init]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With W=1 build, the compiler throws warning message as below:
security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c:24:12: warning:
no previous prototype for ‘ima_mok_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
__init int ima_mok_init(void)
Silence the warning by adding static keyword to ima_mok_init().
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com>
Fixes: 41c89b64d7 ("IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Clarify the details around the automatic variable initialization modes
available. Specifically this details the values used for pattern init
and expands on the rationale for zero init safety. Additionally makes
zero init the default when available.
Cc: glider@google.com
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
When CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS is enabled, build the kernel with
"-fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr" (in GCC 11). This option will zero any
caller-used register contents just before returning from a function,
ensuring that temporary values are not leaked beyond the function
boundary. This means that register contents are less likely to be
available for side channel attacks and information exposures.
Additionally this helps reduce the number of useful ROP gadgets in the
kernel image by about 20%:
$ ROPgadget.py --nosys --nojop --binary vmlinux.stock | tail -n1
Unique gadgets found: 337245
$ ROPgadget.py --nosys --nojop --binary vmlinux.zero-call-regs | tail -n1
Unique gadgets found: 267175
and more notably removes simple "write-what-where" gadgets:
$ ROPgadget.py --ropchain --binary vmlinux.stock | sed -n '/Step 1/,/Step 2/p'
- Step 1 -- Write-what-where gadgets
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff8102d76c mov qword ptr [rsi], rdx ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81000cf5 pop rsi ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff8104d7c8 pop rdx ; ret
[-] Can't find the 'xor rdx, rdx' gadget. Try with another 'mov [reg], reg'
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff814c2b4c mov qword ptr [rsi], rdi ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81000cf5 pop rsi ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81001e51 pop rdi ; ret
[-] Can't find the 'xor rdi, rdi' gadget. Try with another 'mov [reg], reg'
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81540d61 mov qword ptr [rsi], rdi ; pop rbx ; pop rbp ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81000cf5 pop rsi ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81001e51 pop rdi ; ret
[-] Can't find the 'xor rdi, rdi' gadget. Try with another 'mov [reg], reg'
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff8105341e mov qword ptr [rsi], rax ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81000cf5 pop rsi ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff81029a11 pop rax ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0xffffffff811f1c3b xor rax, rax ; ret
- Step 2 -- Init syscall number gadgets
$ ROPgadget.py --ropchain --binary vmlinux.zero* | sed -n '/Step 1/,/Step 2/p'
- Step 1 -- Write-what-where gadgets
[-] Can't find the 'mov qword ptr [r64], r64' gadget
For an x86_64 parallel build tests, this has a less than 1% performance
impact, and grows the image size less than 1%:
$ size vmlinux.stock vmlinux.zero-call-regs
text data bss dec hex filename
22437676 8559152 14127340 45124168 2b08a48 vmlinux.stock
22453184 8563248 14110956 45127388 2b096dc vmlinux.zero-call-regs
Impact for other architectures may vary. For example, arm64 sees a 5.5%
image size growth, mainly due to needing to always clear x16 and x17:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210510134503.GA88495@C02TD0UTHF1T.local/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Mark 'smack_enabled' as __initdata
since it is only used during initialization code.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In the smk_access_entry() function, if no matching rule is found
in the rust_list, a negative error code will be used to perform bit
operations with the MAY_ enumeration value. This is semantically
wrong. This patch fixes this issue.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
audit_log_start() may return NULL in below cases:
- when audit is not initialized.
- when audit backlog limit exceeds.
After the call to audit_log_start() is made and then possible NULL audit
buffer argument is passed to audit_log_*() functions,
audit_log_*() functions return immediately in case of a NULL audit buffer
argument.
But it is optimal to return early when audit_log_start() returns NULL,
because it is not necessary for audit_log_*() functions to be called with
NULL audit buffer argument.
So add exception handling for possible NULL audit buffers where
return value can be handled from callers.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com>
[PM: tweak subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The get_unaligned()/put_unaligned() helpers are traditionally architecture
specific, with the two main variants being the "access-ok.h" version
that assumes unaligned pointer accesses always work on a particular
architecture, and the "le-struct.h" version that casts the data to a
byte aligned type before dereferencing, for architectures that cannot
always do unaligned accesses in hardware.
Based on the discussion linked below, it appears that the access-ok
version is not realiable on any architecture, but the struct version
probably has no downsides. This series changes the code to use the
same implementation on all architectures, addressing the few exceptions
separately.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75d07691-1e4f-741f-9852-38c0b4f520bc@synopsys.com/
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=100363
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210507220813.365382-14-arnd@kernel.org/
Link: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic.git unaligned-rework-v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whGObOKruA_bU3aPGZfoDqZM1_9wBkwREp0H0FgR-90uQ@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Merge tag 'asm-generic-unaligned-5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull asm/unaligned.h unification from Arnd Bergmann:
"Unify asm/unaligned.h around struct helper
The get_unaligned()/put_unaligned() helpers are traditionally
architecture specific, with the two main variants being the
"access-ok.h" version that assumes unaligned pointer accesses always
work on a particular architecture, and the "le-struct.h" version that
casts the data to a byte aligned type before dereferencing, for
architectures that cannot always do unaligned accesses in hardware.
Based on the discussion linked below, it appears that the access-ok
version is not realiable on any architecture, but the struct version
probably has no downsides. This series changes the code to use the
same implementation on all architectures, addressing the few
exceptions separately"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75d07691-1e4f-741f-9852-38c0b4f520bc@synopsys.com/
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=100363
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210507220813.365382-14-arnd@kernel.org/
Link: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic.git unaligned-rework-v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whGObOKruA_bU3aPGZfoDqZM1_9wBkwREp0H0FgR-90uQ@mail.gmail.com/
* tag 'asm-generic-unaligned-5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
asm-generic: simplify asm/unaligned.h
asm-generic: uaccess: 1-byte access is always aligned
netpoll: avoid put_unaligned() on single character
mwifiex: re-fix for unaligned accesses
apparmor: use get_unaligned() only for multi-byte words
partitions: msdos: fix one-byte get_unaligned()
asm-generic: unaligned always use struct helpers
asm-generic: unaligned: remove byteshift helpers
powerpc: use linux/unaligned/le_struct.h on LE power7
m68k: select CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
sh: remove unaligned access for sh4a
openrisc: always use unaligned-struct header
asm-generic: use asm-generic/unaligned.h for most architectures
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Merge tag 'safesetid-5.14' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux
Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton:
"One very minor code cleanup change that marks a variable as
__initdata"
* tag 'safesetid-5.14' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: Mark safesetid_initialized as __initdata
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.14' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"There is nothing more significant than an improvement to a byte count
check in smackfs.
All changes have been in next for weeks"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.14' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: fix doc warning
Revert "Smack: Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges"
smackfs: restrict bytes count in smk_set_cipso()
security/smack/: fix misspellings using codespell tool
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another merge window, another small audit pull request.
Four patches in total: one is cosmetic, one removes an unnecessary
initialization, one renames some enum values to prevent name
collisions, and one converts list_del()/list_add() to list_move().
None of these are earth shattering and all pass the audit-testsuite
tests while merging cleanly on top of your tree from earlier today"
* tag 'audit-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: remove unnecessary 'ret' initialization
audit: remove trailing spaces and tabs
audit: Use list_move instead of list_del/list_add
audit: Rename enum audit_state constants to avoid AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition
audit: add blank line after variable declarations
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
- The slow_avc_audit() function is now non-blocking so we can remove
the AVC_NONBLOCKING tricks; this also includes the 'flags' variant of
avc_has_perm().
- Use kmemdup() instead of kcalloc()+copy when copying parts of the
SELinux policydb.
- The InfiniBand device name is now passed by reference when possible
in the SELinux code, removing a strncpy().
- Minor cleanups including: constification of avtab function args,
removal of useless LSM/XFRM function args, SELinux kdoc fixes, and
removal of redundant assignments.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: kill 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and avc_audit()
selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking
selinux: Fix kernel-doc
selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC
lsm_audit,selinux: pass IB device name by reference
selinux: Remove redundant assignment to rc
selinux: Corrected comment to match kernel-doc comment
selinux: delete selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() useless argument
selinux: constify some avtab function arguments
selinux: simplify duplicate_policydb_cond_list() by using kmemdup()
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The large majority of the changes are EVM portable & immutable
signature related: removing a dependency on loading an HMAC key,
safely allowing file metadata included in the EVM portable & immutable
signatures to be modified, allowing EVM signatures to fulfill IMA file
signature policy requirements, including the EVM file metadata
signature in lieu of an IMA file data signature in the measurement
list, and adding dynamic debugging of EVM file metadata.
In addition, in order to detect critical data or file change
reversions, duplicate measurement records are permitted in the IMA
measurement list.
The remaining patches address compiler, sparse, and doc warnings"
* tag 'integrity-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: (31 commits)
evm: Check xattr size discrepancy between kernel and user
evm: output EVM digest calculation info
IMA: support for duplicate measurement records
ima: Fix warning: no previous prototype for function 'ima_add_kexec_buffer'
ima: differentiate between EVM failures in the audit log
ima: Fix fall-through warning for Clang
ima: Pass NULL instead of 0 to ima_get_action() in ima_file_mprotect()
ima: Include header defining ima_post_key_create_or_update()
ima/evm: Fix type mismatch
ima: Set correct casting types
doc: Fix warning in Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
evm: Don't return an error in evm_write_xattrs() if audit is not enabled
ima: Define new template evm-sig
ima: Define new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues
evm: Verify portable signatures against all protected xattrs
ima: Define new template field imode
ima: Define new template fields iuid and igid
ima: Add ima_show_template_uint() template library function
ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback
...
The kernel and the user obtain an xattr value in two different ways:
kernel (EVM): uses vfs_getxattr_alloc() which obtains the xattr value from
the filesystem handler (raw value);
user (ima-evm-utils): uses vfs_getxattr() which obtains the xattr value
from the LSMs (normalized value).
Normally, this does not have an impact unless security.selinux is set with
setfattr, with a value not terminated by '\0' (this is not the recommended
way, security.selinux should be set with the appropriate tools such as
chcon and restorecon).
In this case, the kernel and the user see two different xattr values: the
former sees the xattr value without '\0' (raw value), the latter sees the
value with '\0' (value normalized by SELinux).
This could result in two different verification outcomes from EVM and
ima-evm-utils, if a signature was calculated with a security.selinux value
terminated by '\0' and the value set in the filesystem is not terminated by
'\0'. The former would report verification failure due to the missing '\0',
while the latter would report verification success (because it gets the
normalized value with '\0').
This patch mitigates this issue by comparing in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() the
size of the xattr returned by the two xattr functions and by warning the
user if there is a discrepancy.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Output the data used in calculating the EVM digest and the resulting
digest as ascii hexadecimal strings.
Suggested-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> (CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG)
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Use %zu for size_t)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Fix gcc W=1 warnings:
security/tomoyo/audit.c:331: warning: Function parameter or member 'matched_acl' not described in 'tomoyo_get_audit'
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c:146: warning: Function parameter or member 'inode' not described in 'tomoyo_release'
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:122: warning: Function parameter or member 'path' not described in 'tomoyo_inode_getattr'
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:497: warning: Function parameter or member 'clone_flags' not described in 'tomoyo_task_alloc'
security/tomoyo/util.c:92: warning: Function parameter or member 'time64' not described in 'tomoyo_convert_time'
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com>
[ penguin-kernel: Also adjust spaces and similar warnings ]
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
The variable 'ret' is set to 0 when declared.
The 'ret' is unused until it is set to 0 again.
So it had better remove unnecessary initialization.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
... along with avc_has_perm_flags() itself, since now it's identical
to avc_has_perm() (as pointed out by Paul Moore)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[PM: add "selinux:" prefix to subj and tweak for length]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now;
no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix function name and add comment for parameter state in ss/services.c
kernel-doc to remove some warnings found by running make W=1 LLVM=1.
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
IMA measures contents of a given file/buffer/critical-data record,
and properly re-measures it on change. However, IMA does not measure
the duplicate value for a given record, since TPM extend is a very
expensive operation. For example, if the record changes from value
'v#1' to 'v#2', and then back to 'v#1', IMA will not measure and log
the last change to 'v#1', since the hash of 'v#1' for that record is
already present in the IMA htable. This limits the ability of an
external attestation service to accurately determine the current state
of the system. The service would incorrectly conclude that the latest
value of the given record on the system is 'v#2', and act accordingly.
Define and use a new Kconfig option IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE to permit
duplicate records in the IMA measurement list.
In addition to the duplicate measurement records described above,
other duplicate file measurement records may be included in the log,
when CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE is enabled. For example,
- i_version is not enabled,
- i_generation changed,
- same file present on different filesystems,
- an inode is evicted from dcache
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated list of duplicate measurement records]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The function prototype for ima_add_kexec_buffer() is present
in 'linux/ima.h'. But this header file is not included in
ima_kexec.c where the function is implemented. This results
in the following compiler warning when "-Wmissing-prototypes" flag
is turned on:
security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c:81:6: warning: no previous prototype
for function 'ima_add_kexec_buffer' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Include the header file 'linux/ima.h' in ima_kexec.c to fix
the compiler warning.
Fixes: dce92f6b11 (arm64: Enable passing IMA log to next kernel on kexec)
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Mark safesetid_initialized as __initdata since it is only used
in initialization routine.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a
fall-through warning by explicitly adding a break statement instead
of just letting the code fall through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch fixes the sparse warning for ima_post_key_create_or_update() by
adding the header file that defines the prototype (linux/ima.h).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The endianness of a variable written to the measurement list cannot be
determined at compile time, as it depends on the value of the
ima_canonical_fmt global variable (set through a kernel option with the
same name if the machine is big endian).
If ima_canonical_fmt is false, the endianness of a variable is the same as
the machine; if ima_canonical_fmt is true, the endianness is little endian.
The warning arises due to this type of instruction:
var = cpu_to_leXX(var)
which tries to assign a value in little endian to a variable with native
endianness (little or big endian).
Given that the variables set with this instruction are not used in any
operation but just written to a buffer, it is safe to force the type of the
value being set to be the same of the type of the variable with:
var = (__force <var type>)cpu_to_leXX(var)
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The code expects that the values being parsed from a buffer when the
ima_canonical_fmt global variable is true are in little endian. Thus, this
patch sets the casting types accordingly.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Fix gcc W=1 warning:
security/smack/smack_access.c:342: warning: Function parameter or member 'ad' not described in 'smack_log'
security/smack/smack_access.c:403: warning: Function parameter or member 'skp' not described in 'smk_insert_entry'
security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'level' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls'
security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'len' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls'
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This patch avoids that evm_write_xattrs() returns an error when audit is
not enabled. The ab variable can be NULL and still be passed to the other
audit_log_() functions, as those functions do not include any instruction.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With the recent introduction of the evmsig template field, remote verifiers
can obtain the EVM portable signature instead of the IMA signature, to
verify file metadata.
After introducing the new fields to include file metadata in the
measurement list, this patch finally defines the evm-sig template, whose
format is:
d-ng|n-ng|evmsig|xattrnames|xattrlengths|xattrvalues|iuid|igid|imode
xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues are populated only from defined
EVM protected xattrs, i.e. the ones that EVM considers to verify the
portable signature. xattrnames and xattrlengths are populated only if the
xattr is present.
xattrnames and xattrlengths are not necessary for verifying the EVM
portable signature, but they are included for completeness of information,
if a remote verifier wants to infer more from file metadata.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch defines the new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and
xattrvalues, which contain respectively a list of xattr names (strings,
separated by |), lengths (u32, hex) and values (hex). If an xattr is not
present, the name and length are not displayed in the measurement list.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Missing prototype def)
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Currently, the evm_config_default_xattrnames array contains xattr names
only related to LSMs which are enabled in the kernel configuration.
However, EVM portable signatures do not depend on local information and a
vendor might include in the signature calculation xattrs that are not
enabled in the target platform.
Just including all xattrs names in evm_config_default_xattrnames is not a
safe approach, because a target system might have already calculated
signatures or HMACs based only on the enabled xattrs. After applying this
patch, EVM would verify those signatures and HMACs with all xattrs instead.
The non-enabled ones, which could possibly exist, would cause a
verification error.
Thus, this patch adds a new field named enabled to the xattr_list
structure, which is set to true if the LSM associated to a given xattr name
is enabled in the kernel configuration. The non-enabled xattrs are taken
into account only in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), if the passed security.evm
type is EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG.
The new function evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled() has been defined so that
IMA can include all protected xattrs and not only the enabled ones in the
measurement list, if the new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths or
xattrvalues have been included in the template format.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch defines the new template field imode, which includes the
inode mode. It can be used by a remote verifier to verify the EVM portable
signature, if it was included with the template fields sig or evmsig.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch defines the new template fields iuid and igid, which include
respectively the inode UID and GID. For idmapped mounts, still the original
UID and GID are provided.
These fields can be used to verify the EVM portable signature, if it was
included with the template fields sig or evmsig.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch introduces the new function ima_show_template_uint(). This can
be used for showing integers of different sizes in ASCII format. The
function ima_show_template_data_ascii() automatically determines how to
print a stored integer by checking the integer size.
If integers have been written in canonical format,
ima_show_template_data_ascii() calls the appropriate leXX_to_cpu() function
to correctly display the value.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Files might come from a remote source and might have xattrs, including
security.ima. It should not be IMA task to decide whether security.ima
should be kept or not. This patch removes the removexattr() system
call in ima_inode_post_setattr().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With the patch to accept EVM portable signatures when the
appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy, appraisal can
be successfully done even if the file does not have an IMA signature.
However, remote attestation would not see that a different signature type
was used, as only IMA signatures can be included in the measurement list.
This patch solves the issue by introducing the new template field 'evmsig'
to show EVM portable signatures and by including its value in the existing
field 'sig' if the IMA signature is not found.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
System administrators can require that all accessed files have a signature
by specifying appraise_type=imasig in a policy rule.
Currently, IMA signatures satisfy this requirement. Appended signatures may
also satisfy this requirement, but are not applicable as IMA signatures.
IMA/appended signatures ensure data source authentication for file content
and prevent any change. EVM signatures instead ensure data source
authentication for file metadata. Given that the digest or signature of the
file content must be included in the metadata, EVM signatures provide the
same file data guarantees of IMA signatures, as well as providing file
metadata guarantees.
This patch lets systems protected with EVM signatures pass appraisal
verification if the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the
policy. This facilitates deployment in the scenarios where only EVM
signatures are available.
The patch makes the following changes:
file xattr types:
security.ima: IMA_XATTR_DIGEST/IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG
security.evm: EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG
execve(), mmap(), open() behavior (with appraise_type=imasig):
before: denied (file without IMA signature, imasig requirement not met)
after: allowed (file with EVM portable signature, imasig requirement met)
open(O_WRONLY) behavior (without appraise_type=imasig):
before: allowed (file without IMA signature, not immutable)
after: denied (file with EVM portable signature, immutable)
In addition, similarly to IMA signatures, this patch temporarily allows
new files without or with incomplete metadata to be opened so that content
can be written.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With the patch to allow xattr/attr operations if a portable signature
verification fails, cp and tar can copy all xattrs/attrs so that at the
end of the process verification succeeds.
However, it might happen that the xattrs/attrs are already set to the
correct value (taken at signing time) and signature verification succeeds
before the copy has completed. For example, an archive might contains files
owned by root and the archive is extracted by root.
Then, since portable signatures are immutable, all subsequent operations
fail (e.g. fchown()), even if the operation is legitimate (does not alter
the current value).
This patch avoids this problem by reporting successful operation to user
space when that operation does not alter the current value of xattrs/attrs.
With this patch, the one that introduces evm_hmac_disabled() and the one
that allows a metadata operation on the INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE error, EVM
portable signatures can be used without disabling metadata verification
(by setting EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES). Due to keeping metadata
verification enabled, altering immutable metadata protected with a portable
signature that was successfully verified will be denied (existing
behavior).
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [implicit declaration of function]
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
In preparation for 'evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified
metadata', this patch passes mnt_userns to the inode set/remove xattr hooks
so that the GID of the inode on an idmapped mount is correctly determined
by posix_acl_update_mode().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If files with portable signatures are copied from one location to another
or are extracted from an archive, verification can temporarily fail until
all xattrs/attrs are set in the destination. Only portable signatures may
be moved or copied from one file to another, as they don't depend on
system-specific information such as the inode generation. Instead portable
signatures must include security.ima.
Unlike other security.evm types, EVM portable signatures are also
immutable. Thus, it wouldn't be a problem to allow xattr/attr operations
when verification fails, as portable signatures will never be replaced with
the HMAC on possibly corrupted xattrs/attrs.
This patch first introduces a new integrity status called
INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE, that allows callers of
evm_verify_current_integrity() to detect that a portable signature didn't
pass verification and then adds an exception in evm_protect_xattr() and
evm_inode_setattr() for this status and returns 0 instead of -EPERM.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When a file is being created, LSMs can set the initial label with the
inode_init_security hook. If no HMAC key is loaded, the new file will have
LSM xattrs but not the HMAC. It is also possible that the file remains
without protected xattrs after creation if no active LSM provided it, or
because the filesystem does not support them.
Unfortunately, EVM will deny any further metadata operation on new files,
as evm_protect_xattr() will return the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL error if protected
xattrs exist without security.evm, INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if no protected
xattrs exist or INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN if xattrs are not supported. This would
limit the usability of EVM when only a public key is loaded, as commands
such as cp or tar with the option to preserve xattrs won't work.
This patch introduces the evm_hmac_disabled() function to determine whether
or not it is safe to ignore verification errors, based on the ability of
EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key is not loaded, and it cannot be
loaded in the future due to the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag,
allowing an operation despite the attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not
make them valid.
Since the post hooks can be executed even when the HMAC key is not loaded,
this patch also ensures that the EVM_INIT_HMAC initialization flag is set
before the post hooks call evm_update_evmxattr().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (for ensuring EVM_INIT_HMAC is set)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set, EVM allows any operation on
metadata. Its main purpose is to allow users to freely set metadata when it
is protected by a portable signature, until an HMAC key is loaded.
However, callers of evm_verifyxattr() are not notified about metadata
changes and continue to rely on the last status returned by the function.
For example IMA, since it caches the appraisal result, will not call again
evm_verifyxattr() until the appraisal flags are cleared, and will grant
access to the file even if there was a metadata operation that made the
portable signature invalid.
This patch introduces evm_revalidate_status(), which callers of
evm_verifyxattr() can use in their xattr hooks to determine whether
re-validation is necessary and to do the proper actions. IMA calls it in
its xattr hooks to reset the appraisal flags, so that the EVM status is
re-evaluated after a metadata operation.
Lastly, this patch also adds a call to evm_reset_status() in
evm_inode_post_setattr() to invalidate the cached EVM status after a
setattr operation.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to
temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary
to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is
cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is
calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs.
Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized
with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust
xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation.
Fixes: ae1ba1676b ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The public builtin keys do not need to be appraised by IMA as the
restriction on the IMA/EVM trusted keyrings ensures that a key can be
loaded only if it is signed with a key on the builtin or secondary
keyrings.
However, when evm_load_x509() is called, appraisal is already enabled and
a valid IMA signature must be added to the EVM key to pass verification.
Since the restriction is applied on both IMA and EVM trusted keyrings, it
is safe to disable appraisal also when the EVM key is loaded. This patch
calls evm_load_x509() inside ima_load_x509() if CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is
enabled, which crosses the normal IMA and EVM boundary.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on
initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a
key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as
public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC.
Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a
possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to
switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should
have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files.
More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the
kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a
legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error
when no HMAC key has been loaded.
This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with
a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized.
Fixes: 26ddabfe96 ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete. Define and read an unsigned
int.
Fixes: f00d797507 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This reverts commit 942cb357ae.
The io_uring PF_IO_WORKER threads no longer have PF_KTHREAD set, so no
need to special case them for credential checks.
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Using get_unaligned() on a u8 pointer is pointless, and will
result in a compiler warning after a planned cleanup:
In file included from arch/x86/include/generated/asm/unaligned.h:1,
from security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:16:
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c: In function 'unpack_u8':
include/asm-generic/unaligned.h:13:15: error: 'packed' attribute ignored for field of type 'u8' {aka 'unsigned char'} [-Werror=attributes]
13 | const struct { type x __packed; } *__pptr = (typeof(__pptr))(ptr); \
| ^
Simply dereference this pointer directly.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
While trying to address a Coverity warning that the dev_name string
might end up unterminated when strcpy'ing it in
selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(), I realized that it is possible (and
simpler) to just pass the dev_name pointer directly, rather than copying
the string to a buffer.
The ibendport variable goes out of scope at the end of the function
anyway, so the lifetime of the dev_name pointer will never be shorter
than that of ibendport, thus we can safely just pass the dev_name
pointer and be done with it.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The `tpm_get_ops` call at the beginning of the function is not paired
with a `tpm_put_ops` on this return path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f221974525 ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Two error return paths are neglecting to free allocated object td,
causing a memory leak. Fix this by returning via the error return
path that securely kfree's td.
Fixes clang scan-build warning:
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:496:10: warning: Potential
memory leak [unix.Malloc]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5df16caada ("KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Variable rc is set to '-EINVAL' but this value is never read as
it is overwritten or not used later on, hence it is a redundant
assignment and can be removed.
Cleans up the following clang-analyzer warning:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2103:3: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2079:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2071:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2062:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2592:3: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores].
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Minor documentation update.
Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
seliunx_xfrm_policy_lookup() is hooks of security_xfrm_policy_lookup().
The dir argument is uselss in security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). So
remove the dir argument from selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and
security_xfrm_policy_lookup().
Signed-off-by: Zhongjun Tan <tanzhongjun@yulong.com>
[PM: reformat the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We can do the allocation + copying of expr.nodes in one go using
kmemdup().
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A typo is found out by codespell tool in 383th line of smackfs.c:
$ codespell ./security/smack/
./smackfs.c:383: numer ==> number
Fix a typo found by codespell.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This pull request just has a single 3-line code cleanup CL to eliminate
some unnecessary 'break' statements. No other work was done on SafeSetID
for the v5.13 merge window.
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Merge tag 'safesetid-5.13' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux
Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton:
"Simple code cleanup
This just has a single three-line code cleanup to eliminate some
unnecessary 'break' statements"
* tag 'safesetid-5.13' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: Fix code specification by scripts/checkpatch.pl
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted stuff all over the place"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
useful constants: struct qstr for ".."
hostfs_open(): don't open-code file_dentry()
whack-a-mole: kill strlen_user() (again)
autofs: should_expire() argument is guaranteed to be positive
apparmor:match_mn() - constify devpath argument
buffer: a small optimization in grow_buffers
get rid of autofs_getpath()
constify dentry argument of dentry_path()/dentry_path_raw()
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin
keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well.
Also six trivial changes and bug fixes"
* tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies
ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments.
ima: Fix function name error in comment.
ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring
ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key
keys: cleanup build time module signing keys
ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value
ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
Core:
- bpf:
- allow bpf programs calling kernel functions (initially to
reuse TCP congestion control implementations)
- enable task local storage for tracing programs - remove the
need to store per-task state in hash maps, and allow tracing
programs access to task local storage previously added for
BPF_LSM
- add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper, allowing programs to
walk all map elements in a more robust and easier to verify
fashion
- sockmap: support UDP and cross-protocol BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT
redirection
- lpm: add support for batched ops in LPM trie
- add BTF_KIND_FLOAT support - mostly to allow use of BTF
on s390 which has floats in its headers files
- improve BPF syscall documentation and extend the use of kdoc
parsing scripts we already employ for bpf-helpers
- libbpf, bpftool: support static linking of BPF ELF files
- improve support for encapsulation of L2 packets
- xdp: restructure redirect actions to avoid a runtime lookup,
improving performance by 4-8% in microbenchmarks
- xsk: build skb by page (aka generic zerocopy xmit) - improve
performance of software AF_XDP path by 33% for devices
which don't need headers in the linear skb part (e.g. virtio)
- nexthop: resilient next-hop groups - improve path stability
on next-hops group changes (incl. offload for mlxsw)
- ipv6: segment routing: add support for IPv4 decapsulation
- icmp: add support for RFC 8335 extended PROBE messages
- inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation
- tcp: deal better with delayed TX completions - make sure we don't
give up on fast TCP retransmissions only because driver is
slow in reporting that it completed transmitting the original
- tcp: reorder tcp_congestion_ops for better cache locality
- mptcp:
- add sockopt support for common TCP options
- add support for common TCP msg flags
- include multiple address ids in RM_ADDR
- add reset option support for resetting one subflow
- udp: GRO L4 improvements - improve 'forward' / 'frag_list'
co-existence with UDP tunnel GRO, allowing the first to take
place correctly even for encapsulated UDP traffic
- micro-optimize dev_gro_receive() and flow dissection, avoid
retpoline overhead on VLAN and TEB GRO
- use less memory for sysctls, add a new sysctl type, to allow using
u8 instead of "int" and "long" and shrink networking sysctls
- veth: allow GRO without XDP - this allows aggregating UDP
packets before handing them off to routing, bridge, OvS, etc.
- allow specifing ifindex when device is moved to another namespace
- netfilter:
- nft_socket: add support for cgroupsv2
- nftables: add catch-all set element - special element used
to define a default action in case normal lookup missed
- use net_generic infra in many modules to avoid allocating
per-ns memory unnecessarily
- xps: improve the xps handling to avoid potential out-of-bound
accesses and use-after-free when XPS change race with other
re-configuration under traffic
- add a config knob to turn off per-cpu netdev refcnt to catch
underflows in testing
Device APIs:
- add WWAN subsystem to organize the WWAN interfaces better and
hopefully start driving towards more unified and vendor-
-independent APIs
- ethtool:
- add interface for reading IEEE MIB stats (incl. mlx5 and
bnxt support)
- allow network drivers to dump arbitrary SFP EEPROM data,
current offset+length API was a poor fit for modern SFP
which define EEPROM in terms of pages (incl. mlx5 support)
- act_police, flow_offload: add support for packet-per-second
policing (incl. offload for nfp)
- psample: add additional metadata attributes like transit delay
for packets sampled from switch HW (and corresponding egress
and policy-based sampling in the mlxsw driver)
- dsa: improve support for sandwiched LAGs with bridge and DSA
- netfilter:
- flowtable: use direct xmit in topologies with IP
forwarding, bridging, vlans etc.
- nftables: counter hardware offload support
- Bluetooth:
- improvements for firmware download w/ Intel devices
- add support for reading AOSP vendor capabilities
- add support for virtio transport driver
- mac80211:
- allow concurrent monitor iface and ethernet rx decap
- set priority and queue mapping for injected frames
- phy: add support for Clause-45 PHY Loopback
- pci/iov: add sysfs MSI-X vector assignment interface
to distribute MSI-X resources to VFs (incl. mlx5 support)
New hardware/drivers:
- dsa: mv88e6xxx: add support for Marvell mv88e6393x -
11-port Ethernet switch with 8x 1-Gigabit Ethernet
and 3x 10-Gigabit interfaces.
- dsa: support for legacy Broadcom tags used on BCM5325, BCM5365
and BCM63xx switches
- Microchip KSZ8863 and KSZ8873; 3x 10/100Mbps Ethernet switches
- ath11k: support for QCN9074 a 802.11ax device
- Bluetooth: Broadcom BCM4330 and BMC4334
- phy: Marvell 88X2222 transceiver support
- mdio: add BCM6368 MDIO mux bus controller
- r8152: support RTL8153 and RTL8156 (USB Ethernet) chips
- mana: driver for Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA)
- Actions Semi Owl Ethernet MAC
- can: driver for ETAS ES58X CAN/USB interfaces
Pure driver changes:
- add XDP support to: enetc, igc, stmmac
- add AF_XDP support to: stmmac
- virtio:
- page_to_skb() use build_skb when there's sufficient tailroom
(21% improvement for 1000B UDP frames)
- support XDP even without dedicated Tx queues - share the Tx
queues with the stack when necessary
- mlx5:
- flow rules: add support for mirroring with conntrack,
matching on ICMP, GTP, flex filters and more
- support packet sampling with flow offloads
- persist uplink representor netdev across eswitch mode
changes
- allow coexistence of CQE compression and HW time-stamping
- add ethtool extended link error state reporting
- ice, iavf: support flow filters, UDP Segmentation Offload
- dpaa2-switch:
- move the driver out of staging
- add spanning tree (STP) support
- add rx copybreak support
- add tc flower hardware offload on ingress traffic
- ionic:
- implement Rx page reuse
- support HW PTP time-stamping
- octeon: support TC hardware offloads - flower matching on ingress
and egress ratelimitting.
- stmmac:
- add RX frame steering based on VLAN priority in tc flower
- support frame preemption (FPE)
- intel: add cross time-stamping freq difference adjustment
- ocelot:
- support forwarding of MRP frames in HW
- support multiple bridges
- support PTP Sync one-step timestamping
- dsa: mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-switch: offload bridge port flags like
learning, flooding etc.
- ipa: add IPA v4.5, v4.9 and v4.11 support (Qualcomm SDX55, SM8350,
SC7280 SoCs)
- mt7601u: enable TDLS support
- mt76:
- add support for 802.3 rx frames (mt7915/mt7615)
- mt7915 flash pre-calibration support
- mt7921/mt7663 runtime power management fixes
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- bpf:
- allow bpf programs calling kernel functions (initially to
reuse TCP congestion control implementations)
- enable task local storage for tracing programs - remove the
need to store per-task state in hash maps, and allow tracing
programs access to task local storage previously added for
BPF_LSM
- add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper, allowing programs to walk
all map elements in a more robust and easier to verify fashion
- sockmap: support UDP and cross-protocol BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT
redirection
- lpm: add support for batched ops in LPM trie
- add BTF_KIND_FLOAT support - mostly to allow use of BTF on
s390 which has floats in its headers files
- improve BPF syscall documentation and extend the use of kdoc
parsing scripts we already employ for bpf-helpers
- libbpf, bpftool: support static linking of BPF ELF files
- improve support for encapsulation of L2 packets
- xdp: restructure redirect actions to avoid a runtime lookup,
improving performance by 4-8% in microbenchmarks
- xsk: build skb by page (aka generic zerocopy xmit) - improve
performance of software AF_XDP path by 33% for devices which don't
need headers in the linear skb part (e.g. virtio)
- nexthop: resilient next-hop groups - improve path stability on
next-hops group changes (incl. offload for mlxsw)
- ipv6: segment routing: add support for IPv4 decapsulation
- icmp: add support for RFC 8335 extended PROBE messages
- inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation
- tcp: deal better with delayed TX completions - make sure we don't
give up on fast TCP retransmissions only because driver is slow in
reporting that it completed transmitting the original
- tcp: reorder tcp_congestion_ops for better cache locality
- mptcp:
- add sockopt support for common TCP options
- add support for common TCP msg flags
- include multiple address ids in RM_ADDR
- add reset option support for resetting one subflow
- udp: GRO L4 improvements - improve 'forward' / 'frag_list'
co-existence with UDP tunnel GRO, allowing the first to take place
correctly even for encapsulated UDP traffic
- micro-optimize dev_gro_receive() and flow dissection, avoid
retpoline overhead on VLAN and TEB GRO
- use less memory for sysctls, add a new sysctl type, to allow using
u8 instead of "int" and "long" and shrink networking sysctls
- veth: allow GRO without XDP - this allows aggregating UDP packets
before handing them off to routing, bridge, OvS, etc.
- allow specifing ifindex when device is moved to another namespace
- netfilter:
- nft_socket: add support for cgroupsv2
- nftables: add catch-all set element - special element used to
define a default action in case normal lookup missed
- use net_generic infra in many modules to avoid allocating
per-ns memory unnecessarily
- xps: improve the xps handling to avoid potential out-of-bound
accesses and use-after-free when XPS change race with other
re-configuration under traffic
- add a config knob to turn off per-cpu netdev refcnt to catch
underflows in testing
Device APIs:
- add WWAN subsystem to organize the WWAN interfaces better and
hopefully start driving towards more unified and vendor-
independent APIs
- ethtool:
- add interface for reading IEEE MIB stats (incl. mlx5 and bnxt
support)
- allow network drivers to dump arbitrary SFP EEPROM data,
current offset+length API was a poor fit for modern SFP which
define EEPROM in terms of pages (incl. mlx5 support)
- act_police, flow_offload: add support for packet-per-second
policing (incl. offload for nfp)
- psample: add additional metadata attributes like transit delay for
packets sampled from switch HW (and corresponding egress and
policy-based sampling in the mlxsw driver)
- dsa: improve support for sandwiched LAGs with bridge and DSA
- netfilter:
- flowtable: use direct xmit in topologies with IP forwarding,
bridging, vlans etc.
- nftables: counter hardware offload support
- Bluetooth:
- improvements for firmware download w/ Intel devices
- add support for reading AOSP vendor capabilities
- add support for virtio transport driver
- mac80211:
- allow concurrent monitor iface and ethernet rx decap
- set priority and queue mapping for injected frames
- phy: add support for Clause-45 PHY Loopback
- pci/iov: add sysfs MSI-X vector assignment interface to distribute
MSI-X resources to VFs (incl. mlx5 support)
New hardware/drivers:
- dsa: mv88e6xxx: add support for Marvell mv88e6393x - 11-port
Ethernet switch with 8x 1-Gigabit Ethernet and 3x 10-Gigabit
interfaces.
- dsa: support for legacy Broadcom tags used on BCM5325, BCM5365 and
BCM63xx switches
- Microchip KSZ8863 and KSZ8873; 3x 10/100Mbps Ethernet switches
- ath11k: support for QCN9074 a 802.11ax device
- Bluetooth: Broadcom BCM4330 and BMC4334
- phy: Marvell 88X2222 transceiver support
- mdio: add BCM6368 MDIO mux bus controller
- r8152: support RTL8153 and RTL8156 (USB Ethernet) chips
- mana: driver for Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA)
- Actions Semi Owl Ethernet MAC
- can: driver for ETAS ES58X CAN/USB interfaces
Pure driver changes:
- add XDP support to: enetc, igc, stmmac
- add AF_XDP support to: stmmac
- virtio:
- page_to_skb() use build_skb when there's sufficient tailroom
(21% improvement for 1000B UDP frames)
- support XDP even without dedicated Tx queues - share the Tx
queues with the stack when necessary
- mlx5:
- flow rules: add support for mirroring with conntrack, matching
on ICMP, GTP, flex filters and more
- support packet sampling with flow offloads
- persist uplink representor netdev across eswitch mode changes
- allow coexistence of CQE compression and HW time-stamping
- add ethtool extended link error state reporting
- ice, iavf: support flow filters, UDP Segmentation Offload
- dpaa2-switch:
- move the driver out of staging
- add spanning tree (STP) support
- add rx copybreak support
- add tc flower hardware offload on ingress traffic
- ionic:
- implement Rx page reuse
- support HW PTP time-stamping
- octeon: support TC hardware offloads - flower matching on ingress
and egress ratelimitting.
- stmmac:
- add RX frame steering based on VLAN priority in tc flower
- support frame preemption (FPE)
- intel: add cross time-stamping freq difference adjustment
- ocelot:
- support forwarding of MRP frames in HW
- support multiple bridges
- support PTP Sync one-step timestamping
- dsa: mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-switch: offload bridge port flags like
learning, flooding etc.
- ipa: add IPA v4.5, v4.9 and v4.11 support (Qualcomm SDX55, SM8350,
SC7280 SoCs)
- mt7601u: enable TDLS support
- mt76:
- add support for 802.3 rx frames (mt7915/mt7615)
- mt7915 flash pre-calibration support
- mt7921/mt7663 runtime power management fixes"
* tag 'net-next-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2451 commits)
net: selftest: fix build issue if INET is disabled
net: netrom: nr_in: Remove redundant assignment to ns
net: tun: Remove redundant assignment to ret
net: phy: marvell: add downshift support for M88E1240
net: dsa: ksz: Make reg_mib_cnt a u8 as it never exceeds 255
net/sched: act_ct: Remove redundant ct get and check
icmp: standardize naming of RFC 8335 PROBE constants
bpf, selftests: Update array map tests for per-cpu batched ops
bpf: Add batched ops support for percpu array
bpf: Implement formatted output helpers with bstr_printf
seq_file: Add a seq_bprintf function
sfc: adjust efx->xdp_tx_queue_count with the real number of initialized queues
net:nfc:digital: Fix a double free in digital_tg_recv_dep_req
net: fix a concurrency bug in l2tp_tunnel_register()
net/smc: Remove redundant assignment to rc
mpls: Remove redundant assignment to err
llc2: Remove redundant assignment to rc
net/tls: Remove redundant initialization of record
rds: Remove redundant assignment to nr_sig
dt-bindings: net: mdio-gpio: add compatible for microchip,mdio-smi0
...
- Refactoring powerpc and arm64 kexec DT handling to common code. This
enables IMA on arm64.
- Add kbuild support for applying DT overlays at build time. The first
user are the DT unittests.
- Fix kerneldoc formatting and W=1 warnings in drivers/of/
- Fix handling 64-bit flag on PCI resources
- Bump dtschema version required to v2021.2.1
- Enable undocumented compatible checks for dtbs_check. This allows
tracking of missing binding schemas.
- DT docs improvements. Regroup the DT docs and add the example schema
and DT kernel ABI docs to the doc build.
- Convert Broadcom Bluetooth and video-mux bindings to schema
- Add QCom sm8250 Venus video codec binding schema
- Add vendor prefixes for AESOP, YIC System Co., Ltd, and Siliconfile
Technologies Inc.
- Cleanup of DT schema type references on common properties and
standard unit properties
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Merge tag 'devicetree-for-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux
Pull devicetree updates from Rob Herring:
- Refactor powerpc and arm64 kexec DT handling to common code. This
enables IMA on arm64.
- Add kbuild support for applying DT overlays at build time. The first
user are the DT unittests.
- Fix kerneldoc formatting and W=1 warnings in drivers/of/
- Fix handling 64-bit flag on PCI resources
- Bump dtschema version required to v2021.2.1
- Enable undocumented compatible checks for dtbs_check. This allows
tracking of missing binding schemas.
- DT docs improvements. Regroup the DT docs and add the example schema
and DT kernel ABI docs to the doc build.
- Convert Broadcom Bluetooth and video-mux bindings to schema
- Add QCom sm8250 Venus video codec binding schema
- Add vendor prefixes for AESOP, YIC System Co., Ltd, and Siliconfile
Technologies Inc.
- Cleanup of DT schema type references on common properties and
standard unit properties
* tag 'devicetree-for-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux: (64 commits)
powerpc: If kexec_build_elf_info() fails return immediately from elf64_load()
powerpc: Free fdt on error in elf64_load()
of: overlay: Fix kerneldoc warning in of_overlay_remove()
of: linux/of.h: fix kernel-doc warnings
of/pci: Add IORESOURCE_MEM_64 to resource flags for 64-bit memory addresses
dt-bindings: bcm4329-fmac: add optional brcm,ccode-map
docs: dt: update writing-schema.rst references
dt-bindings: media: venus: Add sm8250 dt schema
of: base: Fix spelling issue with function param 'prop'
docs: dt: Add DT API documentation
of: Add missing 'Return' section in kerneldoc comments
of: Fix kerneldoc output formatting
docs: dt: Group DT docs into relevant sub-sections
docs: dt: Make 'Devicetree' wording more consistent
docs: dt: writing-schema: Include the example schema in the doc build
docs: dt: writing-schema: Remove spurious indentation
dt-bindings: Fix reference in submitting-patches.rst to the DT ABI doc
dt-bindings: ddr: Add optional manufacturer and revision ID to LPDDR3
dt-bindings: media: video-interfaces: Drop the example
devicetree: bindings: clock: Minor typo fix in the file armada3700-tbg-clock.txt
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add support for measuring the SELinux state and policy capabilities
using IMA.
- A handful of SELinux/NFS patches to compare the SELinux state of one
mount with a set of mount options. Olga goes into more detail in the
patch descriptions, but this is important as it allows more
flexibility when using NFS and SELinux context mounts.
- Properly differentiate between the subjective and objective LSM
credentials; including support for the SELinux and Smack. My clumsy
attempt at a proper fix for AppArmor didn't quite pass muster so John
is working on a proper AppArmor patch, in the meantime this set of
patches shouldn't change the behavior of AppArmor in any way. This
change explains the bulk of the diffstat beyond security/.
- Fix a problem where we were not properly terminating the permission
list for two SELinux object classes.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions
smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials
selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials
lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
nfs: account for selinux security context when deciding to share superblock
nfs: remove unneeded null check in nfs_fill_super()
lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
selinux: measure state and policy capabilities
selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs
First, the code is found to be irregular through checkpatch.pl.
Then I found break is really useless here.
Signed-off-by: Yanwei Gao <gaoyanwei.tx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- crypto_destroy_tfm now ignores errors as well as NULL pointers
Algorithms:
- Add explicit curve IDs in ECDH algorithm names
- Add NIST P384 curve parameters
- Add ECDSA
Drivers:
- Add support for Green Sardine in ccp
- Add ecdh/curve25519 to hisilicon/hpre
- Add support for AM64 in sa2ul"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (184 commits)
fsverity: relax build time dependency on CRYPTO_SHA256
fscrypt: relax Kconfig dependencies for crypto API algorithms
crypto: camellia - drop duplicate "depends on CRYPTO"
crypto: s5p-sss - consistently use local 'dev' variable in probe()
crypto: s5p-sss - remove unneeded local variable initialization
crypto: s5p-sss - simplify getting of_device_id match data
ccp: ccp - add support for Green Sardine
crypto: ccp - Make ccp_dev_suspend and ccp_dev_resume void functions
crypto: octeontx2 - add support for OcteonTX2 98xx CPT block.
crypto: chelsio/chcr - Remove useless MODULE_VERSION
crypto: ux500/cryp - Remove duplicate argument
crypto: chelsio - remove unused function
crypto: sa2ul - Add support for AM64
crypto: sa2ul - Support for per channel coherency
dt-bindings: crypto: ti,sa2ul: Add new compatible for AM64
crypto: hisilicon - enable new error types for QM
crypto: hisilicon - add new error type for SEC
crypto: hisilicon - support new error types for ZIP
crypto: hisilicon - dynamic configuration 'err_info'
crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c
...
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Merge tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull x509 dbx/mokx UEFI support from David Howells:
"Here's a set of patches from Eric Snowberg[1] that add support for
EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries in the dbx and mokx UEFI tables (such
entries cause matching certificates to be rejected).
These are currently ignored and only the hash entries are made use of.
Additionally Eric included his patches to allow such certificates to
be preloaded.
These patches deal with CVE-2020-26541.
To quote Eric:
'This is the fifth patch series for adding support for
EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries [2]. It has been expanded to not only
include dbx entries but also entries in the mokx. Additionally
my series to preload these certificate [3] has also been
included'"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com [1]
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-security-module/patch/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/cover/1315485/ [3]
* tag 'keys-cve-2020-26541-v3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring
certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs
certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function
certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries
Fix a regression in the TPM trusted keys caused by the generic rework
to add ARM TEE based trusted keys. Without this fix, the TPM trusted
key subsystem fails to add or load any keys.
Signed-off-by: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'queue' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/tpmdd
Pull tpm fixes from James Bottomley:
"Fix a regression in the TPM trusted keys caused by the generic rework
to add ARM TEE based trusted keys.
Without this fix, the TPM trusted key subsystem fails to add or load
any keys"
* tag 'queue' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: fix TPM trusted keys for generic framework
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"New features:
- ARM TEE backend for kernel trusted keys to complete the existing
TPM backend
- ASN.1 format for TPM2 trusted keys to make them interact with the
user space stack, such as OpenConnect VPN
Other than that, a bunch of bug fixes"
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: Fix missing null return from kzalloc call
char: tpm: fix error return code in tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_recv()
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source
KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys
KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable
security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys
lib: Add ASN.1 encoder
tpm: vtpm_proxy: Avoid reading host log when using a virtual device
tpm: acpi: Check eventlog signature before using it
tpm: efi: Use local variable for calculating final log size
Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to
landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI
version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security
approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole
sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of
protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features
provided by the running kernel.
This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock
features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem
interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing
multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New
Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version
number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for
each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space
libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes
as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs.
This is a much more lighter approach than the previous
landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space
libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions:
selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version.
Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
These 3 system calls are designed to be used by unprivileged processes
to sandbox themselves:
* landlock_create_ruleset(2): Creates a ruleset and returns its file
descriptor.
* landlock_add_rule(2): Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a
ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor.
* landlock_restrict_self(2): Enforces a ruleset on the calling thread
and its future children (similar to seccomp). This syscall has the
same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the
no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user
namespace.
All these syscalls have a "flags" argument (not currently used) to
enable extensibility.
Here are the motivations for these new syscalls:
* A sandboxed process may not have access to file systems, including
/dev, /sys or /proc, but it should still be able to add more
restrictions to itself.
* Neither prctl(2) nor seccomp(2) (which was used in a previous version)
fit well with the current definition of a Landlock security policy.
All passed structs (attributes) are checked at build time to ensure that
they don't contain holes and that they are aligned the same way for each
architecture.
See the user and kernel documentation for more details (provided by a
following commit):
* Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
* Documentation/security/landlock.rst
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
The sb_delete security hook is called when shutting down a superblock,
which may be useful to release kernel objects tied to the superblock's
lifetime (e.g. inodes).
This new hook is needed by Landlock to release (ephemerally) tagged
struct inodes. This comes from the unprivileged nature of Landlock
described in the next commit.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-7-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to
express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file)
and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through
landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is
allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following
the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are
collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create
access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify
a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the
filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user
has from the filesystem.
Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not
keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are
in use.
This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control
which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the
result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease
review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control
without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp
filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may
not be currently handled by Landlock.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security infrastructure.
Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is
allocated there.
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of
the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.
A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Process's credentials point to a Landlock domain, which is underneath
implemented with a ruleset. In the following commits, this domain is
used to check and enforce the ptrace and filesystem security policies.
A domain is inherited from a parent to its child the same way a thread
inherits a seccomp policy.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
A Landlock ruleset is mainly a red-black tree with Landlock rules as
nodes. This enables quick update and lookup to match a requested
access, e.g. to a file. A ruleset is usable through a dedicated file
descriptor (cf. following commit implementing syscalls) which enables a
process to create and populate a ruleset with new rules.
A domain is a ruleset tied to a set of processes. This group of rules
defines the security policy enforced on these processes and their future
children. A domain can transition to a new domain which is the
intersection of all its constraints and those of a ruleset provided by
the current process. This modification only impact the current process.
This means that a process can only gain more constraints (i.e. lose
accesses) over time.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode).
A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules
are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e.
subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain).
Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially
unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a
system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes.
Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls.
The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects
while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes
use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once
no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be
written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a
rule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock,
this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference
objects.
A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
This patch adds the missing NULL termination to the "bpf" and
"perf_event" object class permission lists.
This missing NULL termination should really only affect the tools
under scripts/selinux, with the most important being genheaders.c,
although in practice this has not been an issue on any of my dev/test
systems. If the problem were to manifest itself it would likely
result in bogus permissions added to the end of the object class;
thankfully with no access control checks using these bogus
permissions and no policies defining these permissions the impact
would likely be limited to some noise about undefined permissions
during policy load.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ec27c3568a ("selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations")
Fixes: da97e18458 ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The generic framework patch broke the current TPM trusted keys because
it doesn't correctly remove the values consumed by the generic parser
before passing them on to the implementation specific parser. Fix
this by having the generic parser return the string minus the consumed
tokens.
Additionally, there may be no tokens left for the implementation
specific parser, so make it handle the NULL case correctly and finally
fix a TPM 1.2 specific check for no keyhandle.
Fixes: 5d0682be31 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Tested-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
The original patch 8c657a0590 ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal
and unseal operations") was correct on the mailing list:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210128235621.127925-4-jarkko@kernel.org/
But somehow got rebased so that the tpm_try_get_ops() in
tpm2_seal_trusted() got lost. This causes an imbalanced put of the
TPM ops and causes oopses on TIS based hardware.
This fix puts back the lost tpm_try_get_ops()
Fixes: 8c657a0590 ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations")
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix multiple
warnings by explicitly adding multiple break statements instead of just
letting the code fall through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
- keep the ZC code, drop the code related to reinit
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
- fix build after move to net_generic
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE both enable KASAN stack
instrumentation, but we should only need one config, so that we remove
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE and make CONFIG_KASAN_STACK workable. see [1].
When enable KASAN stack instrumentation, then for gcc we could do no
prompt and default value y, and for clang prompt and default value n.
This patch fixes the following compilation warning:
include/linux/kasan.h:333:30: warning: 'CONFIG_KASAN_STACK' is not defined, evaluates to 0 [-Wundef]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge snafu]
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221 [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210226012531.29231-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Fixes: d9b571c885 ("kasan: fix KASAN_STACK dependency for HW_TAGS")
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix kernel-doc notation in commoncap.c.
Use correct (matching) function name in comments as in code.
Use correct function argument names in kernel-doc comments.
Use kernel-doc's "Return:" format for function return values.
Fixes these kernel-doc warnings:
../security/commoncap.c:1206: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setioprio() instead
../security/commoncap.c:1219: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setnice() instead
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
The kzalloc call can return null with the GFP_KERNEL flag so
add a null check and exit via a new error exit label. Use the
same exit error label for another error path too.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Dereference null return value")
Fixes: 830027e2cb55 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality
to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key.
Refer to Documentation/staging/tee.rst for detailed information about TEE.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
which contains necessary functions of a backend.
Also, define a module parameter in order to select a particular trust
source in case a platform support multiple trust sources. In case its
not specified then implementation itetrates through trust sources list
starting with TPM and assign the first trust source as a backend which
has initiazed successfully during iteration.
Note that current implementation only supports a single trust source at
runtime which is either selectable at compile time or during boot via
aforementioned module parameter.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a
key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using
party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other
consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the
key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to
migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only
sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound
to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't
load.
Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're
loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from
the last byte of old format keys.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the
ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior
trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities
representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the
export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format.
The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the
exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine,
openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy
specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy
handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you
don't have to keep passing it in each time.
This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so
keys with passwords but no policy.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually
recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1
hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this
hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex
number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length
passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted
keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this
into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys.
so before
keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u
after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new
directly supplied password:
keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u
Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct
password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator
for which form is input.
Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM
2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty
authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in
20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the
Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch
makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys.
Fixes: 0fe5480303 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips")
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
MAINTAINERS
- keep Chandrasekar
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c
- simple fix + trust the code re-added to param.c in -next is fine
include/linux/bpf.h
- trivial
include/linux/ethtool.h
- trivial, fix kdoc while at it
include/linux/skmsg.h
- move to relevant place in tcp.c, comment re-wrapped
net/core/skmsg.c
- add the sk = sk // sk = NULL around calls
net/tipc/crypto.c
- trivial
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux fixes.
These fix known problems relating to (re)loading SELinux policy or
changing the policy booleans, and pass our test suite without problem"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix race between old and new sidtab
selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleans
selinux: make nslot handling in avtab more robust
init_once is a callback to kmem_cache_create. The parameter
type of this function is void *, so it's better to give a
explicit cast here.
Signed-off-by: Jiele Zhao <unclexiaole@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The original function name was ima_path_check(). The policy parsing
still supports PATH_CHECK. Commit 9bbb6cad01 ("ima: rename
ima_path_check to ima_file_check") renamed the function to
ima_file_check(), but missed modifying the function name in the
comment.
Fixes: 9bbb6cad01 ("ima: rename ima_path_check to ima_file_check").
Signed-off-by: Jiele Zhao <unclexiaole@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kernel currently only loads the kernel module signing key onto the
builtin trusted keyring. Load the module signing key onto the IMA keyring
as well.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Since commit 1b8b31a2e6 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to
RCU"), there is a small window during policy load where the new policy
pointer has already been installed, but some threads may still be
holding the old policy pointer in their read-side RCU critical sections.
This means that there may be conflicting attempts to add a new SID entry
to both tables via sidtab_context_to_sid().
See also (and the rest of the thread):
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNvfux46_f8gnvVvRYMKoes24nwm2n3sPbMjrB8vKTW00g@mail.gmail.com/
Fix this by installing the new policy pointer under the old sidtab's
spinlock along with marking the old sidtab as "frozen". Then, if an
attempt to add new entry to a "frozen" sidtab is detected, make
sidtab_context_to_sid() return -ESTALE to indicate that a new policy
has been installed and that the caller will have to abort the policy
transaction and try again after re-taking the policy pointer (which is
guaranteed to be a newer policy). This requires adding a retry-on-ESTALE
logic to all callers of sidtab_context_to_sid(), but fortunately these
are easy to determine and aren't that many.
This seems to be the simplest solution for this problem, even if it
looks somewhat ugly. Note that other places in the kernel (e.g.
do_mknodat() in fs/namei.c) use similar stale-retry patterns, so I think
it's reasonable.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1b8b31a2e6 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole
conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in
cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional
avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach
often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules
being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed.
To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the
individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This
approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the
av_lists exactly once.
The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows:
# sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
# setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off
On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool
command:
# sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
While on the broken kernels, it will be different:
# sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
While there, also simplify the computation of nslots. This changes the
nslots values for nrules 2 or 3 to just two slots instead of 4, which
makes the sequence more consistent.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c7c556f1e8 ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
1. Make sure all fileds are initialized in avtab_init().
2. Slightly refactor avtab_alloc() to use the above fact.
3. Use h->nslot == 0 as a sentinel in the access functions to prevent
dereferencing h->htable when it's not allocated.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since commit 3bfe610669 ("io-wq: fork worker threads from original
task") stopped using PF_KTHREAD flag for the io_uring PF_IO_WORKER threads,
tomoyo_kernel_service() no longer needs to check PF_IO_WORKER flag.
(This is a 5.12+ patch. Please don't send to stable kernels.)
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Add support for IMA signature verification for EC keys. Since SHA type
of hashes can be used by RSA and ECDSA signature schemes we need to
look at the key and derive from the key which signature scheme to use.
Since this can be applied to all types of keys, we change the selection
of the encoding type to be driven by the key's signature scheme rather
than by the hash type.
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.12-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity fix from Mimi Zohar:
"Just one patch to address a NULL ptr dereferencing when there is a
mismatch between the user enabled LSMs and IMA/EVM"
* tag 'integrity-v5.12-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized
gcc-11 introdces a harmless warning for cap_inode_getsecurity:
security/commoncap.c: In function ‘cap_inode_getsecurity’:
security/commoncap.c:440:33: error: ‘memcpy’ reading 16 bytes from a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
440 | memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The problem here is that tmpbuf is initialized to NULL, so gcc assumes
it is not accessible unless it gets set by vfs_getxattr_alloc(). This is
a legitimate warning as far as I can tell, but the code is correct since
it correctly handles the error when that function fails.
Add a separate NULL check to tell gcc about it as well.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
In ima_restore_measurement_list(), hdr[HDR_PCR].data is pointing to a
buffer of type u8, which contains the dumped 32-bit pcr value.
Currently, only the least significant byte is used to restore the pcr
value. We should convert hdr[HDR_PCR].data to a pointer of type u32
before fetching the value to restore the correct pcr value.
Fixes: 47fdee60b4 ("ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers")
Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With the split of the security_task_getsecid() into subjective and
objective variants it's time to update Smack to ensure it is using
the correct task creds.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux has a function, task_sid(), which returns the task's
objective credentials, but unfortunately is used in a few places
where the subjective task credentials should be used. Most notably
in the new security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook.
This patch fixes this and attempts to make things more obvious by
introducing a new function, task_sid_subj(), and renaming the
existing task_sid() function to task_sid_obj().
This patch also adds an interesting function in task_sid_binder().
The task_sid_binder() function has a comment which hopefully
describes it's reason for being, but it basically boils down to the
simple fact that we can't safely access another task's subjective
credentials so in the case of binder we need to stick with the
objective credentials regardless.
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.
This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount
with new options and determines if new options confict with an
existing mount or not.
A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share
the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux patches:
- Fix a problem where a local variable is used outside its associated
function. Thankfully this can only be triggered by reloading the
SELinux policy, which is a restricted operation for other obvious
reasons.
- Fix some incorrect, and inconsistent, audit and printk messages
when loading the SELinux policy.
All three patches are relatively minor and have been through our
testing with no failures"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting
selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion
selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load
Let's drop the pr_err()s from sel_make_policy_nodes() and just add one
pr_warn_ratelimited() call to the sel_make_policy_nodes() error path in
sel_write_load().
Changing from error to warning makes sense, since after 02a52c5c8c
("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs"), this error
path no longer leads to a broken selinuxfs tree (it's just kept in the
original state and policy load is aborted).
I also added _ratelimited to be consistent with the other prtin in the
same function (it's probably not necessary, but can't really hurt...
there are likely more important error messages to be printed when
filesystem entry creation starts erroring out).
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating
selinuxfs") moved the selinux_policy_commit() call out of
security_load_policy() into sel_write_load(), which caused a subtle yet
rather serious bug.
The problem is that security_load_policy() passes a reference to the
convert_params local variable to sidtab_convert(), which stores it in
the sidtab, where it may be accessed until the policy is swapped over
and RCU synchronized. Before 02a52c5c8c, selinux_policy_commit() was
called directly from security_load_policy(), so the convert_params
pointer remained valid all the way until the old sidtab was destroyed,
but now that's no longer the case and calls to sidtab_context_to_sid()
on the old sidtab after security_load_policy() returns may cause invalid
memory accesses.
This can be easily triggered using the stress test from commit
ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance"):
```
function rand_cat() {
echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}
function do_work() {
while true; do
echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
>/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
done
}
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done
kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```
Fix this by allocating the temporary sidtab convert structures
dynamically and passing them among the
selinux_policy_{load,cancel,commit} functions.
Fixes: 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in security.h and services.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, we should jump to 'out', not 'out1',
as the latter would incorrectly log an MAC_POLICY_LOAD audit record,
even though the policy hasn't actually been reloaded. The 'out1' jump
label now becomes unused and can be removed.
Fixes: 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It turns out that there are in fact userspace implementations that
care and this recent change caused a regression.
https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071
As the motivation for the original change was future development,
and the impact is existing real world code just revert this change
and allow the ambiguity in v3 file caps.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95ebabde38 ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- RTM_NEWNEXTHOP et.al. that handle resilient groups will have a new nested
attribute, NHA_RES_GROUP, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_GROUP_*.
- RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET et.al. is a suite of new messages that will
currently serve only for dumping of individual buckets of resilient next
hop groups. For nexthop group buckets, these messages will carry a nested
attribute NHA_RES_BUCKET, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_BUCKET_*.
There are several reasons why a new suite of messages is created for
nexthop buckets instead of overloading the information on the existing
RTM_{NEW,DEL,GET}NEXTHOP messages.
First, a nexthop group can contain a large number of nexthop buckets (4k
is not unheard of). This imposes limits on the amount of information that
can be encoded for each nexthop bucket given a netlink message is limited
to 64k bytes.
Second, while RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET is only used for notifications at
this point, in the future it can be extended to provide user space with
control over nexthop buckets configuration.
- The new group type is NEXTHOP_GRP_TYPE_RES. Note that nexthop code is
adjusted to bounce groups with that type for now.
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A typo is f out by codespell tool in 422th line of security.h:
$ codespell ./security/selinux/include/
./security.h:422: thie ==> the, this
Fix a typo found by codespell.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A typo is found out by codespell tool in 16th line of hashtab.c
$ codespell ./security/selinux/ss/
./hashtab.c:16: rouding ==> rounding
Fix a typo found by codespell.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux stores the configuration state and the policy capabilities
in kernel memory. Changes to this data at runtime would have an impact
on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring this data
through IMA subsystem provides a tamper-resistant way for
an attestation service to remotely validate it at runtime.
Measure the configuration state and policy capabilities by calling
the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data().
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
Sample measurement of SELinux state and policy capabilities:
10 2122...65d8 ima-buf sha256:13c2...1292 selinux-state 696e...303b
Execute the following command to extract the measured data
from the IMA's runtime measurements list:
grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
The output should be a list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
To verify the measurement is consistent with the current SELinux state
reported on the system, compare the integer values in the following
files with those set in the IMA measurement (using the following commands):
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities/[capability_file]
Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state
and done on a separate system (likely an attestation server) requiring
"initialized=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;"
for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually
set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy
itself via seinfo, for example).
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Now overlayfs allow unpriviliged mounts. That is root inside a non-init
user namespace can mount overlayfs. This is being added in 5.11 kernel.
Giuseppe tried to mount overlayfs with option "context" and it failed
with error -EACCESS.
$ su test
$ unshare -rm
$ mkdir -p lower upper work merged
$ mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower,workdir=work,upperdir=upper,userxattr,context='system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0' none merged
This fails with -EACCESS. It works if option "-o context" is not specified.
Little debugging showed that selinux_set_mnt_opts() returns -EACCESS.
So this patch adds "overlay" to the list, where it is fine to specific
context from non init_user_ns.
Reported-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
[PM: trimmed the changelog from the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The functions defined in "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" handle setting up
and freeing the resources required to carry over the IMA measurement
list from the current kernel to the next kernel across kexec system call.
These functions do not have architecture specific code, but are
currently limited to powerpc.
Move remove_ima_buffer() and setup_ima_buffer() calls into
of_kexec_alloc_and_setup_fdt() defined in "drivers/of/kexec.c".
Move the remaining architecture independent functions from
"arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" to "drivers/of/kexec.c".
Delete "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" and "arch/powerpc/include/asm/ima.h".
Remove references to the deleted files and functions in powerpc and
in ima.
Co-developed-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174930.27324-11-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
The fields ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size in "struct kimage_arch"
for powerpc are used to carry forward the IMA measurement list across
kexec system call. These fields are not architecture specific, but are
currently limited to powerpc.
arch_ima_add_kexec_buffer() defined in "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c"
sets ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size for the kexec system call.
This function does not have architecture specific code, but is
currently limited to powerpc.
Move ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size to "struct kimage".
Set ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size in ima_add_kexec_buffer()
in security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c.
Co-developed-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174930.27324-9-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
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Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
"Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
various people for the upcoming merge window.
A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:
- Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
search.
This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.
- Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.
This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
currently writable by userspace.
The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
have any visible effect"
* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
KEYS: remove redundant memset
security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdfhttps://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
Pull user namespace update from Eric Biederman:
"There are several pieces of active development, but only a single
change made it through the gauntlet to be ready for v5.12. That change
is tightening up the semantics of the v3 capabilities xattr. It is
just short of being a bug-fix/security issue as no user space is known
to even generate the problem case"
* 'userns-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities
Pull RCU-safe common_lsm_audit() from Al Viro:
"Make common_lsm_audit() non-blocking and usable from RCU pathwalk
context.
We don't really need to grab/drop dentry in there - rcu_read_lock() is
enough. There's a couple of followups using that to simplify the
logics in selinux, but those hadn't soaked in -next yet, so they'll
have to go in next window"
* 'work.audit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
make dump_common_audit_data() safe to be called from RCU pathwalk
new helper: d_find_alias_rcu()
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"New features:
- Cr50 I2C TPM driver
- sysfs exports of PCR registers in TPM 2.0 chips
Bug fixes:
- bug fixes for tpm_tis driver, which had a racy wait for hardware
state change to be ready to send a command to the TPM chip. The bug
has existed already since 2006, but has only made itself known in
recent past. This is the same as the "last time" :-)
- Otherwise there's bunch of fixes for not as alarming regressions. I
think the list is about the same as last time, except I added fixes
for some disjoint bugs in trusted keys that I found some time ago"
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing
KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()
tpm/ppi: Constify static struct attribute_group
ABI: add sysfs description for tpm exports of PCR registers
tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers
keys: Update comment for restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain
tpm: Remove tpm_dev_wq_lock
char: tpm: add i2c driver for cr50
tpm: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
tpm_tis: Clean up locality release
tpm_tis: Fix check_locality for correct locality acquisition
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"New is IMA support for measuring kernel critical data, as per usual
based on policy. The first example measures the in memory SELinux
policy. The second example measures the kernel version.
In addition are four bug fixes to address memory leaks and a missing
'static' function declaration"
* tag 'integrity-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Make function integrity_add_key() static
ima: Free IMA measurement buffer after kexec syscall
ima: Free IMA measurement buffer on error
IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot
selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a label
IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
evm: Fix memleak in init_desc
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got a good handful of patches for SELinux this time around; with
everything passing the selinux-testsuite and applying cleanly to your
tree as of a few minutes ago. The highlights are:
- Add support for labeling anonymous inodes, and extend this new
support to userfaultfd.
- Fallback to SELinux genfs file labeling if the filesystem does not
have xattr support. This is useful for virtiofs which can vary in
its xattr support depending on the backing filesystem.
- Classify and handle MPTCP the same as TCP in SELinux.
- Ensure consistent behavior between inode_getxattr and
inode_listsecurity when the SELinux policy is not loaded. This
fixes a known problem with overlayfs.
- A couple of patches to prune some unused variables from the SELinux
code, mark private variables as static, and mark other variables as
__ro_after_init or __read_mostly"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
fs: anon_inodes: rephrase to appropriate kernel-doc
userfaultfd: use secure anon inodes for userfaultfd
selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes
fs: add LSM-supporting anon-inode interface
security: add inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook
selinux: fall back to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS if no xattr support
selinux: mark selinux_xfrm_refcount as __read_mostly
selinux: mark some global variables __ro_after_init
selinux: make selinuxfs_mount static
selinux: drop the unnecessary aurule_callback variable
selinux: remove unused global variables
selinux: fix inconsistency between inode_getxattr and inode_listsecurity
selinux: handle MPTCP consistently with TCP
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem,
the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(),
which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The
ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient,
as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT
need to be done as a one single atom.
Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), and use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send
TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.
Fixes: 2e19e10131 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")
Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Consider the following transcript:
$ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u
add_key: Invalid argument
The documentation has the following description:
migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
default 1 (resealing allowed)
The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by
allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL.
[*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fixes: d00a1c72f7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the
return value:
1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated.
2. A negative value on error.
However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would
only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read
counts to the user space does not make any possible sense.
Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value.
Fixes: 41ab999c80 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The sparse tool complains as follows:
security/integrity/digsig.c:146:12: warning:
symbol 'integrity_add_key' was not declared. Should it be static?
This function is not used outside of digsig.c, so this
commit marks it static.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 60740accf7 ("integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. This buffer is not freed before
completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak.
Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address
of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. In error code paths this memory
is not freed resulting in memory leak.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
the error code paths in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
clang static analysis reports this representative problem:
label.c:1463:16: warning: Assigned value is garbage or undefined
label->hname = name;
^ ~~~~
In aa_update_label_name(), this the problem block of code
if (aa_label_acntsxprint(&name, ...) == -1)
return res;
On failure, aa_label_acntsxprint() has a more complicated return
that just -1. So check for a negative return.
It was also noted that the aa_label_acntsxprint() main comment refers
to a nonexistent parameter, so clean up the comment.
Fixes: f1bd904175 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Drop repeated words in comments.
{a, then, to}
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Delete the doubled word "then" in a comment.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
With LSM stacking calling back into capable to check for MAC_ADMIN
for apparmor policy results in asking the other stacked LSMs for
MAC_ADMIN resulting in the other LSMs answering based on their
policy management.
For apparmor policy management we just need to call apparmor's
capability fn directly.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Previously the policy capable checks assumed they were using the
current task. Make them take the task label so the query can be
made against an arbitrary task.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where
bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds
GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger than PAGE_SIZE.
Per smackfs doc, smk_write_net4addr accepts any label or -CIPSO,
smk_write_net6addr accepts any label or -DELETE. I couldn't find
any general rule for other label lengths except SMK_LABELLEN,
SMK_LONGLABEL, SMK_CIPSOMAX which are documented.
Let's constrain, in general, smackfs label lengths for PAGE_SIZE.
Although fuzzer crashes write to smackfs/netlabel on 0x400000 length.
Here is a quick way to reproduce the WARNING:
python -c "print('A' * 0x400000)" > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel
Reported-by: syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Commit db68ce10c4 ("new helper: uaccess_kernel()") replaced
segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS) with uaccess_kernel(). But the correct
method for tomoyo to check whether current is a kernel thread in order
to assume that kernel threads are privileged for socket operations was
(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD). Now that uaccess_kernel() became 0 on x86,
tomoyo has to fix this problem. Do like commit 942cb357ae ("Smack:
Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges") does.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
syzbot is reporting that tomoyo's quota check is racy [1]. But this check
is tolerant of some degree of inaccuracy. Thus, teach KCSAN to ignore
this data race.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=999533deec7ba6337f8aa25d8bd1a4d5f7e50476
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0789a72b46fd91431bd8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
If a capability is stored on disk in v2 format cap_inode_getsecurity() will
currently return in v2 format unconditionally.
This is wrong: v2 cap should be equivalent to a v3 cap with zero rootid,
and so the same conversions performed on it.
If the rootid cannot be mapped, v3 is returned unconverted. Fix this so
that both v2 and v3 return -EOVERFLOW if the rootid (or the owner of the fs
user namespace in case of v2) cannot be mapped into the current user
namespace.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The integrity of a kernel can be verified by the boot loader on cold
boot, and during kexec, by the current running kernel, before it is
loaded. However, it is still possible that the new kernel being
loaded is older than the current kernel, and/or has known
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is imperative that an attestation
service be able to verify the version of the kernel being loaded on
the client, from cold boot and subsequent kexec system calls,
ensuring that only kernels with versions known to be good are loaded.
Measure the kernel version using ima_measure_critical_data() early on
in the boot sequence, reducing the chances of known kernel
vulnerabilities being exploited. With IMA being part of the kernel,
this overall approach makes the measurement itself more trustworthy.
To enable measuring the kernel version "ima_policy=critical_data"
needs to be added to the kernel command line arguments.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset ima_policy=critical_data
If runtime measurement of the kernel version is ever needed, the
following should be added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=kernel_info
To extract the measured data after boot, the following command can be used:
grep -m 1 "kernel_version" \
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
Sample output from the command above:
10 a8297d408e9d5155728b619761d0dd4cedf5ef5f ima-buf
sha256:5660e19945be0119bc19cbbf8d9c33a09935ab5d30dad48aa11f879c67d70988
kernel_version 352e31312e302d7263332d31363138372d676564623634666537383234342d6469727479
The above hex-ascii string corresponds to the kernel version
(e.g. xxd -r -p):
5.11.0-rc3-16187-gedb64fe78244-dirty
Signed-off-by: Raphael Gianotti <raphgi@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA does sometimes access the inode's i_uid and compares it against the
rules' fowner. Enable IMA to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. We simply make use of the helpers we introduced
before. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-27-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The i_uid and i_gid are mostly used when logging for AppArmor. This is
broken in a bunch of places where the global root id is reported instead
of the i_uid or i_gid of the file. Nonetheless, be kind and log the
mapped inode if we're coming from an idmapped mount. If the initial user
namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see
identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-26-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.
As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is
privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the
inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped
mounts.
The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to
translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the
ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or
the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user
namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we
either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which
direction we're translating.
Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user
namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the
superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to
handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace.
In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch
series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode()
helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let
them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix
acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend
the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass
the mount's user namespace down.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given
inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers
privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former
verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and
the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested
capability in their current user namespace.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all
operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in
behavior.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update()
uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot
write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash
from it.
Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set
KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass
this to keyring_alloc().
We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag
manually.
Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current
implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the
blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.
Fixes: 734114f878 ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Reviewing use of memset in keyctl_pkey.c
keyctl_pkey_params_get prologue code to set params up
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
params->encoding = "raw";
keyctl_pkey_query has the same prologue
and calls keyctl_pkey_params_get.
So remove the prologue.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Drop repeated words in comments.
{to, will, the}
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Use kvfree_sensitive() instead of open-coding it.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
The merged API doesn't use a watch_queue device, but instead relies on
pipes, so let the documentation reflect that.
Fixes: f7e47677e3 ("watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
When the semantics of the ->read() handlers were changed such that "buffer"
is a kernel pointer, some __user annotations survived.
Since they're wrong now, get rid of them.
Fixes: d3ec10aa95 ("KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning
by explicitly adding a break statement instead of letting the code fall
through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
We are not guaranteed the locking environment that would prevent
dentry getting renamed right under us. And it's possible for
old long name to be freed after rename, leading to UAF here.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v2.6.2+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data
at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided
by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem
provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate
the policy contents at runtime.
Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy
can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of
the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run
the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6
Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading
the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe
system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get
the expected hash.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring
early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy
is loaded.
Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document
the new critical data builtin policy.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to
specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data
measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label
in the IMA policy.
Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing
the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can
be used to limit the measurements based on the label.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Integrity critical data may belong to a single subsystem or it may
arise from cross subsystem interaction. Currently there is no mechanism
to group or limit the data based on certain label. Limiting and
grouping critical data based on a label would make it flexible and
configurable to measure.
Define "label:=", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func
CRITICAL_DATA to allow grouping and limiting measurement of integrity
critical data.
Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA
policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"label:=". If "label:=" is not provided with
the func CRITICAL_DATA, measure all the input integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for
measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer
would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The
policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.)
for integrity critical buffer data measurements.
Add policy rule support for measuring integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA provides capabilities to measure file and buffer data. However,
various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory
also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems
contain such integrity critical data. These kernel subsystems help
protect the integrity of the system. Currently, IMA does not provide a
generic function for measuring kernel integrity critical data.
Define ima_measure_critical_data, a new IMA hook, to measure kernel
integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot
command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data
sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash,
not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring
buffer data hash.
Introduce a boolean parameter to support measuring buffer data hash,
which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer itself.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA functions such as ima_match_keyring(), process_buffer_measurement(),
ima_match_policy() etc. handle data specific to keyrings. Currently,
these constructs are not generic to handle any func specific data.
This makes it harder to extend them without code duplication.
Refactor the keyring specific measurement constructs to be generic and
reusable in other measurement scenarios.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in
the previous patches to give SELinux the ability to control
anonymous-inode files that are created using the new
anon_inode_getfd_secure() function.
A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by
adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security
type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used
for the name-based transition is the name associated with the
anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or
"[perf_event]".
Example:
type uffd_t;
type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]";
allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create };
(The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd
support this new interface. The example above is just
for exposition.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This change adds a new LSM hook, inode_init_security_anon(), that will
be used while creating secure anonymous inodes. The hook allows/denies
its creation and assigns a security context to the inode.
The new hook accepts an optional context_inode parameter that callers
can use to provide additional contextual information to security modules
for granting/denying permission to create an anon-inode of the same type.
This context_inode's security_context can also be used to initialize the
newly created anon-inode's security_context.
Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When a superblock is assigned the SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR behavior by the
policy yet it lacks xattr support, try to fall back to genfs rather than
rejecting the mount. If a genfscon rule is found for the filesystem,
then change the behavior to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS, otherwise reject the
mount as before. A similar fallback is already done in security_fs_use()
if no behavior specification is found for the given filesystem.
This is needed e.g. for virtiofs, which may or may not support xattrs
depending on the backing host filesystem.
Example:
# seinfo --genfs | grep ' ramfs'
genfscon ramfs / system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0
# echo '(fsuse xattr ramfs (system_u object_r fs_t ((s0) (s0))))' >ramfs_xattr.cil
# semodule -i ramfs_xattr.cil
# mount -t ramfs none /mnt
Before:
mount: /mnt: mount(2) system call failed: Operation not supported.
After:
(mount succeeds)
# ls -Zd /mnt
system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0 /mnt
See also:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20210105142148.GA3200@redhat.com/T/https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/pull/478
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
tmp_tfm is allocated, but not freed on subsequent kmalloc failure, which
leads to a memory leak. Free tmp_tfm.
Fixes: d46eb36995 ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: formatted/reworded patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This is motivated by a perfomance regression of selinux_xfrm_enabled()
that happened on a RHEL kernel due to false sharing between
selinux_xfrm_refcount and (the late) selinux_ss.policy_rwlock (i.e. the
.bss section memory layout changed such that they happened to share the
same cacheline). Since the policy rwlock's memory region was modified
upon each read-side critical section, the readers of
selinux_xfrm_refcount had frequent cache misses, eventually leading to a
significant performance degradation under a TCP SYN flood on a system
with many cores (32 in this case, but it's detectable on less cores as
well).
While upstream has since switched to RCU locking, so the same can no
longer happen here, selinux_xfrm_refcount could still share a cacheline
with another frequently written region, thus marking it __read_mostly
still makes sense. __read_mostly helps, because it will put the symbol
in a separate section along with other read-mostly variables, so there
should never be a clash with frequently written data.
Since selinux_xfrm_refcount is modified only in case of an explicit
action, it should be safe to do this (i.e. it shouldn't disrupt other
read-mostly variables too much).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
All of these are never modified outside initcalls, so they can be
__ro_after_init.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It is not referenced outside selinuxfs.c, so remove its extern header
declaration and make it static.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Its value is actually not changed anywhere, so it can be substituted for
a direct call to audit_update_lsm_rules().
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
All of sel_ib_pkey_list, sel_netif_list, sel_netnode_list, and
sel_netport_list are declared but never used. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr
calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will
intercept in inode_getxattr hooks.
When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the
security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it
in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an
xattr returned by listxattr.
This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower
files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized,
because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by
vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr().
Match the logic of inode_listsecurity to that of inode_getxattr and
do not list the security.selinux xattr if selinux is not initialized.
Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/
Fixes: c8e222616c ("selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org#v5.9+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The MPTCP protocol uses a specific protocol value, even if
it's an extension to TCP. Additionally, MPTCP sockets
could 'fall-back' to TCP at run-time, depending on peer MPTCP
support and available resources.
As a consequence of the specific protocol number, selinux
applies the raw_socket class to MPTCP sockets.
Existing TCP application converted to MPTCP - or forced to
use MPTCP socket with user-space hacks - will need an
updated policy to run successfully.
This change lets selinux attach the TCP socket class to
MPTCP sockets, too, so that no policy changes are needed in
the above scenario.
Note that the MPTCP is setting, propagating and updating the
security context on all the subflows and related request
socket.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CAHC9VhTaK3xx0hEGByD2zxfF7fadyPP1kb-WeWH_YCyq9X-sRg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[PM: tweaked subject's prefix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The v3 file capabilities have a uid field that records the filesystem
uid of the root user of the user namespace the file capabilities are
valid in.
When someone is silly enough to have the same underlying uid as the
root uid of multiple nested containers a v3 filesystem capability can
be ambiguous.
In the spirit of don't do that then, forbid writing a v3 filesystem
capability if it is ambiguous.
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
in the face of io_uring's use of kernel threads.
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.11-io_uring-fix' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack fix from Casey Schaufler:
"Provide a fix for the incorrect handling of privilege in the face of
io_uring's use of kernel threads. That invalidated an long standing
assumption regarding the privilege of kernel threads.
The fix is simple and safe. It was provided by Jens Axboe and has been
tested"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.11-io_uring-fix' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges
- Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor
- Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode
- Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64
- Some fixes for the capsule loader
- Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module
- Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM
+ followup fixes:
- fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader changes
- suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM
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Merge tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Borislav Petkov:
"These got delayed due to a last minute ia64 build issue which got
fixed in the meantime.
EFI updates collected by Ard Biesheuvel:
- Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor
- Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode
- Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64
- Some fixes for the capsule loader
- Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module
- Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM
with a few followup fixes:
- fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader
changes
- suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM"
* tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi: arm: force use of unsigned type for EFI_PHYS_ALIGN
efi: ia64: disable the capsule loader
efi: stub: get rid of efi_get_max_fdt_addr()
efi/efi_test: read RuntimeServicesSupported
efi: arm: reduce minimum alignment of uncompressed kernel
efi: capsule: clean scatter-gather entries from the D-cache
efi: capsule: use atomic kmap for transient sglist mappings
efi: x86/xen: switch to efi_get_secureboot_mode helper
arm64/ima: add ima_arch support
ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures
efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot
efi/libstub: EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER should not default to yes
efi/x86: Only copy the compressed kernel image in efi_relocate_kernel()
efi/libstub/x86: simplify efi_is_native()
Smack assumes that kernel threads are privileged for smackfs
operations. This was necessary because the credential of the
kernel thread was not related to a user operation. With io_uring
the credential does reflect a user's rights and can be used.
Suggested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Merge tag 'ovl-update-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs
Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
- Allow unprivileged mounting in a user namespace.
For quite some time the security model of overlayfs has been that
operations on underlying layers shall be performed with the
privileges of the mounting task.
This way an unprvileged user cannot gain privileges by the act of
mounting an overlayfs instance. A full audit of all function calls
made by the overlayfs code has been performed to see whether they
conform to this model, and this branch contains some fixes in this
regard.
- Support running on copied filesystem images by optionally disabling
UUID verification.
- Bug fixes as well as documentation updates.
* tag 'ovl-update-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs:
ovl: unprivieged mounts
ovl: do not get metacopy for userxattr
ovl: do not fail because of O_NOATIME
ovl: do not fail when setting origin xattr
ovl: user xattr
ovl: simplify file splice
ovl: make ioctl() safe
ovl: check privs before decoding file handle
vfs: verify source area in vfs_dedupe_file_range_one()
vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr()
ovl: fix incorrect extent info in metacopy case
ovl: expand warning in ovl_d_real()
ovl: document lower modification caveats
ovl: warn about orphan metacopy
ovl: doc clarification
ovl: introduce new "uuid=off" option for inodes index feature
ovl: propagate ovl_fs to ovl_decode_real_fh and ovl_encode_real_fh
set of corrections in function header comments.
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.11' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"There are no functional changes. Just one minor code clean-up and a
set of corrections in function header comments"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.11' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
security/smack: remove unused varible 'rc'
Smack: fix kernel-doc interface on functions
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just three patches here. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed
via EFI (defines a common EFI secure and trusted boot IMA policy) and
BPF LSM (exporting the IMA file cache hash info based on inode).
The three patches included here:
- bug fix: fail calculating the file hash, when a file not opened for
read and the attempt to re-open it for read fails.
- defer processing the "ima_appraise" boot command line option to
avoid enabling different modes (e.g. fix, log) to when the secure
boot flag is available on arm.
- defines "ima-buf" as the default IMA buffer measurement template in
preparation for the builtin integrity "critical data" policy"
* tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly
ima: select ima-buf template for buffer measurement
ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"While we have a small number of SELinux patches for v5.11, there are a
few changes worth highlighting:
- Change the LSM network hooks to pass flowi_common structs instead
of the parent flowi struct as the LSMs do not currently need the
full flowi struct and they do not have enough information to use it
safely (missing information on the address family).
This patch was discussed both with Herbert Xu (representing team
netdev) and James Morris (representing team
LSMs-other-than-SELinux).
- Fix how we handle errors in inode_doinit_with_dentry() so that we
attempt to properly label the inode on following lookups instead of
continuing to treat it as unlabeled.
- Tweak the kernel logic around allowx, auditallowx, and dontauditx
SELinux policy statements such that the auditx/dontauditx are
effective even without the allowx statement.
Everything passes our test suite"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks
selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct
selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling
selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowx
selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A small set of audit patches for v5.11 with four patches in total and
only one of any real significance.
Richard's patch to trigger accompanying records causes the kernel to
emit additional related records when an audit event occurs; helping
provide some much needed context to events in the audit log. It is
also worth mentioning that this is a revised patch based on an earlier
attempt that had to be reverted in the v5.8 time frame.
Everything passes our test suite, and with no problems reported please
merge this for v5.11"
* tag 'audit-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: replace atomic_add_return()
audit: fix macros warnings
audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules present
audit: fix a kernel-doc markup
Strangely I hadn't had noticed the existence of the list_entry_is_head()
in apparmor code when added the same one in the list.h. Luckily it's
fully identical and didn't break builds. In any case we don't need a
duplicate anymore, thus remove it from apparmor code.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201208100639.88182-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Fixes: e130816164 ("include/linux/list.h: add a macro to test if entry is pointing to the head")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E . Hallyn " <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Core:
- support "prefer busy polling" NAPI operation mode, where we defer softirq
for some time expecting applications to periodically busy poll
- AF_XDP: improve efficiency by more batching and hindering
the adjacency cache prefetcher
- af_packet: make packet_fanout.arr size configurable up to 64K
- tcp: optimize TCP zero copy receive in presence of partial or unaligned
reads making zero copy a performance win for much smaller messages
- XDP: add bulk APIs for returning / freeing frames
- sched: support fragmenting IP packets as they come out of conntrack
- net: allow virtual netdevs to forward UDP L4 and fraglist GSO skbs
BPF:
- BPF switch from crude rlimit-based to memcg-based memory accounting
- BPF type format information for kernel modules and related tracing
enhancements
- BPF implement task local storage for BPF LSM
- allow the FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing programs to use bpf_sk_storage
Protocols:
- mptcp: improve multiple xmit streams support, memory accounting and
many smaller improvements
- TLS: support CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher
- seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT4/DT6 behavior
- sctp: Implement RFC 6951: UDP Encapsulation of SCTP
- ppp_generic: add ability to bridge channels directly
- bridge: Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) support as is defined in
IEEE 802.1Q section 12.14.
Drivers:
- mlx5: make use of the new auxiliary bus to organize the driver internals
- mlx5: more accurate port TX timestamping support
- mlxsw:
- improve the efficiency of offloaded next hop updates by using
the new nexthop object API
- support blackhole nexthops
- support IEEE 802.1ad (Q-in-Q) bridging
- rtw88: major bluetooth co-existance improvements
- iwlwifi: support new 6 GHz frequency band
- ath11k: Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS)
- mt7915: dual band concurrent (DBDC) support
- net: ipa: add basic support for IPA v4.5
Refactor:
- a few pieces of in_interrupt() cleanup work from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
- phy: add support for shared interrupts; get rid of multiple driver
APIs and have the drivers write a full IRQ handler, slight growth
of driver code should be compensated by the simpler API which
also allows shared IRQs
- add common code for handling netdev per-cpu counters
- move TX packet re-allocation from Ethernet switch tag drivers to
a central place
- improve efficiency and rename nla_strlcpy
- number of W=1 warning cleanups as we now catch those in a patchwork
build bot
Old code removal:
- wan: delete the DLCI / SDLA drivers
- wimax: move to staging
- wifi: remove old WDS wifi bridging support
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- support "prefer busy polling" NAPI operation mode, where we defer
softirq for some time expecting applications to periodically busy
poll
- AF_XDP: improve efficiency by more batching and hindering the
adjacency cache prefetcher
- af_packet: make packet_fanout.arr size configurable up to 64K
- tcp: optimize TCP zero copy receive in presence of partial or
unaligned reads making zero copy a performance win for much smaller
messages
- XDP: add bulk APIs for returning / freeing frames
- sched: support fragmenting IP packets as they come out of conntrack
- net: allow virtual netdevs to forward UDP L4 and fraglist GSO skbs
BPF:
- BPF switch from crude rlimit-based to memcg-based memory accounting
- BPF type format information for kernel modules and related tracing
enhancements
- BPF implement task local storage for BPF LSM
- allow the FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing programs to use
bpf_sk_storage
Protocols:
- mptcp: improve multiple xmit streams support, memory accounting and
many smaller improvements
- TLS: support CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher
- seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT4/DT6 behavior
- sctp: Implement RFC 6951: UDP Encapsulation of SCTP
- ppp_generic: add ability to bridge channels directly
- bridge: Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) support as is defined
in IEEE 802.1Q section 12.14.
Drivers:
- mlx5: make use of the new auxiliary bus to organize the driver
internals
- mlx5: more accurate port TX timestamping support
- mlxsw:
- improve the efficiency of offloaded next hop updates by using
the new nexthop object API
- support blackhole nexthops
- support IEEE 802.1ad (Q-in-Q) bridging
- rtw88: major bluetooth co-existance improvements
- iwlwifi: support new 6 GHz frequency band
- ath11k: Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS)
- mt7915: dual band concurrent (DBDC) support
- net: ipa: add basic support for IPA v4.5
Refactor:
- a few pieces of in_interrupt() cleanup work from Sebastian Andrzej
Siewior
- phy: add support for shared interrupts; get rid of multiple driver
APIs and have the drivers write a full IRQ handler, slight growth
of driver code should be compensated by the simpler API which also
allows shared IRQs
- add common code for handling netdev per-cpu counters
- move TX packet re-allocation from Ethernet switch tag drivers to a
central place
- improve efficiency and rename nla_strlcpy
- number of W=1 warning cleanups as we now catch those in a patchwork
build bot
Old code removal:
- wan: delete the DLCI / SDLA drivers
- wimax: move to staging
- wifi: remove old WDS wifi bridging support"
* tag 'net-next-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1922 commits)
net: hns3: fix expression that is currently always true
net: fix proc_fs init handling in af_packet and tls
nfc: pn533: convert comma to semicolon
af_vsock: Assign the vsock transport considering the vsock address flags
af_vsock: Set VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST flag on the receive path
vsock_addr: Check for supported flag values
vm_sockets: Add VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST vsock flag
vm_sockets: Add flags field in the vsock address data structure
net: Disable NETIF_F_HW_TLS_TX when HW_CSUM is disabled
tcp: Add logic to check for SYN w/ data in tcp_simple_retransmit
net: mscc: ocelot: install MAC addresses in .ndo_set_rx_mode from process context
nfc: s3fwrn5: Release the nfc firmware
net: vxget: clean up sparse warnings
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Use eXtended mezzanine to offload IPv4 router
mlxsw: spectrum: Set KVH XLT cache mode for Spectrum2/3
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Introduce basic XM cache flushing
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache Enable Register
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache ML Delete Register
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Implement L-value tracking for M-index
mlxsw: reg: Add XM Router M Table Register
...
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add speed testing on 1420-byte blocks for networking
Algorithms:
- Improve performance of chacha on ARM for network packets
- Improve performance of aegis128 on ARM for network packets
Drivers:
- Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
- Add support for QAT 4xxx devices
- Enable crypto-engine retry mechanism in caam
- Enable support for crypto engine on sdm845 in qce
- Add HiSilicon PRNG driver support"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (161 commits)
crypto: qat - add capability detection logic in qat_4xxx
crypto: qat - add AES-XTS support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: qat - add AES-CTR support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: atmel-i2c - select CONFIG_BITREVERSE
crypto: hisilicon/trng - replace atomic_add_return()
crypto: keembay - Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
dt-bindings: Add Keem Bay OCS AES bindings
crypto: aegis128 - avoid spurious references crypto_aegis128_update_simd
crypto: seed - remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: x86/sha512 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: aesni - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: cpt - Fix sparse warnings in cptpf
hwrng: ks-sa - Add dependency on IOMEM and OF
crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file
crypto: arm/aes-ce - work around Cortex-A57/A72 silion errata
crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()
crypto: ccree - rework cache parameters handling
crypto: cavium - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
crypto: marvell/octeontx - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
...
cap_convert_nscap() does permission checking as well as conversion of the
xattr value conditionally based on fs's user-ns.
This is needed by overlayfs and probably other layered fs (ecryptfs) and is
what vfs_foo() is supposed to do anyway.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2020-12-12
Just one patch this time:
1) Redact the SA keys with kernel lockdown confidentiality.
If enabled, no secret keys are sent to uuserspace.
From Antony Antony.
* 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next:
xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201212085737.2101294-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2020-12-03
The main changes are:
1) Support BTF in kernel modules, from Andrii.
2) Introduce preferred busy-polling, from Björn.
3) bpf_ima_inode_hash() and bpf_bprm_opts_set() helpers, from KP Singh.
4) Memcg-based memory accounting for bpf objects, from Roman.
5) Allow bpf_{s,g}etsockopt from cgroup bind{4,6} hooks, from Stanislav.
* https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (118 commits)
selftests/bpf: Fix invalid use of strncat in test_sockmap
libbpf: Use memcpy instead of strncpy to please GCC
selftests/bpf: Add fentry/fexit/fmod_ret selftest for kernel module
selftests/bpf: Add tp_btf CO-RE reloc test for modules
libbpf: Support attachment of BPF tracing programs to kernel modules
libbpf: Factor out low-level BPF program loading helper
bpf: Allow to specify kernel module BTFs when attaching BPF programs
bpf: Remove hard-coded btf_vmlinux assumption from BPF verifier
selftests/bpf: Add CO-RE relocs selftest relying on kernel module BTF
selftests/bpf: Add support for marking sub-tests as skipped
selftests/bpf: Add bpf_testmod kernel module for testing
libbpf: Add kernel module BTF support for CO-RE relocations
libbpf: Refactor CO-RE relocs to not assume a single BTF object
libbpf: Add internal helper to load BTF data by FD
bpf: Keep module's btf_data_size intact after load
bpf: Fix bpf_put_raw_tracepoint()'s use of __module_address()
selftests/bpf: Add Userspace tests for TCP_WINDOW_CLAMP
bpf: Adds support for setting window clamp
samples/bpf: Fix spelling mistake "recieving" -> "receiving"
bpf: Fix cold build of test_progs-no_alu32
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201204021936.85653-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const'
qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the
'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function
expects a 'struct sock *'.
However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to
security_inet_conn_request instead.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Commit a408e4a86b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
permissions") already introduced a second open to measure a file when the
original file descriptor does not allow it. However, it didn't remove the
existing method of changing the mode of the original file descriptor, which
is still necessary if the current process does not have enough privileges
to open a new one.
Changing the mode isn't really an option, as the filesystem might need to
do preliminary steps to make the read possible. Thus, this patch removes
the code and keeps the second open as the only option to measure a file
when it is unreadable with the original file descriptor.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.20.x: 0014cc04e8 ima: Set file->f_mode
Fixes: 2fe5d6def1 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Since tomoyo_memory_ok() will check for null pointer returned by
kzalloc() in tomoyo_assign_profile(), tomoyo_assign_namespace(),
tomoyo_get_name() and tomoyo_commit_ok(), then emit OOM warnings
if needed. And this is the expected behavior as informed by
Tetsuo Handa.
Let's add __GFP_NOWARN to kzalloc() in those related functions.
Besides, to achieve this goal, remove the null check for entry
right after kzalloc() in tomoyo_assign_namespace().
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
redact XFRM SA secret in the netlink response to xfrm_get_sa()
or dumpall sa.
Enable lockdown, confidentiality mode, at boot or at run time.
e.g. when enabled:
cat /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
none integrity [confidentiality]
ip xfrm state
src 172.16.1.200 dst 172.16.1.100
proto esp spi 0x00000002 reqid 2 mode tunnel
replay-window 0
aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 96
note: the aead secret is redacted.
Redacting secret is also a FIPS 140-2 requirement.
v1->v2
- add size checks before memset calls
v2->v3
- replace spaces with tabs for consistency
v3->v4
- use kernel lockdown instead of a /proc setting
v4->v5
- remove kconfig option
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
This is in preparation to add a helper for BPF LSM programs to use
IMA hashes when attached to LSM hooks. There are LSM hooks like
inode_unlink which do not have a struct file * argument and cannot
use the existing ima_file_hash API.
An inode based API is, therefore, useful in LSM based detections like an
executable trying to delete itself which rely on the inode_unlink LSM
hook.
Moreover, the ima_file_hash function does nothing with the struct file
pointer apart from calling file_inode on it and converting it to an
inode.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201124151210.1081188-2-kpsingh@chromium.org
As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do
not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi
struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol
specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers
to the address family independent flowi_common struct.
Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning
by explicitly adding a break statement instead of letting the code fall
through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Provide the proposed description (add key) or the original description
(update/instantiate key) when preparsing a key so that the key type can
validate it against the data.
This is important for rxrpc server keys as we need to check that they have
the right amount of key material present - and it's better to do that when
the key is loaded rather than deep in trying to process a response packet.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
The default IMA template used for all policy rules is the value set
for CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE if the policy rule does not specify
a template. The default IMA template for buffer measurements should be
'ima-buf' - so that the measured buffer is correctly included in the IMA
measurement log entry.
With the default template format, buffer measurements are added to
the measurement list, but do not include the buffer data, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to validate. Including 'ima-buf'
template records in the measurement list by default, should not impact
existing attestation servers without 'ima-buf' template support.
Initialize a global 'ima-buf' template and select that template,
by default, for buffer measurements.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This varible isn't used and can be removed to avoid a gcc warning:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3873:6: warning: variable ‘rc’ set but not
used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to make sure we return an error code when an
allocation fails. It passes all of our tests, but given the nature of
the patch that isn't surprising"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: Fix error return code in sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow()
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2020-11-14
1) Add BTF generation for kernel modules and extend BTF infra in kernel
e.g. support for split BTF loading and validation, from Andrii Nakryiko.
2) Support for pointers beyond pkt_end to recognize LLVM generated patterns
on inlined branch conditions, from Alexei Starovoitov.
3) Implements bpf_local_storage for task_struct for BPF LSM, from KP Singh.
4) Enable FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing program to use the bpf_sk_storage
infra, from Martin KaFai Lau.
5) Add XDP bulk APIs that introduce a defer/flush mechanism to optimize the
XDP_REDIRECT path, from Lorenzo Bianconi.
6) Fix a potential (although rather theoretical) deadlock of hashtab in NMI
context, from Song Liu.
7) Fixes for cross and out-of-tree build of bpftool and runqslower allowing build
for different target archs on same source tree, from Jean-Philippe Brucker.
8) Fix error path in htab_map_alloc() triggered from syzbot, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Move functionality from test_tcpbpf_user into the test_progs framework so it
can run in BPF CI, from Alexander Duyck.
10) Lift hashtab key_size limit to be larger than MAX_BPF_STACK, from Florian Lehner.
Note that for the fix from Song we have seen a sparse report on context
imbalance which requires changes in sparse itself for proper annotation
detection where this is currently being discussed on linux-sparse among
developers [0]. Once we have more clarification/guidance after their fix,
Song will follow-up.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sparse/CAHk-=wh4bx8A8dHnX612MsDO13st6uzAz1mJ1PaHHVevJx_ZCw@mail.gmail.com/T/https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sparse/20201109221345.uklbp3lzgq6g42zb@ltop.local/T/
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (66 commits)
net: mlx5: Add xdp tx return bulking support
net: mvpp2: Add xdp tx return bulking support
net: mvneta: Add xdp tx return bulking support
net: page_pool: Add bulk support for ptr_ring
net: xdp: Introduce bulking for xdp tx return path
bpf: Expose bpf_d_path helper to sleepable LSM hooks
bpf: Augment the set of sleepable LSM hooks
bpf: selftest: Use bpf_sk_storage in FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP
bpf: Allow using bpf_sk_storage in FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP
bpf: Rename some functions in bpf_sk_storage
bpf: Folding omem_charge() into sk_storage_charge()
selftests/bpf: Add asm tests for pkt vs pkt_end comparison.
selftests/bpf: Add skb_pkt_end test
bpf: Support for pointers beyond pkt_end.
tools/bpf: Always run the *-clean recipes
tools/bpf: Add bootstrap/ to .gitignore
bpf: Fix NULL dereference in bpf_task_storage
tools/bpftool: Fix build slowdown
tools/runqslower: Build bpftool using HOSTCC
tools/runqslower: Enable out-of-tree build
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201114020819.29584-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The are some kernel-doc interface issues:
security/smack/smackfs.c:1950: warning: Function parameter or member
'list' not described in 'smk_parse_label_list'
security/smack/smackfs.c:1950: warning: Excess function parameter
'private' description in 'smk_parse_label_list'
security/smack/smackfs.c:1979: warning: Function parameter or member
'list' not described in 'smk_destroy_label_list'
security/smack/smackfs.c:1979: warning: Excess function parameter 'head'
description in 'smk_destroy_label_list'
security/smack/smackfs.c:2141: warning: Function parameter or member
'count' not described in 'smk_read_logging'
security/smack/smackfs.c:2141: warning: Excess function parameter 'cn'
description in 'smk_read_logging'
security/smack/smackfs.c:2278: warning: Function parameter or member
'format' not described in 'smk_user_access'
Correct them in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling case
instead of 0 in function sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(), as done elsewhere
in this function.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 409dcf3153 ("selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhou <chenzhou10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It appears to have been needed for selinux_complete_init() in the past,
but today it's useless.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Similar to bpf_local_storage for sockets and inodes add local storage
for task_struct.
The life-cycle of storage is managed with the life-cycle of the
task_struct. i.e. the storage is destroyed along with the owning task
with a callback to the bpf_task_storage_free from the task_free LSM
hook.
The BPF LSM allocates an __rcu pointer to the bpf_local_storage in
the security blob which are now stackable and can co-exist with other
LSMs.
The userspace map operations can be done by using a pid fd as a key
passed to the lookup, update and delete operations.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201106103747.2780972-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
Move the x86 IMA arch code into security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c,
so that we will be able to wire it up for arm64 in a future patch.
Co-developed-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
A previous fix, commit 83370b31a9 ("selinux: fix error initialization
in inode_doinit_with_dentry()"), changed how failures were handled
before a SELinux policy was loaded. Unfortunately that patch was
potentially problematic for two reasons: it set the isec->initialized
state without holding a lock, and it didn't set the inode's SELinux
label to the "default" for the particular filesystem. The later can
be a problem if/when a later attempt to revalidate the inode fails
and SELinux reverts to the existing inode label.
This patch should restore the default inode labeling that existed
before the original fix, without affecting the LABEL_INVALID marking
such that revalidation will still be attempted in the future.
Fixes: 83370b31a9 ("selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()")
Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since wildcards that need recursion consume kernel stack memory (or might
cause CPU stall warning problem), we cannot allow infinite recursion.
Since TOMOYO 1.8 survived with 20 recursions limit for 5 years, nobody
would complain if applying this limit to TOMOYO 2.6.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Chester reports that it is necessary to introduce a new way to pass
the EFI secure boot status between the EFI stub and the core kernel
on ARM systems. The usual way of obtaining this information is by
checking the SecureBoot and SetupMode EFI variables, but this can
only be done after the EFI variable workqueue is created, which
occurs in a subsys_initcall(), whereas arch_ima_get_secureboot()
is called much earlier by the IMA framework.
However, the IMA framework itself is started as a late_initcall,
and the only reason the call to arch_ima_get_secureboot() occurs
so early is because it happens in the context of a __setup()
callback that parses the ima_appraise= command line parameter.
So let's refactor this code a little bit, by using a core_param()
callback to capture the command line argument, and deferring any
reasoning based on its contents to the IMA init routine.
Cc: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20200904072905.25332-2-clin@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [missing core_param()]
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: included linux/module.h]
Tested-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
clang warns about additions on NULL pointers being undefined in C:
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c:226:59: warning: arithmetic on a null pointer treated as a cast from integer to pointer is a GNU extension [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key,
Change the code to instead use a cast through uintptr_t to avoid
the warning.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
This allows for dontauditing very specific ioctls e.g. TCGETS without
dontauditing every ioctl or granting additional permissions.
Now either an allowx, dontauditx or auditallowx rules enables checking
for extended permissions.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Hettwer <j2468h@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Mark the inode security label as invalid if we cannot find
a dentry so that we will retry later rather than marking it
initialized with the unlabeled SID.
Fixes: 9287aed2ad ("selinux: Convert isec->lock into a spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Tianyue Ren <rentianyue@kylinos.cn>
[PM: minor comment tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When there are no audit rules registered, mandatory records (config,
etc.) are missing their accompanying records (syscall, proctitle, etc.).
This is due to audit context dummy set on syscall entry based on absence
of rules that signals that no other records are to be printed. Clear the dummy
bit if any record is generated, open coding this in audit_log_start().
The proctitle context and dummy checks are pointless since the
proctitle record will not be printed if no syscall records are printed.
The fds array is reset to -1 after the first syscall to indicate it
isn't valid any more, but was never set to -1 when the context was
allocated to indicate it wasn't yet valid.
Check ctx->pwd in audit_log_name().
The audit_inode* functions can be called without going through
getname_flags() or getname_kernel() that sets audit_names and cwd, so
set the cwd in audit_alloc_name() if it has not already been done so due to
audit_names being valid and purge all other audit_getcwd() calls.
Revert the LSM dump_common_audit_data() LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* cases from the
ghak96 patch since they are no longer necessary due to cwd coverage in
audit_alloc_name().
Thanks to bauen1 <j2468h@googlemail.com> for reporting LSM situations in
which context->cwd is not valid, inadvertantly fixed by the ghak96 patch.
Please see upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/120
This is also related to upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'safesetid-5.10' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux
Pull SafeSetID updates from Micah Morton:
"The changes are mostly contained to within the SafeSetID LSM, with the
exception of a few 1-line changes to change some ns_capable() calls to
ns_capable_setid() -- causing a flag (CAP_OPT_INSETID) to be set that
is examined by SafeSetID code and nothing else in the kernel.
The changes to SafeSetID internally allow for setting up GID
transition security policies, as already existed for UIDs"
* tag 'safesetid-5.10' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: Fix warnings reported by test bot
LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling
LSM: Signal to SafeSetID when setting group IDs
A previous commit changed the notification mode from true/false to an
int, allowing notify-no, notify-yes, or signal-notify. This was
backwards compatible in the sense that any existing true/false user
would translate to either 0 (on notification sent) or 1, the latter
which mapped to TWA_RESUME. TWA_SIGNAL was assigned a value of 2.
Clean this up properly, and define a proper enum for the notification
mode. Now we have:
- TWA_NONE. This is 0, same as before the original change, meaning no
notification requested.
- TWA_RESUME. This is 1, same as before the original change, meaning
that we use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.
- TWA_SIGNAL. This uses TIF_SIGPENDING/JOBCTL_TASK_WORK for the
notification.
Clean up all the callers, switching their 0/1/false/true to using the
appropriate TWA_* mode for notifications.
Fixes: e91b481623 ("task_work: teach task_work_add() to do signal_wake_up()")
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Add redirect_neigh() BPF packet redirect helper, allowing to limit stack
traversal in common container configs and improving TCP back-pressure.
Daniel reports ~10Gbps => ~15Gbps single stream TCP performance gain.
Expand netlink policy support and improve policy export to user space.
(Ge)netlink core performs request validation according to declared
policies. Expand the expressiveness of those policies (min/max length
and bitmasks). Allow dumping policies for particular commands.
This is used for feature discovery by user space (instead of kernel
version parsing or trial and error).
Support IGMPv3/MLDv2 multicast listener discovery protocols in bridge.
Allow more than 255 IPv4 multicast interfaces.
Add support for Type of Service (ToS) reflection in SYN/SYN-ACK
packets of TCPv6.
In Multi-patch TCP (MPTCP) support concurrent transmission of data
on multiple subflows in a load balancing scenario. Enhance advertising
addresses via the RM_ADDR/ADD_ADDR options.
Support SMC-Dv2 version of SMC, which enables multi-subnet deployments.
Allow more calls to same peer in RxRPC.
Support two new Controller Area Network (CAN) protocols -
CAN-FD and ISO 15765-2:2016.
Add xfrm/IPsec compat layer, solving the 32bit user space on 64bit
kernel problem.
Add TC actions for implementing MPLS L2 VPNs.
Improve nexthop code - e.g. handle various corner cases when nexthop
objects are removed from groups better, skip unnecessary notifications
and make it easier to offload nexthops into HW by converting
to a blocking notifier.
Support adding and consuming TCP header options by BPF programs,
opening the doors for easy experimental and deployment-specific
TCP option use.
Reorganize TCP congestion control (CC) initialization to simplify life
of TCP CC implemented in BPF.
Add support for shipping BPF programs with the kernel and loading them
early on boot via the User Mode Driver mechanism, hence reusing all the
user space infra we have.
Support sleepable BPF programs, initially targeting LSM and tracing.
Add bpf_d_path() helper for returning full path for given 'struct path'.
Make bpf_tail_call compatible with bpf-to-bpf calls.
Allow BPF programs to call map_update_elem on sockmaps.
Add BPF Type Format (BTF) support for type and enum discovery, as
well as support for using BTF within the kernel itself (current use
is for pretty printing structures).
Support listing and getting information about bpf_links via the bpf
syscall.
Enhance kernel interfaces around NIC firmware update. Allow specifying
overwrite mask to control if settings etc. are reset during update;
report expected max time operation may take to users; support firmware
activation without machine reboot incl. limits of how much impact
reset may have (e.g. dropping link or not).
Extend ethtool configuration interface to report IEEE-standard
counters, to limit the need for per-vendor logic in user space.
Adopt or extend devlink use for debug, monitoring, fw update
in many drivers (dsa loop, ice, ionic, sja1105, qed, mlxsw,
mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-eth).
In mlxsw expose critical and emergency SFP module temperature alarms.
Refactor port buffer handling to make the defaults more suitable and
support setting these values explicitly via the DCBNL interface.
Add XDP support for Intel's igb driver.
Support offloading TC flower classification and filtering rules to
mscc_ocelot switches.
Add PTP support for Marvell Octeontx2 and PP2.2 hardware, as well as
fixed interval period pulse generator and one-step timestamping in
dpaa-eth.
Add support for various auth offloads in WiFi APs, e.g. SAE (WPA3)
offload.
Add Lynx PHY/PCS MDIO module, and convert various drivers which have
this HW to use it. Convert mvpp2 to split PCS.
Support Marvell Prestera 98DX3255 24-port switch ASICs, as well as
7-port Mediatek MT7531 IP.
Add initial support for QCA6390 and IPQ6018 in ath11k WiFi driver,
and wcn3680 support in wcn36xx.
Improve performance for packets which don't require much offloads
on recent Mellanox NICs by 20% by making multiple packets share
a descriptor entry.
Move chelsio inline crypto drivers (for TLS and IPsec) from the crypto
subtree to drivers/net. Move MDIO drivers out of the phy directory.
Clean up a lot of W=1 warnings, reportedly the actively developed
subsections of networking drivers should now build W=1 warning free.
Make sure drivers don't use in_interrupt() to dynamically adapt their
code. Convert tasklets to use new tasklet_setup API (sadly this
conversion is not yet complete).
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
- Add redirect_neigh() BPF packet redirect helper, allowing to limit
stack traversal in common container configs and improving TCP
back-pressure.
Daniel reports ~10Gbps => ~15Gbps single stream TCP performance gain.
- Expand netlink policy support and improve policy export to user
space. (Ge)netlink core performs request validation according to
declared policies. Expand the expressiveness of those policies
(min/max length and bitmasks). Allow dumping policies for particular
commands. This is used for feature discovery by user space (instead
of kernel version parsing or trial and error).
- Support IGMPv3/MLDv2 multicast listener discovery protocols in
bridge.
- Allow more than 255 IPv4 multicast interfaces.
- Add support for Type of Service (ToS) reflection in SYN/SYN-ACK
packets of TCPv6.
- In Multi-patch TCP (MPTCP) support concurrent transmission of data on
multiple subflows in a load balancing scenario. Enhance advertising
addresses via the RM_ADDR/ADD_ADDR options.
- Support SMC-Dv2 version of SMC, which enables multi-subnet
deployments.
- Allow more calls to same peer in RxRPC.
- Support two new Controller Area Network (CAN) protocols - CAN-FD and
ISO 15765-2:2016.
- Add xfrm/IPsec compat layer, solving the 32bit user space on 64bit
kernel problem.
- Add TC actions for implementing MPLS L2 VPNs.
- Improve nexthop code - e.g. handle various corner cases when nexthop
objects are removed from groups better, skip unnecessary
notifications and make it easier to offload nexthops into HW by
converting to a blocking notifier.
- Support adding and consuming TCP header options by BPF programs,
opening the doors for easy experimental and deployment-specific TCP
option use.
- Reorganize TCP congestion control (CC) initialization to simplify
life of TCP CC implemented in BPF.
- Add support for shipping BPF programs with the kernel and loading
them early on boot via the User Mode Driver mechanism, hence reusing
all the user space infra we have.
- Support sleepable BPF programs, initially targeting LSM and tracing.
- Add bpf_d_path() helper for returning full path for given 'struct
path'.
- Make bpf_tail_call compatible with bpf-to-bpf calls.
- Allow BPF programs to call map_update_elem on sockmaps.
- Add BPF Type Format (BTF) support for type and enum discovery, as
well as support for using BTF within the kernel itself (current use
is for pretty printing structures).
- Support listing and getting information about bpf_links via the bpf
syscall.
- Enhance kernel interfaces around NIC firmware update. Allow
specifying overwrite mask to control if settings etc. are reset
during update; report expected max time operation may take to users;
support firmware activation without machine reboot incl. limits of
how much impact reset may have (e.g. dropping link or not).
- Extend ethtool configuration interface to report IEEE-standard
counters, to limit the need for per-vendor logic in user space.
- Adopt or extend devlink use for debug, monitoring, fw update in many
drivers (dsa loop, ice, ionic, sja1105, qed, mlxsw, mv88e6xxx,
dpaa2-eth).
- In mlxsw expose critical and emergency SFP module temperature alarms.
Refactor port buffer handling to make the defaults more suitable and
support setting these values explicitly via the DCBNL interface.
- Add XDP support for Intel's igb driver.
- Support offloading TC flower classification and filtering rules to
mscc_ocelot switches.
- Add PTP support for Marvell Octeontx2 and PP2.2 hardware, as well as
fixed interval period pulse generator and one-step timestamping in
dpaa-eth.
- Add support for various auth offloads in WiFi APs, e.g. SAE (WPA3)
offload.
- Add Lynx PHY/PCS MDIO module, and convert various drivers which have
this HW to use it. Convert mvpp2 to split PCS.
- Support Marvell Prestera 98DX3255 24-port switch ASICs, as well as
7-port Mediatek MT7531 IP.
- Add initial support for QCA6390 and IPQ6018 in ath11k WiFi driver,
and wcn3680 support in wcn36xx.
- Improve performance for packets which don't require much offloads on
recent Mellanox NICs by 20% by making multiple packets share a
descriptor entry.
- Move chelsio inline crypto drivers (for TLS and IPsec) from the
crypto subtree to drivers/net. Move MDIO drivers out of the phy
directory.
- Clean up a lot of W=1 warnings, reportedly the actively developed
subsections of networking drivers should now build W=1 warning free.
- Make sure drivers don't use in_interrupt() to dynamically adapt their
code. Convert tasklets to use new tasklet_setup API (sadly this
conversion is not yet complete).
* tag 'net-next-5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2583 commits)
Revert "bpfilter: Fix build error with CONFIG_BPFILTER_UMH"
net, sockmap: Don't call bpf_prog_put() on NULL pointer
bpf, selftest: Fix flaky tcp_hdr_options test when adding addr to lo
bpf, sockmap: Add locking annotations to iterator
netfilter: nftables: allow re-computing sctp CRC-32C in 'payload' statements
net: fix pos incrementment in ipv6_route_seq_next
net/smc: fix invalid return code in smcd_new_buf_create()
net/smc: fix valid DMBE buffer sizes
net/smc: fix use-after-free of delayed events
bpfilter: Fix build error with CONFIG_BPFILTER_UMH
cxgb4/ch_ipsec: Replace the module name to ch_ipsec from chcr
net: sched: Fix suspicious RCU usage while accessing tcf_tunnel_info
bpf: Fix register equivalence tracking.
rxrpc: Fix loss of final ack on shutdown
rxrpc: Fix bundle counting for exclusive connections
netfilter: restore NF_INET_NUMHOOKS
ibmveth: Identify ingress large send packets.
ibmveth: Switch order of ibmveth_helper calls.
cxgb4: handle 4-tuple PEDIT to NAT mode translation
selftests: Add VRF route leaking tests
...
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Continuing IMA policy rule cleanup and validation in particular for
measuring keys, adding/removing/updating informational and error
messages (e.g. "ima_appraise" boot command line option), and other bug
fixes (e.g. minimal data size validation before use, return code and
NULL pointer checking)"
* tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash
evm: Check size of security.evm before using it
ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()
ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpy
integrity: include keyring name for unknown key request
ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise
integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback
ima: add check for enforced appraise option
integrity: Use current_uid() in integrity_audit_message()
ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable
ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule
Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (396 commits)
binder: fix UAF when releasing todo list
docs: w1: w1_therm: Fix broken xref, mistakes, clarify text
misc: Kconfig: fix a HISI_HIKEY_USB dependency
LSM: Fix type of id parameter in kernel_post_load_data prototype
misc: Kconfig: add a new dependency for HISI_HIKEY_USB
firmware_loader: fix a kernel-doc markup
w1: w1_therm: make w1_poll_completion static
binder: simplify the return expression of binder_mmap
test_firmware: Test partial read support
firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf()
firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv
fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads
IMA: Add support for file reads without contents
LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data()
firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument
fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201012' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A decent number of SELinux patches for v5.10, twenty two in total. The
highlights are listed below, but all of the patches pass our test
suite and merge cleanly.
- A number of changes to how the SELinux policy is loaded and managed
inside the kernel with the goal of improving the atomicity of a
SELinux policy load operation.
These changes account for the bulk of the diffstat as well as the
patch count. A special thanks to everyone who contributed patches
and fixes for this work.
- Convert the SELinux policy read-write lock to RCU.
- A tracepoint was added for audited SELinux access control events;
this should help provide a more unified backtrace across kernel and
userspace.
- Allow the removal of security.selinux xattrs when a SELinux policy
is not loaded.
- Enable policy capabilities in SELinux policies created with the
scripts/selinux/mdp tool.
- Provide some "no sooner than" dates for the SELinux checkreqprot
sysfs deprecation"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201012' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (22 commits)
selinux: provide a "no sooner than" date for the checkreqprot removal
selinux: Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot
selinux: access policycaps with READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE
selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()
selinux: move policy mutex to selinux_state, use in lockdep checks
selinux: fix error handling bugs in security_load_policy()
selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU
selinux: delete repeated words in comments
selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events
selinux: add tracepoint on audited events
selinux: Create new booleans and class dirs out of tree
selinux: Standardize string literal usage for selinuxfs directory names
selinux: Refactor selinuxfs directory populating functions
selinux: Create function for selinuxfs directory cleanup
selinux: permit removing security.selinux xattr before policy load
selinux: fix memdup.cocci warnings
selinux: avoid dereferencing the policy prior to initialization
selinux: fix allocation failure check on newpolicy->sidtab
selinux: refactor changing booleans
selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs
...
Two kernel test robot suggested clean-ups.
Teach Smack to use the IPv4 netlabel cache.
This results in a 12-14% improvement on TCP benchmarks.
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.10' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Two minor fixes and one performance enhancement to Smack. The
performance improvement is significant and the new code is more like
its counterpart in SELinux.
- Two kernel test robot suggested clean-ups.
- Teach Smack to use the IPv4 netlabel cache. This results in a
12-14% improvement on TCP benchmarks"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.10' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: Remove unnecessary variable initialization
Smack: Fix build when NETWORK_SECMARK is not set
Smack: Use the netlabel cache
Smack: Set socket labels only once
Smack: Consolidate uses of secmark into a function
Fix multiple cast-to-union warnings related to casting kuid_t and kgid_t
types to kid_t union type. Also fix incompatible type warning that
arises from accidental omission of "__rcu" qualifier on the struct
setid_ruleset pointer in the argument list for safesetid_file_read().
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
The SafeSetID LSM has functionality for restricting setuid() calls based
on its configured security policies. This patch adds the analogous
functionality for setgid() calls. This is mostly a copy-and-paste change
with some code deduplication, plus slight modifications/name changes to
the policy-rule-related structs (now contain GID rules in addition to
the UID ones) and some type generalization since SafeSetID now needs to
deal with kgid_t and kuid_t types.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Allow DRBG testing through user-space af_alg
- Add tcrypt speed testing support for keyed hashes
- Add type-safe init/exit hooks for ahash
Algorithms:
- Mark arc4 as obsolete and pending for future removal
- Mark anubis, khazad, sead and tea as obsolete
- Improve boot-time xor benchmark
- Add OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm and use it for integrity
Drivers:
- Fixes and enhancement for XTS in caam
- Add support for XIP8001B hwrng in xiphera-trng
- Add RNG and hash support in sun8i-ce/sun8i-ss
- Allow imx-rngc to be used by kernel entropy pool
- Use crypto engine in omap-sham
- Add support for Ingenic X1830 with ingenic"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (205 commits)
X.509: Fix modular build of public_key_sm2
crypto: xor - Remove unused variable count in do_xor_speed
X.509: fix error return value on the failed path
crypto: bcm - Verify GCM/CCM key length in setkey
crypto: qat - drop input parameter from adf_enable_aer()
crypto: qat - fix function parameters descriptions
crypto: atmel-tdes - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: drivers - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: mxc-rnga - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: stm32 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking
crypto: xor - defer load time benchmark to a later time
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uninitalized 'curr_qm_qp_num'
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the return value when device is busy
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix zero length input in GZIP decompress
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uncleared debug registers
lib/mpi: Fix unused variable warnings
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no effect
hwrng: npcm - modify readl to readb
...
Pull compat iovec cleanups from Al Viro:
"Christoph's series around import_iovec() and compat variant thereof"
* 'work.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
security/keys: remove compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov
mm: remove compat_process_vm_{readv,writev}
fs: remove compat_sys_vmsplice
fs: remove the compat readv/writev syscalls
fs: remove various compat readv/writev helpers
iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec
iov_iter: refactor rw_copy_check_uvector and import_iovec
iov_iter: move rw_copy_check_uvector() into lib/iov_iter.c
compat.h: fix a spelling error in <linux/compat.h>
- Preliminary RISC-V enablement - the bulk of it will arrive via the RISCV tree.
- Relax decompressed image placement rules for 32-bit ARM
- Add support for passing MOK certificate table contents via a config table
rather than a EFI variable.
- Add support for 18 bit DIMM row IDs in the CPER records.
- Work around broken Dell firmware that passes the entire Boot#### variable
contents as the command line
- Add definition of the EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO memory attribute so we can
identify it in the memory map listings.
- Don't abort the boot on arm64 if the EFI RNG protocol is available but
returns with an error
- Replace slashes with exclamation marks in efivarfs file names
- Split efi-pstore from the deprecated efivars sysfs code, so we can
disable the latter on !x86.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and updates.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'efi-core-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI changes from Ingo Molnar:
- Preliminary RISC-V enablement - the bulk of it will arrive via the
RISCV tree.
- Relax decompressed image placement rules for 32-bit ARM
- Add support for passing MOK certificate table contents via a config
table rather than a EFI variable.
- Add support for 18 bit DIMM row IDs in the CPER records.
- Work around broken Dell firmware that passes the entire Boot####
variable contents as the command line
- Add definition of the EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO memory attribute so we
can identify it in the memory map listings.
- Don't abort the boot on arm64 if the EFI RNG protocol is available
but returns with an error
- Replace slashes with exclamation marks in efivarfs file names
- Split efi-pstore from the deprecated efivars sysfs code, so we can
disable the latter on !x86.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and updates.
* tag 'efi-core-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
efi: mokvar: add missing include of asm/early_ioremap.h
efi: efivars: limit availability to X86 builds
efi: remove some false dependencies on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: gsmi: fix false dependency on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: efivars: un-export efivars_sysfs_init()
efi: pstore: move workqueue handling out of efivars
efi: pstore: disentangle from deprecated efivars module
efi: mokvar-table: fix some issues in new code
efi/arm64: libstub: Deal gracefully with EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL failure
efivarfs: Replace invalid slashes with exclamation marks in dentries.
efi: Delete deprecated parameter comments
efi/libstub: Fix missing-prototypes in string.c
efi: Add definition of EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO and ability to report it
cper,edac,efi: Memory Error Record: bank group/address and chip id
edac,ghes,cper: Add Row Extension to Memory Error Record
efi/x86: Add a quirk to support command line arguments on Dell EFI firmware
efi/libstub: Add efi_warn and *_once logging helpers
integrity: Load certs from the EFI MOK config table
integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routine
efi: Support for MOK variable config table
...
Since commit e2dc9bf3f5 ("umd: Transform fork_usermode_blob into
fork_usermode_driver") started calling execve() on a program written in
a local mount which is not connected to mount tree,
tomoyo_realpath_from_path() started returning a pathname in
"$fsname:/$pathname" format which violates TOMOYO's domainname rule that
it must start with "<$namespace>" followed by zero or more repetitions of
pathnames which start with '/'.
Since $fsname must not contain '.' since commit 79c0b2df79 ("add
filesystem subtype support"), tomoyo_correct_path() can recognize a token
which appears '/' before '.' appears (e.g. proc:/self/exe ) as a pathname
while rejecting a token which appears '.' before '/' appears (e.g.
exec.realpath="/bin/bash" ) as a condition parameter.
Therefore, accept domainnames which contain pathnames which do not start
with '/' but contain '/' before '.' (e.g. <kernel> tmpfs:/bpfilter_umh ).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
The initialization of rc in smack_from_netlbl() is pointless.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To perform partial reads, callers of kernel_read_file*() must have a
non-NULL file_size argument and a preallocated buffer. The new "offset"
argument can then be used to seek to specific locations in the file to
fill the buffer to, at most, "buf_size" per call.
Where possible, the LSM hooks can report whether a full file has been
read or not so that the contents can be reasoned about.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-14-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When the kernel_read_file LSM hook is called with contents=false, IMA
can appraise the file directly, without requiring a filled buffer. When
such a buffer is available, though, IMA can continue to use it instead
of forcing a double read here.
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706232309.12010-10-scott.branden@broadcom.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-13-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.
For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead
of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(),
and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a
security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected.
Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized
change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this:
return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size,
kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id),
read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK,
0, NULL);
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-10-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().
Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)
Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.
With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.
Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation for adding partial read support, add an optional output
argument to kernel_read_file*() that reports the file size so callers
can reason more easily about their reading progress.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-8-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation for further refactoring of kernel_read_file*(), rename
the "max_size" argument to the more accurate "buf_size", and correct
its type to size_t. Add kerndoc to explain the specifics of how the
arguments will be used. Note that with buf_size now size_t, it can no
longer be negative (and was never called with a negative value). Adjust
callers to use it as a "maximum size" when *buf is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-7-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
"size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
INT_MAX.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
Fixes: a098ecd2fa ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
Fixes: fd90bc559b ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
Fixes: 4f0496d8ff ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native version of
keyctl_instantiate_key_iov can be used for the compat case as well.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use in compat_syscall to import either native or the compat iovecs, and
remove the now superflous compat_import_iovec.
This removes the need for special compat logic in most callers, and
the remaining ones can still be simplified by using __import_iovec
with a bool compat parameter.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Two minor conflicts:
1) net/ipv4/route.c, adding a new local variable while
moving another local variable and removing it's
initial assignment.
2) drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz9477.c, overlapping changes.
One pretty prints the port mode differently, whilst another
changes the driver to try and obtain the port mode from
the port node rather than the switch node.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Use proper conditional compilation for the secmark field in
the network skb.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
ima_file_hash can be called when there is no iint->ima_hash available
even though the inode exists in the integrity cache. It is fairly
common for a file to not have a hash. (e.g. an mknodat, prior to the
file being closed).
Another example where this can happen (suggested by Jann Horn):
Process A does:
while(1) {
unlink("/tmp/imafoo");
fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0700);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("open");
continue;
}
write(fd, "A", 1);
close(fd);
}
and Process B does:
while (1) {
int fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
char *mapping = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
if (mapping != MAP_FAILED)
munmap(mapping, 0x1000);
close(fd);
}
Due to the race to get the iint->mutex between ima_file_hash and
process_measurement iint->ima_hash could still be NULL.
Fixes: 6beea7afcc ("ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile
variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of
the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate
list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass
the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for
this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation.
An EFI configuration table is a much more primitive mechanism
compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage
of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel.
This patch adds the support to load certs from the MokListRT
entry in the MOK variable configuration table, if it's present.
The pre-existing support to load certs from the MokListRT EFI
variable remains and is used if the EFI MOK configuration table
isn't present or can't be successfully used.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-4-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Move the loading of certs from the UEFI MokListRT into a separate
routine to facilitate additional MokList functionality.
There is no visible functional change as a result of this patch.
Although the UEFI dbx certs are now loaded before the MokList certs,
they are loaded onto different key rings. So the order of the keys
on their respective key rings is the same.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-3-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
checkreqprot data member in selinux_state struct is accessed directly by
SELinux functions to get and set. This could cause unexpected read or
write access to this data member due to compiler optimizations and/or
compiler's reordering of access to this field.
Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot data member in
selinux_state struct. These helper functions use READ_ONCE and
WRITE_ONCE macros to ensure atomic read or write of memory for
this data member.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183 ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch removes the unnecessary semicolon at the end of
ima_get_binary_runtime_size().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d158847ae8 ("ima: maintain memory size needed for serializing the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in
ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next
iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling
crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921 ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Utilize the Netlabel cache mechanism for incoming packet matching.
Refactor the initialization of secattr structures, as it was being
done in two places.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Refactor the IP send checks so that the netlabel value
is set only when necessary, not on every send. Some functions
get renamed as the changes made the old name misleading.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Add a function smack_from_skb() that returns the Smack label
identified by a network secmark. Replace the explicit uses of
the secmark with this function.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE for all accesses to the
selinux_state.policycaps booleans to prevent compiler
mischief.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Depending on the IMA policy rule a key may be searched for in multiple
keyrings (e.g. .ima and .platform) and possibly not found. This patch
improves feedback by including the keyring "description" (name) in the
error message.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Only emit an unknown/invalid message when setting the IMA appraise mode
to anything other than "enforce", when secureboot is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
THOBY Simon