Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2 of the license
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From what I can tell, it has never been used.
Mimi: This was introduced prior to Rusty's decision to use appended
signatures for kernel modules.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The patch refactors integrity_load_x509(), making it a wrapper for a new
function named integrity_add_key(). This patch also defines a new
function named integrity_load_cert() for loading the platform keys.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec
additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing
to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In
such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel
image.
It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party
keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable.
The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an
administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage.
In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the
necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to
store platform keys.
This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys
provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to
facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this
keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from
userspace.
This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If Integrity is not auditing, IMA shouldn't audit, either.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
We want to add additional evm control nodes, and it'd be preferable not
to clutter up the securityfs root directory any further. Create a new
integrity directory, move the ima directory into it, create an evm
directory for the evm attribute and add compatibility symlinks.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This macro isn't used anymore since commit 0d73a55208 ("ima: re-introduce
own integrity cache lock"), so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in
environments which are unwilling to accept the risk of trusting the
signature verification and want to always fail safe, but are for example
using a pre-built kernel.
This patch defines a new builtin policy named "fail_securely", which can
be specified on the boot command line as an argument to "ima_policy=".
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
credentials that it did previously.
After this patch, an IMA policy rule along the lines of:
measure func=CREDS_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t
will trigger if a process is executed and runs as unconfined_t, ignoring
the context of the parent process. This is in contrast to:
measure func=BPRM_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t
which will trigger if the process that calls exec() is already executing
in unconfined_t, ignoring the context that the child process executes
into.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changelog:
- initialize ima_creds_status
The builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy, which is specified on the boot
command line, can be replaced with a custom policy, normally early in
the boot process. Custom policies can be more restrictive in some ways,
like requiring file signatures, but can be less restrictive in other
ways, like not appraising mutable files. With a less restrictive policy
in place, files in the builtin policy might not be hashed and labeled
with a security.ima hash. On reboot, files which should be labeled in
the ima_appraise_tcb are not labeled, possibly preventing the system
from booting properly.
To resolve this problem, this patch extends the existing IMA policy
actions "measure", "dont_measure", "appraise", "dont_appraise", and
"audit" with "hash" and "dont_hash". The new "hash" action will write
the file hash as security.ima, but without requiring the file to be
appraised as well.
For example, the builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy includes the rule,
"appraise fowner=0". Adding the "hash fowner=0" rule to a custom
policy, will cause the needed file hashes to be calculated and written
as security.ima xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint->mutex was eliminated.
Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.
More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.
To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem.
Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on
close or on open.
Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.
Fixes: Commit 6552321831 ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The EVM signature includes the inode number and (optionally) the
filesystem UUID, making it impractical to ship EVM signatures in
packages. This patch adds a new portable format intended to allow
distributions to include EVM signatures. It is identical to the existing
format but hardcodes the inode and generation numbers to 0 and does not
include the filesystem UUID even if the kernel is configured to do so.
Removing the inode means that the metadata and signature from one file
could be copied to another file without invalidating it. This is avoided
by ensuring that an IMA xattr is present during EVM validation.
Portable signatures are intended to be immutable - ie, they will never
be transformed into HMACs.
Based on earlier work by Dmitry Kasatkin and Mikhail Kurinnoi.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 and CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 options permit
loading x509 signed certificates onto the trusted keyrings without
verifying the x509 certificate file's signature.
This patch replaces the call to the integrity_read_file() specific
function with the common kernel_read_file_from_path() function.
To avoid verifying the file signature, this patch defines
READING_X509_CERTFICATE.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
These changes are too small to warrant their own patches:
The keyid and sig_size members of struct signature_v2_hdr are in BE format,
so use a type that makes this assumption explicit. Also, use beXX_to_cpu
instead of __beXX_to_cpu to read them.
Change integrity_kernel_read to take a void * buffer instead of char *
buffer, so that callers don't have to use a cast if they provide a buffer
that isn't a char *.
Add missing #endif comment in ima.h pointing out which macro it refers to.
Add missing fall through comment in ima_appraise.c.
Constify mask_tokens and func_tokens arrays.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To keep track of which measurements have been extended to which PCRs, this
patch defines a new integrity_iint_cache field named measured_pcrs. This
field is a bitmask of the PCRs measured. Each bit corresponds to a PCR
index. For example, bit 10 corresponds to PCR 10.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changing file metadata (eg. uid, guid) could result in having to
re-appraise a file's integrity, but does not change the "new file"
status nor the security.ima xattr. The IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO and
IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flags are policy rule specific. This patch
only resets these flags, not the IMA_NEW_FILE or IMA_DIGSIG flags.
With this patch, changing the file timestamp will not remove the
file signature on new files.
Reported-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of
enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and
the file signature re-appraised, based on policy. As there is no need to
preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and
module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file.
This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring
and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into
memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by
the normal IMA policy based processing.
Changelog v5:
- fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL
v3:
- rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file()
v1:
- split patch
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
This patch defines a configuration option and the evm_load_x509() hook
to load an X509 certificate onto the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
Changes in v4:
* Patch description updated
Changes in v3:
* Removed EVM_X509_PATH definition. CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH is used
directly.
Changes in v2:
* default key patch changed to /etc/keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring().
Changes in v3:
* Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing
keyring instead of using __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper.
* Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
Changes in v2:
* Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option
* Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config
file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch adds validity checks for 'path' parameter and
makes it const.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
SELinux, and integrity code.
The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading
keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: Remove security_ops extern
security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
VFS: refactor vfs_read()
ima: require signature based appraisal
integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
ima: added error messages to template-related functions
ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: report policy load status
ima: use path names cache
...
Define configuration option to load X509 certificate into the
IMA trusted kernel keyring. It implements ima_load_x509() hook
to load X509 certificate into the .ima trusted kernel keyring
from the root filesystem.
Changes in v3:
* use ima_policy_flag in ima_get_action()
ima_load_x509 temporarily clears ima_policy_flag to disable
appraisal to load key. Use it to skip appraisal rules.
* Key directory path changed to /etc/keys (Mimi)
* Expand IMA_LOAD_X509 Kconfig help
Changes in v2:
* added '__init'
* use ima_policy_flag to disable appraisal to load keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Provide the function to load x509 certificates from the kernel into the
integrity kernel keyring.
Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch defines a new function called integrity_read_file()
to read file from the kernel into a buffer. Subsequent patches
will read a file containing the public keys and load them onto
the IMA keyring.
This patch moves and renames ima_kernel_read(), the non-security
checking version of kernel_read(), to integrity_kernel_read().
Changes in v3:
* Patch descriptions improved (Mimi)
* Add missing cast (kbuild test robot)
Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
integrity_init_keyring() is used only from kernel '__init'
functions. Add it there as well.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch completes the switching to the 'ima_policy_flag' variable
in the checks at the beginning of IMA functions, starting with the
commit a756024e.
Checking 'iint_initialized' is completely unnecessary, because
S_IMA flag is unset if iint was not allocated. At the same time
the integrity cache is allocated with SLAB_PANIC and the kernel will
panic if the allocation fails during kernel initialization. So on
a running system iint_initialized is always true and can be removed.
Changes in v3:
* not limiting test to IMA_APPRAISE (spotted by Roberto Sassu)
Changes in v2:
* 'iint_initialized' removal patch merged to this patch (requested
by Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Commit f381c27 "integrity: move ima inode integrity data management"
(re)moved few functions but left their declarations in header files.
This patch removes them and also removes duplicated declaration of
integrity_iint_find().
Commit c7de7ad "ima: remove unused cleanup functions". This patch
removes these definitions as well.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On ima_file_free(), newly created empty files are not labeled with
an initial security.ima value, because the iversion did not change.
Commit dff6efc "fs: fix iversion handling" introduced a change in
iversion behavior. To verify this change use the shell command:
$ (exec >foo)
$ getfattr -h -e hex -d -m security foo
This patch defines the IMA_NEW_FILE flag. The flag is initially
set, when IMA detects that a new file is created, and subsequently
checked on the ima_file_free() hook to set the initial security.ima
value.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> 3.14+
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.
This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
Changelog v6:
- remove ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING in C code - Dmitry
- update Kconfig dependency and help
- select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - Dmitry
Changelog v5:
- Move integrity_init_keyring() to init_ima() - Dmitry
- reset keyring[id] on failure - Dmitry
Changelog v1:
- don't link IMA trusted keyring to user keyring
Changelog:
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
- differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
- replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)
- only make the IMA keyring a trusted keyring (reported-by D. Kastatkin)
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() definition based on
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE, not CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
(reported-by Jim Davis)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.
The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file
access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.
Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
This reverts commit 217091dd7a, which
caused the following build error:
security/integrity/digsig.c:70:5: error: redefinition of ‘integrity_init_keyring’
security/integrity/integrity.h:149:12: note: previous definition of ‘integrity_init_keyring’ w
security/integrity/integrity.h:149:12: warning: ‘integrity_init_keyring’ defined but not used
reported by Krzysztof Kolasa. Mimi says:
"I made the classic mistake of requesting this patch to be upstreamed
at the last second, rather than waiting until the next open window.
At this point, the best course would probably be to revert the two
commits and fix them for the next open window"
Reported-by: Krzysztof Kolasa <kkolasa@winsoft.pl>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
Changelog:
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
- differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
- replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
All files labeled with 'security.ima' hashes, are hashed using the
same hash algorithm. Changing from one hash algorithm to another,
requires relabeling the filesystem. This patch defines a new xattr
type, which includes the hash algorithm, permitting different files
to be hashed with different algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
For each inode in the IMA policy, an iint is allocated. To support
larger hash digests, the iint digest size changed from 20 bytes to
the maximum supported hash digest size. Instead of allocating the
maximum size, which most likely is not needed, this patch dynamically
allocates the needed hash storage.
Changelog:
- fix krealloc bug
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
For possibility to use xattr type for new signature formats,
pass full xattr to the signature verification function.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
All files on the filesystem, currently, are hashed using the same hash
algorithm. In preparation for files from different packages being
signed using different hash algorithms, this patch adds support for
reading the signature hash algorithm from the 'security.ima' extended
attribute and calculates the appropriate file data hash based on it.
Changelog:
- fix scripts Lindent and checkpatch msgs - Mimi
- fix md5 support for older version, which occupied 20 bytes in the
xattr, not the expected 16 bytes. Fix the comparison to compare
only the first 16 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In preparation of supporting more hash algorithms with larger hash sizes
needed for signature verification, this patch replaces the 20 byte sized
digest, with a more flexible structure. The new structure includes the
hash algorithm, digest size, and digest.
Changelog:
- recalculate filedata hash for the measurement list, if the signature
hash digest size is greater than 20 bytes.
- use generic HASH_ALGO_
- make ima_calc_file_hash static
- scripts lindent and checkpatch fixes
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch moves the integrity_audit_msg() function and defintion to
security/integrity/, the parent directory, renames the 'ima_audit'
boot command line option to 'integrity_audit', and fixes the Kconfig
help text to reflect the actual code.
Changelog:
- Fixed ifdef inclusion of integrity_audit_msg() (Fengguang Wu)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on
signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the
signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM
signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional
signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric
key infrastructure.
Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header
could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save
space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM
header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a
sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the
current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to
identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils
was updated to support the new signature format.
While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many
different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated
during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm.
The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5
is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be
generated using a sha1 hash algorithm.
Changes in this patch:
- Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of
in source #ifdefs.
- keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign
IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel
asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also
loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be
done using keyctl only.
- keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done
using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match().
- Kconfig option title was changed
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
With the new IMA policy 'appraise_type=' option, different hooks
can require different methods for appraising a file's integrity.
For example, the existing 'ima_appraise_tcb' policy defines a
generic rule, requiring all root files to be appraised, without
specfying the appraisal method. A more specific rule could require
all kernel modules, for example, to be signed.
appraise fowner=0 func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
appraise fowner=0
As a result, the integrity appraisal results for the same inode, but
for different hooks, could differ. This patch caches the integrity
appraisal results on a per hook basis.
Changelog v2:
- Rename ima_cache_status() to ima_set_cache_status()
- Rename and move get_appraise_status() to ima_get_cache_status()
Changelog v0:
- include IMA_APPRAISE/APPRAISED_SUBMASK in IMA_DO/DONE_MASK (Dmitry)
- Support independent MODULE_CHECK appraise status.
- fixed IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE/APPRAISED flags
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
In preparation for hook specific appraise status results, increase
the iint flags size.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
The 'security.ima' extended attribute may contain either the file data's
hash or a digital signature. This patch adds support for requiring a
specific extended attribute type. It extends the IMA policy with a new
keyword 'appraise_type=imasig'. (Default is hash.)
Changelog v2:
- Fixed Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy option syntax
Changelog v1:
- Differentiate between 'required' vs. 'actual' extended attribute
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch reduces size of the iint structure by 8 bytes.
It saves about 15% of iint cache memory.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
IMA audit hashes patches introduced new IMA flags and required
space went beyond 8 bits. Currently the only flag is IMA_DIGSIG.
This patch use 16 bit short instead of 8 bit char.
Without this fix IMA signature will be replaced with hash, which
should not happen.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Thomas Gleixner