Translating a context struct to string can be quite slow, especially if
the context has a lot of category bits set. This can cause quite
noticeable performance impact in situations where the translation needs
to be done repeatedly. A common example is a UNIX datagram socket with
the SO_PASSSEC option enabled, which is used e.g. by systemd-journald
when receiving log messages via datagram socket. This scenario can be
reproduced with:
cat /dev/urandom | base64 | logger &
timeout 30s perf record -p $(pidof systemd-journald) -a -g
kill %1
perf report -g none --pretty raw | grep security_secid_to_secctx
Before the caching introduced by this patch, computing the context
string (security_secid_to_secctx() function) takes up ~65% of
systemd-journald's CPU time (assuming a context with 1024 categories
set and Fedora x86_64 release kernel configs). After this patch
(assuming near-perfect cache hit ratio) this overhead is reduced to just
~2%.
This patch addresses the issue by caching a certain number (compile-time
configurable) of recently used context strings to speed up repeated
translations of the same context, while using only a small amount of
memory.
The cache is integrated into the existing sidtab table by adding a field
to each entry, which when not NULL contains an RCU-protected pointer to
a cache entry containing the cached string. The cache entries are kept
in a linked list sorted according to how recently they were used. On a
cache miss when the cache is full, the least recently used entry is
removed to make space for the new entry.
The patch migrates security_sid_to_context_core() to use the cache (also
a few other functions where it was possible without too much fuss, but
these mostly use the translation for logging in case of error, which is
rare).
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1733259
Cc: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
[PM: lots of merge fixups due to collisions with other sidtab patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This replaces the reverse table lookup and reverse cache with a
hashtable which improves cache-miss reverse-lookup times from
O(n) to O(1)* and maintains the same performance as a reverse
cache hit.
This reduces the time needed to add a new sidtab entry from ~500us
to 5us on a Pixel 3 when there are ~10,000 sidtab entries.
The implementation uses the kernel's generic hashtable API,
It uses the context's string represtation as the hash source,
and the kernels generic string hashing algorithm full_name_hash()
to reduce the string to a 32 bit value.
This change also maintains the improvement introduced in
commit ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance") which removed the need to keep the current sidtab
locked during policy reload. It does however introduce periodic
locking of the target sidtab while converting the hashtable. Sidtab
entries are never modified or removed, so the context struct stored
in the sid_to_context tree can also be used for the context_to_sid
hashtable to reduce memory usage.
This bug was reported by:
- On the selinux bug tracker.
BUG: kernel softlockup due to too many SIDs/contexts #37https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/37
- Jovana Knezevic on Android's bugtracker.
Bug: 140252993
"During multi-user performance testing, we create and remove users
many times. selinux_android_restorecon_pkgdir goes from 1ms to over
20ms after about 200 user creations and removals. Accumulated over
~280 packages, that adds a significant time to user creation,
making perf benchmarks unreliable."
* Hashtable lookup is only O(1) when n < the number of buckets.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reported-by: Jovana Knezevic <jovanak@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: subj tweak, removed changelog from patch description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended
for namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional
time_t, timeval and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe
code. Even though the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel,
having the types and associated functions around means that we
can still grow new users, and that we may be missing conversions
to safe types that actually matter.
There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to
get the last users of these types removed, those have been
submitted to the respective maintainers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Merge tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground
Pull y2038 cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
"y2038 syscall implementation cleanups
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended for
namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional time_t, timeval
and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe code. Even though
the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel, having the types and
associated functions around means that we can still grow new users,
and that we may be missing conversions to safe types that actually
matter.
There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to get the
last users of these types removed, those have been submitted to the
respective maintainers"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
* tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: (26 commits)
y2038: alarm: fix half-second cut-off
y2038: ipc: fix x32 ABI breakage
y2038: fix typo in powerpc vdso "LOPART"
y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls
y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64
y2038: move itimer reset into itimer.c
y2038: use compat_{get,set}_itimer on alpha
y2038: itimer: compat handling to itimer.c
y2038: time: avoid timespec usage in settimeofday()
y2038: timerfd: Use timespec64 internally
y2038: elfcore: Use __kernel_old_timeval for process times
y2038: make ns_to_compat_timeval use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: socket: use __kernel_old_timespec instead of timespec
y2038: socket: remove timespec reference in timestamping
y2038: syscalls: change remaining timeval to __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: rusage: use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: uapi: change __kernel_time_t to __kernel_old_time_t
y2038: stat: avoid 'time_t' in 'struct stat'
y2038: ipc: remove __kernel_time_t reference from headers
y2038: vdso: powerpc: avoid timespec references
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Only three SELinux patches for v5.5:
- Remove the size limit on SELinux policies, the limitation was a
lingering vestige and no longer necessary.
- Allow file labeling before the policy is loaded. This should ease
some of the burden when the policy is initially loaded (no need to
relabel files), but it should also help enable some new system
concepts which dynamically create the root filesystem in the
initrd.
- Add support for the "greatest lower bound" policy construct which
is defined as the intersection of the MLS range of two SELinux
labels"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: default_range glblub implementation
selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded
selinux: remove load size limit
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"This is mostly to fix the iwlwifi regression:
1) Flush GRO state properly in iwlwifi driver, from Alexander Lobakin.
2) Validate TIPC link name with properly length macro, from John
Rutherford.
3) Fix completion init and device query timeouts in ibmvnic, from
Thomas Falcon.
4) Fix SKB size calculation for netlink messages in psample, from
Nikolay Aleksandrov.
5) Similar kind of fix for OVS flow dumps, from Paolo Abeni.
6) Handle queue allocation failure unwind properly in gve driver, we
could try to release pages we didn't allocate. From Jeroen de
Borst.
7) Serialize TX queue SKB list accesses properly in mscc ocelot
driver. From Yangbo Lu"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net:
net: usb: aqc111: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier
net: phy: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier
net: wireless: intel: iwlwifi: fix GRO_NORMAL packet stalling
net: mscc: ocelot: use skb queue instead of skbs list
net: mscc: ocelot: avoid incorrect consuming in skbs list
gve: Fix the queue page list allocated pages count
net: inet_is_local_reserved_port() port arg should be unsigned short
openvswitch: fix flow command message size
net: phy: dp83869: Fix return paths to return proper values
net: psample: fix skb_over_panic
net: usbnet: Fix -Wcast-function-type
net: hso: Fix -Wcast-function-type
net: port < inet_prot_sock(net) --> inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, port)
ibmvnic: Serialize device queries
ibmvnic: Bound waits for device queries
ibmvnic: Terminate waiting device threads after loss of service
ibmvnic: Fix completion structure initialization
net-sctp: replace some sock_net(sk) with just 'net'
net: Fix a documentation bug wrt. ip_unprivileged_port_start
tipc: fix link name length check
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main kernel side changes in this cycle were:
- Various Intel-PT updates and optimizations (Alexander Shishkin)
- Prohibit kprobes on Xen/KVM emulate prefixes (Masami Hiramatsu)
- Add support for LSM and SELinux checks to control access to the
perf syscall (Joel Fernandes)
- Misc other changes, optimizations, fixes and cleanups - see the
shortlog for details.
There were numerous tooling changes as well - 254 non-merge commits.
Here are the main changes - too many to list in detail:
- Enhancements to core tooling infrastructure, perf.data, libperf,
libtraceevent, event parsing, vendor events, Intel PT, callchains,
BPF support and instruction decoding.
- There were updates to the following tools:
perf annotate
perf diff
perf inject
perf kvm
perf list
perf maps
perf parse
perf probe
perf record
perf report
perf script
perf stat
perf test
perf trace
- And a lot of other changes: please see the shortlog and Git log for
more details"
* 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (279 commits)
perf parse: Fix potential memory leak when handling tracepoint errors
perf probe: Fix spelling mistake "addrees" -> "address"
libtraceevent: Fix memory leakage in copy_filter_type
libtraceevent: Fix header installation
perf intel-bts: Does not support AUX area sampling
perf intel-pt: Add support for decoding AUX area samples
perf intel-pt: Add support for recording AUX area samples
perf pmu: When using default config, record which bits of config were changed by the user
perf auxtrace: Add support for queuing AUX area samples
perf session: Add facility to peek at all events
perf auxtrace: Add support for dumping AUX area samples
perf inject: Cut AUX area samples
perf record: Add aux-sample-size config term
perf record: Add support for AUX area sampling
perf auxtrace: Add support for AUX area sample recording
perf auxtrace: Move perf_evsel__find_pmu()
perf record: Add a function to test for kernel support for AUX area sampling
perf tools: Add kernel AUX area sampling definitions
perf/core: Make the mlock accounting simple again
perf report: Jump to symbol source view from total cycles view
...
Note that the sysctl write accessor functions guarantee that:
net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock <= net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0]
invariant is maintained, and as such the max() in selinux hooks is actually spurious.
ie. even though
if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) || snum > high) {
per logic is the same as
if ((snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) && snum < low) || snum > high) {
it is actually functionally equivalent to:
if (snum < low || snum > high) {
which is equivalent to:
if (snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) || snum < low || snum > high) {
even though the first clause is spurious.
But we want to hold on to it in case we ever want to change what what
inet_port_requires_bind_service() means (for example by changing
it from a, by default, [0..1024) range to some sort of set).
Test: builds, git 'grep inet_prot_sock' finds no other references
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Preparing for a change to the itimer internals, stop using the
do_setitimer() symbol and instead use a new higher-level interface.
The do_getitimer()/do_setitimer functions can now be made static,
allowing the compiler to potentially produce better object code.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinuxfix from Paul Moore:
"One patch to ensure we don't copy bad memory up into userspace"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()
A policy developer can now specify glblub as a default_range default and
the computed transition will be the intersection of the mls range of
the two contexts.
The glb (greatest lower bound) lub (lowest upper bound) of a range is calculated
as the greater of the low sensitivities and the lower of the high sensitivities
and the and of each category bitmap.
This can be used by MLS solution developers to compute a context that satisfies,
for example, the range of a network interface and the range of a user logging in.
Some examples are:
User Permitted Range | Network Device Label | Computed Label
---------------------|----------------------|----------------
s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0 | s0
s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0-s1:c0.c1023 | s0-s1:c0.c12
s0-s4:c0.c512 | s1-s1:c0.c1023 | s1-s1:c0.c512
s0-s15:c0,c2 | s4-s6:c0.c128 | s4-s6:c0,c2
s0-s4 | s2-s6 | s2-s4
s0-s4 | s5-s8 | INVALID
s5-s8 | s0-s4 | INVALID
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
[PM: subject lines and checkpatch.pl fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
string_to_context_struct() may garble the context string, so we need to
copy back the contents again from the old context struct to avoid
storing the corrupted context.
Since string_to_context_struct() tokenizes (and therefore truncates) the
context string and we are later potentially copying it with kstrdup(),
this may eventually cause pieces of uninitialized kernel memory to be
disclosed to userspace (when copying to userspace based on the stored
length and not the null character).
How to reproduce on Fedora and similar:
# dnf install -y memcached
# systemctl start memcached
# semodule -d memcached
# load_policy
# load_policy
# systemctl stop memcached
# ausearch -m AVC
type=AVC msg=audit(1570090572.648:313): avc: denied { signal } for pid=1 comm="systemd" scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0 trawcon=73797374656D5F75007400000000000070BE6E847296FFFF726F6D000096FFFF76
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Milos Malik <mmalik@redhat.com>
Fixes: ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add two commands to add and delete list of link properties. Implement
the first property type along - alternative ifnames.
Each net device can have multiple alternative names.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the
`security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being
loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible
to have newly created files with the correct label before actually
loading the policy.
This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is
loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such
instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One
then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently
races with other processes trying to access those same files.
Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root
filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports
this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]).
One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g.
laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former,
labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter
scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when
populating the new filesystem.
This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways:
1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized
2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized;
instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be
attempted at a later time
Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously
discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't
accepted.
[1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html
[2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
[3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html
Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Load size was limited to 64MB, this was legacy limitation due to vmalloc()
which was removed a while ago.
Signed-off-by: zhanglin <zhang.lin16@zte.com.cn>
[PM: removed comments in the description about 'real world use cases']
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify,
fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the
LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks.
- The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in
the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for
good.
- Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return
the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we
would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now
we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry
for it.
- Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with
READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection.
- A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward
declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc)
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm: remove current_security()
selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob
selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab
fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications
selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one
selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array
selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings
selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations
We need to use selinux_cred() to fetch the SELinux cred blob instead
of directly using current->security or current_security(). There
were a couple of lingering uses of current_security() in the SELinux code
that were apparently missed during the earlier conversions. IIUC, this
would only manifest as a bug if multiple security modules including
SELinux are enabled and SELinux is not first in the lsm order. After
this change, there appear to be no other users of current_security()
in-tree; perhaps we should remove it altogether.
Fixes: bbd3662a83 ("Infrastructure management of the cred security blob")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As noted in Documentation/atomic_t.txt, if we don't need the RMW atomic
operations, we should only use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() +
smp_rmb()/smp_wmb() where necessary (or the combined variants
smp_load_acquire()/smp_store_release()).
This patch converts the sidtab code to use regular u32 for the counter
and reverse lookup cache and use the appropriate operations instead of
atomic_get()/atomic_set(). Note that when reading/updating the reverse
lookup cache we don't need memory barriers as it doesn't need to be
consistent or accurate. We can now also replace some atomic ops with
regular loads (when under spinlock) and stores (for conversion target
fields that are always accessed under the master table's spinlock).
We can now also bump SIDTAB_MAX to U32_MAX as we can use the full u32
range again.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a
check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been
provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify,
or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but
even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from
the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact
that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about
when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant
more power to an application in the form of permission events. While
notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass
information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking.
Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will
then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be
completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the
ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a
distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply
the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and
superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock.
Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch
all files accessed within a given mount or superblock.
In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been
placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify,
fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the
point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the
path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of
object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The
mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values
shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path
struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available,
particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by
pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for
use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security
modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not
use any of them.
This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes
that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive
all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that
is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks
or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added
by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have
no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the
requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application
has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in
its coverage.
Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must
also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access
requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue
that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during
fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered
by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements
checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process
can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized.
The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file
permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm
(descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission:
watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which
subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application
based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The
selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore
ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through
fanotify.
The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline
permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for
any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should
be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and
watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb
permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch
permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for
mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to
the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled
object existed representing the mount.
The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from
read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing
a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened
read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct
indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read
access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read
events on a file.
Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the
only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event.
This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though
fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit
trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Previously if we couldn't find an entry in the cache and we failed to
allocate memory for a new cache entry we would fail the network object
label lookup; this is obviously not ideal. This patch fixes this so
that we return the object label even if we can't cache the object at
this point in time due to memory pressure.
The GitHub issue tracker is below:
* https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/3
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The name is overly long and inconsistent with the other *_val_to_struct
members. Dropping the "_array" prefix makes the code easier to read and
gets rid of one line over 80 characters warning.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix most of the code style warnings discovered when moving code around.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
No code changes, but move a lot of the policydb destructors higher up
so we can get rid of a forward declaration.
This patch does expose a few old checkpatch.pl errors, but those will
be dealt with in a separate (set of) patches.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One more small fix for a potential memory leak in an error path"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()
Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to
destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in
the error path.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190726' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to add some proper bounds/overflow checking
when adding a new sid/secid"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190726' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
"The first part of mount updates.
Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"
* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
constify ksys_mount() string arguments
don't bother with registering rootfs
init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
convenience helper: get_tree_single()
convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
vfs: Kill sget_userns()
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Some highlights from this development cycle:
1) Big refactoring of ipv6 route and neigh handling to support
nexthop objects configurable as units from userspace. From David
Ahern.
2) Convert explored_states in BPF verifier into a hash table,
significantly decreased state held for programs with bpf2bpf
calls, from Alexei Starovoitov.
3) Implement bpf_send_signal() helper, from Yonghong Song.
4) Various classifier enhancements to mvpp2 driver, from Maxime
Chevallier.
5) Add aRFS support to hns3 driver, from Jian Shen.
6) Fix use after free in inet frags by allocating fqdirs dynamically
and reworking how rhashtable dismantle occurs, from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add act_ctinfo packet classifier action, from Kevin
Darbyshire-Bryant.
8) Add TFO key backup infrastructure, from Jason Baron.
9) Remove several old and unused ISDN drivers, from Arnd Bergmann.
10) Add devlink notifications for flash update status to mlxsw driver,
from Jiri Pirko.
11) Lots of kTLS offload infrastructure fixes, from Jakub Kicinski.
12) Add support for mv88e6250 DSA chips, from Rasmus Villemoes.
13) Various enhancements to ipv6 flow label handling, from Eric
Dumazet and Willem de Bruijn.
14) Support TLS offload in nfp driver, from Jakub Kicinski, Dirk van
der Merwe, and others.
15) Various improvements to axienet driver including converting it to
phylink, from Robert Hancock.
16) Add PTP support to sja1105 DSA driver, from Vladimir Oltean.
17) Add mqprio qdisc offload support to dpaa2-eth, from Ioana
Radulescu.
18) Add devlink health reporting to mlx5, from Moshe Shemesh.
19) Convert stmmac over to phylink, from Jose Abreu.
20) Add PTP PHC (Physical Hardware Clock) support to mlxsw, from
Shalom Toledo.
21) Add nftables SYNPROXY support, from Fernando Fernandez Mancera.
22) Convert tcp_fastopen over to use SipHash, from Ard Biesheuvel.
23) Track spill/fill of constants in BPF verifier, from Alexei
Starovoitov.
24) Support bounded loops in BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
25) Various page_pool API fixes and improvements, from Jesper Dangaard
Brouer.
26) Just like ipv4, support ref-countless ipv6 route handling. From
Wei Wang.
27) Support VLAN offloading in aquantia driver, from Igor Russkikh.
28) Add AF_XDP zero-copy support to mlx5, from Maxim Mikityanskiy.
29) Add flower GRE encap/decap support to nfp driver, from Pieter
Jansen van Vuuren.
30) Protect against stack overflow when using act_mirred, from John
Hurley.
31) Allow devmap map lookups from eBPF, from Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.
32) Use page_pool API in netsec driver, Ilias Apalodimas.
33) Add Google gve network driver, from Catherine Sullivan.
34) More indirect call avoidance, from Paolo Abeni.
35) Add kTLS TX HW offload support to mlx5, from Tariq Toukan.
36) Add XDP_REDIRECT support to bnxt_en, from Andy Gospodarek.
37) Add MPLS manipulation actions to TC, from John Hurley.
38) Add sending a packet to connection tracking from TC actions, and
then allow flower classifier matching on conntrack state. From
Paul Blakey.
39) Netfilter hw offload support, from Pablo Neira Ayuso"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (2080 commits)
net/mlx5e: Return in default case statement in tx_post_resync_params
mlx5: Return -EINVAL when WARN_ON_ONCE triggers in mlx5e_tls_resync().
net: dsa: add support for BRIDGE_MROUTER attribute
pkt_sched: Include const.h
net: netsec: remove static declaration for netsec_set_tx_de()
net: netsec: remove superfluous if statement
netfilter: nf_tables: add hardware offload support
net: flow_offload: rename tc_cls_flower_offload to flow_cls_offload
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_is_busy() and use it
net: sched: remove tcf block API
drivers: net: use flow block API
net: sched: use flow block API
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_{priv, incref, decref}()
net: flow_offload: add list handling functions
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_alloc() and flow_block_cb_free()
net: flow_offload: rename TCF_BLOCK_BINDER_TYPE_* to FLOW_BLOCK_BINDER_TYPE_*
net: flow_offload: rename TC_BLOCK_{UN}BIND to FLOW_BLOCK_{UN}BIND
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_setup_simple()
net: hisilicon: Add an tx_desc to adapt HI13X1_GMAC
net: hisilicon: Add an rx_desc to adapt HI13X1_GMAC
...
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features:
- IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the
IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM
label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is
being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label
deletions.
- Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being
mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar
changes at the VFS layer would be preferable.
- The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a
couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line
measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes).
- Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent
list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and
storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is
the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement
list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
IMA: Define a new template field buf
IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
IMA: support for per policy rule template formats
integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers
x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY
ima: Make arch_policy_entry static
ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute
x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
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Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:
- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.
ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.
Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.
- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"
* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Like the audit pull request this is a little early due to some
upcoming vacation plans and uncertain network access while I'm away.
Also like the audit PR, the list of patches here is pretty minor, the
highlights include:
- Explicitly use __le variables to make sure "sparse" can verify
proper byte endian handling.
- Remove some BUG_ON()s that are no longer needed.
- Allow zero-byte writes to the "keycreate" procfs attribute without
requiring key:create to make it easier for userspace to reset the
keycreate label.
- Consistently log the "invalid_context" field as an untrusted string
in the AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR audit records"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
selinux: fix empty write to keycreate file
selinux: remove some no-op BUG_ONs
selinux: provide __le variables explicitly
Convert the selinuxfs filesystem to the new internal mount API as the old
one will be obsoleted and removed. This allows greater flexibility in
communication of mount parameters between userspace, the VFS and the
filesystem.
See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt for more information.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The userspace tools expect all fields of the same name to be logged
consistently with the same encoding. Since the invalid_context fields
contain untrusted strings in selinux_inode_setxattr()
and selinux_setprocattr(), encode all instances of this field the same
way as though they were untrusted even though
compute_sid_handle_invalid_context() and security_sid_mls_copy() are
trusted.
Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/57
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot
usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it
seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity,
switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename
the functions accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190612' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three patches for v5.2.
One fixes a problem where we weren't correctly logging raw SELinux
labels, the other two fix problems where we weren't properly checking
calls to kmemdup()"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190612' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings
When sid == 0 (we are resetting keycreate_sid to the default value), we
should skip the KEY__CREATE check.
Before this patch, doing a zero-sized write to /proc/self/keycreate
would check if the current task can create unlabeled keys (which would
usually fail with -EACCESS and generate an AVC). Now it skips the check
and correctly sets the task's keycreate_sid to 0.
Bug report: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1719067
Tested using the reproducer from the report above.
Fixes: 4eb582cf1f ("[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys")
Reported-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kir@sacred.ru>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), 'arg' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It
returns NULL when fails. So 'arg' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts'
should be freed when error.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Fixes: 99dbbb593f ("selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In selinux_add_mnt_opt(), 'val' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It returns
NULL when fails. So 'val' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts' should be
freed when error.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Fixes: 757cbe597f ("LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
[PM: fixed some indenting problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
These strings may come from untrusted sources (e.g. file xattrs) so they
need to be properly escaped.
Reproducer:
# setenforce 0
# touch /tmp/test
# setfattr -n security.selinux -v 'kuřecí řízek' /tmp/test
# runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/test
(look at the generated AVCs)
Actual result:
type=AVC [...] trawcon=kuřecí řízek
Expected result:
type=AVC [...] trawcon=6B75C5996563C3AD20C599C3AD7A656B
Fixes: fede148324 ("selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 135 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531081036.435762997@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 64 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.894819585@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
New UAPI for nexthops as standalone objects:
- defines netlink ancillary header, struct nhmsg
- RTM commands for nexthop objects, RTM_*NEXTHOP,
- RTNLGRP for nexthop notifications, RTNLGRP_NEXTHOP,
- Attributes for creating nexthops, NHA_*
- Attribute for route specs to specify a nexthop by id, RTA_NH_ID.
The nexthop attributes and semantics follow the route and RTA ones for
device, gateway and lwt encap. Unique to nexthop objects are a blackhole
and a group which contains references to other nexthop objects. With the
exception of blackhole and group, nexthop objects MUST contain a device.
Gateway and encap are optional. Nexthop groups can only reference other
pre-existing nexthops by id. If the NHA_ID attribute is present that id
is used for the nexthop. If not specified, one is auto assigned.
Dump requests can include attributes:
- NHA_GROUPS to return only nexthop groups,
- NHA_MASTER to limit dumps to nexthops with devices enslaved to the
given master (e.g., VRF)
- NHA_OIF to limit dumps to nexthops using given device
nlmsg_route_perms in selinux code is updated for the new RTM comands.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since acdf52d97f ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc"), these check whether
an address-of value is NULL, which is pointless.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190521' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to fix a problem when disconnecting a SCTP
socket with connect(AF_UNSPEC)"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190521' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: do not report error on connect(AF_UNSPEC)
While the endiannes is being handled properly sparse was unable to verify
this due to type inconsistency. So introduce an additional __le32
respectively _le64 variable to be passed to le32/64_to_cpu() to allow
sparse to verify proper typing. Note that this patch does not change
the generated binary on little-endian systems - on 32bit powerpc it
does change the binary.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Mc Guire <hofrat@osadl.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program if not see http www gnu org licenses
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details [based]
[from] [clk] [highbank] [c] you should have received a copy of the
gnu general public license along with this program if not see http
www gnu org licenses
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 355 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jilayne Lovejoy <opensource@jilayne.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190519154041.837383322@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
calling connect(AF_UNSPEC) on an already connected TCP socket is an
established way to disconnect() such socket. After commit 68741a8ada
("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure") it no longer works
and, in the above scenario connect() fails with EAFNOSUPPORT.
Fix the above explicitly early checking for AF_UNSPEC family, and
returning success in that case.
Reported-by: Tom Deseyn <tdeseyn@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 68741a8ada ("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure")
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This reverts commit c7e0d6cca8.
It was agreed a slightly different fix via the selinux tree.
v1 -> v2:
- use the correct reverted commit hash
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
calling connect(AF_UNSPEC) on an already connected TCP socket is an
established way to disconnect() such socket. After commit 68741a8ada
("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure") it no longer works
and, in the above scenario connect() fails with EAFNOSUPPORT.
Fix the above falling back to the generic/old code when the address family
is not AF_INET{4,6}, but leave the SCTP code path untouched, as it has
specific constraints.
Fixes: 68741a8ada ("selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure")
Reported-by: Tom Deseyn <tdeseyn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190507' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got a few SELinux patches for the v5.2 merge window, the
highlights are below:
- Add LSM hooks, and the SELinux implementation, for proper labeling
of kernfs. While we are only including the SELinux implementation
here, the rest of the LSM folks have given the hooks a thumbs-up.
- Update the SELinux mdp (Make Dummy Policy) script to actually work
on a modern system.
- Disallow userspace to change the LSM credentials via
/proc/self/attr when the task's credentials are already overridden.
The change was made in procfs because all the LSM folks agreed this
was the Right Thing To Do and duplicating it across each LSM was
going to be annoying"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190507' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials
selinux: Check address length before reading address family
kernfs: fix xattr name handling in LSM helpers
MAINTAINERS: update SELinux file patterns
selinux: avoid uninitialized variable warning
selinux: remove useless assignments
LSM: lsm_hooks.h - fix missing colon in docstring
selinux: Make selinux_kernfs_init_security static
kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook
LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization
kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes
selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems
kernfs: do not alloc iattrs in kernfs_xattr_get
kernfs: clean up struct kernfs_iattrs
scripts/selinux: fix build
selinux: use kernel linux/socket.h for genheaders and mdp
scripts/selinux: modernize mdp
When compiling genheaders and mdp from a newer host kernel, the
following error happens:
In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:18:
./security/selinux/include/classmap.h:238:2: error: #error New
address family defined, please update secclass_map. #error New
address family defined, please update secclass_map. ^~~~~
make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.host:107:
scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders] Error 1 make[2]: ***
[scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux/genheaders] Error 2
make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux] Error 2
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
Instead of relying on the host definition, include linux/socket.h in
classmap.h to have PF_MAX.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <paulo@paulo.ac>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: manually merge in mdp.c, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind()/connect() is
shorter than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The implementation of kernfs_security_xattr_*() helpers reuses the
kernfs_node_xattr_*() functions, which take the suffix of the xattr name
and extract full xattr name from it using xattr_full_name(). However,
this function relies on the fact that the suffix passed to xattr
handlers from VFS is always constructed from the full name by just
incerementing the pointer. This doesn't necessarily hold for the callers
of kernfs_security_xattr_*(), so their usage will easily lead to
out-of-bounds access.
Fix this by moving the xattr name reconstruction to the VFS xattr
handlers and replacing the kernfs_security_xattr_*() helpers with more
general kernfs_xattr_*() helpers that take full xattr name and allow
accessing all kernfs node's xattrs.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Fixes: b230d5aba2 ("LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization")
Fixes: ec882da5cd ("selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
clang correctly points out a code path that would lead
to an uninitialized variable use:
security/selinux/netlabel.c:310:6: error: variable 'addr' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is false
[-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/netlabel.c:322:40: note: uninitialized use occurs here
rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
^~~~
security/selinux/netlabel.c:310:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always true
if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/netlabel.c:291:23: note: initialize the variable 'addr' to silence this warning
struct sockaddr *addr;
^
= NULL
This is probably harmless since we should not see ipv6 packets
of CONFIG_IPV6 is disabled, but it's better to rearrange the code
so this cannot happen.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
[PM: removed old patchwork link, fixed checkpatch.pl style errors]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The code incorrectly assigned directly to the variables instead of the
values they point to. Since the values are already set to NULL/0 at the
beginning of the function, we can simply remove these useless
assignments.
Reported-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hariprasad.kelam@gmail.com>
Fixes: fede148324 ("selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: removed a bad comment that was causing compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix sparse warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:3389:5: warning:
symbol 'selinux_kernfs_init_security' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The hook applies the same logic as selinux_determine_inode_label(), with
the exception of the super_block handling, which will be enforced on the
actual inodes later by other hooks.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: minor merge fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since kernfs supports the security xattr handlers, we can simply use
these to determine the inode's context, dropping the need to update it
from kernfs explicitly using a security_inode_notifysecctx() call.
We achieve this by setting a new sbsec flag SE_SBGENFS_XATTR to all
mounts that are known to use kernfs under the hood and then fetching the
xattrs after determining the fallback genfs sid in
inode_doinit_with_dentry() when this flag is set.
This will allow implementing full security xattr support in kernfs and
removing the ...notifysecctx() call in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: more manual merge fixups]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When compiling genheaders and mdp from a newer host kernel, the
following error happens:
In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:18:
./security/selinux/include/classmap.h:238:2: error: #error New
address family defined, please update secclass_map. #error New
address family defined, please update secclass_map. ^~~~~
make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.host:107:
scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders] Error 1 make[2]: ***
[scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux/genheaders] Error 2
make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux] Error 2
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
Instead of relying on the host definition, include linux/socket.h in
classmap.h to have PF_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <paulo@paulo.ac>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: manually merge in mdp.c, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The conversion to kvmalloc() forgot to account for the possibility that
p->type_attr_map_array might be null in policydb_destroy().
Fix this by destroying its contents only if it is not NULL.
Also make sure ebitmap_init() is called on all entries before
policydb_destroy() can be called. Right now this is a no-op, because
both kvcalloc() and ebitmap_init() just zero out the whole struct, but
let's rather not rely on a specific implementation.
Reported-by: syzbot+a57b2aff60832666fc28@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: acdf52d97f ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small fixes for SELinux in v5.1: one adds a buffer length check to
the SELinux SCTP code, the other ensures that the SELinux labeling for
a NFS mount is not disabled if the filesystem is mounted twice"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security/selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS on reused superblock
selinux: add the missing walk_size + len check in selinux_sctp_bind_connect
Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro:
"The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the
old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point
conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some
are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series
outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing
stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted
filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the
next cycle fodder.
It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is
probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the
commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting
the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better
to fix it up after -rc1 instead.
That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which
should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size
increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to
shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next
cycle"
* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
afs: Add fs_context support
vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
cpuset: Use fs_context
kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context
cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper
cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions
cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context
cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing
cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing
cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic()
cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree()
cgroup: start switching to fs_context
ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
...
The flex arrays were being used for constant sized arrays, so there's no
benefit to using flex_arrays over something simpler.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181217131929.11727-4-kent.overstreet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In the case when we're reusing a superblock, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts()
fails to set set_kern_flags, with the result that
nfs_clone_sb_security() incorrectly clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL.
The result is that if you mount the same NFS filesystem twice, NFS
security labels are turned off, even if they would work fine if you
mounted the filesystem only once.
("fixes" may be not exactly the right tag, it may be more like
"fixed-other-cases-but-missed-this-one".)
Cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b4d3452b8 "security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts..."
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As does in __sctp_connect(), when checking addrs in a while loop, after
get the addr len according to sa_family, it's necessary to do the check
walk_size + af->sockaddr_len > addrs_size to make sure it won't access
an out-of-bounds addr.
The same thing is needed in selinux_sctp_bind_connect(), otherwise an
out-of-bounds issue can be triggered:
[14548.772313] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14548.927083] Call Trace:
[14548.938072] dump_stack+0x9a/0xe9
[14548.953015] print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
[14548.996524] kasan_report.cold.6+0x92/0x1a6
[14549.015335] selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14549.036947] security_sctp_bind_connect+0x58/0x90
[14549.058142] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x5a/0x150 [sctp]
[14549.081650] sctp_setsockopt.part.24+0x1322/0x3ce0 [sctp]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
and more translations. There's also some LICENSES adjustments from
Thomas.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.1' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"A fairly routine cycle for docs - lots of typo fixes, some new
documents, and more translations. There's also some LICENSES
adjustments from Thomas"
* tag 'docs-5.1' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (74 commits)
docs: Bring some order to filesystem documentation
Documentation/locking/lockdep: Drop last two chars of sample states
doc: rcu: Suspicious RCU usage is a warning
docs: driver-api: iio: fix errors in documentation
Documentation/process/howto: Update for 4.x -> 5.x versioning
docs: Explicitly state that the 'Fixes:' tag shouldn't split lines
doc: security: Add kern-doc for lsm_hooks.h
doc: sctp: Merge and clean up rst files
Docs: Correct /proc/stat path
scripts/spdxcheck.py: fix C++ comment style detection
doc: fix typos in license-rules.rst
Documentation: fix admin-guide/README.rst minimum gcc version requirement
doc: process: complete removal of info about -git patches
doc: translations: sync translations 'remove info about -git patches'
perf-security: wrap paragraphs on 72 columns
perf-security: elaborate on perf_events/Perf privileged users
perf-security: document collected perf_events/Perf data categories
perf-security: document perf_events/Perf resource control
sysfs.txt: add note on available attribute macros
docs: kernel-doc: typo "if ... if" -> "if ... is"
...
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.
Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.
Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.
All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1"
* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: mark expected switch fall-through
audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
audit: join tty records to their syscall
audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
audit: ignore fcaps on umount
audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
audit: add support for fcaps v3
audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Nine SELinux patches for v5.1, all bug fixes.
As far as I'm concerned, nothing really jumps out as risky or special
to me, but each commit has a decent description so you can judge for
yourself. As usual, everything passes the selinux-testsuite; please
merge for v5.1"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix avc audit messages
selinux: replace BUG_ONs with WARN_ONs in avc.c
selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs
selinux: replace some BUG_ON()s with a WARN_ON()
selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once
selinux: do not override context on context mounts
selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts
selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link
selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk
new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context
method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts
of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for
doing the same to LSM parts.
[needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Implement the new mount API LSM hooks for SELinux. At some point the old
hooks will need to be removed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents
under the security section when they should have be sections with the
SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection
headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize
the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the
missing SPDX header.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
commit a2c513835b ("selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once")
introduced usage of audit_log_string() in place of audit_log_format()
for fixed strings. However, audit_log_string() quotes the string.
This breaks the avc audit message format and userspace audit parsers.
Switch back to using audit_log_format().
Fixes: a2c513835b ("selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).
The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.
It was part of commit 03d37d25e0 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.
Remove it.
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
These checks are only guarding against programming errors that could
silently grant too many permissions. These cases are better handled with
WARN_ON(), since it doesn't really help much to crash the machine in
this case.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In case a file has an invalid context set, in an AVC record generated
upon access to such file, the target context is always reported as
unlabeled. This patch adds new optional fields to the AVC record
(srawcon and trawcon) that report the actual context string if it
differs from the one reported in scontext/tcontext. This is useful for
diagnosing SELinux denials involving invalid contexts.
To trigger an AVC that illustrates this situation:
# setenforce 0
# touch /tmp/testfile
# setfattr -n security.selinux -v system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0 /tmp/testfile
# runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/testfile
AVC before:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1
AVC after:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1 trawcon=system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0
Note that it is also possible to encounter this situation with the
'scontext' field - e.g. when a new policy is loaded while a process is
running, whose context is not valid in the new policy.
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1135683
Cc: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We don't need to crash the machine in these cases. Let's just detect the
buggy state early and error out with a warning.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
avc_dump_av() and avc_dump_query() are each used only in one place. Get
rid of them and open code their contents in the call sites.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'v5.0-rc3' into next-general
Sync to Linux 5.0-rc3 to pull in the VFS changes which impacted a lot
of the LSM code.
Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init()
is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called
between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific
initialization function is called, we can move these calls from
individual modules to ordered_lsm_init().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small patch to fix a potential NULL dereference on a failed
SELinux policy load"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy
Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT
flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in
selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called
in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in
selinux_inode_notifysecctx().
This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the
'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been
explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been
remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as
having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one.
Steps to reproduce:
# mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
# umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
Result before:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Result after:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling
files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The
'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when
the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS.
While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit
and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new
SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic.
Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit bda0be7ad9 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
switched selinux_inode_follow_link() to use avc_has_perm_flags() and
pass down the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag if called during RCU walk. However,
the only test of MAY_NOT_BLOCK occurs during slow_avc_audit()
and only if passing an inode as audit data (LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE). Since
selinux_inode_follow_link() passes a dentry directly, passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
here serves no purpose. Switch selinux_inode_follow_link() to use
avc_has_perm() and drop avc_has_perm_flags() since there are no other
users.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit 0dc1ba24f7 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
results in no audit messages at all if in permissive mode because the
cache is updated during the rcu walk and thus no denial occurs on
the subsequent ref walk. Fix this by not updating the cache when
performing a non-blocking permission check. This only affects search
and symlink read checks during rcu walk.
Fixes: 0dc1ba24f7 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
Reported-by: BMK <bmktuwien@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure
sens_destroy handles that case correctly.
Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and
msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead
of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and
the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly.
Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provides the security blob pointers.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead
they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
There are no longer users of selinux_is_enabled().
Remove it. As selinux_is_enabled() is the only reason
for include/linux/selinux.h remove that as well.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense
if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this
patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules
and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has
to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure
at some later date.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In preparation for removing CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY, this removes the
soon-to-be redundant SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE. Since explicit
ordering via CONFIG_LSM or "lsm=" will define whether an LSM is enabled or
not, this CONFIG will become effectively ignored, so remove it. However,
in order to stay backward-compatible with "security=selinux", the enable
variable defaults to true.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and
handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates
the selection logic to handle them.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this
moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making
their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all
LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable"
variable.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In preparation for lifting the "is this LSM enabled?" logic out of the
individual LSMs, pass in any special enabled state tracking (as needed
for SELinux, AppArmor, and LoadPin). This should be an "int" to include
handling any future cases where "enabled" is exposed via sysctl which
has no "bool" type.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This adds a flag for the current "major" LSMs to distinguish them when
we have a universal method for ordering all LSMs. It's called "legacy"
since the distinction of "major" will go away in the blob-sharing world.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro:
"Mount API prereqs.
Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor
fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits,
mostly)"
* 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits)
mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT
smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
smack: get rid of match_token()
smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper
LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()
selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit
selinux: switch away from match_token()
selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()
LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts
smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts
selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts
LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()
LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method
nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly
btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use
selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts()
LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount()
new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) New ipset extensions for matching on destination MAC addresses, from
Stefano Brivio.
2) Add ipv4 ttl and tos, plus ipv6 flow label and hop limit offloads to
nfp driver. From Stefano Brivio.
3) Implement GRO for plain UDP sockets, from Paolo Abeni.
4) Lots of work from Michał Mirosław to eliminate the VLAN_TAG_PRESENT
bit so that we could support the entire vlan_tci value.
5) Rework the IPSEC policy lookups to better optimize more usecases,
from Florian Westphal.
6) Infrastructure changes eliminating direct manipulation of SKB lists
wherever possible, and to always use the appropriate SKB list
helpers. This work is still ongoing...
7) Lots of PHY driver and state machine improvements and
simplifications, from Heiner Kallweit.
8) Various TSO deferral refinements, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Add ntuple filter support to aquantia driver, from Dmitry Bogdanov.
10) Batch dropping of XDP packets in tuntap, from Jason Wang.
11) Lots of cleanups and improvements to the r8169 driver from Heiner
Kallweit, including support for ->xmit_more. This driver has been
getting some much needed love since he started working on it.
12) Lots of new forwarding selftests from Petr Machata.
13) Enable VXLAN learning in mlxsw driver, from Ido Schimmel.
14) Packed ring support for virtio, from Tiwei Bie.
15) Add new Aquantia AQtion USB driver, from Dmitry Bezrukov.
16) Add XDP support to dpaa2-eth driver, from Ioana Ciocoi Radulescu.
17) Implement coalescing on TCP backlog queue, from Eric Dumazet.
18) Implement carrier change in tun driver, from Nicolas Dichtel.
19) Support msg_zerocopy in UDP, from Willem de Bruijn.
20) Significantly improve garbage collection of neighbor objects when
the table has many PERMANENT entries, from David Ahern.
21) Remove egdev usage from nfp and mlx5, and remove the facility
completely from the tree as it no longer has any users. From Oz
Shlomo and others.
22) Add a NETDEV_PRE_CHANGEADDR so that drivers can veto the change and
therefore abort the operation before the commit phase (which is the
NETDEV_CHANGEADDR event). From Petr Machata.
23) Add indirect call wrappers to avoid retpoline overhead, and use them
in the GRO code paths. From Paolo Abeni.
24) Add support for netlink FDB get operations, from Roopa Prabhu.
25) Support bloom filter in mlxsw driver, from Nir Dotan.
26) Add SKB extension infrastructure. This consolidates the handling of
the auxiliary SKB data used by IPSEC and bridge netfilter, and is
designed to support the needs to MPTCP which could be integrated in
the future.
27) Lots of XDP TX optimizations in mlx5 from Tariq Toukan.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1845 commits)
net: dccp: fix kernel crash on module load
drivers/net: appletalk/cops: remove redundant if statement and mask
bnx2x: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bnx2x_del_all_vlans() on some hw
net/net_namespace: Check the return value of register_pernet_subsys()
net/netlink_compat: Fix a missing check of nla_parse_nested
ieee802154: lowpan_header_create check must check daddr
net/mlx4_core: drop useless LIST_HEAD
mlxsw: spectrum: drop useless LIST_HEAD
net/mlx5e: drop useless LIST_HEAD
iptunnel: Set tun_flags in the iptunnel_metadata_reply from src
net/mlx5e: fix semicolon.cocci warnings
staging: octeon: fix build failure with XFRM enabled
net: Revert recent Spectre-v1 patches.
can: af_can: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
packet: validate address length if non-zero
nfc: af_nfc: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
net: core: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
net: minor cleanup in skb_ext_add()
net: drop the unused helper skb_ext_get()
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181224' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux patches from Paul Moore:
"I already used my best holiday pull request lines in the audit pull
request, so this one is going to be a bit more boring, sorry about
that. To make up for this, we do have a birthday of sorts to
celebrate: SELinux turns 18 years old this December. Perhaps not the
most exciting thing in the world for most people, but I think it's
safe to say that anyone reading this email doesn't exactly fall into
the "most people" category.
Back to business and the pull request itself:
Ondrej has five patches in this pull request and I lump them into
three categories: one patch to always allow submounts (using similar
logic to elsewhere in the kernel), one to fix some issues with the
SELinux policydb, and the others to cleanup and improve the SELinux
sidtab.
The other patches from Alexey and Petr and trivial fixes that are
adequately described in their respective subject lines.
With this last pull request of the year, I want to thank everyone who
has contributed patches, testing, and reviews to the SELinux project
this year, and the past 18 years. Like any good open source effort,
SELinux is only as good as the community which supports it, and I'm
very happy that we have the community we do - thank you all!"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181224' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance
selinux: use separate table for initial SID lookup
selinux: make "selinux_policycap_names[]" const char *
selinux: always allow mounting submounts
selinux: refactor sidtab conversion
Documentation: Update SELinux reference policy URL
selinux: policydb - fix byte order and alignment issues
Adding options to growing mnt_opts. NFS kludge with passing
context= down into non-text-options mount switched to it, and
with that the last use of ->sb_parse_opts_str() is gone.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
make it use selinux_add_opt() and avoid separate copies - gather
non-LSM options by memmove() in place
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
It's not a good fit, unfortunately, and the next step will make it
even less so. Open-code what we need here.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
the guts of the loop in selinux_parse_opts_str() - takes one
(already recognized) option and adds it to growing selinux_mnt_opts.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
none of the convolutions needed, just 4 strings, TYVM...
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the
moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off
with private structures with several strings in those, rather than
this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays"
ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without
disrupting anything outside of given module.
Changes:
* instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer
initialized to NULL.
* security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and
security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **);
call sites are unchanged.
* security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take
it by value (i.e. as void *).
* new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does
whatever freeing that needs to be done.
* ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as
mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty".
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
it's much easier to just do the right thing in ->sb_show_options(),
without bothering with allocating and populating arrays, etc.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Kill ->sb_copy_data() - it's used only in combination with immediately
following ->sb_parse_opts_str(). Turn that combination into a new
method.
This is just a mechanical move - cleanups will be the next step.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... leaving the "is it kernel-internal" logics in the caller.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags. Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
skb_sec_path gains 'const' qualifier to avoid
xt_policy.c: 'skb_sec_path' discards 'const' qualifier from pointer target type
same reasoning as previous conversions: Won't need to touch these
spots anymore when skb->sp is removed.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen
and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new
entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM.
Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of
distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't
handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the
following reproducer:
while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done &
for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do
runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break
# or:
# chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break
done
This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during
policy reload, thus solving the above problem.
The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated
sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets
indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages:
1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in
logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups)
and can still be done safely without locking.
2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after
acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be
searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a
new entry are now about twice as fast.
3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible
to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion.
The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up
to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about
4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32
entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point
the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway...
The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that
each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for
kmalloc() to handle.
Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent
logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the
hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries.
The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but
it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the
contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its
effectivity, not the correctness of lookups.
Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple
stress test:
```
function rand_cat() {
echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}
function do_work() {
while true; do
echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
>/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
done
}
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done
kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```
Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38
Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com>
Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts]
[PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This moves handling of initial SIDs into a separate table. Note that the
SIDs stored in the main table are now shifted by SECINITSID_NUM and
converted to/from the actual SIDs transparently by helper functions.
This change doesn't make much sense on its own, but it simplifies
further sidtab overhaul in a succeeding patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fixed some checkpatch warnings on line length, whitespace]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181129' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One more SELinux fix for v4.20: add some missing netlink message to
SELinux permission mappings. The netlink messages were added in v4.19,
but unfortunately we didn't catch it then because the mechanism to
catch these things was bypassed.
In addition to adding the mappings, we're adding some comments to the
code to hopefully prevent bypasses in the future"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181129' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: add support for RTM_NEWCHAIN, RTM_DELCHAIN, and RTM_GETCHAIN
Commit 32a4f5ecd7 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
added new RTM_* definitions without properly updating SELinux, this
patch adds the necessary SELinux support.
While there was a BUILD_BUG_ON() in the SELinux code to protect from
exactly this case, it was bypassed in the broken commit. In order to
hopefully prevent this from happening in the future, add additional
comments which provide some instructions on how to resolve the
BUILD_BUG_ON() failures.
Fixes: 32a4f5ecd7 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If a superblock has the MS_SUBMOUNT flag set, we should always allow
mounting it. These mounts are done automatically by the kernel either as
part of mounting some parent mount (e.g. debugfs always mounts tracefs
under "tracing" for compatibility) or they are mounted automatically as
needed on subdirectory accesses (e.g. NFS crossmnt mounts). Since such
automounts are either an implicit consequence of the parent mount (which
is already checked) or they can happen during regular accesses (where it
doesn't make sense to check against the current task's context), the
mount permission check should be skipped for them.
Without this patch, attempts to access contents of an automounted
directory can cause unexpected SELinux denials.
In the current kernel tree, the MS_SUBMOUNT flag is set only via
vfs_submount(), which is called only from the following places:
- AFS, when automounting special "symlinks" referencing other cells
- CIFS, when automounting "referrals"
- NFS, when automounting subtrees
- debugfs, when automounting tracefs
In all cases the submounts are meant to be transparent to the user and
it makes sense that if mounting the master is allowed, then so should be
the automounts. Note that CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability checking is already
skipped for (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT) in:
- sget_userns() in fs/super.c:
if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) &&
!(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- sget() in fs/super.c:
/* Ensure the requestor has permissions over the target filesystem */
if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
Verified internally on patched RHEL 7.6 with a reproducer using
NFS+httpd and selinux-tesuite.
Fixes: 93faccbbfa ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This is a purely cosmetic change that encapsulates the three-step sidtab
conversion logic (shutdown -> clone -> map) into a single function
defined in sidtab.c (as opposed to services.c).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespaces fixes to make checkpatch happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small SELinux fixes for v4.20.
Ondrej's patch adds a check on user input, and my patch ensures we
don't look past the end of a buffer.
Both patches are quite small and pass the selinux-testsuite"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix non-MLS handling in mls_context_to_sid()
selinux: check length properly in SCTP bind hook
Commit 95ffe19420 ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make
it stricter") inadvertently changed how we handle labels that did not
contain MLS information. This patch restores the proper behavior in
mls_context_to_sid() and adds a comment explaining the proper
behavior to help ensure this doesn't happen again.
Fixes: 95ffe19420 ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter")
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux_sctp_bind_connect() must verify if the address buffer has
sufficient length before accessing the 'sa_family' field. See
__sctp_connect() for a similar check.
The length of the whole address ('len') is already checked in the
callees.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Fixes: d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.17+
Cc: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Do the LE conversions before doing the Infiniband-related range checks.
The incorrect checks are otherwise causing a failure to load any policy
with an ibendportcon rule on BE systems. This can be reproduced by
running (on e.g. ppc64):
cat >my_module.cil <<EOF
(type test_ibendport_t)
(roletype object_r test_ibendport_t)
(ibendportcon mlx4_0 1 (system_u object_r test_ibendport_t ((s0) (s0))))
EOF
semodule -i my_module.cil
Also, fix loading/storing the 64-bit subnet prefix for OCON_IBPKEY to
use a correctly aligned buffer.
Finally, do not use the 'nodebuf' (u32) buffer where 'buf' (__le32)
should be used instead.
Tested internally on a ppc64 machine with a RHEL 7 kernel with this
patch applied.
Cc: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+
Fixes: a806f7a161 ("selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband support")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, there are a couple of minor updates, as well as some
reworking of the LSM initialization code from Kees Cook (these prepare
the way for ordered stackable LSMs, but are a valuable cleanup on
their own)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
LSM: Remove initcall tracing
LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
security: fix LSM description location
keys: Fix the use of the C++ keyword "private" in uapi/linux/keyctl.h
seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely()
security: tomoyo: Fix obsolete function
security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVAL
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181022' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux patches for v4.20, all fall under the bug-fix or
behave-better category, which is good. All three have pretty good
descriptions too, which is even better"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181022' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: Add __GFP_NOWARN to allocation at str_read()
selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter
selinux: fix mounting of cgroup2 under older policies
In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include
the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the
contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops
the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding
member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is
much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying
around in the kernel.
The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is
including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in
the kernel that embed struct siginfo.
So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the
traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that
is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to
128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo.
The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h
A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have
the same field offsets.
To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same
size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
this case.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The intended behavior change for this patch is to reject any MLS strings
that contain (trailing) garbage if p->mls_enabled is true.
As suggested by Paul Moore, change mls_context_to_sid() so that the two
parts of the range are extracted before the rest of the parsing. Because
now we don't have to scan for two different separators simultaneously
everywhere, we can actually switch to strchr() everywhere instead of the
open-coded loops that scan for two separators at once.
mls_context_to_sid() used to signal how much of the input string was parsed
by updating `*scontext`. However, there is actually no case in which
mls_context_to_sid() only parses a subset of the input and still returns
a success (other than the buggy case with a second '-' in which it
incorrectly claims to have consumed the entire string). Turn `scontext`
into a simple pointer argument and stop redundantly checking whether the
entire input was consumed in string_to_context_struct(). This also lets us
remove the `scontext_len` argument from `string_to_context_struct()`.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
[PM: minor merge fuzz in convert_context()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit 901ef845fa ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
broke mounting of cgroup2 under older SELinux policies which lacked
a genfscon rule for cgroup2. This prevents mounting of cgroup2 even
when SELinux is permissive.
Change the handling when there is no genfscon rule in policy to
just mark the inode unlabeled and not return an error to the caller.
This permits mounting and access if allowed by policy, e.g. to
unconfined domains.
I also considered changing the behavior of security_genfs_sid() to
never return -ENOENT, but the current behavior is relied upon by
other callers to perform caller-specific handling.
Fixes: 901ef845fa ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
- Gustavo A. R. Silva keeps working on the implicit switch fallthru
changes.
- Support 802.11ax High-Efficiency wireless in cfg80211 et al, From
Luca Coelho.
- Re-enable ASPM in r8169, from Kai-Heng Feng.
- Add virtual XFRM interfaces, which avoids all of the limitations of
existing IPSEC tunnels. From Steffen Klassert.
- Convert GRO over to use a hash table, so that when we have many
flows active we don't traverse a long list during accumluation.
- Many new self tests for routing, TC, tunnels, etc. Too many
contributors to mention them all, but I'm really happy to keep
seeing this stuff.
- Hardware timestamping support for dpaa_eth/fsl-fman from Yangbo Lu.
- Lots of cleanups and fixes in L2TP code from Guillaume Nault.
- Add IPSEC offload support to netdevsim, from Shannon Nelson.
- Add support for slotting with non-uniform distribution to netem
packet scheduler, from Yousuk Seung.
- Add UDP GSO support to mlx5e, from Boris Pismenny.
- Support offloading of Team LAG in NFP, from John Hurley.
- Allow to configure TX queue selection based upon RX queue, from
Amritha Nambiar.
- Support ethtool ring size configuration in aquantia, from Anton
Mikaev.
- Support DSCP and flowlabel per-transport in SCTP, from Xin Long.
- Support list based batching and stack traversal of SKBs, this is
very exciting work. From Edward Cree.
- Busyloop optimizations in vhost_net, from Toshiaki Makita.
- Introduce the ETF qdisc, which allows time based transmissions. IGB
can offload this in hardware. From Vinicius Costa Gomes.
- Add parameter support to devlink, from Moshe Shemesh.
- Several multiplication and division optimizations for BPF JIT in
nfp driver, from Jiong Wang.
- Lots of prepatory work to make more of the packet scheduler layer
lockless, when possible, from Vlad Buslov.
- Add ACK filter and NAT awareness to sch_cake packet scheduler, from
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.
- Support regions and region snapshots in devlink, from Alex Vesker.
- Allow to attach XDP programs to both HW and SW at the same time on
a given device, with initial support in nfp. From Jakub Kicinski.
- Add TLS RX offload and support in mlx5, from Ilya Lesokhin.
- Use PHYLIB in r8169 driver, from Heiner Kallweit.
- All sorts of changes to support Spectrum 2 in mlxsw driver, from
Ido Schimmel.
- PTP support in mv88e6xxx DSA driver, from Andrew Lunn.
- Make TCP_USER_TIMEOUT socket option more accurate, from Jon
Maxwell.
- Support for templates in packet scheduler classifier, from Jiri
Pirko.
- IPV6 support in RDS, from Ka-Cheong Poon.
- Native tproxy support in nf_tables, from Máté Eckl.
- Maintain IP fragment queue in an rbtree, but optimize properly for
in-order frags. From Peter Oskolkov.
- Improvde handling of ACKs on hole repairs, from Yuchung Cheng"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1996 commits)
bpf: test: fix spelling mistake "REUSEEPORT" -> "REUSEPORT"
hv/netvsc: Fix NULL dereference at single queue mode fallback
net: filter: mark expected switch fall-through
xen-netfront: fix warn message as irq device name has '/'
cxgb4: Add new T5 PCI device ids 0x50af and 0x50b0
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: missing unlock on error path
rds: fix building with IPV6=m
inet/connection_sock: prefer _THIS_IP_ to current_text_addr
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: bitwise vs logical bug
net: sock_diag: Fix spectre v1 gadget in __sock_diag_cmd()
ieee802154: hwsim: using right kind of iteration
net: hns3: Add vlan filter setting by ethtool command -K
net: hns3: Set tx ring' tc info when netdev is up
net: hns3: Remove tx ring BD len register in hns3_enet
net: hns3: Fix desc num set to default when setting channel
net: hns3: Fix for phy link issue when using marvell phy driver
net: hns3: Fix for information of phydev lost problem when down/up
net: hns3: Fix for command format parsing error in hclge_is_all_function_id_zero
net: hns3: Add support for serdes loopback selftest
bnxt_en: take coredump_record structure off stack
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"There are 16 patches in here but really only one that is of any
significance. That one patch is by nixiaoming and fixes a few places
where we were not properly cleaning up dentry and inode objects in the
selinuxfs error handling code. The rest are either printk->pr_*
conversions, constification tweaks, and a minor tweak to MAINTAINERS.
Everything passes the selinux-testsuite and looks to merge cleanly
against your master branch"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: cleanup dentry and inodes on error in selinuxfs
selinux: constify write_op[]
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netnode
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avc
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netif
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netport
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in sidtab
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netlink
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in selinuxfs
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in services
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avtab
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in hooks
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in policydb
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in ebitmap
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in conditional
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM and SELinux subsystems
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers
- Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of
kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file
descriptor, from Mimi Zohar.
- Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than
just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from
Mimi.
- Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if
using signed firmware), from Mimi.
- Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be
measured by IMA, from Mimi.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()
security: export security_kernel_load_data function
ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)
module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
ima: add build time policy
ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback
ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
Pull vfs open-related updates from Al Viro:
- "do we need fput() or put_filp()" rules are gone - it's always fput()
now. We keep track of that state where it belongs - in ->f_mode.
- int *opened mess killed - in finish_open(), in ->atomic_open()
instances and in fs/namei.c code around do_last()/lookup_open()/atomic_open().
- alloc_file() wrappers with saner calling conventions are introduced
(alloc_file_clone() and alloc_file_pseudo()); callers converted, with
much simplification.
- while we are at it, saner calling conventions for path_init() and
link_path_walk(), simplifying things inside fs/namei.c (both on
open-related paths and elsewhere).
* 'work.open3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (40 commits)
few more cleanups of link_path_walk() callers
allow link_path_walk() to take ERR_PTR()
make path_init() unconditionally paired with terminate_walk()
document alloc_file() changes
make alloc_file() static
do_shmat(): grab shp->shm_file earlier, switch to alloc_file_clone()
new helper: alloc_file_clone()
create_pipe_files(): switch the first allocation to alloc_file_pseudo()
anon_inode_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
hugetlb_file_setup(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
ocxlflash_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
cxl_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
... and switch shmem_file_setup() to alloc_file_pseudo()
__shmem_file_setup(): reorder allocations
new wrapper: alloc_file_pseudo()
kill FILE_{CREATED,OPENED}
switch atomic_open() and lookup_open() to returning 0 in all success cases
document ->atomic_open() changes
->atomic_open(): return 0 in all success cases
get rid of 'opened' in path_openat() and the helpers downstream
...
If the resource requested by d_alloc_name is not added to the linked
list through d_add, then dput needs to be called to release the
subsequent abnormal branch to avoid resource leakage.
Add missing dput to selinuxfs.c
Signed-off-by: nixiaoming <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Allow user to create, destroy, get and dump chain objects. Do that by
extending rtnl commands by the chain-specific ones. User will now be
able to explicitly create or destroy chains (so far this was done only
automatically according the filter/act needs and refcounting). Also, the
user will receive notification about any chain creation or destuction.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly
or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch
replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new
security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes
in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One fairly straightforward patch to fix a longstanding issue where a
process could stall while accessing files in selinuxfs and block
everyone else due to a held mutex.
The patch passes all our tests and looks to apply cleanly to your
current tree"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions
If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace
buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can
stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held.
For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem
to access anything that requires locking.
For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region.
For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access
up above the locked region.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings and
replace KERN_CONT with 2 longer prints.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
[PM: fixed some missing newlines identified by Joe Perches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings.
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add Maglev hashing scheduler to IPVS, from Inju Song.
2) Lots of new TC subsystem tests from Roman Mashak.
3) Add TCP zero copy receive and fix delayed acks and autotuning with
SO_RCVLOWAT, from Eric Dumazet.
4) Add XDP_REDIRECT support to mlx5 driver, from Jesper Dangaard
Brouer.
5) Add ttl inherit support to vxlan, from Hangbin Liu.
6) Properly separate ipv6 routes into their logically independant
components. fib6_info for the routing table, and fib6_nh for sets of
nexthops, which thus can be shared. From David Ahern.
7) Add bpf_xdp_adjust_tail helper, which can be used to generate ICMP
messages from XDP programs. From Nikita V. Shirokov.
8) Lots of long overdue cleanups to the r8169 driver, from Heiner
Kallweit.
9) Add BTF ("BPF Type Format"), from Martin KaFai Lau.
10) Add traffic condition monitoring to iwlwifi, from Luca Coelho.
11) Plumb extack down into fib_rules, from Roopa Prabhu.
12) Add Flower classifier offload support to igb, from Vinicius Costa
Gomes.
13) Add UDP GSO support, from Willem de Bruijn.
14) Add documentation for eBPF helpers, from Quentin Monnet.
15) Add TLS tx offload to mlx5, from Ilya Lesokhin.
16) Allow applications to be given the number of bytes available to read
on a socket via a control message returned from recvmsg(), from
Soheil Hassas Yeganeh.
17) Add x86_32 eBPF JIT compiler, from Wang YanQing.
18) Add AF_XDP sockets, with zerocopy support infrastructure as well.
From Björn Töpel.
19) Remove indirect load support from all of the BPF JITs and handle
these operations in the verifier by translating them into native BPF
instead. From Daniel Borkmann.
20) Add GRO support to ipv6 gre tunnels, from Eran Ben Elisha.
21) Allow XDP programs to do lookups in the main kernel routing tables
for forwarding. From David Ahern.
22) Allow drivers to store hardware state into an ELF section of kernel
dump vmcore files, and use it in cxgb4. From Rahul Lakkireddy.
23) Various RACK and loss detection improvements in TCP, from Yuchung
Cheng.
24) Add TCP SACK compression, from Eric Dumazet.
25) Add User Mode Helper support and basic bpfilter infrastructure, from
Alexei Starovoitov.
26) Support ports and protocol values in RTM_GETROUTE, from Roopa
Prabhu.
27) Support bulking in ->ndo_xdp_xmit() API, from Jesper Dangaard
Brouer.
28) Add lots of forwarding selftests, from Petr Machata.
29) Add generic network device failover driver, from Sridhar Samudrala.
* ra.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1959 commits)
strparser: Add __strp_unpause and use it in ktls.
rxrpc: Fix terminal retransmission connection ID to include the channel
net: hns3: Optimize PF CMDQ interrupt switching process
net: hns3: Fix for VF mailbox receiving unknown message
net: hns3: Fix for VF mailbox cannot receiving PF response
bnx2x: use the right constant
Revert "net: sched: cls: Fix offloading when ingress dev is vxlan"
net: dsa: b53: Fix for brcm tag issue in Cygnus SoC
enic: fix UDP rss bits
netdev-FAQ: clarify DaveM's position for stable backports
rtnetlink: validate attributes in do_setlink()
mlxsw: Add extack messages for port_{un, }split failures
netdevsim: Add extack error message for devlink reload
devlink: Add extack to reload and port_{un, }split operations
net: metrics: add proper netlink validation
ipmr: fix error path when ipmr_new_table fails
ip6mr: only set ip6mr_table from setsockopt when ip6mr_new_table succeeds
net: hns3: remove unused hclgevf_cfg_func_mta_filter
netfilter: provide udp*_lib_lookup for nf_tproxy
qed*: Utilize FW 8.37.2.0
...
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another reasonable chunk of audit changes for v4.18, thirteen patches
in total.
The thirteen patches can mostly be broken down into one of four
categories: general bug fixes, accessor functions for audit state
stored in the task_struct, negative filter matches on executable
names, and extending the (relatively) new seccomp logging knobs to the
audit subsystem.
The main driver for the accessor functions from Richard are the
changes we're working on to associate audit events with containers,
but I think they have some standalone value too so I figured it would
be good to get them in now.
The seccomp/audit patches from Tyler apply the seccomp logging
improvements from a few releases ago to audit's seccomp logging;
starting with this patchset the changes in
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged should apply to both the
standard kernel logging and audit.
As usual, everything passes the audit-testsuite and it happens to
merge cleanly with your tree"
[ Heh, except it had trivial merge conflicts with the SELinux tree that
also came in from Paul - Linus ]
* tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID
audit: use existing session info function
audit: normalize loginuid read access
audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged
audit: use inline function to set audit context
audit: use inline function to get audit context
audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro
seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging
seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl
seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string
seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl
audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable
audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"SELinux is back with a quiet pull request for v4.18. Three patches,
all small: two cleanups of the SELinux audit records, and one to
migrate to a newly defined type (vm_fault_t).
Everything passes our test suite, and as of about five minutes ago it
merged cleanly with your tree"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record
audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record
security: selinux: Change return type to vm_fault_t
Pull security system updates from James Morris:
- incorporate new socketpair() hook into LSM and wire up the SELinux
and Smack modules. From David Herrmann:
"The idea is to allow SO_PEERSEC to be called on AF_UNIX sockets
created via socketpair(2), and return the same information as if
you emulated socketpair(2) via a temporary listener socket.
Right now SO_PEERSEC will return the unlabeled credentials for a
socketpair, rather than the actual credentials of the creating
process."
- remove the unused security_settime LSM hook (Sargun Dhillon).
- remove some stack allocated arrays from the keys code (Tycho
Andersen)
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes
dh key: get rid of stack allocated array
big key: get rid of stack array allocation
smack: provide socketpair callback
selinux: provide socketpair callback
net: hook socketpair() into LSM
security: add hook for socketpair()
security: remove security_settime
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Misc bits and pieces not fitting into anything more specific"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
vfs: delete unnecessary assignment in vfs_listxattr
Documentation: filesystems: update filesystem locking documentation
vfs: namei: use path_equal() in follow_dotdot()
fs.h: fix outdated comment about file flags
__inode_security_revalidate() never gets NULL opt_dentry
make xattr_getsecurity() static
vfat: simplify checks in vfat_lookup()
get rid of dead code in d_find_alias()
it's SB_BORN, not MS_BORN...
msdos_rmdir(): kill BS comment
remove rpc_rmdir()
fs: avoid fdput() after failed fdget() in vfs_dedupe_file_range()
Filling in the padding slot in the bpf structure as a bug fix in 'ne'
overlapped with actually using that padding area for something in
'net-next'.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180530' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One more small fix for SELinux: a small string length fix found by
KASAN.
I dislike sending patches this late in the release cycle, but this
patch fixes a legitimate problem, is very small, limited in scope, and
well understood.
There are two threads with more information on the problem, the latest
is linked below:
https://marc.info/?t=152723737400001&r=1&w=2
Stephen points out in the thread linked above:
'Such a setxattr() call can only be performed by a process with
CAP_MAC_ADMIN that is also allowed mac_admin permission in SELinux
policy. Consequently, this is never possible on Android (no process
is allowed mac_admin permission, always enforcing) and is only
possible in Fedora/RHEL for a few domains (if enforcing)'"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180530' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity
Call trace:
[<ffffff9203a8d7a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428
[<ffffff9203a8dbf8>] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[<ffffff920409bfb8>] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124
[<ffffff9203d187e8>] print_address_description+0x68/0x258
[<ffffff9203d18c00>] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0
[<ffffff9203d1927c>] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffff9203d1776c>] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0
[<ffffff9203d17cdc>] memcpy+0x34/0x68
[<ffffff9203d75348>] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160
[<ffffff9203d75490>] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120
[<ffffff9203d75d68>] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8
[<ffffff9203d76fb4>] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0
[<ffffff9203a83f70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an
embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr()
on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string,
it would result in a panic.
To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context
instead of the length passed by the userspace process.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover <sgrover@codeaurora.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
S390 bpf_jit.S is removed in net-next and had changes in 'net',
since that code isn't used any more take the removal.
TLS data structures split the TX and RX components in 'net-next',
put the new struct members from the bug fix in 'net' into the RX
part.
The 'net-next' tree had some reworking of how the ERSPAN code works in
the GRE tunneling code, overlapping with a one-line headroom
calculation fix in 'net'.
Overlapping changes in __sock_map_ctx_update_elem(), keep the bits
that read the prog members via READ_ONCE() into local variables
before using them.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"Assorted fixes all over the place"
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
aio: fix io_destroy(2) vs. lookup_ioctx() race
ext2: fix a block leak
nfsd: vfs_mkdir() might succeed leaving dentry negative unhashed
cachefiles: vfs_mkdir() might succeed leaving dentry negative unhashed
unfuck sysfs_mount()
kernfs: deal with kernfs_fill_super() failures
cramfs: Fix IS_ENABLED typo
befs_lookup(): use d_splice_alias()
affs_lookup: switch to d_splice_alias()
affs_lookup(): close a race with affs_remove_link()
fix breakage caused by d_find_alias() semantics change
fs: don't scan the inode cache before SB_BORN is set
do d_instantiate/unlock_new_inode combinations safely
iov_iter: fix memory leak in pipe_get_pages_alloc()
iov_iter: fix return type of __pipe_get_pages()
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180516' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"A small pull request to fix a few regressions in the SELinux/SCTP code
with applications that call bind() with AF_UNSPEC/INADDR_ANY.
The individual commit descriptions have more information, but the
commits themselves should be self explanatory"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180516' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: correctly handle sa_family cases in selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
selinux: fix address family in bind() and connect() to match address/port
selinux: add AF_UNSPEC and INADDR_ANY checks to selinux_socket_bind()
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an
access function to retrieve the audit context pointer for the task
rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in auditsc.c and selinuxfs.c, checkpatch.pl fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Allow to pass the socket address structure with AF_UNSPEC family for
compatibility purposes. selinux_socket_bind() will further check it
for INADDR_ANY and selinux_socket_connect_helper() should return
EINVAL.
For a bad address family return EINVAL instead of AFNOSUPPORT error,
i.e. what is expected from SCTP protocol in such case.
Fixes: d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since sctp_bindx() and sctp_connectx() can have multiple addresses,
sk_family can differ from sa_family. Therefore, selinux_socket_bind()
and selinux_socket_connect_helper(), which process sockaddr structure
(address and port), should use the address family from that structure
too, and not from the socket one.
The initialization of the data for the audit record is moved above,
in selinux_socket_bind(), so that there is no duplicate changes and
code.
Fixes: d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support") breaks compatibility
with the old programs that can pass sockaddr_in structure with AF_UNSPEC
and INADDR_ANY to bind(). As a result, bind() returns EAFNOSUPPORT error.
This was found with LTP/asapi_01 test.
Similar to commit 29c486df6a ("net: ipv4: relax AF_INET check in
bind()"), which relaxed AF_INET check for compatibility, add AF_UNSPEC
case to AF_INET and make sure that the address is INADDR_ANY.
Fixes: d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
"VFS: don't keep disconnected dentries on d_anon" had a non-trivial
side-effect - d_unhashed() now returns true for those dentries,
making d_find_alias() skip them altogether. For most of its callers
that's fine - we really want a connected alias there. However,
there is a codepath where we relied upon picking such aliases
if nothing else could be found - selinux delayed initialization
of contexts for inodes on already mounted filesystems used to
rely upon that.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # f1ee616214 "VFS: don't keep disconnected dentries on d_anon"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Make sure to implement the new socketpair callback so the SO_PEERSEC
call on socketpair(2)s will return correct information.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Buildable skeleton of AF_XDP without any functionality. Just what it
takes to register a new address family.
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The audit MAC_POLICY_LOAD record had redundant dangling keywords and was
missing information about which LSM was responsible and its completion
status. While this record is only issued on success, the parser expects
the res= field to be present.
Old record:
type=MAC_POLICY_LOAD msg=audit(1479299795.404:43): policy loaded auid=0 ses=1
Delete the redundant dangling keywords, add the lsm= field and the res=
field.
New record:
type=MAC_POLICY_LOAD msg=audit(1523293846.204:894): auid=0 ses=1 lsm=selinux res=1
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/47
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There were two formats of the audit MAC_STATUS record, one of which was more
standard than the other. One listed enforcing status changes and the
other listed enabled status changes with a non-standard label. In
addition, the record was missing information about which LSM was
responsible and the operation's completion status. While this record is
only issued on success, the parser expects the res= field to be present.
old enforcing/permissive:
type=MAC_STATUS msg=audit(1523312831.378:24514): enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=0 ses=1
old enable/disable:
type=MAC_STATUS msg=audit(1523312831.378:24514): selinux=0 auid=0 ses=1
List both sets of status and old values and add the lsm= field and the
res= field.
Here is the new format:
type=MAC_STATUS msg=audit(1523293828.657:891): enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=0 ses=1 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=selinux res=1
This record already accompanied a SYSCALL record.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/46
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: 80-char fixes, merge fuzz, use new SELinux state functions]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler
in struct vm_operations_struct.
Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting msq ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/msg (0444) and the MSG_STAT shmctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the msq metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new MSG_STAT_ANY command such that the msq ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/sem (0444) and the SEM_STAT semctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the sma metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new SEM_STAT_ANY command such that the sem ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-3-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "sysvipc: introduce STAT_ANY commands", v2.
The following patches adds the discussed (see [1]) new command for shm
as well as for sems and msq as they are subject to the same
discrepancies for ipc object permission checks between the syscall and
via procfs. These new commands are justified in that (1) we are stuck
with this semantics as changing syscall and procfs can break userland;
and (2) some users can benefit from performance (for large amounts of
shm segments, for example) from not having to parse the procfs
interface.
Once merged, I will submit the necesary manpage updates. But I'm thinking
something like:
: diff --git a/man2/shmctl.2 b/man2/shmctl.2
: index 7bb503999941..bb00bbe21a57 100644
: --- a/man2/shmctl.2
: +++ b/man2/shmctl.2
: @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
: .\" 2005-04-25, mtk -- noted aberrant Linux behavior w.r.t. new
: .\" attaches to a segment that has already been marked for deletion.
: .\" 2005-08-02, mtk: Added IPC_INFO, SHM_INFO, SHM_STAT descriptions.
: +.\" 2018-02-13, dbueso: Added SHM_STAT_ANY description.
: .\"
: .TH SHMCTL 2 2017-09-15 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
: .SH NAME
: @@ -242,6 +243,18 @@ However, the
: argument is not a segment identifier, but instead an index into
: the kernel's internal array that maintains information about
: all shared memory segments on the system.
: +.TP
: +.BR SHM_STAT_ANY " (Linux-specific)"
: +Return a
: +.I shmid_ds
: +structure as for
: +.BR SHM_STAT .
: +However, the
: +.I shm_perm.mode
: +is not checked for read access for
: +.IR shmid ,
: +resembing the behaviour of
: +/proc/sysvipc/shm.
: .PP
: The caller can prevent or allow swapping of a shared
: memory segment with the following \fIcmd\fP values:
: @@ -287,7 +300,7 @@ operation returns the index of the highest used entry in the
: kernel's internal array recording information about all
: shared memory segments.
: (This information can be used with repeated
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operations to obtain information about all shared memory segments
: on the system.)
: A successful
: @@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ isn't accessible.
: \fIshmid\fP is not a valid identifier, or \fIcmd\fP
: is not a valid command.
: Or: for a
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operation, the index value specified in
: .I shmid
: referred to an array slot that is currently unused.
This patch (of 3):
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object metadata
between /proc/sysvipc/shm (0444) and the SHM_STAT shmctl command. The
later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO. As such there can
be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the info is displayed
anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the shm metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing all
the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an overlook - so
we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the syscall or the
procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie ipcs). Some
applications require getting the procfs info (without root privileges) and
can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to 500x in some
reported cases.
This patch introduces a new SHM_STAT_ANY command such that the shm ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/220
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit 0619f0f5e3 ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state") triggers a BUG
when SELinux is runtime-disabled (i.e. systemd or equivalent disables
SELinux before initial policy load via /sys/fs/selinux/disable based on
/etc/selinux/config SELINUX=disabled).
This does not manifest if SELinux is disabled via kernel command line
argument or if SELinux is enabled (permissive or enforcing).
Before:
SELinux: Disabled at runtime.
BUG: Dentry 000000006d77e5c7{i=17,n=null} still in use (1) [unmount of selinuxfs selinuxfs]
After:
SELinux: Disabled at runtime.
Fixes: 0619f0f5e3 ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Ondrej Mosnacek