As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch renames some variables in chap_server_compute_hash() to make it
harder to confuse the initiator's challenge with the target's challenge
when the mutual chap authentication is used.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017131037.9903-4-mlombard@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
This patch modifies the chap_server_compute_hash() function to make it
agnostic to the choice of hash algorithm that is used. It also adds
support to three new hash algorithms: SHA1, SHA256 and SHA3-256.
The chap_got_response() function has been removed because the digest type
validity is already checked by chap_server_open()
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191028123822.5864-2-mlombard@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
RFC 2307 states:
For CHAP [RFC1994], in the first step, the initiator MUST send:
CHAP_A=<A1,A2...>
Where A1,A2... are proposed algorithms, in order of preference.
...
For the Algorithm, as stated in [RFC1994], one value is required to
be implemented:
5 (CHAP with MD5)
LIO currently checks for this value by only comparing a single byte in
the tokenized Algorithm string, which means that any value starting with
a '5' (e.g. "55") is interpreted as "CHAP with MD5". Fix this by
comparing the entire tokenized string.
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190912095547.22427-2-ddiss@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Two iscsi fixes. One for an oops in the client which can be triggered
by the server authentication protocol and the other in the target code
which causes data corruption.
Signed-off-by: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi
Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley:
"Two iscsi fixes.
One for an oops in the client which can be triggered by the server
authentication protocol and the other in the target code which causes
data corruption"
* tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
scsi: iscsi: set auth_protocol back to NULL if CHAP_A value is not supported
scsi: target/iblock: Fix overrun in WRITE SAME emulation
If the CHAP_A value is not supported, the chap_server_open() function
should free the auth_protocol pointer and set it to NULL, or we will leave
a dangling pointer around.
[ 66.010905] Unsupported CHAP_A value
[ 66.011660] Security negotiation failed.
[ 66.012443] iSCSI Login negotiation failed.
[ 68.413924] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 68.414962] CPU: 0 PID: 1562 Comm: targetcli Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0-80.el8.x86_64 #1
[ 68.416589] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 68.417677] RIP: 0010:__kmalloc_track_caller+0xc2/0x210
Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Based on 3 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version [author] [kishon] [vijay] [abraham]
[i] [kishon]@[ti] [com] this program is distributed in the hope that
it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied
warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see
the gnu general public license for more details
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version [author] [graeme] [gregory]
[gg]@[slimlogic] [co] [uk] [author] [kishon] [vijay] [abraham] [i]
[kishon]@[ti] [com] [based] [on] [twl6030]_[usb] [c] [author] [hema]
[hk] [hemahk]@[ti] [com] this program is distributed in the hope
that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the
implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1105 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.202006027@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
If chap_server_compute_md5() fails early, e.g. via CHAP_N mismatch, then
crypto_free_shash() is called with a NULL pointer which gets
dereferenced in crypto_shash_tfm().
Fixes: 69110e3ced ("iscsi-target: Use shash and ahash")
Suggested-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
It's not safe to use weak random data here, especially for the challenge
response randomness. Since we're always in process context, it's safe to
simply wait until we have enough randomness to carry out the
authentication correctly.
While we're at it, we clean up a small memleak during an error
condition.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: "Nicholas A. Bellinger" <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Cc: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Remove superfluous #include directives from the include/target/*.h
files. Add missing #include directives to other *.h and *.c files.
Use forward declarations for structures where possible. This
change reduces the build time for make M=drivers/target on my
laptop from 27.1s to 18.7s or by about 30%.
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Bryant G. Ly <bryantly@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch fix spelling typos in printk from various part
of the codes.
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
This patch replaces uses of the long obsolete hash interface with
either shash (for non-SG users) or ahash.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Seems strange to see in include/target/iscsi/iscsi_transport.h:
include "../../../drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_core.h"
Move it to it's natural location.
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
This patch adds a check in chap_server_compute_md5() to enforce a
1024 byte maximum for the CHAP_C key value following the requirement
in RFC-3720 Section 11.1.4:
"..., C and R are large-binary-values and their binary length (not
the length of the character string that represents them in encoded
form) MUST not exceed 1024 bytes."
Reported-by: rahul.rane <rahul.rane@calsoftinc.com>
Tested-by: rahul.rane <rahul.rane@calsoftinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
This patch converts chap_server_compute_md5() from simple_strtoul() to
kstrtoul usage().
This addresses the case where a empty 'CHAP_I=' key value received during
mutual authentication would be converted to a '0' by simple_strtoul(),
instead of failing the login attempt.
Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
Tested-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure
the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication
does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target.
This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1:
Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder
for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication.
Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP
connection if it occurs.
Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.1+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
The target is failing to handle list of CHAP_A key-value pair form
initiator.The target is expecting CHAP_A=5 always. In other cases,
where initiator sends list (for example) CHAP_A=6,5 target is failing
the security negotiation. Which is incorrect.
This patch handles the case (RFC 3720 section 11.1.4).
where in the initiator may send list of CHAP_A values and target replies
with appropriate CHAP_A value in response
(Drop whitespaces + rename to chap_check_algorithm + save original
pointer + add explicit check for CHAP_A key - nab)
Signed-off-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
In iSCSI negotiations with initiator CHAP enabled, usernames with
trailing garbage are permitted, because the string comparison only
checks the strlen of the configured username.
e.g. "usernameXXXXX" will be permitted to match "username".
Just check one more byte so the trailing null char is also matched.
Signed-off-by: Eric Seppanen <eric@purestorage.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.1+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
These just want to return a pointer instead of a value, but are otherwise
the same.
ISCSI_TPG_LUN macro was unused.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Grover <agrover@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Update copyright ownership/year information for target-core,
loopback, iscsi-target, tcm_qla2xx, vhost and iser-target.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
The result from get_random_bytes should already be random, so further
manipulation and mixing should not be needed.
Signed-off-by: Andy Grover <agrover@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=916290
Used a temp var since we take its address in sg_init_one.
Signed-off-by: Andy Grover <agrover@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
This patch makes chap_server_compute_md5() use proper unsigned long
usage for the CHAP_I (identifier) and check for values beyond 255 as
per RFC-1994.
Reported-by: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
A reader should spend an extra moment whenever noticing a cast,
because either something special is going on that deserves extra
attention or, as is all too often the case, the code is wrong.
These casts, afaics, have all been useless. They cast a foo* to a
foo*, cast a void* to the assigned type, cast a foo* to void*, before
assigning it to a void* variable, etc.
In a few cases I also removed an additional &...[0], which is equally
useless.
Lastly I added three FIXMEs where, to the best of my judgement, the
code appears to have a bug. It would be good if someone could check
these.
Signed-off-by: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Fix the following compile warning with hex2bin() usage:
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c: In function ‘chap_string_to_hex’:
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c:35: warning: ignoring return value of ‘hex2bin’, declared with attribute warn_unused_result
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
This patch converts chap_string_to_hex() to use hex2bin() instead of
the internal chap_asciihex_to_binaryhex().
(nab: Fix up minor compile breakage + typo)
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Nicholas A. Bellinger" <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
The Linux-iSCSI.org target module is a full featured in-kernel
software implementation of iSCSI target mode (RFC-3720) for the
current WIP mainline target v4.1 infrastructure code for the v3.1
kernel. More information can be found here:
http://linux-iscsi.org/wiki/ISCSI
This includes support for:
* RFC-3720 defined request / response state machines and support for
all defined iSCSI operation codes from Section 10.2.1.2 using libiscsi
include/scsi/iscsi_proto.h PDU definitions
* Target v4.1 compatible control plane using the generic layout in
target_core_fabric_configfs.c and fabric dependent attributes
within /sys/kernel/config/target/iscsi/ subdirectories.
* Target v4.1 compatible iSCSI statistics based on RFC-4544 (iSCSI MIBS)
* Support for IPv6 and IPv4 network portals in M:N mapping to TPGs
* iSCSI Error Recovery Hierarchy support
* Per iSCSI connection RX/TX thread pair scheduling affinity
* crc32c + crc32c_intel SSEv4 instruction offload support using libcrypto
* CHAP Authentication support using libcrypto
* Conversion to use internal SGl allocation with iscsit_alloc_buffs() ->
transport_generic_map_mem_to_cmd()
(nab: Fix iscsi_proto.h struct scsi_lun usage from linux-next in commit:
iscsi: Use struct scsi_lun in iscsi structs instead of u8[8])
(nab: Fix 32-bit compile warnings)
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Grover <agrover@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland Dreier <roland@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Waiman Long