Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
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extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 23 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.458548087@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The squashfs fragment reading code doesn't actually verify that the
fragment is inside the fragment table. The end result _is_ verified to
be inside the image when actually reading the fragment data, but before
that is done, we may end up taking a page fault because the fragment
table itself might not even exist.
Another report from Anatoly and his endless squashfs image fuzzing.
Reported-by: Анатолий Тросиненко <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Acked-by:: Phillip Lougher <phillip.lougher@gmail.com>,
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Anatoly Trosinenko reports that a corrupted squashfs image can cause a
kernel oops. It turns out that squashfs can end up being confused about
negative fragment lengths.
The regular squashfs_read_data() does check for negative lengths, but
squashfs_read_metadata() did not, and the fragment size code just
blindly trusted the on-disk value. Fix both the fragment parsing and
the metadata reading code.
Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
My existing email address may stop working in a month or two, so update
email to one that will continue working.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@lougher.demon.co.uk>
Fsfuzzer generates corrupted filesystems which throw a warn_on in
kmalloc. One of these is due to a corrupted superblock fragments field.
Fix this by checking that the number of bytes to be read (and allocated)
does not extend into the next filesystem structure.
Also add a couple of other sanity checks of the mount-time fragment table
structures.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@lougher.demon.co.uk>
Move squashfs_i() definition out of squashfs.h, this eliminates
the need to #include squashfs_fs_i.h from numerous files.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@lougher.demon.co.uk>
Move zlib buffer init/destroy code into separate wrapper file. Also
make zlib z_stream field a void * removing the need to include zlib.h
for most files.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@lougher.demon.co.uk>
Thomas Gleixner