The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some public key algorithms (like EC-DSA) keep in parameters field
important data such as digest and curve OIDs (possibly more for
different EC-DSA variants). Thus, just setting a public key (as
for RSA) is not enough.
Append parameters into the key stream for akcipher_set_{pub,priv}_key.
Appended data is: (u32) algo OID, (u32) parameters length, parameters
data.
This does not affect current akcipher API nor RSA ciphers (they could
ignore it). Idea of appending parameters to the key stream is by Herbert
Xu.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Treat (struct public_key_signature)'s digest same as its signature (s).
Since digest should be already in the kmalloc'd memory do not kmemdup
digest value before calling {public,tpm}_key_verify_signature.
Patch is split from the previous as suggested by Herbert Xu.
Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The sign operation can operate in a non-hashed mode by running the RSA
sign operation directly on the input. This assumes that the input is
less than key_size_in_bytes - 11. Since the TPM performs its own PKCS1
padding, it isn't possible to support 'raw' mode, only 'pkcs1'.
Alternatively, a hashed version is also possible. In this variant the
input is hashed (by userspace) via the selected hash function first.
Then this implementation takes care of converting the hash to ASN.1
format and the sign operation is performed on the result. This is
similar to the implementation inside crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c.
ASN1 templates were copied from crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c. There seems to
be no easy way to expose that functionality, but likely the templates
should be shared somehow.
The sign operation is implemented via TPM_Sign operation on the TPM.
It is assumed that the TPM wrapped key provided uses
TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_DER signature scheme. This allows the TPM_Sign
operation to work on data up to key_len_in_bytes - 11 bytes long.
In theory, we could also use TPM_Unbind instead of TPM_Sign, but we would
have to manually pkcs1 pad the digest first.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch implements the verify_signature operation. The public key
portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used. The operation is
performed entirely in software using the crypto API.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch implements the pkey_decrypt operation using the private key
blob. The blob is first loaded into the TPM via tpm_loadkey2. Once the
handle is obtained, tpm_unbind operation is used to decrypt the data on
the TPM and the result is returned. The key loaded by tpm_loadkey2 is
then evicted via tpm_flushspecific operation.
This patch assumes that the SRK authorization is a well known 20-byte of
zeros and the same holds for the key authorization of the provided key.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands.
Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm
key subtype and a module dependency is introduced.
In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the
asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch impelements the pkey_encrypt operation. The public key
portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used. The operation is
performed entirely in software using the crypto API.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This commit implements the pkey_query operation. This is accomplished
by utilizing the public key portion to obtain max encryption size
information for the operations that utilize the public key (encrypt,
verify). The private key size extracted from the TPM_Key data structure
is used to fill the information where the private key is used (decrypt,
sign).
The kernel uses a DER/BER format for public keys and does not support
setting the key via the raw binary form. To get around this a simple
DER/BER formatter is implemented which stores the DER/BER formatted key
and exponent in a temporary buffer for use by the crypto API.
The only exponent supported currently is 65537. This holds true for
other Linux TPM tools such as 'create_tpm_key' and
trousers-openssl_tpm_engine.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
For TPM based keys, the only standard seems to be described here:
http://david.woodhou.se/draft-woodhouse-cert-best-practice.html#rfc.section.4.4
Quote from the relevant section:
"Rather, a common form of storage for "wrapped" keys is to encode the
binary TCPA_KEY structure in a single ASN.1 OCTET-STRING, and store the
result in PEM format with the tag "-----BEGIN TSS KEY BLOB-----". "
This patch implements the above behavior. It is assumed that the PEM
encoding is stripped out by userspace and only the raw DER/BER format is
provided. This is similar to how PKCS7, PKCS8 and X.509 keys are
handled.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The parsed BER/DER blob obtained from user space contains a TPM_Key
structure. This structure has some information about the key as well as
the public key portion.
This patch extracts this information for future use.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key format [RFC 5208] parser for the
asymmetric key type. For the moment, this will only support unencrypted
DER blobs. PEM and decryption can be added later.
PKCS#8 keys can be loaded like this:
openssl pkcs8 -in private_key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | \
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Implement the encrypt, decrypt and sign operations for the software
asymmetric key subtype. This mostly involves offloading the call to the
crypto layer.
Note that the decrypt and sign operations require a private key to be
supplied. Encrypt (and also verify) will work with either a public or a
private key. A public key can be supplied with an X.509 certificate and a
private key can be supplied using a PKCS#8 blob:
# j=`openssl pkcs8 -in ~/pkcs7/firmwarekey2.priv -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s`
# keyctl pkey_query $j - enc=pkcs1
key_size=4096
max_data_size=512
max_sig_size=512
max_enc_size=512
max_dec_size=512
encrypt=y
decrypt=y
sign=y
verify=y
# keyctl pkey_encrypt $j 0 data enc=pkcs1 >/tmp/enc
# keyctl pkey_decrypt $j 0 /tmp/enc enc=pkcs1 >/tmp/dec
# cmp data /tmp/dec
# keyctl pkey_sign $j 0 data enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 >/tmp/sig
# keyctl pkey_verify $j 0 data /tmp/sig enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1
#
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Put a flag in the public_key struct to indicate if the structure is holding
a private key. The private key must be held ASN.1 encoded in the format
specified in RFC 3447 A.1.2. This is the form required by crypto/rsa.c.
The software encryption subtype's verification and query functions then
need to select the appropriate crypto function to set the key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide a query function for the software public key implementation. This
permits information about such a key to be obtained using
query_asymmetric_key() or KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers fill in the signature encoding type field
recently added to the public_key_signature struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This
include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature
already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this:
int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *enc, void *data);
int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the
encoding for verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Replace the use of a magic number that indicates that verify_*_signature()
should use the secondary keyring with a symbol.
Signed-off-by: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The signatureValue field of a X.509 certificate is encoded as a BIT STRING.
For RSA signatures this BIT STRING is of so-called primitive subtype, which
contains a u8 prefix indicating a count of unused bits in the encoding.
We have to strip this prefix from signature data, just as we already do for
key data in x509_extract_key_data() function.
This wasn't noticed earlier because this prefix byte is zero for RSA key
sizes divisible by 8. Since BIT STRING is a big-endian encoding adding zero
prefixes has no bearing on its value.
The signature length, however was incorrect, which is a problem for RSA
implementations that need it to be exactly correct (like AMD CCP).
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Fixes: c26fd69fa0 ("X.509: Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) X.509 certificates")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Our convention is to distinguish file types by suffixes with a period
as a separator.
*-asn1.[ch] is a different pattern from other generated sources such
as *.lex.c, *.tab.[ch], *.dtb.S, etc. More confusing, files with
'-asn1.[ch]' are generated files, but '_asn1.[ch]' are checked-in
files:
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c
include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.h
include/linux/sunrpc/gss_asn1.h
Rename generated files to *.asn1.[ch] for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
The asymmetric key type allows an X.509 certificate to be added even if
its signature's hash algorithm is not available in the crypto API. In
that case 'payload.data[asym_auth]' will be NULL. But the key
restriction code failed to check for this case before trying to use the
signature, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference in
key_or_keyring_common() or in restrict_link_by_signature().
Fix this by returning -ENOPKG when the signature is unsupported.
Reproducer when all the CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512* options are disabled and
keyctl has support for the 'restrict_keyring' command:
keyctl new_session
keyctl restrict_keyring @s asymmetric builtin_trusted
openssl req -new -sha512 -x509 -batch -nodes -outform der \
| keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s
Fixes: a511e1af8b ("KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The X.509 parser mishandles the case where the certificate's signature's
hash algorithm is not available in the crypto API. In this case,
x509_get_sig_params() doesn't allocate the cert->sig->digest buffer;
this part seems to be intentional. However,
public_key_verify_signature() is still called via
x509_check_for_self_signed(), which triggers the 'BUG_ON(!sig->digest)'.
Fix this by making public_key_verify_signature() return -ENOPKG if the
hash buffer has not been allocated.
Reproducer when all the CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512* options are disabled:
openssl req -new -sha512 -x509 -batch -nodes -outform der \
| keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s
Fixes: 6c2dc5ae4a ("X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier")
Reported-by: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@linaro.org>
Cc: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
If none of the certificates in a SignerInfo's certificate chain match a
trusted key, nor is the last certificate signed by a trusted key, then
pkcs7_validate_trust_one() tries to check whether the SignerInfo's
signature was made directly by a trusted key. But, it actually fails to
set the 'sig' variable correctly, so it actually verifies the last
signature seen. That will only be the SignerInfo's signature if the
certificate chain is empty; otherwise it will actually be the last
certificate's signature.
This is not by itself a security problem, since verifying any of the
certificates in the chain should be sufficient to verify the SignerInfo.
Still, it's not working as intended so it should be fixed.
Fix it by setting 'sig' correctly for the direct verification case.
Fixes: 757932e6da ("PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
If there is a blacklisted certificate in a SignerInfo's certificate
chain, then pkcs7_verify_sig_chain() sets sinfo->blacklisted and returns
0. But, pkcs7_verify() fails to handle this case appropriately, as it
actually continues on to the line 'actual_ret = 0;', indicating that the
SignerInfo has passed verification. Consequently, PKCS#7 signature
verification ignores the certificate blacklist.
Fix this by not considering blacklisted SignerInfos to have passed
verification.
Also fix the function comment with regards to when 0 is returned.
Fixes: 03bb79315d ("PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
When pkcs7_verify_sig_chain() is building the certificate chain for a
SignerInfo using the certificates in the PKCS#7 message, it is passing
the wrong arguments to public_key_verify_signature(). Consequently,
when the next certificate is supposed to be used to verify the previous
certificate, the next certificate is actually used to verify itself.
An attacker can use this bug to create a bogus certificate chain that
has no cryptographic relationship between the beginning and end.
Fortunately I couldn't quite find a way to use this to bypass the
overall signature verification, though it comes very close. Here's the
reasoning: due to the bug, every certificate in the chain beyond the
first actually has to be self-signed (where "self-signed" here refers to
the actual key and signature; an attacker might still manipulate the
certificate fields such that the self_signed flag doesn't actually get
set, and thus the chain doesn't end immediately). But to pass trust
validation (pkcs7_validate_trust()), either the SignerInfo or one of the
certificates has to actually be signed by a trusted key. Since only
self-signed certificates can be added to the chain, the only way for an
attacker to introduce a trusted signature is to include a self-signed
trusted certificate.
But, when pkcs7_validate_trust_one() reaches that certificate, instead
of trying to verify the signature on that certificate, it will actually
look up the corresponding trusted key, which will succeed, and then try
to verify the *previous* certificate, which will fail. Thus, disaster
is narrowly averted (as far as I could tell).
Fixes: 6c2dc5ae4a ("X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
->pkey_algo used to be an enum, but was changed to a string by commit
4e8ae72a75 ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum"). But
two comparisons were not updated. Fix them to use strcmp().
This bug broke signature verification in certain configurations,
depending on whether the string constants were deduplicated or not.
Fixes: 4e8ae72a75 ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Use crypto_shash_digest() instead of crypto_shash_init() followed by
crypto_shash_finup(). (For simplicity only; they are equivalent.)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In public_key_verify_signature(), if akcipher_request_alloc() fails, we
return -ENOMEM. But that error code was set 25 lines above, and by
accident someone could easily insert new code in between that assigns to
'ret', which would introduce a signature verification bypass. Make the
code clearer by moving the -ENOMEM down to where it is used.
Additionally, the callers of public_key_verify_signature() only consider
a negative return value to be an error. This means that if any positive
return value is accidentally introduced deeper in the call stack (e.g.
'return EBADMSG' instead of 'return -EBADMSG' somewhere in RSA),
signature verification will be bypassed. Make things more robust by
having public_key_verify_signature() warn about positive errors and
translate them into -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Use crypto_shash_digest() instead of crypto_shash_init() followed by
crypto_shash_finup(). (For simplicity only; they are equivalent.)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
pkcs7_validate_trust_one() used 'x509->next == x509' to identify a
self-signed certificate. That's wrong; ->next is simply the link in the
linked list of certificates in the PKCS#7 message. It should be
checking ->signer instead. Fix it.
Fortunately this didn't actually matter because when we re-visited
'x509' on the next iteration via 'x509->signer', it was already seen and
not verified, so we returned -ENOKEY anyway.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
If pkcs7_check_authattrs() returns an error code, we should pass that
error code on, rather than using ENOMEM.
Fixes: 99db443506 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Adding a specially crafted X.509 certificate whose subjectPublicKey
ASN.1 value is zero-length caused x509_extract_key_data() to set the
public key size to SIZE_MAX, as it subtracted the nonexistent BIT STRING
metadata byte. Then, x509_cert_parse() called kmemdup() with that bogus
size, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() in kmalloc_slab().
This appears to be harmless, but it still must be fixed since WARNs are
never supposed to be user-triggerable.
Fix it by updating x509_cert_parse() to validate that the value has a
BIT STRING metadata byte, and that the byte is 0 which indicates that
the number of bits in the bitstring is a multiple of 8.
It would be nice to handle the metadata byte in asn1_ber_decoder()
instead. But that would be tricky because in the general case a BIT
STRING could be implicitly tagged, and/or could legitimately have a
length that is not a whole number of bytes.
Here was the WARN (cleaned up slightly):
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 202 at mm/slab_common.c:971 kmalloc_slab+0x5d/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:971
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 202 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff880033014180 task.stack: ffff8800305c8000
Call Trace:
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3706 [inline]
__kmalloc_track_caller+0x22/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726
kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118
kmemdup include/linux/string.h:414 [inline]
x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Fixes: 42d5ec27f8 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Set the module licence to prevent the kernel from being tainted if loaded
as a module.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.15:
API:
- Disambiguate EBUSY when queueing crypto request by adding ENOSPC.
This change touches code outside the crypto API.
- Reset settings when empty string is written to rng_current.
Algorithms:
- Add OSCCA SM3 secure hash.
Drivers:
- Remove old mv_cesa driver (replaced by marvell/cesa).
- Enable rfc3686/ecb/cfb/ofb AES in crypto4xx.
- Add ccm/gcm AES in crypto4xx.
- Add support for BCM7278 in iproc-rng200.
- Add hash support on Exynos in s5p-sss.
- Fix fallback-induced error in vmx.
- Fix output IV in atmel-aes.
- Fix empty GCM hash in mediatek.
Others:
- Fix DoS potential in lib/mpi.
- Fix potential out-of-order issues with padata"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits)
lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loop
crypto: stm32/hash - Fix return issue on update
crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g'
crypto: qat - Clean up error handling in qat_dh_set_secret()
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0
crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - Add support for BCM7278
dt-bindings: rng: Document BCM7278 RNG200 compatible
crypto: chcr - Replace _manual_ swap with swap macro
crypto: marvell - Add a NULL entry at the end of mv_cesa_plat_id_table[]
hwrng: virtio - Virtio RNG devices need to be re-registered after suspend/resume
crypto: atmel - remove empty functions
crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit()
MAINTAINERS: update maintainer for qat
crypto: caam - remove unused param of ctx_map_to_sec4_sg()
crypto: caam - remove unneeded edesc zeroization
crypto: atmel-aes - Reset the controller before each use
crypto: atmel-aes - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt
hwrng: core - Reset user selected rng by writing "" to rng_current
...
public_key_verify_signature() is starting an async crypto op and
waiting for it to complete. Move it over to generic code doing
the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The ASN.1 parser does not necessarily set the sinfo field,
this patch prevents a NULL pointer dereference on broken
input.
Fixes: 99db443506 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type")
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3+
For finding asymmetric key, the input id_0 and id_1 parameters can
not be NULL at the same time. This patch adds the BUG_ON checking
for id_0 and id_1.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fix the wrong index number when checking the existence of second
id in function of finding asymmetric key. The id_1 is the second
id that the index in array must be 1 but not 0.
Fixes: 9eb029893a (KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key())
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
We forgot to set the error code on this path so it could result in
returning NULL which leads to a NULL dereference.
Fixes: db6c43bd21 ("crypto: KEYS: convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher api")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
public_key_verify_signature() was passing the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG
flag to akcipher_request_set_callback() but was not handling correctly
the case where a -EBUSY error could be returned from the call to
crypto_akcipher_verify() if backlog was used, possibly casuing
data corruption due to use-after-free of buffers.
Resolve this by handling -EBUSY correctly.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain link restriction that
searches for signing keys in the destination keyring in addition to the
signing key or keyring designated when the destination keyring was
created. Userspace enables this behavior by including the "chain" option
in the keyring restriction:
keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, keyring, "asymmetric",
"key_or_keyring:<signing key>:chain");
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Adds restrict_link_by_signature_keyring(), which uses the restrict_key
member of the provided destination_keyring data structure as the
key or keyring to search for signing keys.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Look up asymmetric keyring restriction information using the key-type
lookup_restrict hook.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
PKCS#7: Handle certificates that are blacklisted when verifying the chain
of trust on the signatures on a PKCS#7 message.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted based on their TBSCertificate hash.
This is convenient since we have to determine this anyway to be able to
check the signature on an X.509 certificate. This is also what UEFI uses
in its blacklist.
If a certificate built into the kernel is blacklisted, something like the
following might then be seen during boot:
X.509: Cert 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46 is blacklisted
Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-129)
where the hex string shown is the blacklisted hash.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes the following issues:
- a crash regression in the new skcipher walker
- incorrect return value in public_key_verify_signature
- fix for in-place signing in the sign-file utility"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: skcipher - fix crash in virtual walk
sign-file: Fix inplace signing when src and dst names are both specified
crypto: asymmetric_keys - set error code on failure
In function public_key_verify_signature(), returns variable ret on
error paths. When the call to kmalloc() fails, the value of ret is 0,
and it is not set to an errno before returning. This patch fixes the
bug.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188891
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Arbitrary X.509 certificates without authority key identifiers (AKIs)
can be added to "trusted" keyrings, including IMA or EVM certs loaded
from the filesystem. Signature verification is currently bypassed for
certs without AKIs.
Trusted keys were recently refactored, and this bug is not present in
4.6.
restrict_link_by_signature should return -ENOKEY (no matching parent
certificate found) if the certificate being evaluated has no AKIs,
instead of bypassing signature checks and returning 0 (new certificate
accepted).
Reported-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Commit e68503bd68 forgot to set digest_len and thus cause the following
error reported by kexec when launching a crash kernel:
kexec_file_load failed: Bad message
Fixes: e68503bd68 (KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content)
Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes the following issues:
- missing selection in public_key that may result in a build failure
- Potential crash in error path in omap-sham
- ccp AES XTS bug that affects requests larger than 4096"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: ccp - Fix AES XTS error for request sizes above 4096
crypto: public_key: select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
crypto: omap-sham - potential Oops on error in probe
In some rare randconfig builds, we can end up with
ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE enabled but CRYPTO_AKCIPHER disabled,
which fails to link because of the reference to crypto_alloc_akcipher:
crypto/built-in.o: In function `public_key_verify_signature':
:(.text+0x110e4): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_akcipher'
This adds a Kconfig 'select' statement to ensure the dependency
is always there.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The PKCS#7 test key type should use the secondary keyring instead of the
built-in keyring if available as the source of trustworthy keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.
What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.
Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.
With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.
Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.
To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.
If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as
there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys
onto it.
This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as
the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to
'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'.
Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't
work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency
loops.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
We should call verify_signature() rather than directly calling
public_key_verify_signature() if we have a struct key to use as we
shouldn't be poking around in the private data of the key struct as that's
subtype dependent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any
dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the
public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether
a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys
rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set.
verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust
chain cannot be verified.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.
If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.
The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
There's a bug in the code determining whether a certificate is self-signed
or not: if they have neither AKID nor SKID then we just assume that the
cert is self-signed, which may not be true.
Fix this by checking that the raw subject name matches the raw issuer name
and that the public key algorithm for the key and signature are both the
same in addition to requiring that the AKID bits match.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Extract the signature digest for an X.509 certificate earlier, at the end
of x509_cert_parse() rather than leaving it to the callers thereof since it
has to be called anyway.
Further, immediately after that, check the signature on self-signed
certificates, also rather in the callers of x509_cert_parse().
We note in the x509_certificate struct the following bits of information:
(1) Whether the signature is self-signed (even if we can't check the
signature due to missing crypto).
(2) Whether the key held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto to be
used. We may get a PKCS#7 message with X.509 certs that we can't make
use of - we just ignore them and give ENOPKG at the end it we couldn't
verify anything if at least one of these unusable certs are in the
chain of trust.
(3) Whether the signature held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto
to be checked. We can still use the key held in this certificate,
even if we can't check the signature on it - if it is held in the
system trusted keyring, for instance. We just can't add it to a ring
of trusted keys or follow it further up the chain of trust.
Making these checks earlier allows x509_check_signature() to be removed and
replaced with direct calls to public_key_verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Point to the public_key_signature struct from the pkcs7_signed_info struct
rather than embedding it. This makes the code consistent with the X.509
signature handling and makes it possible to have a common cleanup function.
We also save a copy of the digest in the signature without sharing the
memory with the crypto layer metadata.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Retain the key verification data (ie. the struct public_key_signature)
including the digest and the key identifiers.
Note that this means that we need to take a separate copy of the digest in
x509_get_sig_params() rather than lumping it in with the crypto layer data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add key identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct so that they can
be used to retain the identifier of the key to be used to verify the
signature in both PKCS#7 and X.509.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th
element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed.
For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The OID_sha224 case is missing a break and it falls through
to the -ENOPKG error default. Since HASH_ALGO_SHA224 seems
to be supported, this looks like an unintentional missing break.
Fixes: 07f081fb50 ("PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.2+
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes a bug in pkcs7_validate_trust and its users where the
output value may in fact be taken from uninitialised memory"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
PKCS#7: pkcs7_validate_trust(): initialize the _trusted output argument
Despite what the DocBook comment to pkcs7_validate_trust() says, the
*_trusted argument is never set to false.
pkcs7_validate_trust() only positively sets *_trusted upon encountering
a trusted PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
This is quite unfortunate since its callers, system_verify_data() for
example, depend on pkcs7_validate_trust() clearing *_trusted on non-trust.
Indeed, UBSAN splats when attempting to load the uninitialized local
variable 'trusted' from system_verify_data() in pkcs7_validate_trust():
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c:194:14
load of value 82 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff818c4d35>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117
[<ffffffff818c4c79>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169
[<ffffffff8194113b>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e
[<ffffffff819419fa>] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x111/0x158
[<ffffffff819418e9>] ? val_to_string.constprop.12+0xcf/0xcf
[<ffffffff818334a4>] ? x509_request_asymmetric_key+0x114/0x370
[<ffffffff814b83f0>] ? kfree+0x220/0x370
[<ffffffff818312c2>] ? public_key_verify_signature_2+0x32/0x50
[<ffffffff81835e04>] pkcs7_validate_trust+0x524/0x5f0
[<ffffffff813c391a>] system_verify_data+0xca/0x170
[<ffffffff813c3850>] ? top_trace_array+0x9b/0x9b
[<ffffffff81510b29>] ? __vfs_read+0x279/0x3d0
[<ffffffff8129372f>] mod_verify_sig+0x1ff/0x290
[...]
The implication is that pkcs7_validate_trust() effectively grants trust
when it really shouldn't have.
Fix this by explicitly setting *_trusted to false at the very beginning
of pkcs7_validate_trust().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of
enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key
subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the
public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type.
To make this work, the following changes have been made:
(1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the
padding and returns just the message hash.
(2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second
parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this,
and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present.
(3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to
something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does
and and has been merged into public_key.c.
(4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead.
Thoughts:
(*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to
the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates
registered that share most of the code?
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The ASN.1 GeneralizedTime object carries an ISO 8601 format date and time.
The time is permitted to show midnight as 00:00 or 24:00 (the latter being
equivalent of 00:00 of the following day).
The permitted value is checked in x509_decode_time() but the actual
handling is left to mktime64().
Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected and could
lead to an unbootable kernel.
Note that with this patch we also permit any 24:mm:ss time and extend this
to UTCTime, which whilst not strictly correct don't permit much leeway in
fiddling date strings.
Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
The format of ASN.1 GeneralizedTime seems to be specified by ISO 8601
[X.680 46.3] and this apparently supports leap seconds (ie. the seconds
field is 60). It's not entirely clear that ASN.1 expects it, but we can
relax the seconds check slightly for GeneralizedTime.
This results in us passing a time with sec as 60 to mktime64(), which
handles it as being a duplicate of the 0th second of the next minute.
We can't really do otherwise without giving the kernel much greater
knowledge of where all the leap seconds are. Unfortunately, this would
require change the mapping of the kernel's current-time-in-seconds.
UTCTime, however, only supports a seconds value in the range 00-59, but for
the sake of simplicity allow this with UTCTime also.
Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected,
potentially making a kernel unbootable.
Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
There are still a couple of minor issues in the X.509 leap year handling:
(1) To avoid doing a modulus-by-400 in addition to a modulus-by-100 when
determining whether the year is a leap year or not, I divided the year
by 100 after doing the modulus-by-100, thereby letting the compiler do
one instruction for both, and then did a modulus-by-4.
Unfortunately, I then passed the now-modified year value to mktime64()
to construct a time value.
Since this isn't a fast path and since mktime64() does a bunch of
divisions, just condense down to "% 400". It's also easier to read.
(2) The default month length for any February where the year doesn't
divide by four exactly is obtained from the month_length[] array where
the value is 29, not 28.
This is fixed by altering the table.
Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The boolean want is not initialized and hence garbage. The default should
be false (later it is only set to true on tne sinfo->authattrs check).
Found with static analysis using CoverityScan
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This patch converts the module verification code to the new akcipher API.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This patch converts the module verification code to the new akcipher API.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Dave Young reported:
> Hi,
>
> I saw the warning "Missing required AuthAttr" when testing kexec,
> known issue? Idea about how to fix it?
>
> The kernel is latest linus tree plus sevral patches from Toshi to
> cleanup io resource structure.
>
> in function pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs():
> if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
> !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
> (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData &&
> !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))) {
> pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n");
> return -EBADMSG;
> }
>
> The third condition below is true:
> (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData &&
> !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))
>
> I signed the kernel with redhat test key like below:
> pesign -c 'Red Hat Test Certificate' -i arch/x86/boot/bzImage -o /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-rc8+ -s --force
And right he is! The Authenticode specification is a paragon amongst
technical documents, and has this pearl of wisdom to offer:
---------------------------------
Authenticode-Specific SignerInfo UnauthenticatedAttributes Structures
The following Authenticode-specific data structures are present in
SignerInfo authenticated attributes.
SpcSpOpusInfo
SpcSpOpusInfo is identified by SPC_SP_OPUS_INFO_OBJID
(1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12) and is defined as follows:
SpcSpOpusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
programName [0] EXPLICIT SpcString OPTIONAL,
moreInfo [1] EXPLICIT SpcLink OPTIONAL,
} --#public--
SpcSpOpusInfo has two fields:
programName
This field contains the program description:
If publisher chooses not to specify a description, the SpcString
structure contains a zero-length program name.
If the publisher chooses to specify a
description, the SpcString structure contains a Unicode string.
moreInfo
This field is set to an SPCLink structure that contains a URL for
a Web site with more information about the signer. The URL is an
ASCII string.
---------------------------------
Which is to say that this is an optional *unauthenticated* field which
may be present in the Authenticated Attribute list. This is not how
pkcs7 is supposed to work, so when David implemented this, he didn't
appreciate the subtlety the original spec author was working with, and
missed the part of the sublime prose that says this Authenticated
Attribute is an Unauthenticated Attribute. As a result, the code in
question simply takes as given that the Authenticated Attributes should
be authenticated.
But this one should not, individually. Because it says it's not
authenticated.
It still has to hash right so the TBS digest is correct. So it is both
authenticated and unauthenticated, all at once. Truly, a wonder of
technical accomplishment.
Additionally, pesign's implementation has always attempted to be
compatible with the signatures emitted from contemporary versions of
Microsoft's signtool.exe. During the initial implementation, Microsoft
signatures always produced the same values for SpcSpOpusInfo -
{U"Microsoft Windows", "http://www.microsoft.com"} - without regard to
who the signer was.
Sometime between Windows 8 and Windows 8.1 they stopped including the
field in their signatures altogether, and as such pesign stopped
producing them in commits c0c4da6 and d79cb0c, sometime around June of
2012. The theory here is that anything that breaks with
pesign signatures would also be breaking with signtool.exe sigs as well,
and that'll be a more noticed problem for firmwares parsing it, so it'll
get fixed. The fact that we've done exactly this bug in Linux code is
first class, grade A irony.
So anyway, we should not be checking this field for presence or any
particular value: if the field exists, it should be at the right place,
but aside from that, as long as the hash matches the field is good.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.
- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an
intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key
into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring.
On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot.
IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted
before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested
operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This file does not contain any modular related function calls. So get
rid of module.h since it drags in a lot of other headers and adds to
the preprocessing load. It does export some symbols though, so we'll
need to ensure it has export.h present instead.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This fixes CVE-2015-5327. It affects kernels from 4.3-rc1 onwards.
Fix the X.509 time validation to use month number-1 when looking up the
number of days in that month. Also put the month number validation before
doing the lookup so as not to risk overrunning the array.
This can be tested by doing the following:
cat <<EOF | openssl x509 -outform DER | keyctl padd asymmetric "" @s
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
EOF
If it works, it emit a key ID; if it fails, it should give a bad message
error.
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a
notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a
maintainer of that"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits)
apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency
selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct
selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static
selinux: use sprintf return value
selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()
selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()
selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()
selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid
selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call
selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default
KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature
KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file
keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used
certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key
Smack: limited capability for changing process label
TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion
vTPM: support little endian guests
char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver
...
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add support for cipher output IVs in testmgr
- Add missing crypto_ahash_blocksize helper
- Mark authenc and des ciphers as not allowed under FIPS.
Algorithms:
- Add CRC support to 842 compression
- Add keywrap algorithm
- A number of changes to the akcipher interface:
+ Separate functions for setting public/private keys.
+ Use SG lists.
Drivers:
- Add Intel SHA Extension optimised SHA1 and SHA256
- Use dma_map_sg instead of custom functions in crypto drivers
- Add support for STM32 RNG
- Add support for ST RNG
- Add Device Tree support to exynos RNG driver
- Add support for mxs-dcp crypto device on MX6SL
- Add xts(aes) support to caam
- Add ctr(aes) and xts(aes) support to qat
- A large set of fixes from Russell King for the marvell/cesa driver"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (115 commits)
crypto: asymmetric_keys - Fix unaligned access in x509_get_sig_params()
crypto: akcipher - Don't #include crypto/public_key.h as the contents aren't used
hwrng: exynos - Add Device Tree support
hwrng: exynos - Fix missing configuration after suspend to RAM
hwrng: exynos - Add timeout for waiting on init done
dt-bindings: rng: Describe Exynos4 PRNG bindings
crypto: marvell/cesa - use __le32 for hardware descriptors
crypto: marvell/cesa - fix missing cpu_to_le32() in mv_cesa_dma_add_op()
crypto: marvell/cesa - use memcpy_fromio()/memcpy_toio()
crypto: marvell/cesa - use gfp_t for gfp flags
crypto: marvell/cesa - use dma_addr_t for cur_dma
crypto: marvell/cesa - use readl_relaxed()/writel_relaxed()
crypto: caam - fix indentation of close braces
crypto: caam - only export the state we really need to export
crypto: caam - fix non-block aligned hash calculation
crypto: caam - avoid needlessly saving and restoring caam_hash_ctx
crypto: caam - print errno code when hash registration fails
crypto: marvell/cesa - fix memory leak
crypto: marvell/cesa - fix first-fragment handling in mv_cesa_ahash_dma_last_req()
crypto: marvell/cesa - rearrange handling for sw padded hashes
...
Eric Biggers