The GRE Key field is intended to be used for identifying an individual
traffic flow within a tunnel. It is useful to be able to have XFRM
policy selector matches to have different policies for different
GRE tunnels.
Signed-off-by: Timo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch allows a host to be configured to respond to any address in
a specified range as if it were local, without actually needing to
configure the address on an interface. This is done through routing
table configuration. For instance, to configure a host to respond
to any address in 10.1/16 received on eth0 as a local address we can do:
ip rule add from all iif eth0 lookup 200
ip route add local 10.1/16 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1 table 200
This host is now reachable by any 10.1/16 address (route lookup on
input for packets received on eth0 can find the route). On output, the
rule will not be matched so that this host can still send packets to
10.1/16 (not sent on loopback). Presumably, external routing can be
configured to make sense out of this.
To make this work, we needed to modify the logic in finding the
interface which is assigned a given source address for output
(dev_ip_find). We perform a normal fib_lookup instead of just a
lookup on the local table, and in the lookup we ignore the input
interface for matching.
This patch is useful to implement IP-anycast for subnets of virtual
addresses.
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This allows to validate the cached object before returning it.
It also allows to destruct object properly, if the last reference
was held in flow cache. This is also a prepartion for caching
bundles in the flow cache.
In return for virtualizing the methods, we save on:
- not having to regenerate the whole flow cache on policy removal:
each flow matching a killed policy gets refreshed as the getter
function notices it smartly.
- we do not have to call flow_cache_flush from policy gc, since the
flow cache now properly deletes the object if it had any references
Signed-off-by: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pass netns to xfrm_lookup()/__xfrm_lookup(). For that pass netns
to flow_cache_lookup() and resolver callback.
Take it from socket or netdevice. Stub DECnet to init_net.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ip_route_output() contains a check to make sure that no flows with
non-local source IP addresses are routed. This obviously makes using
such addresses impossible.
This patch introduces a flowi flag which makes omitting this check
possible. The new flag provides a way of handling transparent and
non-transparent connections differently.
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: KOVACS Krisztian <hidden@sch.bme.hu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch removes an unused field (flags) from struct flowi; it seems
that this "flags" field was used once in the past for multipath
routing with FLOWI_FLAG_MULTIPATHOLDROUTE flag (which does no longer
exist); however, the "flags" field of struct flowi is not used
anymore.
Signed-off-by: Rami Rosen <ramirose@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Kill unnecessary CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6.
o It is redundant for RAW socket to keep MH out with the config then
it can handle any protocol.
o Clean-up at AH.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On MIPv6 usage, XFRM sub policy is enabled.
When main (IPsec) and sub (MIPv6) policy selectors have the same
address set but different upper layer information (i.e. protocol
number and its ports or type/code), multiple bundle should be created.
However, currently we have issue to use the same bundle created for
the first time with all flows covered by the case.
It is useful for the bundle to have the upper layer information
to be restructured correctly if it does not match with the flow.
1. Bundle was created by two policies
Selector from another policy is added to xfrm_dst.
If the flow does not match the selector, it goes to slow path to
restructure new bundle by single policy.
2. Bundle was created by one policy
Flow cache is added to xfrm_dst as originated one. If the flow does
not match the cache, it goes to slow path to try searching another
policy.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now that all protocols have been made aware of the mark
field it can be moved out of the union thus simplyfing
its usage.
The config options in the IPv4/IPv6/DECnet subsystems
to enable respectively disable mark based routing only
obfuscate the code with ifdefs, the cost for the
additional comparison in the flow key is insignificant,
and most distributions have all these options enabled
by default anyway. Therefore it makes sense to remove
the config options and enable mark based routing by
default.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As suggested by David, just kill off some unused fields in dnports to
reduce sizef(struct flowi). If they come back, they should be moved to
nl_u.dn_u in order not to enlarge again struct flowi
[ Modified to really delete this stuff instead of using #if 0. -DaveM ]
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission
(or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via
flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because
the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver.
However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when
calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is
interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated
policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without
transformation.
The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add Mobility header definition for Mobile IPv6.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
This patch was also written by: Antti Tuominen <anttit@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and
state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary
SELinux enforcement pieces.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This adds security to flow key for labeling of flows as also to allow
for making flow cache lookups based on the security label seemless.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The typedef for dn_address has been removed in favour of using __le16
or __u16 directly as appropriate. All the DECnet header files are
updated accordingly.
The byte ordering of dn_eth2dn() and dn_dn2eth() are both changed
since just about all their callers wanted network order rather than
host order, so the conversion is now done in the functions themselves.
Several missed endianess conversions have been picked up during the
conversion process. The nh_gw field in struct dn_fib_info has been
changed from a 32 bit field to 16 bits as it ought to be.
One or two cases of using htons rather than dn_htons in the routing
code have been found and fixed.
There are still a few warnings to fix, but this patch deals with the
important cases.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <steve@chygwyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Caulfield <patrick@tykepenguin.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.
The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.
Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.
Testing:
The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.
The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
Timo Teräs