Commit Graph

56 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Pasha Tatashin 82328227db x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macros
Other architectures and the common mm/ use P*D_MASK, and P*D_SIZE.
Remove the duplicated P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE which are only
used in x86/*.

Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220516185202.604654-1-tatashin@google.com
2022-12-15 10:37:27 -08:00
Kees Cook 595b893e20 randstruct: Reorganize Kconfigs and attribute macros
In preparation for Clang supporting randstruct, reorganize the Kconfigs,
move the attribute macros, and generalize the feature to be named
CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT for on/off, CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_FULL for the full
randomization mode, and CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE for the cache-line
sized mode.

Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-4-keescook@chromium.org
2022-05-08 01:33:06 -07:00
Lai Jiangshan 1591584e2e x86/process/64: Move cpu_current_top_of_stack out of TSS
cpu_current_top_of_stack is currently stored in TSS.sp1. TSS is exposed
through the cpu_entry_area which is visible with user CR3 when PTI is
enabled and active.

This makes it a coveted fruit for attackers.  An attacker can fetch the
kernel stack top from it and continue next steps of actions based on the
kernel stack.

But it is actualy not necessary to be stored in the TSS.  It is only
accessed after the entry code switched to kernel CR3 and kernel GS_BASE
which means it can be in any regular percpu variable.

The reason why it is in TSS is historical (pre PTI) because TSS is also
used as scratch space in SYSCALL_64 and therefore cache hot.

A syscall also needs the per CPU variable current_task and eventually
__preempt_count, so placing cpu_current_top_of_stack next to them makes it
likely that they end up in the same cache line which should avoid
performance regressions. This is not enforced as the compiler is free to
place these variables, so these entry relevant variables should move into
a data structure to make this enforceable.

The seccomp_benchmark doesn't show any performance loss in the "getpid
native" test result.  Actually, the result changes from 93ns before to 92ns
with this change when KPTI is disabled. The test is very stable and
although the test doesn't show a higher degree of precision it gives enough
confidence that moving cpu_current_top_of_stack does not cause a
regression.

[ tglx: Removed unneeded export. Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210125173444.22696-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
2021-03-28 22:40:10 +02:00
Ingo Molnar d9f6e12fb0 x86: Fix various typos in comments
Fix ~144 single-word typos in arch/x86/ code comments.

Doing this in a single commit should reduce the churn.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
2021-03-18 15:31:53 +01:00
Mike Rapoport ca15ca406f mm: remove unneeded includes of <asm/pgalloc.h>
Patch series "mm: cleanup usage of <asm/pgalloc.h>"

Most architectures have very similar versions of pXd_alloc_one() and
pXd_free_one() for intermediate levels of page table.  These patches add
generic versions of these functions in <asm-generic/pgalloc.h> and enable
use of the generic functions where appropriate.

In addition, functions declared and defined in <asm/pgalloc.h> headers are
used mostly by core mm and early mm initialization in arch and there is no
actual reason to have the <asm/pgalloc.h> included all over the place.
The first patch in this series removes unneeded includes of
<asm/pgalloc.h>

In the end it didn't work out as neatly as I hoped and moving
pXd_alloc_track() definitions to <asm-generic/pgalloc.h> would require
unnecessary changes to arches that have custom page table allocations, so
I've decided to move lib/ioremap.c to mm/ and make pgalloc-track.h local
to mm/.

This patch (of 8):

In most cases <asm/pgalloc.h> header is required only for allocations of
page table memory.  Most of the .c files that include that header do not
use symbols declared in <asm/pgalloc.h> and do not require that header.

As for the other header files that used to include <asm/pgalloc.h>, it is
possible to move that include into the .c file that actually uses symbols
from <asm/pgalloc.h> and drop the include from the header file.

The process was somewhat automated using

	sed -i -E '/[<"]asm\/pgalloc\.h/d' \
                $(grep -L -w -f /tmp/xx \
                        $(git grep -E -l '[<"]asm/pgalloc\.h'))

where /tmp/xx contains all the symbols defined in
arch/*/include/asm/pgalloc.h.

[rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix powerpc warning]

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>	[m68k]
Cc: Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627143453.31835-1-rppt@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627143453.31835-2-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 11:33:26 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner f0178fc01f x86/entry: Unbreak __irqentry_text_start/end magic
The entry rework moved interrupt entry code from the irqentry to the
noinstr section which made the irqentry section empty.

This breaks boundary checks which rely on the __irqentry_text_start/end
markers to find out whether a function in a stack trace is
interrupt/exception entry code. This affects the function graph tracer and
filter_irq_stacks().

As the IDT entry points are all sequentialy emitted this is rather simple
to unbreak by injecting __irqentry_text_start/end as global labels.

To make this work correctly:

  - Remove the IRQENTRY_TEXT section from the x86 linker script
  - Define __irqentry so it breaks the build if it's used
  - Adjust the entry mirroring in PTI
  - Remove the redundant kprobes and unwinder bound checks

Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2020-06-11 15:15:29 +02:00
Mike Rapoport e31cf2f4ca mm: don't include asm/pgtable.h if linux/mm.h is already included
Patch series "mm: consolidate definitions of page table accessors", v2.

The low level page table accessors (pXY_index(), pXY_offset()) are
duplicated across all architectures and sometimes more than once.  For
instance, we have 31 definition of pgd_offset() for 25 supported
architectures.

Most of these definitions are actually identical and typically it boils
down to, e.g.

static inline unsigned long pmd_index(unsigned long address)
{
        return (address >> PMD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PMD - 1);
}

static inline pmd_t *pmd_offset(pud_t *pud, unsigned long address)
{
        return (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(*pud) + pmd_index(address);
}

These definitions can be shared among 90% of the arches provided
XYZ_SHIFT, PTRS_PER_XYZ and xyz_page_vaddr() are defined.

For architectures that really need a custom version there is always
possibility to override the generic version with the usual ifdefs magic.

These patches introduce include/linux/pgtable.h that replaces
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h and add the definitions of the page table
accessors to the new header.

This patch (of 12):

The linux/mm.h header includes <asm/pgtable.h> to allow inlining of the
functions involving page table manipulations, e.g.  pte_alloc() and
pmd_alloc().  So, there is no point to explicitly include <asm/pgtable.h>
in the files that include <linux/mm.h>.

The include statements in such cases are remove with a simple loop:

	for f in $(git grep -l "include <linux/mm.h>") ; do
		sed -i -e '/include <asm\/pgtable.h>/ d' $f
	done

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <ley.foon.tan@intel.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-1-rppt@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-2-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 09:39:13 -07:00
Joerg Roedel 7f0a002b5a x86/mm: remove vmalloc faulting
Remove fault handling on vmalloc areas, as the vmalloc code now takes
care of synchronizing changes to all page-tables in the system.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200515140023.25469-8-joro@8bytes.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-02 10:59:12 -07:00
Benjamin Thiel 5bacdc0982 x86/mm/set_memory: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
Add missing includes and move prototypes into the header set_memory.h in
order to fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings.

 [ bp: Add ifdeffery around arch_invalidate_pmem() ]

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Thiel <b.thiel@posteo.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200320145028.6013-1-b.thiel@posteo.de
2020-03-27 11:26:06 +01:00
Kees Cook b907693883 x86/vmlinux: Actually use _etext for the end of the text segment
Various calculations are using the end of the exception table (which
does not need to be executable) as the end of the text segment. Instead,
in preparation for moving the exception table into RO_DATA, move _etext
after the exception table and update the calculations.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-c6x-dev@linux-c6x.org
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029211351.13243-16-keescook@chromium.org
2019-11-04 17:54:16 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 990784b577 x86/mm/pti: Do not invoke PTI functions when PTI is disabled
When PTI is disabled at boot time either because the CPU is not affected or
PTI has been disabled on the command line, the boot code still calls into
pti_finalize() which then unconditionally invokes:

     pti_clone_entry_text()
     pti_clone_kernel_text()

pti_clone_kernel_text() was called unconditionally before the 32bit support
was added and 32bit added the call to pti_clone_entry_text().

The call has no side effects as cloning the page tables into the available
second one, which was allocated for PTI does not create damage. But it does
not make sense either and in case that this functionality would be extended
later this might actually lead to hard to diagnose issues.

Neither function should be called when PTI is runtime disabled. Make the
invocation conditional.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190828143124.063353972@linutronix.de
2019-08-29 20:52:53 +02:00
Song Liu 825d0b73cd x86/mm/pti: Handle unaligned address gracefully in pti_clone_pagetable()
pti_clone_pmds() assumes that the supplied address is either:

 - properly PUD/PMD aligned
or
 - the address is actually mapped which means that independently
   of the mapping level (PUD/PMD/PTE) the next higher mapping
   exists.

If that's not the case the unaligned address can be incremented by PUD or
PMD size incorrectly. All callers supply mapped and/or aligned addresses,
but for the sake of robustness it's better to handle that case properly and
to emit a warning.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog and added WARN_ON_ONCE() ]

Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1908282352470.1938@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
2019-08-29 20:52:52 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner 5b497af42f treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 295
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as
  published by the free software foundation this program is
  distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
  warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
  fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
  for more details

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 64 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.894819585@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-05 17:36:38 +02:00
Linus Torvalds f725492dd1 Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "This includes the following changes:

   - cpu_has() cleanups

   - sync_bitops.h modernization to the rmwcc.h facility, similarly to
     bitops.h

   - continued LTO annotations/fixes

   - misc cleanups and smaller cleanups"

* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/um/vdso: Drop unnecessary cc-ldoption
  x86/vdso: Rename variable to fix -Wshadow warning
  x86/cpu/amd: Exclude 32bit only assembler from 64bit build
  x86/asm: Mark all top level asm statements as .text
  x86/build/vdso: Add FORCE to the build rule of %.so
  x86/asm: Modernize sync_bitops.h
  x86/mm: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()
  x86: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()
  x86/asm: Clarify static_cpu_has()'s intended use
  x86/uaccess: Fix implicit cast of __user pointer
  x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has()
2019-05-06 15:32:35 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 0a499fc5c3 Merge branch 'core-speculation-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull speculation mitigation update from Ingo Molnar:
 "This adds the "mitigations=" bootline option, which offers a
  cross-arch set of options that will work on x86, PowerPC and s390 that
  will map to the arch specific option internally"

* 'core-speculation-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
  powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
  x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
  cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option
2019-05-06 13:01:16 -07:00
Josh Poimboeuf d68be4c4d3 x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-04-17 21:37:28 +02:00
Borislav Petkov 28e3ace70c x86/mm: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()
Using static_cpu_has() is pointless on those paths, convert them to the
boot_cpu_has() variant.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330112022.28888-5-bp@alien8.de
2019-04-08 12:14:16 +02:00
Valdis Kletnieks 4fe64a62e0 x86/mm/pti: Make local symbols static
With 'make C=2 W=1', sparse and gcc both complain:

  CHECK   arch/x86/mm/pti.c
arch/x86/mm/pti.c:84:3: warning: symbol 'pti_mode' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/x86/mm/pti.c:605:6: warning: symbol 'pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal' was not declared. Should it be static?
  CC      arch/x86/mm/pti.o
arch/x86/mm/pti.c:605:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
  605 | void pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal(void)
      |      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal() is only used locally. 'pti_mode' exists in
drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pti.c as well, but it's a completely unrelated
local (static) symbol.

Make both static.

Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/27680.1552376873@turing-police
2019-03-22 13:31:28 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski bf904d2762 x86/pti/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 entry trampoline
The SYSCALL64 trampoline has a couple of nice properties:

 - The usual sequence of SWAPGS followed by two GS-relative accesses to
   set up RSP is somewhat slow because the GS-relative accesses need
   to wait for SWAPGS to finish.  The trampoline approach allows
   RIP-relative accesses to set up RSP, which avoids the stall.

 - The trampoline avoids any percpu access before CR3 is set up,
   which means that no percpu memory needs to be mapped in the user
   page tables.  This prevents using Meltdown to read any percpu memory
   outside the cpu_entry_area and prevents using timing leaks
   to directly locate the percpu areas.

The downsides of using a trampoline may outweigh the upsides, however.
It adds an extra non-contiguous I$ cache line to system calls, and it
forces an indirect jump to transfer control back to the normal kernel
text after CR3 is set up.  The latter is because x86 lacks a 64-bit
direct jump instruction that could jump from the trampoline to the entry
text.  With retpolines enabled, the indirect jump is extremely slow.

Change the code to map the percpu TSS into the user page tables to allow
the non-trampoline SYSCALL64 path to work under PTI.  This does not add a
new direct information leak, since the TSS is readable by Meltdown from the
cpu_entry_area alias regardless.  It does allow a timing attack to locate
the percpu area, but KASLR is more or less a lost cause against local
attack on CPUs vulnerable to Meltdown regardless.  As far as I'm concerned,
on current hardware, KASLR is only useful to mitigate remote attacks that
try to attack the kernel without first gaining RCE against a vulnerable
user process.

On Skylake, with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and KPTI on, this reduces syscall
overhead from ~237ns to ~228ns.

There is a possible alternative approach: Move the trampoline within 2G of
the entry text and make a separate copy for each CPU.  This would allow a
direct jump to rejoin the normal entry path. There are pro's and con's for
this approach:

 + It avoids a pipeline stall

 - It executes from an extra page and read from another extra page during
   the syscall. The latter is because it needs to use a relative
   addressing mode to find sp1 -- it's the same *cacheline*, but accessed
   using an alias, so it's an extra TLB entry.

 - Slightly more memory. This would be one page per CPU for a simple
   implementation and 64-ish bytes per CPU or one page per node for a more
   complex implementation.

 - More code complexity.

The current approach is chosen for simplicity and because the alternative
does not provide a significant benefit, which makes it worth.

[ tglx: Added the alternative discussion to the changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8c7c6e483612c3e4e10ca89495dc160b1aa66878.1536015544.git.luto@kernel.org
2018-09-12 21:33:53 +02:00
Randy Dunlap ff924c5a1e x86/pti: Fix section mismatch warning/error
Fix the section mismatch warning in arch/x86/mm/pti.c:

WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x6972a): Section mismatch in reference from the function pti_clone_pgtable() to the function .init.text:pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte()
The function pti_clone_pgtable() references
the function __init pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte().
This is often because pti_clone_pgtable lacks a __init
annotation or the annotation of pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte is wrong.
FATAL: modpost: Section mismatches detected.

Fixes: 85900ea515 ("x86/pti: Map the vsyscall page if needed")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/43a6d6a3-d69d-5eda-da09-0b1c88215a2a@infradead.org
2018-09-02 11:24:41 +02:00
Linus Torvalds 958f338e96 Merge branch 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
  engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
  unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
  Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
  address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
  other reserved bits set.

  If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
  page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
  bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
  the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
  the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
  and accessible.

  While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
  raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
  loading the data and making it available to other speculative
  instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
  unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.

  While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
  allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
  attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
  and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
  bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.

  The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646

  The mitigations provided by this pull request include:

   - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
     present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.

   - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.

   - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
     by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
     the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs

   - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
     and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
     and at runtime via sysfs

   - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
     mitigations.

  Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
  patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
  heated, but at the end constructive discussions.

  There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
  might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
  workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
  complexity and limitations"

* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
  x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
  tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
  x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
  x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
  cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
  KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
  Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
  x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
  x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
  x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
  x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
  cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
  ...
2018-08-14 09:46:06 -07:00
Joerg Roedel d878efce73 x86/mm/pti: Move user W+X check into pti_finalize()
The user page-table gets the updated kernel mappings in pti_finalize(),
which runs after the RO+X permissions got applied to the kernel page-table
in mark_readonly().

But with CONFIG_DEBUG_WX enabled, the user page-table is already checked in
mark_readonly() for insecure mappings.  This causes false-positive
warnings, because the user page-table did not get the updated mappings yet.

Move the W+X check for the user page-table into pti_finalize() after it
updated all required mappings.

[ tglx: Folded !NX supported fix ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533727000-9172-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-08-10 21:12:45 +02:00
Joerg Roedel 16a3fe634f x86/mm/pti: Clone kernel-image on PTE level for 32 bit
On 32 bit the kernel sections are not huge-page aligned.  When we clone
them on PMD-level we unevitably map some areas that are normal kernel
memory and may contain secrets to user-space. To prevent that we need to
clone the kernel-image on PTE-level for 32 bit.

Also make the page-table cloning code more general so that it can handle
PMD and PTE level cloning. This can be generalized further in the future to
also handle clones on the P4D-level.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533637471-30953-4-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-08-07 23:36:02 +02:00
Joerg Roedel 30514effc9 x86/mm/pti: Don't clear permissions in pti_clone_pmd()
The function sets the global-bit on cloned PMD entries, which only makes
sense when the permissions are identical between the user and the kernel
page-table. Further, only write-permissions are cleared for entry-text and
kernel-text sections, which are not writeable at the end of the boot
process.

The reason why this RW clearing exists is that in the early PTI
implementations the cloned kernel areas were set up during early boot
before the kernel text is set to read only and not touched afterwards.

This is not longer true. The cloned areas are still set up early to get the
entry code working for interrupts and other things, but after the kernel
text has been set RO the clone is repeated which copies the RO PMD/PTEs
over to the user visible clone. That means the initial clearing of the
writable bit can be avoided.

[ tglx: Amended changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533637471-30953-3-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-08-07 23:36:02 +02:00
Joerg Roedel 88c6f8a397 x86/mm/pti: Fix 32 bit PCID check
The check uses the wrong operator and causes false positive
warnings in the kernel log on some systems.

Fixes: 5e8105950a ('x86/mm/pti: Add Warning when booting on a PCID capable CPU')
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533637471-30953-2-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-08-07 18:51:22 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner 315706049c Merge branch 'x86/pti-urgent' into x86/pti
Integrate the PTI Global bit fixes which conflict with the 32bit PTI
support.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-08-06 20:56:34 +02:00
Dave Hansen eac7073aa6 x86/mm/pti: Clear Global bit more aggressively
The kernel image starts out with the Global bit set across the entire
kernel image.  The bit is cleared with set_memory_nonglobal() in the
configurations with PCIDs where the performance benefits of the Global bit
are not needed.

However, this is fragile.  It means that we are stuck opting *out* of the
less-secure (Global bit set) configuration, which seems backwards.  Let's
start more secure (Global bit clear) and then let things opt back in if
they want performance, or are truly mapping common data between kernel and
userspace.

This fixes a bug.  Before this patch, there are areas that are unmapped
from the user page tables (like like everything above 0xffffffff82600000 in
the example below).  These have the hallmark of being a wrong Global area:
they are not identical in the 'current_kernel' and 'current_user' page
table dumps.  They are also read-write, which means they're much more
likely to contain secrets.

Before this patch:

current_kernel:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_kernel-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000          16M                               pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000          14M     ro         PSE     GLB x  pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000          68K     ro                 GLB x  pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000        1980K     RW                 GLB NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000           6M     ro         PSE     GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffff82c00000           6M     RW         PSE     GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82e00000           2M     RW                 GLB NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffff83200000           4M     RW         PSE     GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffa0000000         462M                               pmd

 current_user:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
 current_user-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000          16M                               pmd
 current_user-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000          14M     ro         PSE     GLB x  pmd
 current_user-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000          68K     ro                 GLB x  pte
 current_user-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000        1980K     RW                 GLB NX pte
 current_user-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000           6M     ro         PSE     GLB NX pmd
 current_user-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffffa0000000         474M                               pmd

After this patch:

current_kernel:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
current_kernel-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000          16M                               pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000          14M     ro         PSE     GLB x  pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000          68K     ro                 GLB x  pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000        1980K     RW                     NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000           6M     ro         PSE     GLB NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffff82c00000           6M     RW         PSE         NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82e00000           2M     RW                     NX pte
current_kernel-0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffff83200000           4M     RW         PSE         NX pmd
current_kernel-0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffa0000000         462M                               pmd

  current_user:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
  current_user-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000          16M                               pmd
  current_user-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000          14M     ro         PSE     GLB x  pmd
  current_user-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000          68K     ro                 GLB x  pte
  current_user-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000        1980K     RW                     NX pte
  current_user-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000           6M     ro         PSE     GLB NX pmd
  current_user-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffffa0000000         474M                               pmd

Fixes: 0f561fce4d ("x86/pti: Enable global pages for shared areas")
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: aarcange@redhat.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: jpoimboe@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802225825.A100C071@viggo.jf.intel.com
2018-08-05 22:21:02 +02:00
Nicolai Stange 447ae31667 x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
The next patch in this series will have to make the definition of
irq_cpustat_t available to entering_irq().

Inclusion of asm/hardirq.h into asm/apic.h would cause circular header
dependencies like

  asm/smp.h
    asm/apic.h
      asm/hardirq.h
        linux/irq.h
          linux/topology.h
            linux/smp.h
              asm/smp.h

or

  linux/gfp.h
    linux/mmzone.h
      asm/mmzone.h
        asm/mmzone_64.h
          asm/smp.h
            asm/apic.h
              asm/hardirq.h
                linux/irq.h
                  linux/irqdesc.h
                    linux/kobject.h
                      linux/sysfs.h
                        linux/kernfs.h
                          linux/idr.h
                            linux/gfp.h

and others.

This causes compilation errors because of the header guards becoming
effective in the second inclusion: symbols/macros that had been defined
before wouldn't be available to intermediate headers in the #include chain
anymore.

A possible workaround would be to move the definition of irq_cpustat_t
into its own header and include that from both, asm/hardirq.h and
asm/apic.h.

However, this wouldn't solve the real problem, namely asm/harirq.h
unnecessarily pulling in all the linux/irq.h cruft: nothing in
asm/hardirq.h itself requires it. Also, note that there are some other
archs, like e.g. arm64, which don't have that #include in their
asm/hardirq.h.

Remove the linux/irq.h #include from x86' asm/hardirq.h.

Fix resulting compilation errors by adding appropriate #includes to *.c
files as needed.

Note that some of these *.c files could be cleaned up a bit wrt. to their
set of #includes, but that should better be done from separate patches, if
at all.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-08-05 09:53:13 +02:00
Jiang Biao 8c934e01a7 x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd()
pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd() can return NULL, so the return value should
be checked to prevent a NULL pointer dereference.

Add the check and a warning when the PMD allocation fails.

Signed-off-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: albcamus@gmail.com
Cc: zhong.weidong@zte.com.cn
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532045192-49622-2-git-send-email-jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn
2018-07-20 07:07:39 +02:00
Jiang Biao b2b7d986a8 x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d()
pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d() can return NULL, so the return value should
be checked to prevent a NULL pointer dereference.

Add the check and a warning when the P4D allocation fails.

Signed-off-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: albcamus@gmail.com
Cc: zhong.weidong@zte.com.cn
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532045192-49622-1-git-send-email-jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn
2018-07-20 07:07:39 +02:00
Joerg Roedel 5e8105950a x86/mm/pti: Add Warning when booting on a PCID capable CPU
Warn the user in case the performance can be significantly improved by
switching to a 64-bit kernel.

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-39-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20 01:11:48 +02:00
Joerg Roedel ba0364e260 x86/mm/pti: Clone entry-text again in pti_finalize()
The mapping for entry-text might have changed in the kernel after it was
cloned to the user page-table. Clone again to update the user page-table to
bring the mapping in sync with the kernel again.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-31-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20 01:11:45 +02:00
Joerg Roedel b976690f5d x86/mm/pti: Introduce pti_finalize()
Introduce a new function to finalize the kernel mappings for the userspace
page-table after all ro/nx protections have been applied to the kernel
mappings.

Also move the call to pti_clone_kernel_text() to that function so that it
will run on 32 bit kernels too.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-30-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20 01:11:45 +02:00
Joerg Roedel 1ac228a7c8 x86/mm/pti: Keep permissions when cloning kernel text in pti_clone_kernel_text()
Mapping the kernel text area to user-space makes only sense if it has the
same permissions as in the kernel page-table.  If permissions are different
this will cause a TLB reload when using the kernel page-table, which is as
good as not mapping it at all.

On 64-bit kernels this patch makes no difference, as the whole range cloned
by pti_clone_kernel_text() is mapped RO anyway. On 32 bit there are
writeable mappings in the range, so just keep the permissions as they are.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-29-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20 01:11:45 +02:00
Joerg Roedel 39d668e04e x86/mm/pti: Make pti_clone_kernel_text() compile on 32 bit
The pti_clone_kernel_text() function references __end_rodata_hpage_align,
which is only present on x86-64.  This makes sense as the end of the rodata
section is not huge-page aligned on 32 bit.

Nevertheless a symbol is required for the function that points at the right
address for both 32 and 64 bit. Introduce __end_rodata_aligned for that
purpose and use it in pti_clone_kernel_text().

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-28-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20 01:11:44 +02:00
Joerg Roedel f94560cd6b x86/mm/pti: Clone CPU_ENTRY_AREA on PMD level on x86_32
Cloning on the P4D level would clone the complete kernel address space into
the user-space page-tables for PAE kernels. Cloning on PMD level is fine
for PAE and legacy paging.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-27-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20 01:11:44 +02:00
Joerg Roedel 935232ce28 x86/mm/pti: Add an overflow check to pti_clone_pmds()
The addr counter will overflow if the last PMD of the address space is
cloned, resulting in an endless loop.

Check for that and bail out of the loop when it happens.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-25-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20 01:11:43 +02:00
Joerg Roedel 23b772883d x86/pgtable: Rename pti_set_user_pgd() to pti_set_user_pgtbl()
The way page-table folding is implemented on 32 bit, these functions are
not only setting, but also PUDs and even PMDs. Give the function a more
generic name to reflect that.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-16-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20 01:11:40 +02:00
Jiang Biao 21279157ef x86/pti: Make pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal() static
pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal() is only used in pti.c, make it static.

Signed-off-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: albcamus@gmail.com
Cc: zhong.weidong@zte.com.cn
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531713820-24544-4-git-send-email-jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn
2018-07-16 17:59:57 +02:00
Dave Hansen b7c21bc56f x86/pti: Disallow global kernel text with RANDSTRUCT
commit 26d35ca6c3776784f8156e1d6f80cc60d9a2a915

RANDSTRUCT derives its hardening benefits from the attacker's lack of
knowledge about the layout of kernel data structures.  Keep the kernel
image non-global in cases where RANDSTRUCT is in use to help keep the
layout a secret.

Fixes: 8c06c7740 (x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID)
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222026.D0B4AAC9@viggo.jf.intel.com
2018-04-25 11:02:51 +02:00
Dave Hansen a44ca8f5a3 x86/pti: Reduce amount of kernel text allowed to be Global
commit abb67605203687c8b7943d760638d0301787f8d9

Kees reported to me that I made too much of the kernel image global.
It was far more than just text:

	I think this is too much set global: _end is after data,
	bss, and brk, and all kinds of other stuff that could
	hold secrets. I think this should match what
	mark_rodata_ro() is doing.

This does exactly that.  We use __end_rodata_hpage_align as our
marker both because it is huge-page-aligned and it does not contain
any sections we expect to hold secrets.

Kees's logic was that r/o data is in the kernel image anyway and,
in the case of traditional distributions, can be freely downloaded
from the web, so there's no reason to hide it.

Fixes: 8c06c7740 (x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID)
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222023.1C8B2B20@viggo.jf.intel.com
2018-04-25 11:02:50 +02:00
Dave Hansen 8c06c7740d x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID
Global pages are bad for hardening because they potentially let an
exploit read the kernel image via a Meltdown-style attack which
makes it easier to find gadgets.

But, global pages are good for performance because they reduce TLB
misses when making user/kernel transitions, especially when PCIDs
are not available, such as on older hardware, or where a hypervisor
has disabled them for some reason.

This patch implements a basic, sane policy: If you have PCIDs, you
only map a minimal amount of kernel text global.  If you do not have
PCIDs, you map all kernel text global.

This policy effectively makes PCIDs something that not only adds
performance but a little bit of hardening as well.

I ran a simple "lseek" microbenchmark[1] to test the benefit on
a modern Atom microserver.  Most of the benefit comes from applying
the series before this patch ("entry only"), but there is still a
signifiant benefit from this patch.

  No Global Lines (baseline  ): 6077741 lseeks/sec
  88 Global Lines (entry only): 7528609 lseeks/sec (+23.9%)
  94 Global Lines (this patch): 8433111 lseeks/sec (+38.8%)

[1.] https://github.com/antonblanchard/will-it-scale/blob/master/tests/lseek1.c

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205518.E3D989EB@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-12 09:06:00 +02:00
Dave Hansen 39114b7a74 x86/pti: Never implicitly clear _PAGE_GLOBAL for kernel image
Summary:

In current kernels, with PTI enabled, no pages are marked Global. This
potentially increases TLB misses.  But, the mechanism by which the Global
bit is set and cleared is rather haphazard.  This patch makes the process
more explicit.  In the end, it leaves us with Global entries in the page
tables for the areas truly shared by userspace and kernel and increases
TLB hit rates.

The place this patch really shines in on systems without PCIDs.  In this
case, we are using an lseek microbenchmark[1] to see how a reasonably
non-trivial syscall behaves.  Higher is better:

  No Global pages (baseline): 6077741 lseeks/sec
  88 Global Pages (this set): 7528609 lseeks/sec (+23.9%)

On a modern Skylake desktop with PCIDs, the benefits are tangible, but not
huge for a kernel compile (lower is better):

  No Global pages (baseline): 186.951 seconds time elapsed  ( +-  0.35% )
  28 Global pages (this set): 185.756 seconds time elapsed  ( +-  0.09% )
                               -1.195 seconds (-0.64%)

I also re-checked everything using the lseek1 test[1]:

  No Global pages (baseline): 15783951 lseeks/sec
  28 Global pages (this set): 16054688 lseeks/sec
			     +270737 lseeks/sec (+1.71%)

The effect is more visible, but still modest.

Details:

The kernel page tables are inherited from head_64.S which rudely marks
them as _PAGE_GLOBAL.  For PTI, we have been relying on the grace of
$DEITY and some insane behavior in pageattr.c to clear _PAGE_GLOBAL.
This patch tries to do better.

First, stop filtering out "unsupported" bits from being cleared in the
pageattr code.  It's fine to filter out *setting* these bits but it
is insane to keep us from clearing them.

Then, *explicitly* go clear _PAGE_GLOBAL from the kernel identity map.
Do not rely on pageattr to do it magically.

After this patch, we can see that "GLB" shows up in each copy of the
page tables, that we have the same number of global entries in each
and that they are the *same* entries.

  /sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/current_kernel:11
  /sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/current_user:11
  /sys/kernel/debug/page_tables/kernel:11

  9caae8ad6a1fb53aca2407ec037f612d  current_kernel.GLB
  9caae8ad6a1fb53aca2407ec037f612d  current_user.GLB
  9caae8ad6a1fb53aca2407ec037f612d  kernel.GLB

A quick visual audit also shows that all the entries make sense.
0xfffffe0000000000 is the cpu_entry_area and 0xffffffff81c00000
is the entry/exit text:

  0xfffffe0000000000-0xfffffe0000002000           8K     ro                 GLB NX pte
  0xfffffe0000002000-0xfffffe0000003000           4K     RW                 GLB NX pte
  0xfffffe0000003000-0xfffffe0000006000          12K     ro                 GLB NX pte
  0xfffffe0000006000-0xfffffe0000007000           4K     ro                 GLB x  pte
  0xfffffe0000007000-0xfffffe000000d000          24K     RW                 GLB NX pte
  0xfffffe000002d000-0xfffffe000002e000           4K     ro                 GLB NX pte
  0xfffffe000002e000-0xfffffe000002f000           4K     RW                 GLB NX pte
  0xfffffe000002f000-0xfffffe0000032000          12K     ro                 GLB NX pte
  0xfffffe0000032000-0xfffffe0000033000           4K     ro                 GLB x  pte
  0xfffffe0000033000-0xfffffe0000039000          24K     RW                 GLB NX pte
  0xffffffff81c00000-0xffffffff81e00000           2M     ro         PSE     GLB x  pmd

[1.] https://github.com/antonblanchard/will-it-scale/blob/master/tests/lseek1.c

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205517.C80FBE05@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-12 09:06:00 +02:00
Dave Hansen 0f561fce4d x86/pti: Enable global pages for shared areas
The entry/exit text and cpu_entry_area are mapped into userspace and
the kernel.  But, they are not _PAGE_GLOBAL.  This creates unnecessary
TLB misses.

Add the _PAGE_GLOBAL flag for these areas.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205515.2977EE7D@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-12 09:05:59 +02:00
Seunghun Han c5b679f5c9 x86/pti: Fix a comment typo
s/visinble/visible/

Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1520397135-132809-1-git-send-email-kkamagui@gmail.com
2018-03-08 12:33:21 +01:00
Jike Song 8d56eff266 x86/mm/pti: Remove dead logic in pti_user_pagetable_walk*()
The following code contains dead logic:

 162 if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
 163         unsigned long new_p4d_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
 164         if (!new_p4d_page)
 165                 return NULL;
 166
 167         if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
 168                 set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
 169                 new_p4d_page = 0;
 170         }
 171         if (new_p4d_page)
 172                 free_page(new_p4d_page);
 173 }

There can't be any difference between two pgd_none(*pgd) at L162 and L167,
so it's always false at L171.

Dave Hansen explained:

 Yes, the double-test was part of an optimization where we attempted to
 avoid using a global spinlock in the fork() path.  We would check for
 unallocated mid-level page tables without the lock.  The lock was only
 taken when we needed to *make* an entry to avoid collisions.
 
 Now that it is all single-threaded, there is no chance of a collision,
 no need for a lock, and no need for the re-check.

As all these functions are only called during init, mark them __init as
well.

Fixes: 03f4424f34 ("x86/mm/pti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs")
Signed-off-by: Jike Song <albcamus@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108160341.3461-1-albcamus@gmail.com
2018-01-08 17:42:13 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner de791821c2 x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN
Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table
isolation for mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirski  <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801051525300.1724@nanos
2018-01-05 15:34:43 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner 52994c256d x86/pti: Make sure the user/kernel PTEs match
Meelis reported that his K8 Athlon64 emits MCE warnings when PTI is
enabled:

[Hardware Error]: Error Addr: 0x0000ffff81e000e0
[Hardware Error]: MC1 Error: L1 TLB multimatch.
[Hardware Error]: cache level: L1, tx: INSN

The address is in the entry area, which is mapped into kernel _AND_ user
space. That's special because we switch CR3 while we are executing
there. 

User mapping:
0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff82000000           2M     ro         PSE     GLB x  pmd

Kernel mapping:
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff82000000          16M     ro         PSE         x  pmd

So the K8 is complaining that the TLB entries differ. They differ in the
GLB bit.

Drop the GLB bit when installing the user shared mapping.

Fixes: 6dc72c3cbc ("x86/mm/pti: Share entry text PMD")
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801031407180.1957@nanos
2018-01-03 15:57:59 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski 85900ea515 x86/pti: Map the vsyscall page if needed
Make VSYSCALLs work fully in PTI mode by mapping them properly to the user
space visible page tables.

[ tglx: Hide unused functions (Patch by Arnd Bergmann) ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-23 21:13:00 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski 4b6bbe95b8 x86/mm/pti: Map ESPFIX into user space
Map the ESPFIX pages into user space when PTI is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-23 21:13:00 +01:00