The proc net rewrite had a side effect on selinux, leading it to mislabel
the /proc/net inodes, thereby leading to incorrect denials. Fix
security_genfs_sid to ignore extra leading / characters in the path supplied
by selinux_proc_get_sid since we now get "//net/..." rather than "/net/...".
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
selinux: make mls_compute_sid always polyinstantiate
security/selinux: constify function pointer tables and fields
security: add a secctx_to_secid() hook
security: call security_file_permission from rw_verify_area
security: remove security_sb_post_mountroot hook
Security: remove security.h include from mm.h
Security: remove security_file_mmap hook sparse-warnings (NULL as 0).
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information
security/selinux: Add missing "space"
There is no need for kobject_unregister() anymore, thanks to Kay's
kobject cleanup changes, so replace all instances of it with
kobject_put().
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
kernel_kset does not need to be a kset, but a much simpler kobject now
that we have kobj_attributes.
We also rename kernel_kset to kernel_kobj to catch all users of this
symbol with a build error instead of an easy-to-ignore build warning.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Dynamically create the kset instead of declaring it statically. We also
rename kernel_subsys to kernel_kset to catch all users of this symbol
with a build error instead of an easy-to-ignore build warning.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
We don't need a kset here, a simple kobject will do just fine, so
dynamically create the kobject and use it.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
We don't need a "default" ktype for a kset. We should set this
explicitly every time for each kset. This change is needed so that we
can make ksets dynamic, and cleans up one of the odd, undocumented
assumption that the kset/kobject/ktype model has.
This patch is based on a lot of help from Kay Sievers.
Nasty bug in the block code was found by Dave Young
<hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This patch removes the requirement that the new and related object types
differ in order to polyinstantiate by MLS level. This allows MLS
polyinstantiation to occur in the absence of explicit type_member rules or
when the type has not changed.
Potential users of this support include pam_namespace.so (directory
polyinstantiation) and the SELinux X support (property polyinstantiation).
Signed-off-by: Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The security_sb_post_mountroot() hook is long-since obsolete, and is
fundamentally broken: it is never invoked if someone uses initramfs.
This is particularly damaging, because the existence of this hook has
been used as motivation for not using initramfs.
Stephen Smalley confirmed on 2007-07-19 that this hook was originally
used by SELinux but can now be safely removed:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118485683612916&w=2
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.
Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume
future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.
An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.
An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In linux-2.6.24-rc1, security/commoncap.c:cap_inh_is_capped() was
introduced. It has the exact reverse of its intended behavior. This
led to an unintended privilege esculation involving a process'
inheritable capability set.
To be exposed to this bug, you need to have Filesystem Capabilities
enabled and in use. That is:
- CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES must be defined for the buggy code
to be compiled in.
- You also need to have files on your system marked with fI bits raised.
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Fix a memory leak in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() as reported here:
* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=352281
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
lower than mmap_min_addr. Based on a suggestion from a developer in the
openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO. It is
assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot
more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to
get the kernel to trip over itself. It also means that programs like X
on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Instead of using f_op to detect dead booleans, check the inode index
against the number of booleans and check the dentry name against the
boolean name for that index on reads and writes. This prevents
incorrect use of a boolean file opened prior to a policy reload while
allowing valid use of it as long as it still corresponds to the same
boolean in the policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Do not clear f_op when removing entries since it isn't safe to do.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
An unprivileged process must be able to kill a setuid root program started
by the same user. This is legacy behavior needed for instance for xinit to
kill X when the window manager exits.
When an unprivileged user runs a setuid root program in !SECURE_NOROOT
mode, fP, fI, and fE are set full on, so pP' and pE' are full on. Then
cap_task_kill() prevents the user from signaling the setuid root task.
This is a change in behavior compared to when
!CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES.
This patch introduces a special check into cap_task_kill() just to check
whether a non-root user is signaling a setuid root program started by the
same user. If so, then signal is allowed.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9247
Allow sigcont to be sent to a process with greater capabilities if it is in
the same session. Otherwise, a shell from which I've started a root shell
and done 'suspend' can't be restarted by the parent shell.
Also don't do file-capabilities signaling checks when uids for the
processes don't match, since the standard check_kill_permission will have
done those checks.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Tested-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add more validity checks at policy load time to reject malformed
policies and prevent subsequent out-of-range indexing when in permissive
mode. Resolves the NULL pointer dereference reported in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=357541.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The "e_iter = e_iter->next;" statement in the inner for loop is primally
bug. It should be moved to outside of the for loop.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
On PowerPC allmodconfig build we get this:
security/selinux/xfrm.c:214: warning: comparison is always false due to limited range of data type
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When checking if we can wait on a child we were looking at
p->exit_signal and trying to make the decision based on if the signal
would eventually be allowed. One big flaw is that p->exit_signal is -1
for NPTL threads and so aignal_to_av was not actually checking SIGCHLD
which is what would have been sent. Even is exit_signal was set to
something strange it wouldn't change the fact that the child was there
and needed to be waited on. This patch just assumes wait is based on
SIGCHLD. Specific permission checks are made when the child actually
attempts to send a signal.
This resolves the problem of things like using GDB on confined domains
such as in RH BZ 232371. The confined domain did not have permission to
send a generic signal (exit_signal == -1) back to the unconfined GDB.
With this patch the GDB wait works and since the actual signal sent is
allowed everything functions as it should.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Simplify the vfs_cap_data structure.
Also fix get_file_caps which was declaring
__le32 v1caps[XATTR_CAPS_SZ] on the stack, but
XATTR_CAPS_SZ is already * sizeof(__le32).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
is_init() is an ambiguous name for the pid==1 check. Split it into
is_global_init() and is_container_init().
A cgroup init has it's tsk->pid == 1.
A global init also has it's tsk->pid == 1 and it's active pid namespace
is the init_pid_ns. But rather than check the active pid namespace,
compare the task structure with 'init_pid_ns.child_reaper', which is
initialized during boot to the /sbin/init process and never changes.
Changelog:
2.6.22-rc4-mm2-pidns1:
- Use 'init_pid_ns.child_reaper' to determine if a given task is the
global init (/sbin/init) process. This would improve performance
and remove dependence on the task_pid().
2.6.21-mm2-pidns2:
- [Sukadev Bhattiprolu] Changed is_container_init() calls in {powerpc,
ppc,avr32}/traps.c for the _exception() call to is_global_init().
This way, we kill only the cgroup if the cgroup's init has a
bug rather than force a kernel panic.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment]
[sukadev@us.ibm.com: Use is_global_init() in arch/m32r/mm/fault.c]
[bunk@stusta.de: kernel/pid.c: remove unused exports]
[sukadev@us.ibm.com: Fix capability.c to work with threaded init]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Poetzel <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Get rid of sparse related warnings from places that use integer as NULL
pointer.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The non-filesystem capability meaning of CAP_SETPCAP is that a process, p1,
can change the capabilities of another process, p2. This is not the
meaning that was intended for this capability at all, and this
implementation came about purely because, without filesystem capabilities,
there was no way to use capabilities without one process bestowing them on
another.
Since we now have a filesystem support for capabilities we can fix the
implementation of CAP_SETPCAP.
The most significant thing about this change is that, with it in effect, no
process can set the capabilities of another process.
The capabilities of a program are set via the capability convolution
rules:
pI(post-exec) = pI(pre-exec)
pP(post-exec) = (X(aka cap_bset) & fP) | (pI(post-exec) & fI)
pE(post-exec) = fE ? pP(post-exec) : 0
at exec() time. As such, the only influence the pre-exec() program can
have on the post-exec() program's capabilities are through the pI
capability set.
The correct implementation for CAP_SETPCAP (and that enabled by this patch)
is that it can be used to add extra pI capabilities to the current process
- to be picked up by subsequent exec()s when the above convolution rules
are applied.
Here is how it works:
Let's say we have a process, p. It has capability sets, pE, pP and pI.
Generally, p, can change the value of its own pI to pI' where
(pI' & ~pI) & ~pP = 0.
That is, the only new things in pI' that were not present in pI need to
be present in pP.
The role of CAP_SETPCAP is basically to permit changes to pI beyond
the above:
if (pE & CAP_SETPCAP) {
pI' = anything; /* ie., even (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP != 0 */
}
This capability is useful for things like login, which (say, via
pam_cap) might want to raise certain inheritable capabilities for use
by the children of the logged-in user's shell, but those capabilities
are not useful to or needed by the login program itself.
One such use might be to limit who can run ping. You set the
capabilities of the 'ping' program to be "= cap_net_raw+i", and then
only shells that have (pI & CAP_NET_RAW) will be able to run
it. Without CAP_SETPCAP implemented as described above, login(pam_cap)
would have to also have (pP & CAP_NET_RAW) in order to raise this
capability and pass it on through the inheritable set.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:
- remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix
- remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security
- remove some no longer required exit code
- remove a bunch of no longer used exports
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
overall security architecture.
Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
abuse.
Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
at boot.
The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface
is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree
modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous to make it easier for
NFS to make use of them. There are now accessor functions that do
asynchronous constructions, a wait function to wait for construction to
complete, and a completion function for the key type to indicate completion
of construction.
Note that the construction queue is now gone. Instead, keys under
construction are linked in to the appropriate keyring in advance, and that
anyone encountering one must wait for it to be complete before they can use
it. This is done automatically for userspace.
The following auxiliary changes are also made:
(1) Key type implementation stuff is split from linux/key.h into
linux/key-type.h.
(2) AF_RXRPC provides a way to allocate null rxrpc-type keys so that AFS does
not need to call key_instantiate_and_link() directly.
(3) Adjust the debugging macros so that they're -Wformat checked even if
they are disabled, and make it so they can be enabled simply by defining
__KDEBUG to be consistent with other code of mine.
(3) Documentation.
[alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk: keys: missing word in documentation]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch kills ugly warnings when the "Improve SELinux performance
when ACV misses" patch.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on
any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance
using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h.
In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination
of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse
in performance aspect.
This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry,
so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen.
* struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get
suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of
shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated
from general purpose slab.
* Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation
in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are
changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous
version.
* The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars.
The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we
access many files which have different security context one after
another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so
any access always causes AVC misses.
selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap
AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s]
STD: 0.265 0.019
------------------------------------------
1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s]
2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s]
3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s]
4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s]
5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s]
6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s]
7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s]
8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s]
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Allow policy to select, in much the same way as it selects MLS support, how
the kernel should handle access decisions which contain either unknown
classes or unknown permissions in known classes. The three choices for the
policy flags are
0 - Deny unknown security access. (default)
2 - reject loading policy if it does not contain all definitions
4 - allow unknown security access
The policy's choice is exported through 2 booleans in
selinuxfs. /selinux/deny_unknown and /selinux/reject_unknown.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.
(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)
Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch reduces memory usage of SELinux by tuning avtab. Number of hash
slots in avtab was 32768. Unused slots used memory when number of rules is
fewer. This patch decides number of hash slots dynamically based on number
of rules. (chain length)^2 is also printed out in avtab_hash_eval to see
standard deviation of avtab hash table.
Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Expansion of original idea from Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Add robustness and locking to the local_port_range sysctl.
1. Enforce that low < high when setting.
2. Use seqlock to ensure atomic update.
The locking might seem like overkill, but there are
cases where sysadmin might want to change value in the
middle of a DoS attack.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Each netlink socket will live in exactly one network namespace,
this includes the controlling kernel sockets.
This patch updates all of the existing netlink protocols
to only support the initial network namespace. Request
by clients in other namespaces will get -ECONREFUSED.
As they would if the kernel did not have the support for
that netlink protocol compiled in.
As each netlink protocol is updated to be multiple network
namespace safe it can register multiple kernel sockets
to acquire a presence in the rest of the network namespaces.
The implementation in af_netlink is a simple filter implementation
at hash table insertion and hash table look up time.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Every user of the network device notifiers is either a protocol
stack or a pseudo device. If a protocol stack that does not have
support for multiple network namespaces receives an event for a
device that is not in the initial network namespace it quite possibly
can get confused and do the wrong thing.
To avoid problems until all of the protocol stacks are converted
this patch modifies all netdev event handlers to ignore events on
devices that are not in the initial network namespace.
As the rest of the code is made network namespace aware these
checks can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Given an illegal selinux option it was possible for match_token to work in
random memory at the end of the match_table_t array.
Note that privilege is required to perform a context mount, so this issue is
effectively limited to root only.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Clear parent death signal on SID transitions to prevent unauthorized
signaling between SIDs.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>
The new exec code inserts an accounted vma into an mm struct which is not
current->mm. The existing memory check code has a hard coded assumption
that this does not happen as does the security code.
As the correct mm is known we pass the mm to the security method and the
helper function. A new security test is added for the case where we need
to pass the mm and the existing one is modified to pass current->mm to
avoid the need to change large amounts of code.
(Thanks to Tobias for fixing rejects and testing)
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: WU Fengguang <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Cc: Tobias Diedrich <ranma+kernel@tdiedrich.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Corrects an error code so that it is valid to pass to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <linux_4ever@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@halo.namei>
We don't need to check for NULL pointers before calling kfree().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
A small fix to the SELinux/NetLabel glue code to ensure that the NetLabel
cache is utilized when possible. This was broken when the SELinux/NetLabel
glue code was reorganized in the last kernel release.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Stephen Smalley