Rename nfsd_permission() specific MAY_* flags to NFSD_MAY_* to make it
clear, that these are not used outside nfsd, and to avoid name and
number space conflicts with the VFS.
[comment from hch: rename MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE and MAY_EXEC as well]
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
We already print each operation of the compound when debugging is turned
on; printing the result could also help with remote debugging.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
This basically audits the callers of xattr_permission(), which calls
permission() and can perform writes to the filesystem.
[AV: add missing parts - removexattr() and nfsd posix acls, plug for a leak
spotted by Miklos]
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch addresses a compatibility issue with a Linux NFS server and
AIX NFS client.
I have exported /export as fsid=0 with sec=krb5:krb5i
I have mount --bind /home onto /export/home
I have exported /export/home with sec=krb5i
The AIX client mounts / -o sec=krb5:krb5i onto /mnt
If I do an ls /mnt, the AIX client gets a permission error. Looking at
the network traceIwe see a READDIR looking for attributes
FATTR4_RDATTR_ERROR and FATTR4_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID. The response gives a
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC which the AIX client is not expecting.
Since the AIX client is only asking for an attribute that is an
attribute of the parent file system (pseudo root in my example), it
seems reasonable that there should not be an error.
In discussing this issue with Bruce Fields, I initially proposed
ignoring the error in nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr() if all that was being
asked for was FATTR4_RDATTR_ERROR and FATTR4_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID, however,
Bruce suggested that we avoid calling cross_mnt() if only these
attributes are requested.
The following patch implements bypassing cross_mnt() if only
FATTR4_RDATTR_ERROR and FATTR4_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID are called. Since there
is some complexity in the code in nfsd4_encode_fattr(), I didn't want to
duplicate code (and introduce a maintenance nightmare), so I added a
parameter to nfsd4_encode_fattr() that indicates whether it should
ignore cross mounts and simply fill in the attribute using the passed in
dentry as opposed to it's parent.
Signed-off-by: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
To quote a recent mail from Andrew Morton:
Look: if there's a way in which an unprivileged user can trigger
a printk we fix it, end of story.
OK. I assume that goes double for printk()s that might be triggered by
random hosts on the internet. So, disable some printk()s that look like
they could be triggered by malfunctioning or malicious clients. For
now, just downgrade them to dprintk()s.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
RFC 3530 says:
If the server uses an attribute to store the exclusive create verifier, it
will signify which attribute by setting the appropriate bit in the attribute
mask that is returned in the results.
Linux uses the atime and mtime to store the verifier, but sends a zeroed out
bitmask back to the client. This patch makes sure that we set the correct
bits in the bitmask in this situation.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Implement the secinfo operation.
(Thanks to Usha Ketineni wrote an earlier version of this support.)
Cc: Usha Ketineni <uketinen@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We're passing three arguments to exp_pseudoroot, two of which are just fields
of the svc_rqst. Soon we'll want to pass in a third field as well. So let's
just give up and pass in the whole struct svc_rqst.
Also sneak in some minor style cleanups while we're at it.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Kill another big "if" clause.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
I'm not too fond of these big if conditions. Replace them by checks of a flag
in the operation descriptor. To my eye this makes the code a bit more
self-documenting, and makes the complicated part of the code (proc_compound) a
little more compact.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Define an op descriptor struct, use it to simplify nfsd4_proc_compound().
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make wrappers for verify and nverify, for consistency with other ops.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The inlining contributes to bloating the stack of nfsd4_compound, and I want
to change the compound op functions to function pointers anyway.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Tuck away the replay_owner in the cstate while we're at it.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
OK, this is embarassing--I've even looked back at the history, and cannot for
the life of me figure out why I added this check.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Pass the saved and current filehandles together into all the nfsd4 compound
operations.
I want a unified interface to these operations so we can just call them by
pointer and throw out the huge switch statement.
Also I'll eventually want a structure like this--that holds the state used
during compound processing--for deferral.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
A comment here incorrectly states that "slack_space" is measured in words, not
bytes. Remove the comment, and adjust a variable name and a few comments to
clarify the situation.
This is pure cleanup; there should be no change in functionality.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
In the case where an open creates the file, we shouldn't be rechecking
permissions to open the file; the open succeeds regardless of what the new
file's mode bits say.
This patch fixes the problem, but only by introducing yet another parameter
to nfsd_create_v3. This is ugly. This will be fixed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Minor rearrangement, cleanup of do_open_lookup(). No change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
We are using NFS_REPLAY_ME as a special error value that is never leaked to
clients. That works fine; the only problem is mixing host- and network-
endian values in the same objects. Network-endian equivalent would work just
as fine; switch to it.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
svc_procfunc instances return __be32, not int
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
We weren't actually checking for SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE, with the result that the
owner could open a non-writeable file for write!
Continue to allow DENY_WRITE only with write access.
Thanks to Jim Rees for reporting the bug.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
If a client creates a file using an open which sets the mode to 000, or if a
chmod changes permissions after a file is opened, then situations may arise
where an NFS client knows that some IO is permitted (because a process holds
the file open), but the NFS server does not (because it doesn't know about the
open, and only sees that the IO conflicts with the current mode of the file).
As a hack to solve this problem, NFS servers normally allow the owner to
override permissions on IO. The client can still enforce correct
permissions-checking on open by performing an explicit access check.
In NFSv4 the client can rely on the explicit on-the-wire open instead of an
access check.
Therefore we should not be allowing the owner to override permissions on an
over-the-wire open!
However, we should still allow the owner to override permissions in the case
where the client is claiming an open that it already made either before a
reboot, or while it was holding a delegation.
Thanks to Jim Rees for reporting the bug.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Use all the pieces set up so far to implement referral support, allowing
return of NFS4ERR_MOVED and fs_locations attribute.
Signed-off-by: Manoj Naik <manoj@almaden.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fred Isaman <iisaman@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
.. by allocating the array of 'kvec' in 'struct svc_rqst'.
As we plan to increase RPCSVC_MAXPAGES from 8 upto 256, we can no longer
allocate an array of this size on the stack. So we allocate it in 'struct
svc_rqst'.
However svc_rqst contains (indirectly) an array of the same type and size
(actually several, but they are in a union). So rather than waste space, we
move those arrays out of the separately allocated union and into svc_rqst to
share with the kvec moved out of svc_tcp_recvfrom (various arrays are used at
different times, so there is no conflict).
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add an nfs4 operations count array to nfsd_stats structure. The count is
incremented in nfsd4_proc_compound() where all the operations are handled
by the nfsv4 server. This count of individual nfsv4 operations is also
entered into /proc filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Shankar Anand<shanand@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Since nfsd_setuser() is already called from any operation that uses the
current filehandle (because it's called from fh_verify), there's no reason to
call it from putrootfh.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
NFSd makes sure there is enough space to hold the maximum possible reply
before accepting a request. The units for this maximum is (4byte) words.
However in three places, particularly for read request, the number given is
a number of bytes.
This means too much space is reserved which is slightly wasteful.
This is the sort of patch that could uncover a deeper bug, and it is not
critical, so it would be best for it to spend a while in -mm before going
in to mainline.
(akpm: target 2.6.17-rc2, 2.6.16.3 (approx))
Discovered-by: "Eivind Sarto" <ivan@kasenna.com>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
I just noticed that my patch "don't create on open that fails due to
ERR_GRACE" (recently commited as fb553c0f17)
had an obvious problem that causes a deadlock on reboot recovery. Sending
in this now since it seems like a clear 2.6.16 candidate.--b.
We're returning with a lock held in some error cases.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Clean up some unnecessary special-casing in the setattr code..
Signed-off-by: Fred Isaman <iisaman@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
In an earlier patch (commit b648330a1d) I noted
that a too-early grace-period check was preventing us from bumping the
sequence id on open. Unfortunately in that patch I stupidly moved the
grace-period check back too far, so now an open for create can succesfully
create the file while still returning ERR_GRACE.
The correct place for that check is after we've set the open_owner and handled
any replays, but before we actually start mucking with the filesystem.
Thanks to Avishay Traeger for reporting the bug.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Remove some goto's that made the logic here a little more tortuous than
necessary.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
We need to make sure open reclaims are marked confirmed immediately so that we
can handle replays even if they fail (e.g. with a seqid-incrementing error).
(See 8.1.8.)
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Simple, useful debugging printk: print the number of each op as we process it.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
It seems more natural to move the setting of the replay_owner into the
relevant procedure instead of doing it in nfsv4_proc_compound.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The GRACE and NOGRACE errors should bump the sequence id on open. So we delay
the handling of these errors until nfsd4_process_open2, at which point we've
set the open owner, so the encode routine will be able to bump the sequence
id.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
We're trying to read and write from a struct file that we may not hold a
reference to any more (since a close could be processed as soon as we drop the
state lock).
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
We currently return err_grace if a user attempts a non-reclaim open during the
grace period. But we also need to prevent renames and removes, at least, to
ensure clients have the chance to recover state on files before they are moved
or deleted.
Of course, local users could also do renames and removes during the lease
period, and there's not much we can do about that. This at least will help
with remote users.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add OPEN claim type NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR to nfsd4_open().
A delegation stateid and a name are provided. OPEN with O_CREAT is not legal
with this claim type; otherwise, use the NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL code path to
lookup the filename to be opened.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
Miklos Szeredi