Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Richard Fitzgerald d327ea15a3 random32: Fix implicit truncation warning in prandom_seed_state()
sparse generates the following warning:

 include/linux/prandom.h:114:45: sparse: sparse: cast truncates bits from
 constant value

This is because the 64-bit seed value is manipulated and then placed in a
u32, causing an implicit cast and truncation. A forced cast to u32 doesn't
prevent this warning, which is reasonable because a typecast doesn't prove
that truncation was expected.

Logical-AND the value with 0xffffffff to make explicit that truncation to
32-bit is intended.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525122012.6336-3-rf@opensource.cirrus.com
2021-05-27 15:38:17 +02:00
Willy Tarreau 3744741ada random32: add noise from network and scheduling activity
With the removal of the interrupt perturbations in previous random32
change (random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable), the PRNG
has become 100% deterministic again. While SipHash is expected to be
way more robust against brute force than the previous Tausworthe LFSR,
there's still the risk that whoever has even one temporary access to
the PRNG's internal state is able to predict all subsequent draws till
the next reseed (roughly every minute). This may happen through a side
channel attack or any data leak.

This patch restores the spirit of commit f227e3ec3b ("random32: update
the net random state on interrupt and activity") in that it will perturb
the internal PRNG's statee using externally collected noise, except that
it will not pick that noise from the random pool's bits nor upon
interrupt, but will rather combine a few elements along the Tx path
that are collectively hard to predict, such as dev, skb and txq
pointers, packet length and jiffies values. These ones are combined
using a single round of SipHash into a single long variable that is
mixed with the net_rand_state upon each invocation.

The operation was inlined because it produces very small and efficient
code, typically 3 xor, 2 add and 2 rol. The performance was measured
to be the same (even very slightly better) than before the switch to
SipHash; on a 6-core 12-thread Core i7-8700k equipped with a 40G NIC
(i40e), the connection rate dropped from 556k/s to 555k/s while the
SYN cookie rate grew from 5.38 Mpps to 5.45 Mpps.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
Cc: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org>
Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2020-10-24 20:21:57 +02:00
George Spelvin c51f8f88d7 random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable
Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output.  An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack.  Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key.  (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.)  Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution.  This patch replaces
it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Marc Plumb <lkml.mplumb@gmail.com>
Fixes: f227e3ec3b ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
  to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
  inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
  members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
  happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2020-10-24 20:21:57 +02:00
Linus Torvalds c0842fbc1b random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h
The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed
some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms.  This
include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have
nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are
still there for legacy reasons.

This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the
percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and
protected against recursive inclusion.

A further cleanup step would be to remove this from <linux/random.h>
entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include
just the new header file.  That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping
for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should
catch most users.

But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because
a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of
<linux/random.h>, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including
such fairly core headfers as <linux/net.h>.

So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen.

Fixes: 1c9df907da ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h")
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-03 23:24:26 -07:00