If trace_printk_on_oops is set we lose interesting trace information
when the tracer is enabled across oops handling and printing. We want
the trace which might give us information _WHY_ we oopsed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Ian Campbell noticed that since "Eliminate thousands of warnings with
gcc 3.2 build" (commit 57adc4d2db) all
WARN_ON()'s currently appear to come from warn_slowpath_null(), eg:
WARNING: at kernel/softirq.c:143 warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x20()
because now that warn_slowpath_null() is in the call path, the
__builtin_return_address(0) returns that, rather than the place that
caused the warning.
Fix this by splitting up the warn_slowpath_null/fmt cases differently,
using a common helper function, and getting the return address in the
right place. This also happens to avoid the unnecessary stack usage for
the non-stdargs case, and just generally cleans things up.
Make the function name printout use %pS while at it.
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When building with gcc 3.2 I get thousands of warnings such as
include/linux/gfp.h: In function `allocflags_to_migratetype':
include/linux/gfp.h:105: warning: null format string
due to passing a NULL format string to warn_slowpath() in
#define __WARN() warn_slowpath(__FILE__, __LINE__, NULL)
Split this case out into a separate call. This also shrinks the kernel
slightly:
text data bss dec hex filename
4802274 707668 712704 6222646 5ef336 vmlinux
text data bss dec hex filename
4799027 703572 712704 6215303 5ed687 vmlinux
due to removeing one argument from the commonly-called __WARN().
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: reduce scope of `empty']
Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andi Kleen reported this message triggering on non-lockdep kernels:
Disabling lockdep due to kernel taint
Clarify the message to say 'lock debugging' - debug_locks_off()
turns off all things lock debugging, not just lockdep.
[ Impact: change kernel warning message text ]
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: broaden lockdep checks
Lockdep is disabled after any kernel taints. This might be convenient
to ignore bad locking issues which sources come from outside the kernel
tree. Nevertheless, it might be a frustrating experience for the
staging developers or those who experience a warning but are focused
on another things that require lockdep.
The v2 of this patch simply don't disable anymore lockdep in case
of TAINT_CRAP and TAINT_WARN events.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: LTP <ltp-list@lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@suse.de>
LKML-Reference: <1239412638-6739-2-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: provide useful missing info for developers
Kernel taint can occur in several situations such as warnings,
load of prorietary or staging modules, bad page, etc...
But when such taint happens, a developer might still be working on
the kernel, expecting that lockdep is still enabled. But a taint
disables lockdep without ever warning about it.
Such a kernel behaviour doesn't really help for kernel development.
This patch adds this missing warning.
Since the taint is done most of the time after the main message that
explain the real source issue, it seems safe to warn about it inside
add_taint() so that it appears at last, without hurting the main
information.
v2: Use a generic helper to disable lockdep instead of an
open coded xchg().
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
LKML-Reference: <1239412638-6739-1-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: cleanup, no code changed
Clean up kernel/panic.c some more and make it more consistent.
LKML-Reference: <49B91A7E.76E4.0078.0@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: cleanup, no code changed
Remove an ugly #ifdef CONFIG_SMP from panic(), by providing
an smp_send_stop() wrapper on UP too.
LKML-Reference: <49B91A7E.76E4.0078.0@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: eliminate secondary warnings during panic()
We can panic() in a number of difficult, atomic contexts, hence
we use bust_spinlocks(1) in panic() to increase oops_in_progress,
which prevents various debug checks we have in place.
But in practice this protection only covers the first few printk's
done by panic() - it does not cover the later attempt to stop all
other CPUs and kexec(). If a secondary warning triggers in one of
those facilities that can make the panic message scroll off.
So do bust_spinlocks(0) only much later in panic(). (which code
is only reached if panic policy is relaxed that it can return
after a warning message)
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
LKML-Reference: <49B91A7E.76E4.0078.0@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: no default -fno-stack-protector if stackp is enabled, cleanup
Stackprotector make rules had the following problems.
* cc support test and warning are scattered across makefile and
kernel/panic.c.
* -fno-stack-protector was always added regardless of configuration.
Update such that cc support test and warning are contained in makefile
and -fno-stack-protector is added iff stackp is turned off. While at
it, prepare for 32bit support.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
... because we do want repeated same-oops to be seen by automated
tools like kerneloops.org
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The description for 'D' was missing in the comment... (causing me a
minute of WTF followed by looking at more of the code)
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Impact: cleanup, eliminate code
now that warn_on_slowpath() uses warn_slowpath(...,NULL), we can
eliminate warn_on_slowpath() altogether and use warn_slowpath().
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: extend WARN_ON() output with DMI_PRODUCT_NAME
It's very useful for many low level WARN_ON's to find out which
motherboard has the broken BIOS etc... this patch adds a printk
to the WARN_ON code for this.
On architectures without DMI, gcc should optimize the code out.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: cleanup, code reduction
warn_slowpath is a superset of warn_on_slowpath; just have
warn_on_slowpath call warn_slowpath with a NULL 3rd argument.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
This allows them to be examined and set after boot, plus means they
actually give errors if they are misused (eg. panic=yes).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's somewhat unlikely that it happens, but right now a race window
between interrupts or machine checks or oopses could corrupt the tainted
bitmap because it is modified in a non atomic fashion.
Convert the taint variable to an unsigned long and use only atomic bit
operations on it.
Unfortunately this means the intvec sysctl functions cannot be used on it
anymore.
It turned out the taint sysctl handler could actually be simplified a bit
(since it only increases capabilities) so this patch actually removes
code.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded include]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We need to add a flag for all code that is in the drivers/staging/
directory to prevent all other kernel developers from worrying about
issues here, and to notify users that the drivers might not be as good
as they are normally used to.
Based on code from Andreas Gruenbacher and Jeff Mahoney to provide a
TAINT flag for the support level of a kernel module in the Novell
enterprise kernel release.
This is the kernel portion of this feature, the ability for the flag to
be set needs to be done in the build process and will happen in a
follow-up patch.
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Add a WARN() macro that acts like WARN_ON(), with the added feature that it
takes a printk like argument that is printed as part of the warning message.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix printk arguments]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
turns out gcc generates such stackprotector-failure sequences
in certain circumstances:
movq -8(%rbp), %rax # D.16032,
xorq %gs:40, %rax #,
jne .L17 #,
leave
ret
.L17:
call __stack_chk_fail #
.size __stack_chk_test_func, .-__stack_chk_test_func
.section .init.text,"ax",@progbits
.type panic_setup, @function
panic_setup:
pushq %rbp #
note that there's no jump back to the failing context after the
call to __stack_chk_fail - i.e. it has a ((noreturn)) attribute.
Which is fair enough in the normal case but kills the self-test.
(as we cannot reliably return in the self-test)
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Clean up the code by removing no longer needed code;
make sure the pda is updated and kept in sync
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
check stackprotector functionality by manipulating the canary briefly
during bootup.
far more robust than trying to overflow the stack. (which is architecture
dependent, etc.)
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
If the user selects the stack-protector config option, but does not have
a gcc that has the right bits enabled (for example because it isn't build
with a glibc that supports TLS, as is common for cross-compilers, but also
because it may be too old), then the runtime test fails right now.
This patch adds a warning message for this scenario. This warning accomplishes
two goals
1) the user is informed that the security option he selective isn't available
2) the user is suggested to turn of the CONFIG option that won't work for him,
and would make the runtime test fail anyway.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
This patch adds a simple self-test capability to the stackprotector
feature. The test deliberately overflows a stack buffer and then
checks if the canary trap function gets called.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
if CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is set then the user most definitely wanted
to see as much information about kernel crashes as possible - so give
them at least a stack dump.
this is particularly useful for stackprotector related panics, where
the stacktrace can give us the exact location of the (attempted)
attack.
Pointed out by pageexec@freemail.hu in the stackprotector breakage
threads.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
pointed out by pageexec@freemail.hu:
we just simply panic() when there's a stackprotector attack - giving
the attacked person no information about what kernel code the attack went
against.
print out the attacked function.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The kernel is sent to tainted within the warn_on_slowpath() function, and
whenever a warning occurs the new taint flag 'W' is set. This is useful to
know if a warning occurred before a BUG by preserving the warning as a flag
in the taint state.
This does not work on architectures where WARN_ON has its own definition.
These archs are:
1. s390
2. superh
3. avr32
4. parisc
The maintainers of these architectures have been added in the Cc: list
in this email to alert them to the situation.
The documentation in oops-tracing.txt has been updated to include the
new flag.
Signed-off-by: Nur Hussein <nurhussein@gmail.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: "Randy.Dunlap" <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@atmel.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When an ACPI table is overridden (for now this can happen only for DSDT)
display a big warning and taint the kernel with flag A.
Signed-off-by: Eric Piel <eric.piel@tremplin-utc.net>
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Unlike oopses, WARN_ON() currently does't print the loaded modules list.
This makes it harder to take action on certain bug reports. For example,
recently there were a set of WARN_ON()s reported in the mac80211 stack,
which were just signalling a driver bug. It takes then anther round trip
to the bug reporter (if he responds at all) to find out which driver
is at fault.
Another issue is that, unlike oopses, WARN_ON() doesn't currently printk
the helpful "cut here" line, nor the "end of trace" marker.
Now that WARN_ON() is out of line, the size increase due to this is
minimal and it's worth adding.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
A quick grep shows that there are currently 1145 instances of WARN_ON
in the kernel. Currently, WARN_ON is pretty much entirely inlined,
which makes it hard to enhance it without growing the size of the kernel
(and getting Andrew unhappy).
This patch build on top of Olof's patch that introduces __WARN,
and places the slowpath out of line. It also uses Ingo's suggestion
to not use __FUNCTION__ but to use kallsyms to do the lookup;
this saves a ton of extra space since gcc doesn't need to store the function
string twice now:
3936367 833603 624736 5394706 525112 vmlinux.before
3917508 833603 624736 5375847 520767 vmlinux-slowpath
15Kb savings...
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
CC: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Acked-by: Matt Meckall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Right now it's nearly impossible for parsers that collect kernel crashes
from logs or emails (such as www.kerneloops.org) to detect the
end-of-oops condition. In addition, it's not currently possible to
detect whether or not 2 oopses that look alike are actually the same
oops reported twice, or are truly two unique oopses.
This patch adds an end-of-oops marker, and makes the end marker include
a very simple 64-bit random ID to be able to detect duplicate reports.
Normally, this ID is calculated as a late_initcall() (in the hope that
at that time there is enough entropy to get a unique enough ID); however
for early oopses the oops_exit() function needs to generate the ID on
the fly.
We do this all at the _end_ of an oops printout, so this does not impact
our ability to get the most important portions of a crash out to the
console first.
[ Sidenote: the already existing oopses-since-bootup counter we print
during crashes serves as the differentiator between multiple oopses
that trigger during the same bootup. ]
Tested on 32-bit and 64-bit x86. Artificially injected very early
crashes as well, as expected they result in this constant ID after
multiple bootups:
---[ end trace ca143223eefdc828 ]---
---[ end trace ca143223eefdc828 ]---
because the random pools are still all zero. But it all still works
fine and causes no additional problems (which is the main goal of
instrumentation code).
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
If the kernel OOPSed or BUGed then it probably should be considered as
tainted. Thus, all subsequent OOPSes and SysRq dumps will report the
tainted kernel. This saves a lot of time explaining oddities in the
calltraces.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[ Added parisc patch from Matthew Wilson -Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Allow taint flags to be set from userspace by writing to
/proc/sys/kernel/tainted, and add a new taint flag, TAINT_USER, to be used
when userspace has potentially done something dangerous that might
compromise the kernel. This will allow support personnel to ask further
questions about what may have caused the user taint flag to have been set.
For example, they might examine the logs of the realtime JVM to see if the
Java program has used the really silly, stupid, dangerous, and
completely-non-portable direct access to physical memory feature which MUST
be implemented according to the Real-Time Specification for Java (RTSJ).
Sigh. What were those silly people at Sun thinking?
[akpm@osdl.org: build fix]
[bunk@stusta.de: cleanup]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
GCC emits a call to a __stack_chk_fail() function when the stack canary is
not matching the expected value.
Since this is a bad security issue; lets panic the kernel rather than limping
along; the kernel really can't be trusted anymore when this happens.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
CC: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
To quote Alan Cox:
The default Linux behaviour on an NMI of either memory or unknown is to
continue operation. For many environments such as scientific computing
it is preferable that the box is taken out and the error dealt with than
an uncorrected parity/ECC error get propogated.
A small number of systems do generate NMI's for bizarre random reasons
such as power management so the default is unchanged. In other respects
the new proc/sys entry works like the existing panic controls already in
that directory.
This is separate to the edac support - EDAC allows supported chipsets to
handle ECC errors well, this change allows unsupported cases to at least
panic rather than cause problems further down the line.
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
kernel/panic.c: In function 'add_taint':
kernel/panic.c:176: warning: implicit declaration of function 'debug_locks_off'
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Disable lockdep debugging in two situations where the integrity of the
kernel no longer is guaranteed: when oopsing and when hitting a
tainting-condition. The goal is to not get weird lockdep traces that don't
make sense or are otherwise undebuggable, to not waste time.
Lockdep assumes that the previous state it knows about is valid to operate,
which is why lockdep turns itself off after the first violation it reports,
after that point it can no longer make that assumption.
A kernel oops means that the integrity of the kernel compromised; in
addition anything lockdep would report is of lesser importance than the
oops.
All the tainting conditions are of similar integrity-violating nature and
also make debugging/diagnosing more difficult.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Implement the scheduled unexport of panic_timeout.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The kernel's implementation of notifier chains is unsafe. There is no
protection against entries being added to or removed from a chain while the
chain is in use. The issues were discussed in this thread:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=113018709002036&w=2
We noticed that notifier chains in the kernel fall into two basic usage
classes:
"Blocking" chains are always called from a process context
and the callout routines are allowed to sleep;
"Atomic" chains can be called from an atomic context and
the callout routines are not allowed to sleep.
We decided to codify this distinction and make it part of the API. Therefore
this set of patches introduces three new, parallel APIs: one for blocking
notifiers, one for atomic notifiers, and one for "raw" notifiers (which is
really just the old API under a new name). New kinds of data structures are
used for the heads of the chains, and new routines are defined for
registration, unregistration, and calling a chain. The three APIs are
explained in include/linux/notifier.h and their implementation is in
kernel/sys.c.
With atomic and blocking chains, the implementation guarantees that the chain
links will not be corrupted and that chain callers will not get messed up by
entries being added or removed. For raw chains the implementation provides no
guarantees at all; users of this API must provide their own protections. (The
idea was that situations may come up where the assumptions of the atomic and
blocking APIs are not appropriate, so it should be possible for users to
handle these things in their own way.)
There are some limitations, which should not be too hard to live with. For
atomic/blocking chains, registration and unregistration must always be done in
a process context since the chain is protected by a mutex/rwsem. Also, a
callout routine for a non-raw chain must not try to register or unregister
entries on its own chain. (This did happen in a couple of places and the code
had to be changed to avoid it.)
Since atomic chains may be called from within an NMI handler, they cannot use
spinlocks for synchronization. Instead we use RCU. The overhead falls almost
entirely in the unregister routine, which is okay since unregistration is much
less frequent that calling a chain.
Here is the list of chains that we adjusted and their classifications. None
of them use the raw API, so for the moment it is only a placeholder.
ATOMIC CHAINS
-------------
arch/i386/kernel/traps.c: i386die_chain
arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c: ia64die_chain
arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c: powerpc_die_chain
arch/sparc64/kernel/traps.c: sparc64die_chain
arch/x86_64/kernel/traps.c: die_chain
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c: xaction_notifier_list
kernel/panic.c: panic_notifier_list
kernel/profile.c: task_free_notifier
net/bluetooth/hci_core.c: hci_notifier
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_chain
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_expect_chain
net/ipv6/addrconf.c: inet6addr_chain
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_chain
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_expect_chain
net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_chain
BLOCKING CHAINS
---------------
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c: pSeries_reconfig_chain
arch/s390/kernel/process.c: idle_chain
arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c idle_notifier
drivers/base/memory.c: memory_chain
drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_policy_notifier_list
drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_transition_notifier_list
drivers/macintosh/adb.c: adb_client_list
drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c sleep_notifier_list
drivers/macintosh/via-pmu68k.c sleep_notifier_list
drivers/macintosh/windfarm_core.c wf_client_list
drivers/usb/core/notify.c usb_notifier_list
drivers/video/fbmem.c fb_notifier_list
kernel/cpu.c cpu_chain
kernel/module.c module_notify_list
kernel/profile.c munmap_notifier
kernel/profile.c task_exit_notifier
kernel/sys.c reboot_notifier_list
net/core/dev.c netdev_chain
net/decnet/dn_dev.c: dnaddr_chain
net/ipv4/devinet.c: inetaddr_chain
It's possible that some of these classifications are wrong. If they are,
please let us know or submit a patch to fix them. Note that any chain that
gets called very frequently should be atomic, because the rwsem read-locking
used for blocking chains is very likely to incur cache misses on SMP systems.
(However, if the chain's callout routines may sleep then the chain cannot be
atomic.)
The patch set was written by Alan Stern and Chandra Seetharaman, incorporating
material written by Keith Owens and suggestions from Paul McKenney and Andrew
Morton.
[jes@sgi.com: restructure the notifier chain initialization macros]
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chandra Seetharaman <sekharan@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Attempt to fix the problem wherein people's oops reports scroll off the screen
due to repeated oopsing or to oopses on other CPUs.
If this happens the user can reboot with the `pause_on_oops=<seconds>' option.
It will allow the first oopsing CPU to print an oops record just a single
time. Second oopsing attempts, or oopses on other CPUs will cause those CPUs
to enter a tight loop until the specified number of seconds have elapsed.
The patch implements the infrastructure generically in the expectation that
architectures other than x86 will find it useful.
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
When panic_timeout is zero, suppress triggering a nested panic due to soft
lockup detection.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Sanitize some s390 Kconfig options. We have ARCH_S390, ARCH_S390X,
ARCH_S390_31, 64BIT, S390_SUPPORT and COMPAT. Replace these 6 options by
S390, 64BIT and COMPAT.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
We know the system is in trouble so there is no question if this
is an emergecy :)
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Makes kexec_crashdump() take a pt_regs * as an argument. This allows to
get exact register state at the point of the crash. If we come from direct
panic assertion NULL will be passed and the current registers saved before
crashdump.
This hooks into two places:
die(): check the conditions under which we will panic when calling
do_exit and go there directly with the pt_regs that caused the fatal
fault.
die_nmi(): If we receive an NMI lockup while in the kernel use the
pt_regs and go directly to crash_kexec(). We're probably nested up badly
at this point so this might be the only chance to escape with proper
information.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Nyberg <alexn@telia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch introduces the architecture independent implementation the
sys_kexec_load, the compat_sys_kexec_load system calls.
Kexec on panic support has been integrated into the core patch and is
relatively clean.
In addition the hopefully architecture independent option
crashkernel=size@location has been docuemented. It's purpose is to reserve
space for the panic kernel to live, and where no DMA transfer will ever be
setup to access.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Nyberg <alexn@telia.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch is incredibly trivial, but it does resolve some of the user
confusion as to what "L1-A" actually is.
Clarify printk message to refer to Stop-A (L1-A).
Gentoo has a virtually identical patch in their kernel sources.
Signed-off-by: Tom 'spot' Callaway <tcallawa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
Robert P. J. Day