Gitee limit the repo's size to 3GB, to reduce the size of the code,
sync codes to ock 5.4.119-20.0009.21 in one commit.
Signed-off-by: Jianping Liu <frankjpliu@tencent.com>
Allow em_ipt to use addrtype for matching. Restrict the use only to
revision 1 which has IPv6 support. Since it's a NFPROTO_UNSPEC xt match
we use the user-specified nfproto for matching, in case it's unspecified
both v4/v6 will be matched by the rule.
v2: no changes, was patch 5 in v1
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If we dump NFPROTO_UNSPEC as nfproto user-space libxtables can't handle
it and would exit with an error like:
"libxtables: unhandled NFPROTO in xtables_set_nfproto"
In order to avoid the error return the user-specified nfproto. If we
don't record it then the match family is used which can be
NFPROTO_UNSPEC. Even if we add support to mask NFPROTO_UNSPEC in
iproute2 we have to be compatible with older versions which would be
also be allowed to add NFPROTO_UNSPEC matches (e.g. addrtype after the
last patch).
v3: don't use the user nfproto for matching, only for dumping the rule,
also don't allow the nfproto to be unspecified (explained above)
v2: adjust changes to missing patch, was patch 04 in v1
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Set the family based on the packet if it's unspecified otherwise
protocol-neutral matches will have wrong information (e.g. NFPROTO_UNSPEC).
In preparation for using NFPROTO_UNSPEC xt matches.
v2: set the nfproto only when unspecified
Suggested-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Restrict matching only to ip/ipv6 traffic and make sure we can use the
headers, otherwise matches will be attempted on any protocol which can
be unexpected by the xt matches. Currently policy supports only ipv4/6.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
We currently have two levels of strict validation:
1) liberal (default)
- undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
- garbage at end of message accepted
2) strict (opt-in)
- NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
Split out parsing strictness into four different options:
* TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing
attributes (in message or nested)
* MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type
* UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries
* STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size
The default for future things should be *everything*.
The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE,
and is renamed to _deprecated_strict().
The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to
*_parse_deprecated().
Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags
even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in
this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to
not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going
forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply
to the POLICY flag.
We end up with the following renames:
* nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated
* nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict
* nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated
* nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict
* nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated
* nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated
Using spatch, of course:
@@
expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
@@
expression START, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions
yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong.
Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a
common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication.
Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every
new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the
next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is.
In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The commit a new tc ematch for using netfilter xtable matches.
This allows early classification as well as mirroning/redirecting traffic
based on logic implemented in netfilter extensions.
Current supported use case is classification based on the incoming IPSec
state used during decpsulation using the 'policy' iptables extension
(xt_policy).
The module dynamically fetches the netfilter match module and calls
it using a fake xt_action_param structure based on validated userspace
provided parameters.
As the xt_policy match does not access skb->data, no skb modifications
are needed on match.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Jianping Liu