Change the list operation to only return whether or not an attribute
should be listed. Copying the attribute names into the buffer is moved
to the callers.
Since the result only depends on the dentry and not on the attribute
name, we do not pass the attribute name to list operations.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When a file on tmpfs has an ACL or a Default ACL, listxattr should include the
corresponding xattr name.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use the VFS xattr handler infrastructure and get rid of similar code in
the filesystem. For implementing shmem_xattr_handler_set, we need a
version of simple_xattr_set which removes the attribute when value is
NULL. Use this to implement kernfs_iop_removexattr as well.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add an additional "name" field to struct xattr_handler. When the name
is set, the handler matches attributes with exactly that name. When the
prefix is set instead, the handler matches attributes with the given
prefix and with a non-empty suffix.
This patch should avoid bugs like the one fixed in commit c361016a in
the future.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This function was only briefly used in security/integrity/evm, between
commits 66dbc325 and 15647eb3.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Now that the xattr handler is passed to the xattr handler operations, we
can use the same get and set operations for the user, trusted, and security
xattr namespaces. In those namespaces, we can access the full attribute
name by "reattaching" the name prefix the vfs has skipped for us. Add a
xattr_full_name helper to make this obvious in the code.
For the "system.posix_acl_access" and "system.posix_acl_default"
attributes, handler->prefix is the full attribute name; the suffix is the
empty string.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Cc: v9fs-developer@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
attacks
- Integrity: add digital signature verification
- Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
- IBM vTPM support on ppc64
- Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
- Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"
Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
ima: change flags container data type
Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
ima: audit log hashes
ima: generic IMA action flag handling
ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
audit: export audit_log_task_info
tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
ima: digital signature verification support
ima: add support for different security.ima data types
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
ima: add inode_post_setattr call
ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
ima: allocating iint improvements
ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
ima: integrity appraisal extension
vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
...
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
authenticity.
This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
Changelov v4:
- changed iint cache flags to hex values
Changelog v3:
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
Changelog v2:
- fix audit msg 'res' value
- removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
Changelog v1:
- removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
(INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
- replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
- merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
(moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
- make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
Changelog:
- add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
- fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
only for those measured/appraised.
- don't try to appraise new/empty files
- expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
- IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
- add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
- unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Extract in-memory xattr APIs from tmpfs. Will be used by cgroup.
$ size vmlinux.o
text data bss dec hex filename
4658782 880729 5195032 10734543 a3cbcf vmlinux.o
$ size vmlinux.o
text data bss dec hex filename
4658957 880729 5195032 10734718 a3cc7e vmlinux.o
v7:
- checkpatch warnings fixed
- Implement the changes requested by Hugh Dickins:
- make simple_xattrs_init and simple_xattrs_free inline
- get rid of locking and list reinitialization in simple_xattrs_free,
they're not needed
v6:
- no changes
v5:
- no changes
v4:
- move simple_xattrs_free() to fs/xattr.c
v3:
- in kmem_xattrs_free(), reinitialize the list
- use simple_xattr_* prefix
- introduce simple_xattr_add() to prevent direct list usage
Original-patch-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lpoetter@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
This patch updates security.evm when posix xattr acls are written.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The
initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended
attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted
separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).
While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and
cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other
directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify
the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately
(eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the
proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.
EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a
trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the
root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has
been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can
not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally
this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the
trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing
trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A
sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is
available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.
Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined
at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:
evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To
initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three
calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and
evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security
xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().
Changelog v7:
- Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation
Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review)
- fix URL in patch description
- remove evm_hmac_size definition
- use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size)
- moved linux include before other includes
- test for crypto_hash_setkey failure
- fail earlier for invalid key
- clear entire encrypted key, even on failure
- check xattr name length before comparing xattr names
Changelog:
- locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex
- using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1
operation.
- replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs
(Dmitry Kasatkin)
- iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised
- Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin
- Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
vfs_getxattr_alloc() and vfs_xattr_cmp() are two new kernel xattr helper
functions. vfs_getxattr_alloc() first allocates memory for the requested
xattr and then retrieves it. vfs_xattr_cmp() compares a given value with
the contents of an extended attribute.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a
filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes.
This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of
multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function
walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be
optimized to write multiple xattrs at once.
For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet
been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in
reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
af4f136056 ("security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h") moved the
XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX define from capability.h to xattr.h. This makes sense
except it was previously exports to userspace but xattr.h does not export
it to userspace. This patch exports these headers to userspace to fix the
ABI regression.
There is some slight possibility that this will cause problems in other
applications which used these #defines differently (wrongly) and I could
JUST export the capabilities xattr name that we broke. Does anyonehave an
idea how exposing these headers could cause a problem?
Below is what is being exposed to userspace, included here since it isn't
clear exactly what is going to be made available from the patch.
/* Namespaces */
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX "os2."
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_OS2_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX "security."
#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX "system."
#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX "trusted."
#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."
#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
/* Security namespace */
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT"
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
Reported-by: Ozan Çaglayan <ozan@pardus.org.tr>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In the embedded world there are often situations
where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
security characteristics. These differences
might include privilege required for a given library
provided interface to function properly, as occurs
from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
also cases where it is important to limit use of
libraries based on the provider of the library and
the security aware application may make choices
based on that criteria.
These issues are addressed by providing an additional
Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
if there is no such attribute.
If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
only if a subject with that label has all of the access
permitted a subject with the current task label.
Security aware applications may from time to time
wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
of privilege. One case where this arises is the
environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
to perform the same functions. An application may know
that it should eschew services made available from a
particular vendor, or of a particular version.
In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
been added that is local to the task. This list is
consulted only in the case where the global list has
approved access. It can only further restrict access.
Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
local list access is granted. An application can add
entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.
The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
the list handling to accomodate there being more
than one rule list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes
with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy
to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered
with files that the owner can't deal with because while
they could be written to the directory a process at the
label of the directory can't write them. This is generally
the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real
issue.
This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that
instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory
under certain circumstances.
A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to
Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat".
If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable
and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule
that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the
Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the
creating process.
Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the
label of the directory and then having the other process write
to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule
allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is
running.
Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked
for write access to parent task using label inherited
from the task that forked it.
Fixed issues from previous submit:
- SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set.
- inode security blob was not updated after setting
SMACK64EXEC
- inode security blob was not updated when removing
SMACK64EXEC
The entries in xattr handler table should be immutable (ie const)
like other operation tables.
Later patches convert common filesystems. Uncoverted filesystems
will still work, but will generate a compiler warning.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add a flags argument to struct xattr_handler and pass it to all xattr
handler methods. This allows using the same methods for multiple
handlers, e.g. for the ACL methods which perform exactly the same action
for the access and default ACLs, just using a different underlying
attribute. With a little more groundwork it'll also allow sharing the
methods for the regular user/trusted/secure handlers in extN, ocfs2 and
jffs2 like it's already done for xfs in this patch.
Also change the inode argument to the handlers to a dentry to allow
using the handlers mechnism for filesystems that require it later,
e.g. cifs.
[with GFS2 bits updated by Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This factors out the part of the vfs_setxattr function that performs the
setting of the xattr and its notification. This is needed so the SELinux
implementation of inode_setsecctx can handle the setting of the xattr while
maintaining the proper separation of layers.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.
Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.
The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- reduce the userspace visible part
- fix the in-kernel compilation
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch moves code out of fs/xattr.c:listxattr into a new function -
vfs_listxattr. The code for vfs_listxattr was originally submitted by Bill
Nottingham <notting@redhat.com> to Unionfs.
Sorry about that. The reason for this submission is to make the
listxattr code in fs/xattr.c a little cleaner (as well as to clean up
some code in Unionfs.)
Currently, Unionfs has vfs_listxattr defined in its code. I think
that's very ugly, and I'd like to see it (re)moved. The logical place
to put it, is along side of all the other vfs_*xattr functions.
Overall, I think this patch is benefitial for both kernel.org kernel and
Unionfs.
Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
)
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
The xattr code has rather complex permission checks because the rules are very
different for different attribute namespaces. This patch moves as much as we
can into the generic code. Currently all the major disk based filesystems
duplicate these checks, while many minor filesystems or network filesystems
lack some or all of them.
To do this we need defines for the extended attribute names in common code, I
moved them up from JFS which had the nicest defintions.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add vfs_getxattr, vfs_setxattr and vfs_removexattr helpers for common checks
around invocation of the xattr methods. NFSD already was missing some of the
checks and there will be more soon.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
(James, I haven't touched selinux yet because it's doing various odd things
and I'm not sure how it would interact with the security attribute fallbacks
you added. Could you investigate whether it could use vfs_getxattr or if not
add a __vfs_getxattr helper to share the bits it is fine with?)
For NFSv4: instead of just converting it add an nfsd_getxattr helper for the
code shared by NFSv2/3 and NFSv4 ACLs. In fact that code isn't even
NFS-specific, but I'll wait for more users to pop up first before moving it to
common code.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
Al Viro