The ARM architecture defines the memory locations that are permitted
to be accessed as the result of a speculative instruction fetch from
an exception level for which all stages of translation are disabled.
Specifically, the core is permitted to speculatively fetch from the
4KB region containing the current program counter 4K and next 4K.
When translation is changed from enabled to disabled for the running
exception level (SCTLR_ELn[M] changed from a value of 1 to 0), the
Falkor core may errantly speculatively access memory locations outside
of the 4KB region permitted by the architecture. The errant memory
access may lead to one of the following unexpected behaviors.
1) A System Error Interrupt (SEI) being raised by the Falkor core due
to the errant memory access attempting to access a region of memory
that is protected by a slave-side memory protection unit.
2) Unpredictable device behavior due to a speculative read from device
memory. This behavior may only occur if the instruction cache is
disabled prior to or coincident with translation being changed from
enabled to disabled.
The conditions leading to this erratum will not occur when either of the
following occur:
1) A higher exception level disables translation of a lower exception level
(e.g. EL2 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1 to 0).
2) An exception level disabling its stage-1 translation if its stage-2
translation is enabled (e.g. EL1 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1
to 0 when HCR_EL2[VM] has a value of 1).
To avoid the errant behavior, software must execute an ISB immediately
prior to executing the MSR that will change SCTLR_ELn[M] from 1 to 0.
Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Some places in the kernel open-code sequences using ADRP for a symbol
another instruction using a :lo12: relocation for that same symbol.
These sequences are easy to get wrong, and more painful to read than is
necessary. For these reasons, it is preferable to use the
{adr,ldr,str}_l macros for these cases.
This patch makes use of these in efi-entry.S, removing open-coded
sequences using adrp.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Apart from the arm64/linux and EFI header data structures, there is nothing
in the .head.text section that must reside at the beginning of the Image.
So let's move it to the .init section where it belongs.
Note that this involves some minor tweaking of the EFI header, primarily
because the address of 'stext' no longer coincides with the start of the
.text section. It also requires a couple of relocated symbol references
to be slightly rewritten or their definition moved to the linker script.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
The prologue of the EFI entry point pushes x29 and x30 onto the stack but
fails to create the stack frame correctly by omitting the assignment of x29
to the new value of the stack pointer. So fix that.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Before implementing KASLR for arm64 by building a self-relocating PIE
executable, we have to ensure that values we use before the relocation
routine is executed are not subject to dynamic relocation themselves.
This applies not only to virtual addresses, but also to values that are
supplied by the linker at build time and relocated using R_AARCH64_ABS64
relocations.
So instead, use assemble time constants, or force the use of static
relocations by folding the constants into the instructions.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Since arm64 does not use a builtin decompressor, the EFI stub is built
into the kernel proper. So far, this has been working fine, but actually,
since the stub is in fact a PE/COFF relocatable binary that is executed
at an unknown offset in the 1:1 mapping provided by the UEFI firmware, we
should not be seamlessly sharing code with the kernel proper, which is a
position dependent executable linked at a high virtual offset.
So instead, separate the contents of libstub and its dependencies, by
putting them into their own namespace by prefixing all of its symbols
with __efistub. This way, we have tight control over what parts of the
kernel proper are referenced by the stub.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Changes include:
- Support for alternative instruction patching from Andre
- seccomp from Akashi
- Some AArch32 instruction emulation, required by the Android folks
- Optimisations for exception entry/exit code, cmpxchg, pcpu atomics
- mmu_gather range calculations moved into core code
- EFI updates from Ard, including long-awaited SMBIOS support
- /proc/cpuinfo fixes to align with the format used by arch/arm/
- A few non-critical fixes across the architecture
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Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Will Deacon:
"Here's the usual mixed bag of arm64 updates, also including some
related EFI changes (Acked by Matt) and the MMU gather range cleanup
(Acked by you).
Changes include:
- support for alternative instruction patching from Andre
- seccomp from Akashi
- some AArch32 instruction emulation, required by the Android folks
- optimisations for exception entry/exit code, cmpxchg, pcpu atomics
- mmu_gather range calculations moved into core code
- EFI updates from Ard, including long-awaited SMBIOS support
- /proc/cpuinfo fixes to align with the format used by arch/arm/
- a few non-critical fixes across the architecture"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (70 commits)
arm64: remove the unnecessary arm64_swiotlb_init()
arm64: add module support for alternatives fixups
arm64: perf: Prevent wraparound during overflow
arm64/include/asm: Fixed a warning about 'struct pt_regs'
arm64: Provide a namespace to NCAPS
arm64: bpf: lift restriction on last instruction
arm64: Implement support for read-mostly sections
arm64: compat: align cacheflush syscall with arch/arm
arm64: add seccomp support
arm64: add SIGSYS siginfo for compat task
arm64: add seccomp syscall for compat task
asm-generic: add generic seccomp.h for secure computing mode 1
arm64: ptrace: allow tracer to skip a system call
arm64: ptrace: add NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL regset
arm64: Move some head.text functions to executable section
arm64: jump labels: NOP out NOP -> NOP replacement
arm64: add support to dump the kernel page tables
arm64: Add FIX_HOLE to permanent fixed addresses
arm64: alternatives: fix pr_fmt string for consistency
arm64: vmlinux.lds.S: don't discard .exit.* sections at link-time
...
While efi-entry.S mentions that efi_entry() will have relocated the
kernel image, it actually means that efi_entry will have placed a copy
of the kernel in the appropriate location, and until this is branched to
at the end of efi_entry.S, all instructions are executed from the
original image.
Thus while the flush in efi_entry.S does ensure that the copy is visible
to noncacheable accesses, it does not guarantee that this is true for
the image instructions are being executed from. This could have
disasterous effects when the MMU and caches are disabled if the image
has not been naturally evicted to the PoC.
Additionally, due to a missing dsb following the ic ialluis, the new
kernel image is not necessarily clean in the I-cache when it is branched
to, with similar potentially disasterous effects.
This patch adds additional flushing to ensure that the currently
executing stub text is flushed to the PoC and is thus visible to
noncacheable accesses. As it is placed after the instructions cache
maintenance for the new image and __flush_dcache_area already contains a
dsb, we do not need to add a separate barrier to ensure completion of
the icache maintenance.
Comments are updated to clarify the situation with regard to the two
images and the maintenance required for both.
Fixes: 3c7f255039
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Joel Schopp <joel.schopp@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
After the EFI stub has done its business, it jumps into the kernel by
branching to offset #0 of the loaded Image, which is where it expects
to find the header containing a 'branch to stext' instruction.
However, the UEFI spec 2.1.1 states the following regarding PE/COFF
image loading:
"A UEFI image is loaded into memory through the LoadImage() Boot
Service. This service loads an image with a PE32+ format into memory.
This PE32+ loader is required to load all sections of the PE32+ image
into memory."
In other words, it is /not/ required to load parts of the image that are
not covered by a PE/COFF section, so it may not have loaded the header
at the expected offset, as it is not covered by any PE/COFF section.
So instead, jump to 'stext' directly, which is at the base of the
PE/COFF .text section, by supplying a symbol 'stext_offset' to
efi-entry.o which contains the relative offset of stext into the Image.
Also replace other open coded calculations of the same value with a
reference to 'stext_offset'
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
The CurrentEL system register reports the Current Exception Level
of the CPU. It doesn't say anything about the stack handling, and
yet we compare it to PSR_MODE_EL2t and PSR_MODE_EL2h.
It works by chance because PSR_MODE_EL2t happens to match the right
bits, but that's otherwise a very bad idea. Just check for the EL
value instead.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: fixed arch/arm64/kernel/efi-entry.S]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
This patch adds PE/COFF header fields to the start of the kernel
Image so that it appears as an EFI application to UEFI firmware.
An EFI stub is included to allow direct booting of the kernel
Image.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
[Add support in PE/COFF header for signed images]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Shanker Donthineni