around. Highlights include:
- Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
- The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
- The usual collection of fixes and minor updates.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"There has been a fair amount of activity in the docs tree this time
around. Highlights include:
- Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
- The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
- The usual collection of fixes and minor updates"
* tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (90 commits)
scripts/kernel-doc: handle DECLARE_HASHTABLE
Documentation: atomic_ops.txt is core-api/atomic_ops.rst
Docs: clean up some DocBook loose ends
Make the main documentation title less Geocities
Docs: Use kernel-figure in vidioc-g-selection.rst
Docs: fix table problems in ras.rst
Docs: Fix breakage with Sphinx 1.5 and upper
Docs: Include the Latex "ifthen" package
doc/kokr/howto: Only send regression fixes after -rc1
docs-rst: fix broken links to dynamic-debug-howto in kernel-parameters
doc: Document suitability of IBM Verse for kernel development
Doc: fix a markup error in coding-style.rst
docs: driver-api: i2c: remove some outdated information
Documentation: DMA API: fix a typo in a function name
Docs: Insert missing space to separate link from text
doc/ko_KR/memory-barriers: Update control-dependencies example
Documentation, kbuild: fix typo "minimun" -> "minimum"
docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rst
doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txt
...
While a 'struct key' itself normally does not contain sensitive
information, Documentation/security/keys.txt actually encourages this:
"Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact,
just be a value stored in the struct key itself."
In case someone has taken this advice, or will take this advice in the
future, zero the key structure before freeing it. We might as well, and
as a bonus this could make it a bit more difficult for an adversary to
determine which keys have recently been in use.
This is safe because the key_jar cache does not use a constructor.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel
keys, and adjusts for ReST markup.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow
individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality
was only available using internal kernel APIs.
With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be
configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and
then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring.
To restrict a keyring, call:
keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type,
const char *restriction)
where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a
string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction
option syntax is specific to each key type.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.
The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Key link restrictions require restriction-specific data as well as a
restriction-specific function pointer. As a first step toward replacing
the restrict_link pointer in struct key, define a more general
key_restriction structure that captures the required function, key, and
key type pointers. Key type modules should not be pinned on account of
this key type pointer because the pointer will be cleared by the garbage
collector if the key type is unregistered.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and
without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.
Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().
Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN
set rather than setting it after the fact.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Userspace should not be allowed to remove keys from certain keyrings
(eg. blacklist), though the keys themselves can expire.
This patch defines a new key flag named KEY_FLAG_KEEP to prevent
userspace from being able to unlink, revoke, invalidate or timed
out a key on a keyring. When this flag is set on the keyring, all
keys subsequently added are flagged.
In addition, when this flag is set, the keyring itself can not be
cleared.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Special kernel keys, such as those used to hold DNS results for AFS, CIFS and
NFS and those used to hold idmapper results for NFS, used to be
'invalidateable' with key_revoke(). However, since the default permissions for
keys were reduced:
Commit: 96b5c8fea6
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
it has become impossible to do this.
Add a key flag (KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL) that will permit a key to be
invalidated by root. This should not be used for system keyrings as the
garbage collector will try and remove any invalidate key. For system keyrings,
KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR can be used instead.
After this, from userspace, keyctl_invalidate() and "keyctl invalidate" can be
used by any possessor of CAP_SYS_ADMIN (typically root) to invalidate DNS and
idmapper keys. Invalidated keys are immediately garbage collected and will be
immediately rerequested if needed again.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring,
this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed only by
builtin keys on the system keyring.
This patch defines a new option 'builtin' for the kernel parameter
'keys_ownerid' to allow trust validation using builtin keys.
Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch
Changelog v7:
- rename builtin_keys to use_builtin_keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
"This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"
* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
Warning in scanf string typing
Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
bugfix patch for SMACK
Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
smack: fix key permission verification
KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
This typedef is unnecessary and should just be removed.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.
Whilst we're at it:
(1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.
(2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
directly to that.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Add KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED to indicate that a key either comes from a trusted source
or had a cryptographic signature chain that led back to a trusted key the
kernel already possessed.
Add KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED_ONLY to indicate that a keyring will only accept links to
keys marked with KEY_FLAGS_TRUSTED.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Implement a big key type that can save its contents to tmpfs and thus
swapspace when memory is tight. This is useful for Kerberos ticket caches.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Expand the capacity of a keyring to be able to hold a lot more keys by using
the previously added associative array implementation. Currently the maximum
capacity is:
(PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(header)) / sizeof(struct key *)
which, on a 64-bit system, is a little more 500. However, since this is being
used for the NFS uid mapper, we need more than that. The new implementation
gives us effectively unlimited capacity.
With some alterations, the keyutils testsuite runs successfully to completion
after this patch is applied. The alterations are because (a) keyrings that
are simply added to no longer appear ordered and (b) some of the errors have
changed a bit.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc() on the key usage
count as this makes it easier to hook in refcount error debugging.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for accessing keys. The index key
is the search term needed to find a key directly - basically the key type and
the key description. We can add to that the description length.
This will be useful when turning a keyring into an associative array rather
than just a pointer block.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"A quiet cycle for the security subsystem with just a few maintenance
updates."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs
Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig
Yama: remove locking from delete path
Yama: add RCU to drop read locking
drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup
KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread
seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent
key: Fix resource leak
keys: Fix unreachable code
KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update
Reduce the initial permissions on new keys to grant the possessor everything,
view permission only to the user (so the keys can be seen in /proc/keys) and
nothing else.
This gives the creator a chance to adjust the permissions mask before other
processes can access the new key or create a link to it.
To aid with this, keyring_alloc() now takes a permission argument rather than
setting the permissions itself.
The following permissions are now set:
(1) The user and user-session keyrings grant the user that owns them full
permissions and grant a possessor everything bar SETATTR.
(2) The process and thread keyrings grant the possessor full permissions but
only grant the user VIEW. This permits the user to see them in
/proc/keys, but not to do anything with them.
(3) Anonymous session keyrings grant the possessor full permissions, but only
grant the user VIEW and READ. This means that the user can see them in
/proc/keys and can list them, but nothing else. Possibly READ shouldn't
be provided either.
(4) Named session keyrings grant everything an anonymous session keyring does,
plus they grant the user LINK permission. The whole point of named
session keyrings is that others can also subscribe to them. Possibly this
should be a separate permission to LINK.
(5) The temporary session keyring created by call_sbin_request_key() gets the
same permissions as an anonymous session keyring.
(6) Keys created by add_key() get VIEW, SEARCH, LINK and SETATTR for the
possessor, plus READ and/or WRITE if the key type supports them. The used
only gets VIEW now.
(7) Keys created by request_key() now get the same as those created by
add_key().
Reported-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Reported-by: Stef Walter <stefw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
- Replace key_user ->user_ns equality checks with kuid_has_mapping checks.
- Use from_kuid to generate key descriptions
- Use kuid_t and kgid_t and the associated helpers instead of uid_t and gid_t
- Avoid potential problems with file descriptor passing by displaying
keys in the user namespace of the opener of key status proc files.
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This commit removes the extraneous parentheses from rcu_assign_keypointer()
so that rcu_assign_pointer() can be wrapped in do-while. It also wraps
rcu_assign_keypointer() in a do-while and parenthesizes its final argument,
as suggested by David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
After the previouse change key_replace_session_keyring() becomes a nop.
Remove the dummy definition in key.h and update the callers in
arch/*/kernel/signal.c.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add() and move
key_replace_session_keyring() logic into task_work->func().
Note that we do task_work_cancel() before task_work_add() to ensure that
only one work can be pending at any time. This is important, we must not
allow user-space to abuse the parent's ->task_works list.
The callback, replace_session_keyring(), checks PF_EXITING. I guess this
is not really needed but looks better.
As a side effect, this fixes the (unlikely) race. The callers of
key_replace_session_keyring() and keyctl_session_to_parent() lack the
necessary barriers, the parent can miss the request.
Now we can remove task_struct->replacement_session_keyring and related
code.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Don't bother checking for NULL key pointer in key_validate() as all of the
places that call it will crash anyway if the relevant key pointer is NULL by
the time they call key_validate(). Therefore, the checking must be done prior
to calling here.
Whilst we're at it, simplify the key_validate() function a bit and mark its
argument const.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add support for invalidating a key - which renders it immediately invisible to
further searches and causes the garbage collector to immediately wake up,
remove it from keyrings and then destroy it when it's no longer referenced.
It's better not to do this with keyctl_revoke() as that marks the key to start
returning -EKEYREVOKED to searches when what is actually desired is to have the
key refetched.
To invalidate a key the caller must be granted SEARCH permission by the key.
This may be too strict. It may be better to also permit invalidation if the
caller has any of READ, WRITE or SETATTR permission.
The primary use for this is to evict keys that are cached in special keyrings,
such as the DNS resolver or an ID mapper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Do an LRU discard in keyrings that are full rather than returning ENFILE. To
perform this, a time_t is added to the key struct and updated by the creation
of a link to a key and by a key being found as the result of a search. At the
completion of a successful search, the keyrings in the path between the root of
the search and the first found link to it also have their last-used times
updated.
Note that discarding a link to a key from a keyring does not necessarily
destroy the key as there may be references held by other places.
An alternate discard method that might suffice is to perform FIFO discard from
the keyring, using the spare 2-byte hole in the keylist header as the index of
the next link to be discarded.
This is useful when using a keyring as a cache for DNS results or foreign
filesystem IDs.
This can be tested by the following. As root do:
echo 1000 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
kr=`keyctl newring foo @s`
for ((i=0; i<2000; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a $kr; done
Without this patch ENFILE should be reported when the keyring fills up. With
this patch, the keyring discards keys in an LRU fashion. Note that the stored
LRU time has a granularity of 1s.
After doing this, /proc/key-users can be observed and should show that most of
the 2000 keys have been discarded:
[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/key-users
0: 517 516/516 513/1000 5249/20000
The "513/1000" here is the number of quota-accounted keys present for this user
out of the maximum permitted.
In /proc/keys, the keyring shows the number of keys it has and the number of
slots it has allocated:
[root@andromeda ~]# grep foo /proc/keys
200c64c4 I--Q-- 1 perm 3b3f0000 0 0 keyring foo: 509/509
The maximum is (PAGE_SIZE - header) / key pointer size. That's typically 509
on a 64-bit system and 1020 on a 32-bit system.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Make the keys garbage collector invoke synchronize_rcu() prior to destroying
keys with a zero usage count. This means that a key can be examined under the
RCU read lock in the safe knowledge that it won't get deallocated until after
the lock is released - even if its usage count becomes zero whilst we're
looking at it.
This is useful in keyring search vs key link. Consider a keyring containing a
link to a key. That link can be replaced in-place in the keyring without
requiring an RCU copy-and-replace on the keyring contents without breaking a
search underway on that keyring when the displaced key is released, provided
the key is actually destroyed only after the RCU read lock held by the search
algorithm is released.
This permits __key_link() to replace a key without having to reallocate the key
payload. A key gets replaced if a new key being linked into a keyring has the
same type and description.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
New features include:
- Add NFS client support for containers.
This should enable most of the necessary functionality, including
lockd support, and support for rpc.statd, NFSv4 idmapper and
RPCSEC_GSS upcalls into the correct network namespace from
which the mount system call was issued.
- NFSv4 idmapper scalability improvements
Base the idmapper cache on the keyring interface to allow concurrent
access to idmapper entries. Start the process of migrating users from
the single-threaded daemon-based approach to the multi-threaded
request-key based approach.
- NFSv4.1 implementation id.
Allows the NFSv4.1 client and server to mutually identify each other
for logging and debugging purposes.
- Support the 'vers=4.1' mount option for mounting NFSv4.1 instead of
having to use the more counterintuitive 'vers=4,minorversion=1'.
- SUNRPC tracepoints.
Start the process of adding tracepoints in order to improve debugging
of the RPC layer.
- pNFS object layout support for autologin.
Important bugfixes include:
- Fix a bug in rpc_wake_up/rpc_wake_up_status that caused them to fail
to wake up all tasks when applied to priority waitqueues.
- Ensure that we handle read delegations correctly, when we try to
truncate a file.
- A number of fixes for NFSv4 state manager loops (mostly to do with
delegation recovery).
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Merge tag 'nfs-for-3.4-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs
Pull NFS client updates for Linux 3.4 from Trond Myklebust:
"New features include:
- Add NFS client support for containers.
This should enable most of the necessary functionality, including
lockd support, and support for rpc.statd, NFSv4 idmapper and
RPCSEC_GSS upcalls into the correct network namespace from which
the mount system call was issued.
- NFSv4 idmapper scalability improvements
Base the idmapper cache on the keyring interface to allow
concurrent access to idmapper entries. Start the process of
migrating users from the single-threaded daemon-based approach to
the multi-threaded request-key based approach.
- NFSv4.1 implementation id.
Allows the NFSv4.1 client and server to mutually identify each
other for logging and debugging purposes.
- Support the 'vers=4.1' mount option for mounting NFSv4.1 instead of
having to use the more counterintuitive 'vers=4,minorversion=1'.
- SUNRPC tracepoints.
Start the process of adding tracepoints in order to improve
debugging of the RPC layer.
- pNFS object layout support for autologin.
Important bugfixes include:
- Fix a bug in rpc_wake_up/rpc_wake_up_status that caused them to
fail to wake up all tasks when applied to priority waitqueues.
- Ensure that we handle read delegations correctly, when we try to
truncate a file.
- A number of fixes for NFSv4 state manager loops (mostly to do with
delegation recovery)."
* tag 'nfs-for-3.4-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (224 commits)
NFS: fix sb->s_id in nfs debug prints
xprtrdma: Remove assumption that each segment is <= PAGE_SIZE
xprtrdma: The transport should not bug-check when a dup reply is received
pnfs-obj: autologin: Add support for protocol autologin
NFS: Remove nfs4_setup_sequence from generic rename code
NFS: Remove nfs4_setup_sequence from generic unlink code
NFS: Remove nfs4_setup_sequence from generic read code
NFS: Remove nfs4_setup_sequence from generic write code
NFS: Fix more NFS debug related build warnings
SUNRPC/LOCKD: Fix build warnings when CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG is undefined
nfs: non void functions must return a value
SUNRPC: Kill compiler warning when RPC_DEBUG is unset
SUNRPC/NFS: Add Kbuild dependencies for NFS_DEBUG/RPC_DEBUG
NFS: Use cond_resched_lock() to reduce latencies in the commit scans
NFSv4: It is not safe to dereference lsp->ls_state in release_lockowner
NFS: ncommit count is being double decremented
SUNRPC: We must not use list_for_each_entry_safe() in rpc_wake_up()
Try using machine credentials for RENEW calls
NFSv4.1: Fix a few issues in filelayout_commit_pagelist
NFSv4.1: Clean ups and bugfixes for the pNFS read/writeback/commit code
...
The keyctl_set_timeout function isn't exported to other parts of the
kernel, but I want to use it for the NFS idmapper. I already have the
key, but I wanted a generic way to set the timeout.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Permit key_serial() to be called with a const key pointer.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The kernel contains some special internal keyrings, for instance the DNS
resolver keyring :
2a93faf1 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .dns_resolver: empty
It would occasionally be useful to allow the contents of such keyrings to be
flushed by root (cache invalidation).
Allow a flag to be set on a keyring to mark that someone possessing the
sysadmin capability can clear the keyring, even without normal write access to
the keyring.
Set this flag on the special keyrings created by the DNS resolver, the NFS
identity mapper and the CIFS identity mapper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Define rcu_assign_keypointer(), which uses the key payload.rcudata instead
of payload.data, to resolve the CONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER message:
"incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces)"
Replace the rcu_assign_pointer() calls in encrypted/trusted keys with
rcu_assign_keypointer().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h>
(atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h>
Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs:
Create Documentation/security/, move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/
to Documentation/security/,
add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and
update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>
to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
Improve /proc/keys by:
(1) Don't attempt to summarise the payload of a negated key. It won't have
one. To this end, a helper function - key_is_instantiated() has been
added that allows the caller to find out whether the key is positively
instantiated (as opposed to being uninstantiated or negatively
instantiated).
(2) Do show keys that are negative, expired or revoked rather than hiding
them. This requires an override flag (no_state_check) to be passed to
search_my_process_keyrings() and keyring_search_aux() to suppress this
check.
Without this, keys that are possessed by the caller, but only grant
permissions to the caller if possessed are skipped as the possession check
fails.
Keys that are visible due to user, group or other checks are visible with
or without this patch.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code. This works
much the same as negating a key, and so keyctl_negate_key() is made a special
case of keyctl_reject_key(). The difference is that keyctl_negate_key()
selects ENOKEY as the error to be reported.
Typically the key would be rejected with EKEYEXPIRED, EKEYREVOKED or
EKEYREJECTED, but this is not mandatory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add an RCU payload dereference macro as this seems to be a common piece of code
amongst key types that use RCU referenced payloads.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Linus Torvalds