Due to the use of rhashtables in net namespaces,
rhashtable.h is included in lots of the kernel,
so a small changes can required a large recompilation.
This makes development painful.
This patch splits out rhashtable-types.h which just includes
the major type declarations, and does not include (non-trivial)
inline code. rhashtable.h is no longer included by anything
in the include/ directory.
Common include files only include rhashtable-types.h so a large
recompilation is only triggered when that changes.
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler. For now, this is just
documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT value rather than an
errno. Once all instances are converted, vm_fault_t will become a
distinct type.
Commit 1c8f422059 ("mm: change return type to vm_fault_t")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180425043413.GA21467@jordon-HP-15-Notebook-PC
Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Both smatch and coverity are reporting potential issues with spectre
variant 1 with the 'semnum' index within the sma->sems array, ie:
ipc/sem.c:388 sem_lock() warn: potential spectre issue 'sma->sems'
ipc/sem.c:641 perform_atomic_semop_slow() warn: potential spectre issue 'sma->sems'
ipc/sem.c:721 perform_atomic_semop() warn: potential spectre issue 'sma->sems'
Avoid any possible speculation by using array_index_nospec() thus
ensuring the semnum value is bounded to [0, sma->sem_nsems). With the
exception of sem_lock() all of these are slowpaths.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180423171131.njs4rfm2yzyeg6do@linux-n805
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
shmat()'s SHM_REMAP option forbids passing a nil address for; this is in
fact the very first thing we check for. Andrea reported that for
SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP cases we can end up bypassing the initial addr check,
but we need to check again if the address was rounded down to nil. As
of this patch, such cases will return -EINVAL.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503204934.kk63josdu6u53fbd@linux-n805
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "ipc/shm: shmat() fixes around nil-page".
These patches fix two issues reported[1] a while back by Joe and Andrea
around how shmat(2) behaves with nil-page.
The first reverts a commit that it was incorrectly thought that mapping
nil-page (address=0) was a no no with MAP_FIXED. This is not the case,
with the exception of SHM_REMAP; which is address in the second patch.
I chose two patches because it is easier to backport and it explicitly
reverts bogus behaviour. Both patches ought to be in -stable and ltp
testcases need updated (the added testcase around the cve can be
modified to just test for SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP).
[1] lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430172152.nfa564pvgpk3ut7p@linux-n805
This patch (of 2):
Commit 95e91b831f ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection")
worked on the idea that we should not be mapping as root addr=0 and
MAP_FIXED. However, it was reported that this scenario is in fact
valid, thus making the patch both bogus and breaks userspace as well.
For example X11's libint10.so relies on shmat(1, SHM_RND) for lowmem
initialization[1].
[1] https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/tree/hw/xfree86/os-support/linux/int10/linux.c#n347
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503203243.15045-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Fixes: 95e91b831f ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection")
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
32-bit architectures implementing 64BIT_TIME and COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
need to have the traditional semtimedop() behavior with 32-bit timestamps
for sys_ipc() by calling compat_ksys_semtimedop(), while those that
are not yet converted need to keep using ksys_semtimedop() like
64-bit architectures do.
Note that I chose to not implement a new SEMTIMEDOP64 function that
corresponds to the new sys_semtimedop() with 64-bit timeouts. The reason
here is that sys_ipc() should no longer be used for new system calls,
and libc should just call the semtimedop syscall directly.
One open question remain to whether we want to completely avoid the
sys_ipc() system call for architectures that do not yet have all the
individual calls as they get converted to 64-bit time_t. Doing that
would require adding several extra system calls on m68k, mips, powerpc,
s390, sh, sparc, and x86-32.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Three ipc syscalls (mq_timedsend, mq_timedreceive and and semtimedop)
take a timespec argument. After we move 32-bit architectures over to
useing 64-bit time_t based syscalls, we need seperate entry points for
the old 32-bit based interfaces.
This changes the #ifdef guards for the existing 32-bit compat syscalls
to check for CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME instead, which will then be
enabled on all existing 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
This is a preparatation for changing over __kernel_timespec to 64-bit
times, which involves assigning new system call numbers for mq_timedsend(),
mq_timedreceive() and semtimedop() for compatibility with future y2038
proof user space.
The existing ABIs will remain available through compat code.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The shmid64_ds/semid64_ds/msqid64_ds data structures have been extended
to contain extra fields for storing the upper bits of the time stamps,
this patch does the other half of the job and and fills the new fields on
32-bit architectures as well as 32-bit tasks running on a 64-bit kernel
in compat mode.
There should be no change for native 64-bit tasks.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
In some places, we still used get_seconds() instead of
ktime_get_real_seconds(), and I'm changing the remaining ones now to
all use ktime_get_real_seconds() so we use the full available range for
timestamps instead of overflowing the 'unsigned long' return value in
year 2106 on 32-bit kernels.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
syzbot reported a use-after-free of shm_file_data(file)->file->f_op in
shm_get_unmapped_area(), called via sys_remap_file_pages().
Unfortunately it couldn't generate a reproducer, but I found a bug which
I think caused it. When remap_file_pages() is passed a full System V
shared memory segment, the memory is first unmapped, then a new map is
created using the ->vm_file. Between these steps, the shm ID can be
removed and reused for a new shm segment. But, shm_mmap() only checks
whether the ID is currently valid before calling the underlying file's
->mmap(); it doesn't check whether it was reused. Thus it can use the
wrong underlying file, one that was already freed.
Fix this by making the "outer" shm file (the one that gets put in
->vm_file) hold a reference to the real shm file, and by making
__shm_open() require that the file associated with the shm ID matches
the one associated with the "outer" file.
Taking the reference to the real shm file is needed to fully solve the
problem, since otherwise sfd->file could point to a freed file, which
then could be reallocated for the reused shm ID, causing the wrong shm
segment to be mapped (and without the required permission checks).
Commit 1ac0b6dec6 ("ipc/shm: handle removed segments gracefully in
shm_mmap()") almost fixed this bug, but it didn't go far enough because
it didn't consider the case where the shm ID is reused.
The following program usually reproduces this bug:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
int is_parent = (fork() != 0);
srand(getpid());
for (;;) {
int id = shmget(0xF00F, 4096, IPC_CREAT|0700);
if (is_parent) {
void *addr = shmat(id, NULL, 0);
usleep(rand() % 50);
while (!syscall(__NR_remap_file_pages, addr, 4096, 0, 0, 0));
} else {
usleep(rand() % 50);
shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL);
}
}
}
It causes the following NULL pointer dereference due to a 'struct file'
being used while it's being freed. (I couldn't actually get a KASAN
use-after-free splat like in the syzbot report. But I think it's
possible with this bug; it would just take a more extraordinary race...)
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 9 PID: 258 Comm: syz_ipc Not tainted 4.16.0-05140-gf8cf2f16a7c95 #189
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:d_inode include/linux/dcache.h:519 [inline]
RIP: 0010:touch_atime+0x25/0xd0 fs/inode.c:1724
[...]
Call Trace:
file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2063 [inline]
shmem_mmap+0x25/0x40 mm/shmem.c:2149
call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
shm_mmap+0x34/0x80 ipc/shm.c:465
call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
mmap_region+0x309/0x5b0 mm/mmap.c:1712
do_mmap+0x294/0x4a0 mm/mmap.c:1483
do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2235 [inline]
SYSC_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:2853 [inline]
SyS_remap_file_pages+0x232/0x310 mm/mmap.c:2769
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
[ebiggers@google.com: add comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180410192850.235835-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180409043039.28915-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d11f321e7f1923157eac80aa990b446596f46439@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c8d78c1823 ("mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This was added by the recent "ipc/shm.c: add split function to
shm_vm_ops", but it is not necessary.
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting msq ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/msg (0444) and the MSG_STAT shmctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the msq metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new MSG_STAT_ANY command such that the msq ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/sem (0444) and the SEM_STAT semctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the sma metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new SEM_STAT_ANY command such that the sem ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-3-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "sysvipc: introduce STAT_ANY commands", v2.
The following patches adds the discussed (see [1]) new command for shm
as well as for sems and msq as they are subject to the same
discrepancies for ipc object permission checks between the syscall and
via procfs. These new commands are justified in that (1) we are stuck
with this semantics as changing syscall and procfs can break userland;
and (2) some users can benefit from performance (for large amounts of
shm segments, for example) from not having to parse the procfs
interface.
Once merged, I will submit the necesary manpage updates. But I'm thinking
something like:
: diff --git a/man2/shmctl.2 b/man2/shmctl.2
: index 7bb503999941..bb00bbe21a57 100644
: --- a/man2/shmctl.2
: +++ b/man2/shmctl.2
: @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
: .\" 2005-04-25, mtk -- noted aberrant Linux behavior w.r.t. new
: .\" attaches to a segment that has already been marked for deletion.
: .\" 2005-08-02, mtk: Added IPC_INFO, SHM_INFO, SHM_STAT descriptions.
: +.\" 2018-02-13, dbueso: Added SHM_STAT_ANY description.
: .\"
: .TH SHMCTL 2 2017-09-15 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
: .SH NAME
: @@ -242,6 +243,18 @@ However, the
: argument is not a segment identifier, but instead an index into
: the kernel's internal array that maintains information about
: all shared memory segments on the system.
: +.TP
: +.BR SHM_STAT_ANY " (Linux-specific)"
: +Return a
: +.I shmid_ds
: +structure as for
: +.BR SHM_STAT .
: +However, the
: +.I shm_perm.mode
: +is not checked for read access for
: +.IR shmid ,
: +resembing the behaviour of
: +/proc/sysvipc/shm.
: .PP
: The caller can prevent or allow swapping of a shared
: memory segment with the following \fIcmd\fP values:
: @@ -287,7 +300,7 @@ operation returns the index of the highest used entry in the
: kernel's internal array recording information about all
: shared memory segments.
: (This information can be used with repeated
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operations to obtain information about all shared memory segments
: on the system.)
: A successful
: @@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ isn't accessible.
: \fIshmid\fP is not a valid identifier, or \fIcmd\fP
: is not a valid command.
: Or: for a
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operation, the index value specified in
: .I shmid
: referred to an array slot that is currently unused.
This patch (of 3):
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object metadata
between /proc/sysvipc/shm (0444) and the SHM_STAT shmctl command. The
later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO. As such there can
be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the info is displayed
anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the shm metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing all
the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an overlook - so
we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the syscall or the
procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie ipcs). Some
applications require getting the procfs info (without root privileges) and
can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to 500x in some
reported cases.
This patch introduces a new SHM_STAT_ANY command such that the shm ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/220
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There was a lot of work this cycle fixing bugs that were discovered
after the merge window and getting everything ready where we can
reasonably support fully unprivileged fuse. The bug fixes you already
have and much of the unprivileged fuse work is coming in via other
trees.
Still left for fully unprivileged fuse is figuring out how to cleanly
handle .set_acl and .get_acl in the legacy case, and properly handling
of evm xattrs on unprivileged mounts.
Included in the tree is a cleanup from Alexely that replaced a linked
list with a statically allocated fix sized array for the pid caches,
which simplifies and speeds things up.
Then there is are some cleanups and fixes for the ipc namespace. The
motivation was that in reviewing other code it was discovered that
access ipc objects from different pid namespaces recorded pids in such
a way that when asked the wrong pids were returned. In the worst case
there has been a measured 30% performance impact for sysvipc
semaphores. Other test cases showed no measurable performance impact.
Manfred Spraul and Davidlohr Bueso who tend to work on sysvipc
performance both gave the nod that this is good enough.
Casey Schaufler and James Morris have given their approval to the LSM
side of the changes.
I simplified the types and the code dealing with sysvipc to pass just
kern_ipc_perm for all three types of ipc. Which reduced the header
dependencies throughout the kernel and simplified the lsm code.
Which let me work on the pid fixes without having to worry about
trivial changes causing complete kernel recompiles"
* 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
ipc/shm: Fix pid freeing.
ipc/shm: fix up for struct file no longer being available in shm.h
ipc/smack: Tidy up from the change in type of the ipc security hooks
ipc: Directly call the security hook in ipc_ops.associate
ipc/sem: Fix semctl(..., GETPID, ...) between pid namespaces
ipc/msg: Fix msgctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces
ipc/shm: Fix shmctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces.
ipc/util: Helpers for making the sysvipc operations pid namespace aware
ipc: Move IPCMNI from include/ipc.h into ipc/util.h
msg: Move struct msg_queue into ipc/msg.c
shm: Move struct shmid_kernel into ipc/shm.c
sem: Move struct sem and struct sem_array into ipc/sem.c
msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks
shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooks
sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks
pidns: simpler allocation of pid_* caches
Pull removal of in-kernel calls to syscalls from Dominik Brodowski:
"System calls are interaction points between userspace and the kernel.
Therefore, system call functions such as sys_xyzzy() or
compat_sys_xyzzy() should only be called from userspace via the
syscall table, but not from elsewhere in the kernel.
At least on 64-bit x86, it will likely be a hard requirement from
v4.17 onwards to not call system call functions in the kernel: It is
better to use use a different calling convention for system calls
there, where struct pt_regs is decoded on-the-fly in a syscall wrapper
which then hands processing over to the actual syscall function. This
means that only those parameters which are actually needed for a
specific syscall are passed on during syscall entry, instead of
filling in six CPU registers with random user space content all the
time (which may cause serious trouble down the call chain). Those
x86-specific patches will be pushed through the x86 tree in the near
future.
Moreover, rules on how data may be accessed may differ between kernel
data and user data. This is another reason why calling sys_xyzzy() is
generally a bad idea, and -- at most -- acceptable in arch-specific
code.
This patchset removes all in-kernel calls to syscall functions in the
kernel with the exception of arch/. On top of this, it cleans up the
three places where many syscalls are referenced or prototyped, namely
kernel/sys_ni.c, include/linux/syscalls.h and include/linux/compat.h"
* 'syscalls-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brodo/linux: (109 commits)
bpf: whitelist all syscalls for error injection
kernel/sys_ni: remove {sys_,sys_compat} from cond_syscall definitions
kernel/sys_ni: sort cond_syscall() entries
syscalls/x86: auto-create compat_sys_*() prototypes
syscalls: sort syscall prototypes in include/linux/compat.h
net: remove compat_sys_*() prototypes from net/compat.h
syscalls: sort syscall prototypes in include/linux/syscalls.h
kexec: move sys_kexec_load() prototype to syscalls.h
x86/sigreturn: use SYSCALL_DEFINE0
x86: fix sys_sigreturn() return type to be long, not unsigned long
x86/ioport: add ksys_ioperm() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_ioperm()
mm: add ksys_readahead() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_readahead()
mm: add ksys_mmap_pgoff() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_mmap_pgoff()
mm: add ksys_fadvise64_64() helper; remove in-kernel call to sys_fadvise64_64()
fs: add ksys_fallocate() wrapper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_fallocate()
fs: add ksys_p{read,write}64() helpers; remove in-kernel calls to syscalls
fs: add ksys_truncate() wrapper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_truncate()
fs: add ksys_sync_file_range helper(); remove in-kernel calls to syscall
kernel: add ksys_setsid() helper; remove in-kernel call to sys_setsid()
kernel: add ksys_unshare() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_unshare()
...
Provide ksys_msgsnd() and compat_ksys_msgsnd() wrappers to avoid in-kernel
calls to these syscalls. The ksys_ prefix denotes that these functions are
meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscalls. In particular, they use
the same calling convention as sys_msgsnd() and compat_sys_msgsnd().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Provide ksys_msgrcv() and compat_ksys_msgrcv() wrappers to avoid in-kernel
calls to these syscalls. The ksys_ prefix denotes that these functions are
meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscalls. In particular, they use
the same calling convention as sys_msgrcv() and compat_sys_msgrcv().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Provide ksys_msgctl() and compat_ksys_msgctl() wrappers to avoid in-kernel
calls to these syscalls. The ksys_ prefix denotes that these functions are
meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscalls. In particular, they use
the same calling convention as sys_msgctl() and compat_sys_msgctl().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Provide ksys_shmctl() and compat_ksys_shmctl() wrappers to avoid in-kernel
calls to these syscalls. The ksys_ prefix denotes that these functions are
meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscalls. In particular, they use
the same calling convention as sys_shmctl() and compat_sys_shmctl().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Provide ksys_shmdt() wrapper to avoid in-kernel calls to this syscall.
The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same calling
convention as sys_shmdt().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Provide ksys_shmget() wrapper to avoid in-kernel calls to this syscall.
The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same calling
convention as sys_shmget().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Provide ksys_msgget() wrapper to avoid in-kernel calls to this syscall.
The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same calling
convention as sys_msgget().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Provide ksys_semctl() and compat_ksys_semctl() wrappers to avoid in-kernel
calls to these syscalls. The ksys_ prefix denotes that these functions are
meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscalls. In particular, they use
the same calling convention as sys_semctl() and compat_sys_semctl().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Provide ksys_semget() wrapper to avoid in-kernel calls to this syscall.
The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same calling
convention as sys_semget().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Provide ksys_semtimedop() and compat_ksys_semtimedop() wrappers to avoid
in-kernel calls to these syscalls. The ksys_ prefix denotes that these
functions are meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscalls. In
particular, they use the same calling convention as sys_semtimedop() and
compat_sys_semtimedop().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
If System V shmget/shmat operations are used to create a hugetlbfs
backed mapping, it is possible to munmap part of the mapping and split
the underlying vma such that it is not huge page aligned. This will
untimately result in the following BUG:
kernel BUG at /build/linux-jWa1Fv/linux-4.15.0/mm/hugetlb.c:3310!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
Modules linked in: kcm nfc af_alg caif_socket caif phonet fcrypt
CPU: 18 PID: 43243 Comm: trinity-subchil Tainted: G C E 4.15.0-10-generic #11-Ubuntu
NIP: c00000000036e764 LR: c00000000036ee48 CTR: 0000000000000009
REGS: c000003fbcdcf810 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G C E (4.15.0-10-generic)
MSR: 9000000000029033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002222 XER: 20040000
CFAR: c00000000036ee44 SOFTE: 1
NIP __unmap_hugepage_range+0xa4/0x760
LR __unmap_hugepage_range_final+0x28/0x50
Call Trace:
0x7115e4e00000 (unreliable)
__unmap_hugepage_range_final+0x28/0x50
unmap_single_vma+0x11c/0x190
unmap_vmas+0x94/0x140
exit_mmap+0x9c/0x1d0
mmput+0xa8/0x1d0
do_exit+0x360/0xc80
do_group_exit+0x60/0x100
SyS_exit_group+0x24/0x30
system_call+0x58/0x6c
---[ end trace ee88f958a1c62605 ]---
This bug was introduced by commit 31383c6865 ("mm, hugetlbfs:
introduce ->split() to vm_operations_struct"). A split function was
added to vm_operations_struct to determine if a mapping can be split.
This was mostly for device-dax and hugetlbfs mappings which have
specific alignment constraints.
Mappings initiated via shmget/shmat have their original vm_ops
overwritten with shm_vm_ops. shm_vm_ops functions will call back to the
original vm_ops if needed. Add such a split function to shm_vm_ops.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321161314.7711-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Fixes: 31383c6865 ("mm, hugetlbfs: introduce ->split() to vm_operations_struct")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After the last round of cleanups the shm, sem, and msg associate
operations just became trivial wrappers around the appropriate security
method. Simplify things further by just calling the security method
directly.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Today the last process to update a semaphore is remembered and
reported in the pid namespace of that process. If there are processes
in any other pid namespace querying that process id with GETPID the
result will be unusable nonsense as it does not make any
sense in your own pid namespace.
Due to ipc_update_pid I don't think you will be able to get System V
ipc semaphores into a troublesome cache line ping-pong. Using struct
pids from separate process are not a problem because they do not share
a cache line. Using struct pid from different threads of the same
process are unlikely to be a problem as the reference count update
can be avoided.
Further linux futexes are a much better tool for the job of mutual
exclusion between processes than System V semaphores. So I expect
programs that are performance limited by their interprocess mutual
exclusion primitive will be using futexes.
So while it is possible that enhancing the storage of the last
rocess of a System V semaphore from an integer to a struct pid
will cause a performance regression because of the effect
of frequently updating the pid reference count. I don't expect
that to happen in practice.
This change updates semctl(..., GETPID, ...) to return the
process id of the last process to update a semphore inthe
pid namespace of the calling process.
Fixes: b488893a39 ("pid namespaces: changes to show virtual ids to user")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Today msg_lspid and msg_lrpid are remembered in the pid namespace of
the creator and the processes that last send or received a sysvipc
message. If you have processes in multiple pid namespaces that is
just wrong. The process ids reported will not make the least bit of
sense.
This fix is slightly more susceptible to a performance problem than
the related fix for System V shared memory. By definition the pids
are updated by msgsnd and msgrcv, the fast path of System V message
queues. The only concern over the previous implementation is the
incrementing and decrementing of the pid reference count. As that is
the only difference and multiple updates by of the task_tgid by
threads in the same process have been shown in af_unix sockets to
create a cache line ping-pong between cpus of the same processor.
In this case I don't expect cache lines holding pid reference counts
to ping pong between cpus. As senders and receivers update different
pids there is a natural separation there. Further if multiple threads
of the same process either send or receive messages the pid will be
updated to the same value and ipc_update_pid will avoid the reference
count update.
Which means in the common case I expect msg_lspid and msg_lrpid to
remain constant, and reference counts not to be updated when messages
are sent.
In rare cases it may be possible to trigger the issue which was
observed for af_unix sockets, but it will require multiple processes
with multiple threads to be either sending or receiving messages. It
just does not feel likely that anyone would do that in practice.
This change updates msgctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) to return msg_lspid and
msg_lrpid in the pid namespace of the process calling stat.
This change also updates cat /proc/sysvipc/msg to return print msg_lspid
and msg_lrpid in the pid namespace of the process that opened the proc
file.
Fixes: b488893a39 ("pid namespaces: changes to show virtual ids to user")
Reviewed-by: Nagarathnam Muthusamy <nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Today shm_cpid and shm_lpid are remembered in the pid namespace of the
creator and the processes that last touched a sysvipc shared memory
segment. If you have processes in multiple pid namespaces that
is just wrong, and I don't know how this has been over-looked for
so long.
As only creation and shared memory attach and shared memory detach
update the pids I do not expect there to be a repeat of the issues
when struct pid was attached to each af_unix skb, which in some
notable cases cut the performance in half. The problem was threads of
the same process updating same struct pid from different cpus causing
the cache line to be highly contended and bounce between cpus.
As creation, attach, and detach are expected to be rare operations for
sysvipc shared memory segments I do not expect that kind of cache line
ping pong to cause probems. In addition because the pid is at a fixed
location in the structure instead of being dynamic on a skb, the
reference count of the pid does not need to be updated on each
operation if the pid is the same. This ability to simply skip the pid
reference count changes if the pid is unchanging further reduces the
likelihood of the a cache line holding a pid reference count
ping-ponging between cpus.
Fixes: b488893a39 ("pid namespaces: changes to show virtual ids to user")
Reviewed-by: Nagarathnam Muthusamy <nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This reverts commit 36735a6a2b.
Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> writes:
> [REGRESSION v4.16-rc6] [PATCH] mqueue: forbid unprivileged user access to internal mount
>
> Felix reported weird behaviour on 4.16.0-rc6 with regards to mqueue[1],
> which was introduced by 36735a6a2b ("mqueue: switch to on-demand
> creation of internal mount").
>
> Basically, the reproducer boils down to being able to mount mqueue if
> you create a new user namespace, even if you don't unshare the IPC
> namespace.
>
> Previously this was not possible, and you would get an -EPERM. The mount
> is the *host* mqueue mount, which is being cached and just returned from
> mqueue_mount(). To be honest, I'm not sure if this is safe or not (or if
> it was intentional -- since I'm not familiar with mqueue).
>
> To me it looks like there is a missing permission check. I've included a
> patch below that I've compile-tested, and should block the above case.
> Can someone please tell me if I'm missing something? Is this actually
> safe?
>
> [1]: https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/36674
The issue is a lot deeper than a missing permission check. sb->s_user_ns
was is improperly set as well. So in addition to the filesystem being
mounted when it should not be mounted, so things are not allow that should
be.
We are practically to the release of 4.16 and there is no agreement between
Al Viro and myself on what the code should looks like to fix things properly.
So revert the code to what it was before so that we can take our time
and discuss this properly.
Fixes: 36735a6a2b ("mqueue: switch to on-demand creation of internal mount")
Reported-by: Felix Abecassis <fabecassis@nvidia.com>
Reported-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Capture the pid namespace when /proc/sysvipc/msg /proc/sysvipc/shm
and /proc/sysvipc/sem are opened, and make it available through
the new helper ipc_seq_pid_ns.
This makes it possible to report the pids in these files in the
pid namespace of the opener of the files.
Implement ipc_update_pid. A simple impline helper that will only update
a struct pid pointer if the new value does not equal the old value. This
removes the need for wordy code sequences like:
old = object->pid;
object->pid = new;
put_pid(old);
and
old = object->pid;
if (old != new) {
object->pid = new;
put_pid(old);
}
Allowing the following to be written instead:
ipc_update_pid(&object->pid, new);
Which is easier to read and ensures that the pid reference count is
not touched the old and the new values are the same. Not touching
the reference count in this case is important to help avoid issues
like af_unix experienced, where multiple threads of the same
process managed to bounce the struct pid between cpu cache lines,
but updating the pids reference count.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The definition IPCMNI is only used in ipc/util.h and ipc/util.c. So
there is no reason to keep it in a header file that the whole kernel
can see. Move it into util.h to simplify future maintenance.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
All of the users are now in ipc/msg.c so make the definition local to
that file to make code maintenance easier. AKA to prevent rebuilding
the entire kernel when struct msg_queue changes.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
All of the users are now in ipc/shm.c so make the definition local to
that file to make code maintenance easier. AKA to prevent rebuilding
the entire kernel when struct shmid_kernel changes.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
All of the users are now in ipc/sem.c so make the definitions
local to that file to make code maintenance easier. AKA
to prevent rebuilding the entire kernel when one of these
files is changed.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only
access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by
passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue.
Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to
ipc/msg.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only
access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel..
Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only
access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array.
Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array
to become private to ipc/sem.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This is the mindless scripted replacement of kernel use of POLL*
variables as described by Al, done by this script:
for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
done
with de-mangling cleanups yet to come.
NOTE! On almost all architectures, the EPOLL* constants have the same
values as the POLL* constants do. But they keyword here is "almost".
For various bad reasons they aren't the same, and epoll() doesn't
actually work quite correctly in some cases due to this on Sparc et al.
The next patch from Al will sort out the final differences, and we
should be all done.
Scripted-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Previous behavior added tasks to the work queue using the static_prio
value instead of the dynamic priority value in prio. This caused RT tasks
to be added to the work queue in a FIFO manner rather than by priority.
Normal tasks were handled by priority.
This fix utilizes the dynamic priority of the task to ensure that both RT
and normal tasks are added to the work queue in priority order. Utilizing
the dynamic priority (prio) rather than the base priority (normal_prio)
was chosen to ensure that if a task had a boosted priority when it was
added to the work queue, it would be woken sooner to to ensure that it
releases any other locks it may be holding in a more timely manner. It is
understood that the task could have a lower priority when it wakes than
when it was added to the queue in this (unlikely) case.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513006652-7014-1-git-send-email-jhaws@sdl.usu.edu
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Haws <jhaws@sdl.usu.edu>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
As described in the title, this patch fixes <ipc>id_ds inconsistency when
<ipc>ctl_stat executes concurrently with some ds-changing function, e.g.
shmat, msgsnd or whatever.
For instance, if shmctl(IPC_STAT) is running concurrently
with shmat, following data structure can be returned:
{... shm_lpid = 0, shm_nattch = 1, ...}
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202153456.6514-1-philippe.mikoyan@skat.systems
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mikoyan <philippe.mikoyan@skat.systems>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull mqueue/bpf vfs cleanups from Al Viro:
"mqueue and bpf go through rather painful and similar contortions to
create objects in their dentry trees. Provide a primitive for doing
that without abusing ->mknod(), switch bpf and mqueue to it.
Another mqueue-related thing that has ended up in that branch is
on-demand creation of internal mount (based upon the work of Giuseppe
Scrivano)"
* 'work.mqueue' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
mqueue: switch to on-demand creation of internal mount
tidy do_mq_open() up a bit
mqueue: clean prepare_open() up
do_mq_open(): move all work prior to dentry_open() into a helper
mqueue: fold mq_attr_ok() into mqueue_get_inode()
move dentry_open() calls up into do_mq_open()
mqueue: switch to vfs_mkobj(), quit abusing ->d_fsdata
bpf_obj_do_pin(): switch to vfs_mkobj(), quit abusing ->mknod()
new primitive: vfs_mkobj()
Pull poll annotations from Al Viro:
"This introduces a __bitwise type for POLL### bitmap, and propagates
the annotations through the tree. Most of that stuff is as simple as
'make ->poll() instances return __poll_t and do the same to local
variables used to hold the future return value'.
Some of the obvious brainos found in process are fixed (e.g. POLLIN
misspelled as POLL_IN). At that point the amount of sparse warnings is
low and most of them are for genuine bugs - e.g. ->poll() instance
deciding to return -EINVAL instead of a bitmap. I hadn't touched those
in this series - it's large enough as it is.
Another problem it has caught was eventpoll() ABI mess; select.c and
eventpoll.c assumed that corresponding POLL### and EPOLL### were
equal. That's true for some, but not all of them - EPOLL### are
arch-independent, but POLL### are not.
The last commit in this series separates userland POLL### values from
the (now arch-independent) kernel-side ones, converting between them
in the few places where they are copied to/from userland. AFAICS, this
is the least disruptive fix preserving poll(2) ABI and making epoll()
work on all architectures.
As it is, it's simply broken on sparc - try to give it EPOLLWRNORM and
it will trigger only on what would've triggered EPOLLWRBAND on other
architectures. EPOLLWRBAND and EPOLLRDHUP, OTOH, are never triggered
at all on sparc. With this patch they should work consistently on all
architectures"
* 'misc.poll' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (37 commits)
make kernel-side POLL... arch-independent
eventpoll: no need to mask the result of epi_item_poll() again
eventpoll: constify struct epoll_event pointers
debugging printk in sg_poll() uses %x to print POLL... bitmap
annotate poll(2) guts
9p: untangle ->poll() mess
->si_band gets POLL... bitmap stored into a user-visible long field
ring_buffer_poll_wait() return value used as return value of ->poll()
the rest of drivers/*: annotate ->poll() instances
media: annotate ->poll() instances
fs: annotate ->poll() instances
ipc, kernel, mm: annotate ->poll() instances
net: annotate ->poll() instances
apparmor: annotate ->poll() instances
tomoyo: annotate ->poll() instances
sound: annotate ->poll() instances
acpi: annotate ->poll() instances
crypto: annotate ->poll() instances
block: annotate ->poll() instances
x86: annotate ->poll() instances
...
NeilBrown