Tidy up the formatting/grammar in crypto_engine.rst. Use bulleted lists
where appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fill in missing parameter descriptions for the compression algorithm,
then pick them up to document for the compression_alg structure.
Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Rewrite the skcipher API example, changing it to encrypt a buffer with
AES-256-XTS. This addresses various problems with the previous example:
- It requests a specific driver "cbc-aes-aesni", which is unusual.
Normally users ask for "cbc(aes)", not a specific driver.
- It encrypts only a single AES block. For the reader, that doesn't
clearly distinguish the "skcipher" API from the "cipher" API.
- Showing how to encrypt something with bare CBC is arguably a poor
choice of example, as it doesn't follow modern crypto trends. Now,
usually authenticated encryption is recommended, in which case the
user would use the AEAD API, not skcipher. Disk encryption is still a
legitimate use for skcipher, but for that usually XTS is recommended.
- Many other bugs and poor coding practices, such as not setting
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, unnecessarily allocating a heap buffer for
the IV, unnecessary NULL checks, using a pointless wrapper struct, and
forgetting to set an error code in one case.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove the unnecessary constant CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_DIGEST, which has the
same value as CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_HASH.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove dead code related to internal IV generators, which are no longer
used since they've been replaced with the "seqiv" and "echainiv"
templates. The removed code includes:
- The "givcipher" (GIVCIPHER) algorithm type. No algorithms are
registered with this type anymore, so it's unneeded.
- The "const char *geniv" member of aead_alg, ablkcipher_alg, and
blkcipher_alg. A few algorithms still set this, but it isn't used
anymore except to show via /proc/crypto and CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG.
Just hardcode "<default>" or "<none>" in those cases.
- The 'skcipher_givcrypt_request' structure, which is never used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key format [RFC 5208] parser for the
asymmetric key type. For the moment, this will only support unencrypted
DER blobs. PEM and decryption can be added later.
PKCS#8 keys can be loaded like this:
openssl pkcs8 -in private_key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | \
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This
include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature
already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this:
int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *enc, void *data);
int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the
encoding for verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Some crypto API users allocating a tfm with crypto_alloc_$FOO() are also
specifying the type flags for $FOO, e.g. crypto_alloc_shash() with
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But, that's redundant since the crypto API will
override any specified type flag/mask with the correct ones.
So, remove the unneeded flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
A number of new docs were added, but they're currently not on
the index.rst from the session they're supposed to be, causing
Sphinx warnings.
Add them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Add a note that it is perfectly legal to "abandon" a request object:
- call .init() and then (as many times) .update()
- _not_ call any of .final(), .finup() or .export() at any point in
future
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180222114741.GA27631@gondor.apana.org.au
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The code sample is waiting for an async. crypto op completion.
Adapt sample to use the new generic infrastructure to do the same.
This also fixes a possible data coruption bug created by the
use of wait_for_completion_interruptible() without dealing
correctly with an interrupt aborting the wait prior to the
async op finishing.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Provide more specific examples of keyring restrictions as applied to
X.509 signature chain verification.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
- Fixed bugs in example for shash and rng (added missing "*" and " *").
- Corrected pr_info() in calc_hash().
- Added example usage of calc_hash().
- No need for negate PTR_ERR to get error code, as crypto_alloc_rng
already returns negative values like ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM). Fixed.
Signed-off-by: Kamil Konieczny <k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Mauro says:
This patch series convert the remaining DocBooks to ReST.
The first version was originally
send as 3 patch series:
[PATCH 00/36] Convert DocBook documents to ReST
[PATCH 0/5] Convert more books to ReST
[PATCH 00/13] Get rid of DocBook
The lsm book was added as if it were a text file under
Documentation. The plan is to merge it with another file
under Documentation/security, after both this series and
a security Documentation patch series gets merged.
It also adjusts some Sphinx-pedantic errors/warnings on
some kernel-doc markups.
I also added some patches here to add PDF output for all
existing ReST books.
This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel
keys, and adjusts for ReST markup.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The crypto API book was added without the bits required to
generate PDF output. Add them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
IMA:
- provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules
KEYS:
- add a system blacklist keyring
- add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
functionality to userland via keyctl()
LSM:
- harden LSM API with __ro_after_init
- add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux
- revive security_task_alloc hook
TPM:
- implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
tpm: Fix reference count to main device
tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
...
Add a restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain link restriction that
searches for signing keys in the destination keyring in addition to the
signing key or keyring designated when the destination keyring was
created. Userspace enables this behavior by including the "chain" option
in the keyring restriction:
keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, keyring, "asymmetric",
"key_or_keyring:<signing key>:chain");
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Adds restrict_link_by_signature_keyring(), which uses the restrict_key
member of the provided destination_keyring data structure as the
key or keyring to search for signing keys.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Look up asymmetric keyring restriction information using the key-type
lookup_restrict hook.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Fix a single letter typo in api-skcipher.rst.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The documentation states that crypto_ahash_reqsize() provides the size
of the state structure used by crypto_ahash_export(). But it's actually
crypto_ahash_statesize() which provides this size.
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The :functions: definition allows the specification of multiple
function references which prevents parsing the header file multiple
times.
Reported-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Remove the documentation reference to crypto_alloc_ablkcipher as the API
function call was removed.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Add the KPP API documentation to the kernel crypto API Sphinx
documentation. This addition includes the documentation of the
ECDH and DH helpers which are needed to create the approrpiate input
data for the crypto_kpp_set_secret function.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Keep the cipher API and the request API function documentation in
separate sections.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
With the conversion of the kernel crypto API DocBook to Sphinx, the
monolithic document is broken up into individual documents. The
documentation is unchanged with the exception of a slight reordering to
keep the individual document parts self-contained.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The asynchronous API is quite mature. Not mentioning is at all is probably
better than saying it is under development.
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The patch moves the information provided in
Documentation/crypto/crypto-API-userspace.txt into a separate chapter in
the kernel crypto API DocBook. Some corrections are applied (such as
removing a reference to Netlink when the AF_ALG socket is referred to).
In addition, the AEAD and RNG interface description is now added.
Also, a brief description of the zero-copy interface with an example
code snippet is provided.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The userspace interface of the kernel crypto API is documented with
* a general explanation
* a discussion of the memory in-place operation
* the description of the message digest API
* the description of the symmetric cipher API
The documentation refers to libkcapi as a working example on how to use
the kernel crypto API from user space.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There have never been any real users of MEMSET operations since they
have been introduced in January 2007 by commit 7405f74bad ("dmaengine:
refactor dmaengine around dma_async_tx_descriptor"). Therefore remove
support for them for now, it can be always brought back when needed.
[sebastian.hesselbarth@gmail.com: fix drivers/dma/mv_xor]
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Hesselbarth <sebastian.hesselbarth@gmail.com>
Cc: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <djbw@fb.com>
Cc: Tomasz Figa <t.figa@samsung.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Kevin Hilman <khilman@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In-source documentation for the asymmetric key type. This will be located in:
Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
async_raid6_2data_recov() recovers two data disk failures
async_raid6_datap_recov() recovers a data disk and the P disk
These routines are a port of the synchronous versions found in
drivers/md/raid6recov.c. The primary difference is breaking out the xor
operations into separate calls to async_xor. Two helper routines are
introduced to perform scalar multiplication where needed.
async_sum_product() multiplies two sources by scalar coefficients and
then sums (xor) the result. async_mult() simply multiplies a single
source by a scalar.
This implemention also includes, in contrast to the original
synchronous-only code, special case handling for the 4-disk and 5-disk
array cases. In these situations the default N-disk algorithm will
present 0-source or 1-source operations to dma devices. To cover for
dma devices where the minimum source count is 2 we implement 4-disk and
5-disk handling in the recovery code.
[ Impact: asynchronous raid6 recovery routines for 2data and datap cases ]
Cc: Yuri Tikhonov <yur@emcraft.com>
Cc: Ilya Yanok <yanok@emcraft.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Noll <maan@systemlinux.org>
Acked-by: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
[ Based on an original patch by Yuri Tikhonov ]
This adds support for doing asynchronous GF multiplication by adding
two additional functions to the async_tx API:
async_gen_syndrome() does simultaneous XOR and Galois field
multiplication of sources.
async_syndrome_val() validates the given source buffers against known P
and Q values.
When a request is made to run async_pq against more than the hardware
maximum number of supported sources we need to reuse the previous
generated P and Q values as sources into the next operation. Care must
be taken to remove Q from P' and P from Q'. For example to perform a 5
source pq op with hardware that only supports 4 sources at a time the
following approach is taken:
p, q = PQ(src0, src1, src2, src3, COEF({01}, {02}, {04}, {08}))
p', q' = PQ(p, q, q, src4, COEF({00}, {01}, {00}, {10}))
p' = p + q + q + src4 = p + src4
q' = {00}*p + {01}*q + {00}*q + {10}*src4 = q + {10}*src4
Note: 4 is the minimum acceptable maxpq otherwise we punt to
synchronous-software path.
The DMA_PREP_CONTINUE flag indicates to the driver to reuse p and q as
sources (in the above manner) and fill the remaining slots up to maxpq
with the new sources/coefficients.
Note1: Some devices have native support for P+Q continuation and can skip
this extra work. Devices with this capability can advertise it with
dma_set_maxpq. It is up to each driver how to handle the
DMA_PREP_CONTINUE flag.
Note2: The api supports disabling the generation of P when generating Q,
this is ignored by the synchronous path but is implemented by some dma
devices to save unnecessary writes. In this case the continuation
algorithm is simplified to only reuse Q as a source.
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuri Tikhonov <yur@emcraft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Yanok <yanok@emcraft.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Noll <maan@systemlinux.org>
Acked-by: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
async_xor() needs space to perform dma and page address conversions. In
most cases the code can simply reuse the struct page * array because the
size of the native pointer matches the size of a dma/page address. In
order to support archs where sizeof(dma_addr_t) is larger than
sizeof(struct page *), or to preserve the input parameters, we utilize a
memory region passed in by the caller.
Since the code is now prepared to handle the case where it cannot
perform address conversions on the stack, we no longer need the
!HIGHMEM64G dependency in drivers/dma/Kconfig.
[ Impact: don't clobber input buffers for address conversions ]
Reviewed-by: Andre Noll <maan@systemlinux.org>
Acked-by: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Prepare the api for the arrival of a new parameter, 'scribble'. This
will allow callers to identify scratchpad memory for dma address or page
address conversions. As this adds yet another parameter, take this
opportunity to convert the common submission parameters (flags,
dependency, callback, and callback argument) into an object that is
passed by reference.
Also, take this opportunity to fix up the kerneldoc and add notes about
the relevant ASYNC_TX_* flags for each routine.
[ Impact: moves api pass-by-value parameters to a pass-by-reference struct ]
Signed-off-by: Andre Noll <maan@systemlinux.org>
Acked-by: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
In support of inter-channel chaining async_tx utilizes an ack flag to
gate whether a dependent operation can be chained to another. While the
flag is not set the chain can be considered open for appending. Setting
the ack flag closes the chain and flags the descriptor for garbage
collection. The ASYNC_TX_DEP_ACK flag essentially means "close the
chain after adding this dependency". Since each operation can only have
one child the api now implicitly sets the ack flag at dependency
submission time. This removes an unnecessary management burden from
clients of the api.
[ Impact: clean up and enforce one dependency per operation ]
Reviewed-by: Andre Noll <maan@systemlinux.org>
Acked-by: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
'zero_sum' does not properly describe the operation of generating parity
and checking that it validates against an existing buffer. Change the
name of the operation to 'val' (for 'validate'). This is in
anticipation of the p+q case where it is a requirement to identify the
target parity buffers separately from the source buffers, because the
target parity buffers will not have corresponding pq coefficients.
Reviewed-by: Andre Noll <maan@systemlinux.org>
Acked-by: Maciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
"Wouldn't it be better if the dmaengine layer made sure it didn't pass
the same channel several times to a client?
I mean, you seem concerned that the memcpy() API should be transparent
and easy to use, but the whole registration interface is just
ridiculously complicated..."
- Haavard
The dmaengine and async_tx registration/allocation interface is indeed
needlessly complicated. This redesign has the following goals:
1/ Simplify reference counting: dma channels are not something one would
expect to be hotplugged, it should be an exceptional event handled by
drivers not something clients should be mandated to handle in a
callback. The common case channel removal event is 'rmmod <dma driver>',
which for simplicity should be disallowed if the channel is in use.
2/ Add an interface for requesting exclusive access to a channel
suitable to device-to-memory users.
3/ Convert all memory-to-memory users over to a common allocator, the goal
here is to not have competing channel allocation schemes. The only
competition should be between device-to-memory exclusive allocations and
the memory-to-memory usage case where channels are shared between
multiple "clients".
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <haavard.skinnemoen@atmel.com>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Hook, Gary