Commit 0260643ce "ima: add policy support for extending different pcrs"
introduced a new IMA policy option "pcr=". Missing was the documentation
for this option. This patch updates ima_policy to include this option,
as well as an example.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and
initramfs. Two new IMA policy identifiers KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK are defined.
Example policy rules:
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing
the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other
changes. Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a
ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy.
Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks
enum kernel_read_file_id {
...
READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
READING_MAX_ID
enum ima_hooks {
...
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file
eg: enum ima_hooks {
FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID,
MMAP_CHECK,
In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we
would need to specify a struct containing a union.
struct caller_id {
union {
enum ima_hooks func_id;
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id;
};
};
Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id,
perhaps changing the enumeration name.
For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in the ima_hooks.
Changelog v4:
- replaced switch statement with a kernel_read_file_id to an ima_hooks
id mapping array - Dmitry
- renamed ima_hook tokens KEXEC_CHECK and INITRAMFS_CHECK to
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK respectively - Dave Young
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC. This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes. For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid). In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.
Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Include don't appraise or measure rules for the NSFS filesystem
in the builtin ima_tcb and ima_appraise_tcb policies.
Changelog:
- Update documentation
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19
This patch adds a rule in the default measurement policy to skip inodes
in the cgroupfs filesystem. Measurements for this filesystem can be
avoided, as all the digests collected have the same value of the digest of
an empty file.
Furthermore, this patch updates the documentation of IMA policies in
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy to make it consistent with
the policies set in security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.
This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.
The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file
access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.
Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
The IMA policy permits specifying rules to enable or disable
measurement/appraisal/audit based on the file system magic number.
If, for example, the policy contains an ext4 measurement rule,
the rule is enabled for all ext4 partitions.
Sometimes it might be necessary to enable measurement/appraisal/audit
only for one partition and disable it for another partition of the
same type. With the existing IMA policy syntax, this can not be done.
This patch provides support for IMA policy rules to specify the file
system by its UUID (eg. fsuuid=397449cd-687d-4145-8698-7fed4a3e0363).
For partitions not being appraised, it might be a good idea to mount
file systems with the 'noexec' option to prevent executing non-verified
binaries.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The 'security.ima' extended attribute may contain either the file data's
hash or a digital signature. This patch adds support for requiring a
specific extended attribute type. It extends the IMA policy with a new
keyword 'appraise_type=imasig'. (Default is hash.)
Changelog v2:
- Fixed Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy option syntax
Changelog v1:
- Differentiate between 'required' vs. 'actual' extended attribute
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two
arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL
terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and
appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system.
This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an
extensible and consistent manner.
To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional
patches could pass the signature as the first parameter.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This adds an 'audit' policy action which audit logs file measurements.
Changelog v6:
- use new action flag handling (Dmitry Kasatkin).
- removed whitespace (Mimi)
Changelog v5:
- use audit_log_untrustedstring.
Changelog v4:
- cleanup digest -> hash conversion.
- use filename rather than d_path in ima_audit_measurement.
Changelog v3:
- Use newly exported audit_log_task_info for logging pid/ppid/uid/etc.
- Update the ima_policy ABI documentation.
Changelog v2:
- Use 'audit' action rather than 'measure_and_audit' to permit
auditing in the absence of measuring..
Changelog v1:
- Initial posting.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Unlike the IMA measurement policy, the appraise policy can not be dependent
on runtime process information, such as the task uid, as the 'security.ima'
xattr is written on file close and must be updated each time the file changes,
regardless of the current task uid.
This patch extends the policy language with 'fowner', defines an appraise
policy, which appraises all files owned by root, and defines 'ima_appraise_tcb',
a new boot command line option, to enable the appraise policy.
Changelog v3:
- separate the measure from the appraise rules in order to support measuring
without appraising and appraising without measuring.
- change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
- update default appraise policy for cgroups
Changelog v1:
- don't appraise RAMFS (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- merged rest of "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" commit
(Dmtiry Kasatkin)
ima_must_appraise_or_measure() called ima_match_policy twice, which
searched the policy for a matching rule. Once for a matching measurement
rule and subsequently for an appraisal rule. Searching the policy twice
is unnecessary overhead, which could be noticeable with a large policy.
The new version of ima_must_appraise_or_measure() does everything in a
single iteration using a new version of ima_match_policy(). It returns
IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
With the use of action mask only one efficient matching function
is enough. Removed other specific versions of matching functions.
Changelog:
- change 'owner' to 'fowner' to conform to the new LSM conditions posted by
Roberto Sassu.
- fix calls to ima_log_string()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
With the movement of the ima hooks functions were renamed from *path* to
*file* since they always deal with struct file. This patch renames some of
the ima internal flags to make them consistent with the rest of the code.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Support for a user loadable policy through securityfs
with support for LSM specific policy data.
- free invalid rule in ima_parse_add_rule()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Eric Richter