Here are 3 SPDX patches for 5.7-rc1.
One fixes up the SPDX tag for a single driver, while the other two go
through the tree and add SPDX tags for all of the .gitignore files as
needed.
Nothing too complex, but you will get a merge conflict with your current
tree, that should be trivial to handle (one file modified by two things,
one file deleted.)
All 3 of these have been in linux-next for a while, with no reported
issues other than the merge conflict.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'spdx-5.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx
Pull SPDX updates from Greg KH:
"Here are three SPDX patches for 5.7-rc1.
One fixes up the SPDX tag for a single driver, while the other two go
through the tree and add SPDX tags for all of the .gitignore files as
needed.
Nothing too complex, but you will get a merge conflict with your
current tree, that should be trivial to handle (one file modified by
two things, one file deleted.)
All three of these have been in linux-next for a while, with no
reported issues other than the merge conflict"
* tag 'spdx-5.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx:
ASoC: MT6660: make spdxcheck.py happy
.gitignore: add SPDX License Identifier
.gitignore: remove too obvious comments
Remove initial SIDs that have never been used or are no longer used by
the kernel from its string table, which is also used to generate the
SECINITSID_* symbols referenced in code. Update the code to
gracefully handle the fact that these can now be NULL. Stop treating
it as an error if a policy defines additional initial SIDs unknown to
the kernel. Do not load unused initial SID contexts into the sidtab.
Fix the incorrect usage of the name from the ocontext in error
messages when loading initial SIDs since these are not presently
written to the kernel policy and are therefore always NULL.
After this change, it is possible to safely reclaim and reuse some of
the unused initial SIDs without compatibility issues. Specifically,
unused initial SIDs that were being assigned the same context as the
unlabeled initial SID in policies can be reclaimed and reused for
another purpose, with existing policies still treating them as having
the unlabeled context and future policies having the option of mapping
them to a more specific context. For example, this could have been
used when the infiniband labeling support was introduced to define
initial SIDs for the default pkey and endport SIDs similar to the
handling of port/netif/node SIDs rather than always using
SECINITSID_UNLABELED as the default.
The set of safely reclaimable unused initial SIDs across all known
policies is igmp_packet (13), icmp_socket (14), tcp_socket (15), kmod
(24), policy (25), and scmp_packet (26); these initial SIDs were
assigned the same context as unlabeled in all known policies including
mls. If only considering non-mls policies (i.e. assuming that mls
users always upgrade policy with their kernels), the set of safely
reclaimable unused initial SIDs further includes file_labels (6), init
(7), sysctl_modprobe (16), and sysctl_fs (18) through sysctl_dev (23).
Adding new initial SIDs beyond SECINITSID_NUM to policy unfortunately
became a fatal error in commit 24ed7fdae6 ("selinux: use separate
table for initial SID lookup") and even before that it could cause
problems on a policy reload (collision between the new initial SID and
one allocated at runtime) ever since commit 42596eafdd ("selinux:
load the initial SIDs upon every policy load") so we cannot safely
start adding new initial SIDs to policies beyond SECINITSID_NUM (27)
until such a time as all such kernels do not need to be supported and
only those that include this commit are relevant. That is not a big
deal since we haven't added a new initial SID since 2004 (v2.6.7) and
we have plenty of unused ones we can reclaim if we truly need one.
If we want to avoid the wasted storage in initial_sid_to_string[]
and/or sidtab->isids[] for the unused initial SIDs, we could introduce
an indirection between the kernel initial SID values and the policy
initial SID values and just map the policy SID values in the ocontexts
to the kernel values during policy_load_isids(). Originally I thought
we'd do this by preserving the initial SID names in the kernel policy
and creating a mapping at load time like we do for the security
classes and permissions but that would require a new kernel policy
format version and associated changes to libsepol/checkpolicy and I'm
not sure it is justified. Simpler approach is just to create a fixed
mapping table in the kernel from the existing fixed policy values to
the kernel values. Less flexible but probably sufficient.
A separate selinux userspace change was applied in
8677ce5e8f
to enable removal of most of the unused initial SID contexts from
policies, but there is no dependency between that change and this one.
That change permits removing all of the unused initial SID contexts
from policy except for the fs and sysctl SID contexts. The initial
SID declarations themselves would remain in policy to preserve the
values of subsequent ones but the contexts can be dropped. If/when
the kernel decides to reuse one of them, future policies can change
the name and start assigning a context again without breaking
compatibility.
Here is how I would envision staging changes to the initial SIDs in a
compatible manner after this commit is applied:
1. At any time after this commit is applied, the kernel could choose
to reclaim one of the safely reclaimable unused initial SIDs listed
above for a new purpose (i.e. replace its NULL entry in the
initial_sid_to_string[] table with a new name and start using the
newly generated SECINITSID_name symbol in code), and refpolicy could
at that time rename its declaration of that initial SID to reflect its
new purpose and start assigning it a context going
forward. Existing/old policies would map the reclaimed initial SID to
the unlabeled context, so that would be the initial default behavior
until policies are updated. This doesn't depend on the selinux
userspace change; it will work with existing policies and userspace.
2. In 6 months or so we'll have another SELinux userspace release that
will include the libsepol/checkpolicy support for omitting unused
initial SID contexts.
3. At any time after that release, refpolicy can make that release its
minimum build requirement and drop the sid context statements (but not
the sid declarations) for all of the unused initial SIDs except for
fs and sysctl, which must remain for compatibility on policy
reload with old kernels and for compatibility with kernels that were
still using SECINITSID_SYSCTL (< 2.6.39). This doesn't depend on this
kernel commit; it will work with previous kernels as well.
4. After N years for some value of N, refpolicy decides that it no
longer cares about policy reload compatibility for kernels that
predate this kernel commit, and refpolicy drops the fs and sysctl
SID contexts from policy too (but retains the declarations).
5. After M years for some value of M, the kernel decides that it no
longer cares about compatibility with refpolicies that predate step 4
(dropping the fs and sysctl SIDs), and those two SIDs also become
safely reclaimable. This step is optional and need not ever occur unless
we decide that the need to reclaim those two SIDs outweighs the
compatibility cost.
6. After O years for some value of O, refpolicy decides that it no
longer cares about policy load (not just reload) compatibility for
kernels that predate this kernel commit, and both kernel and refpolicy
can then start adding and using new initial SIDs beyond 27. This does
not depend on the previous change (step 5) and can occur independent
of it.
Fixes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/12
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In old days, the "host-progs" syntax was used for specifying host
programs. It was renamed to the current "hostprogs-y" in 2004.
It is typically useful in scripts/Makefile because it allows Kbuild to
selectively compile host programs based on the kernel configuration.
This commit renames like follows:
always -> always-y
hostprogs-y -> hostprogs
So, scripts/Makefile will look like this:
always-$(CONFIG_BUILD_BIN2C) += ...
always-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += ...
...
hostprogs := $(always-y) $(always-m)
I think this makes more sense because a host program is always a host
program, irrespective of the kernel configuration. We want to specify
which ones to compile by CONFIG options, so always-y will be handier.
The "always", "hostprogs-y", "hostprogs-m" will be kept for backward
compatibility for a while.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
When compiling genheaders and mdp from a newer host kernel, the
following error happens:
In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:18:
./security/selinux/include/classmap.h:238:2: error: #error New
address family defined, please update secclass_map. #error New
address family defined, please update secclass_map. ^~~~~
make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.host:107:
scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders] Error 1 make[2]: ***
[scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux/genheaders] Error 2
make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux] Error 2
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
Instead of relying on the host definition, include linux/socket.h in
classmap.h to have PF_MAX.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <paulo@paulo.ac>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: manually merge in mdp.c, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Please, use at least K&R C; printf had been able to left-adjust
a field for as long as stdio existed and use of '*' for variable
width had been there since v7. Yes, the first edition of K&R
didn't cover the latter feature (it slightly predates v7), but
you are using a much later feature of the language than that -
in K&R C
static char *stoupperx(const char *s)
{
...
}
would've been spelled as
static char *stoupperx(s)
char *s;
{
...
}
While we are at it, the use of strstr() is bogus - it finds the
_first_ instance of substring, so it's a lousy fit for checking
if a string ends with given suffix...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Ensure that genheaders fails with an error if too many permissions
are defined in a class to fit within an access vector. This is similar
to a check performed by checkpolicy when compiling the policy.
Also, fix the suffix on the permission constants generated by this program.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Compiling with clang and -Wundef makes the compiler report a usage of
undefined PF_MAX macro in security/selinux/include/classmap.h:
In file included from scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c:48:
security/selinux/include/classmap.h:37:31: warning: no previous
extern declaration for non-static variable 'secclass_map'
[-Wmissing-variable-declarations]
struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
^
security/selinux/include/classmap.h:235:5: error: 'PF_MAX' is not
defined, evaluates to 0 [-Werror,-Wundef]
#if PF_MAX > 43
^
In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:17:
security/selinux/include/classmap.h:37:31: warning: no previous
extern declaration for non-static variable 'secclass_map'
[-Wmissing-variable-declarations]
struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
^
security/selinux/include/classmap.h:235:5: error: 'PF_MAX' is not
defined, evaluates to 0 [-Werror,-Wundef]
#if PF_MAX > 43
^
PF_MAX is defined in include/linux/socket.h but not in
include/uapi/linux/socket.h. Therefore host programs have to rely on the
definition from libc's /usr/include/bits/socket.h, included by
<sys/socket.h>.
Fix the issue by using sys/socket.h in mdp and genheaders. When
classmap.h is included by security/selinux/avc.c, it uses the kernel
definition of PF_MAX, which makes the test consistent.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 3322d0d64f ("selinux: keep SELinux in sync with new capability
definitions") added a check on the defined capabilities without
explicitly including the capability header file which caused problems
when building genheaders for users of clang/llvm. Resolve this by
using the kernel headers when building genheaders, which is arguably
the right thing to do regardless, and explicitly including the
kernel's capability.h header file in classmap.h. We also update the
mdp build, even though it wasn't causing an error we really should
be using the headers from the kernel we are building.
Reported-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Files added to hostprogs-y are cleaned. (See scripts/Makefile.clean)
Adding them to clean-files is redundant.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.m@jp.panasonic.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The security_is_socket_class() is auto-generated by genheaders based
on classmap.h to reduce maintenance effort when a new class is defined
in SELinux kernel. The name for any socket class should be suffixed by
"socket" and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
If a permission name is long enough the selinux class definition generation
tool will go into a infinite loop. This is because it's macro max() is
fooled into thinking it is dealing with unsigned numbers. This patch makes
sure the macro always uses signed number so 1 > -1.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:20: warning: no previous prototype
for ?usage?
scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:26: warning: no previous prototype
for ?stoupperx?
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The SELinux dynamic class work in c6d3aaa4e3
creates a number of dynamic header files and scripts. Add .gitignore files
so git doesn't complain about these.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to
generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h
and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the
security class mapping definitions in classmap.h. Adding new kernel
classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Linus Torvalds