Commit Graph

560 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Serge E. Hallyn 094972840f file capabilities: simplify signal check
Simplify the uid equivalence check in cap_task_kill().  Anyone can kill a
process owned by the same uid.

Without this patch wireshark is reported to fail.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-23 17:12:13 -08:00
Casey Schaufler 4bc87e6277 Smack: unlabeled outgoing ambient packets
Smack uses CIPSO labeling, but allows for unlabeled packets by
specifying an "ambient" label that is applied to incoming unlabeled
packets.

Because the other end of the connection may dislike IP options, and ssh
is one know application that behaves thus, it is prudent to respond in
kind.

This patch changes the network labeling behavior such that an outgoing
packet that would be given a CIPSO label that matches the ambient label
is left unlabeled.  An "unlbl" domain is added and the netlabel
defaulting mechanism invoked rather than assuming that everything is
CIPSO.  Locking has been added around changes to the ambient label as
the mechanisms used to do so are more involved.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-19 07:51:00 -08:00
Jan Blunck 44707fdf59 d_path: Use struct path in struct avc_audit_data
audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code.  To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-14 21:17:08 -08:00
Jan Blunck 4ac9137858 Embed a struct path into struct nameidata instead of nd->{dentry,mnt}
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.

Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
  <dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
  struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:

without patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5321639  858418  715768 6895825  6938d1 vmlinux

with patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5320026  858418  715768 6894212  693284 vmlinux

This patch:

Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-14 21:13:33 -08:00
Ahmed S. Darwish 2e1d146a19 Smack: check for 'struct socket' with NULL sk
There's a small problem with smack and NFS. A similar report was also
sent here: http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/27/85

I've also added similar checks in inode_{get/set}security().  Cheating from
SELinux post_create_socket(), it does the same.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove uneeded BUG_ON()]
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schuafler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-13 16:21:20 -08:00
Stephen Smalley b68e418c44 selinux: support 64-bit capabilities
Fix SELinux to handle 64-bit capabilities correctly, and to catch
future extensions of capabilities beyond 64 bits to ensure that SELinux
is properly updated.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-02-11 20:30:02 +11:00
David Howells e231c2ee64 Convert ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(p)) instances to ERR_CAST(p)
Convert instances of ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(p)) to ERR_CAST(p) using:

perl -spi -e 's/ERR_PTR[(]PTR_ERR[(](.*)[)][)]/ERR_CAST(\1)/' `grep -rl 'ERR_PTR[(]*PTR_ERR' fs crypto net security`

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-07 08:42:26 -08:00
Paul Moore 394c675397 SELinux: Remove security_get_policycaps()
The security_get_policycaps() functions has a couple of bugs in it and it
isn't currently used by any in-tree code, so get rid of it and all of it's
bugginess.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>
2008-02-06 21:40:59 +08:00
Eric Paris a5ecbcb8c1 security: allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection
Since it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn't
be turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to
set a default at compile time.  This value is still tunable after boot
in /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr

Discussion:
http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.html

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-02-06 21:39:46 +08:00
Casey Schaufler e114e47377 Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.

Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.

Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.

The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on

    http://www.schaufler-ca.com

Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.

Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".

A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.

Smack defines and uses these labels:

    "*" - pronounced "star"
    "_" - pronounced "floor"
    "^" - pronounced "hat"
    "?" - pronounced "huh"

The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:

1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
   is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
   is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
   label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
   rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.

Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.

Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.

Some practical use cases:

Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:

   C        Unclass rx
   S        C       rx
   S        Unclass rx
   TS       S       rx
   TS       C       rx
   TS       Unclass rx

A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.

Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.

A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:

A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:

    ESPN    ABC   r
    ABC     ESPN  r

On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.

Another case that I especially like:

    SatData Guard   w
    Guard   Publish w

A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.

The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 09:44:20 -08:00
Serge E. Hallyn 3b7391de67 capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set
The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow.
 Currently cap_bset is per-system.  It can be manipulated through sysctl,
but only init can add capabilities.  Root can remove capabilities.  By
default it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP.

This patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are
enabled.  It is inherited at fork from parent.  Noone can add elements,
CAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them.

One example use of this is to start a safer container.  For instance, until
device namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is
best to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container.

The bounding set will not affect pP and pE immediately.  It will only
affect pP' and pE' after subsequent exec()s.  It also does not affect pI,
and exec() does not constrain pI'.  So to really start a shell with no way
of regain CAP_MKNOD, you would do

	prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_MKNOD);
	cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();
	cap_value_t caparray[1];
	caparray[0] = CAP_MKNOD;
	cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_DROP);
	cap_set_proc(cap);
	cap_free(cap);

The following test program will get and set the bounding
set (but not pI).  For instance

	./bset get
		(lists capabilities in bset)
	./bset drop cap_net_raw
		(starts shell with new bset)
		(use capset, setuid binary, or binary with
		file capabilities to try to increase caps)

************************************************************
cap_bound.c
************************************************************
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>

 #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ
 #define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
 #endif

 #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
 #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
 #endif

int usage(char *me)
{
	printf("Usage: %s get\n", me);
	printf("       %s drop <capability>\n", me);
	return 1;
}

 #define numcaps 32
char *captable[numcaps] = {
	"cap_chown",
	"cap_dac_override",
	"cap_dac_read_search",
	"cap_fowner",
	"cap_fsetid",
	"cap_kill",
	"cap_setgid",
	"cap_setuid",
	"cap_setpcap",
	"cap_linux_immutable",
	"cap_net_bind_service",
	"cap_net_broadcast",
	"cap_net_admin",
	"cap_net_raw",
	"cap_ipc_lock",
	"cap_ipc_owner",
	"cap_sys_module",
	"cap_sys_rawio",
	"cap_sys_chroot",
	"cap_sys_ptrace",
	"cap_sys_pacct",
	"cap_sys_admin",
	"cap_sys_boot",
	"cap_sys_nice",
	"cap_sys_resource",
	"cap_sys_time",
	"cap_sys_tty_config",
	"cap_mknod",
	"cap_lease",
	"cap_audit_write",
	"cap_audit_control",
	"cap_setfcap"
};

int getbcap(void)
{
	int comma=0;
	unsigned long i;
	int ret;

	printf("i know of %d capabilities\n", numcaps);
	printf("capability bounding set:");
	for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
		ret = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i);
		if (ret < 0)
			perror("prctl");
		else if (ret==1)
			printf("%s%s", (comma++) ? ", " : " ", captable[i]);
	}
	printf("\n");
	return 0;
}

int capdrop(char *str)
{
	unsigned long i;

	int found=0;
	for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
		if (strcmp(captable[i], str) == 0) {
			found=1;
			break;
		}
	}
	if (!found)
		return 1;
	if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) {
		perror("prctl");
		return 1;
	}
	return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	if (argc<2)
		return usage(argv[0]);
	if (strcmp(argv[1], "get")==0)
		return getbcap();
	if (strcmp(argv[1], "drop")!=0 || argc<3)
		return usage(argv[0]);
	if (capdrop(argv[2])) {
		printf("unknown capability\n");
		return 1;
	}
	return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
}
************************************************************

[serue@us.ibm.com: fix typo]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>a
Signed-off-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 09:44:20 -08:00
Andrew Morgan e338d263a7 Add 64-bit capability support to the kernel
The patch supports legacy (32-bit) capability userspace, and where possible
translates 32-bit capabilities to/from userspace and the VFS to 64-bit
kernel space capabilities.  If a capability set cannot be compressed into
32-bits for consumption by user space, the system call fails, with -ERANGE.

FWIW libcap-2.00 supports this change (and earlier capability formats)

 http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-syle fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_task_comm()]
[ezk@cs.sunysb.edu: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unused var]
[serue@us.ibm.com: export __cap_ symbols]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 09:44:20 -08:00
Andrew Morton 8f6936f4d2 revert "capabilities: clean up file capability reading"
Revert b68680e473 to make way for the next
patch: "Add 64-bit capability support to the kernel".

We want to keep the vfs_cap_data.data[] structure, using two 'data's for
64-bit caps (and later three for 96-bit caps), whereas
b68680e473 had gotten rid of the 'data' struct
made its members inline.

The 64-bit caps patch keeps the stack abuse fix at get_file_caps(), which was
the more important part of that patch.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 09:44:20 -08:00
David P. Quigley 4249259404 VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting buffer
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.

Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook.  This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.

The patch also removed the unused err parameter.  The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 09:44:20 -08:00
Eric Paris 4746ec5b01 [AUDIT] add session id to audit messages
In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session
id.  This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in
almost all messages which currently output the auid.  The field is
labeled ses=  or oses=

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2008-02-01 14:06:51 -05:00
Al Viro 0c11b9428f [PATCH] switch audit_get_loginuid() to task_struct *
all callers pass something->audit_context

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-02-01 14:04:59 -05:00
Paul Moore e1770d97a7 [SELinux]: Fix double free in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid()
As pointed out by Adrian Bunk, commit
45c950e0f8 ("fix memory leak in netlabel
code") caused a double-free when security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()
fails.  This patch fixes this by removing the netlbl_secattr_destroy()
call from that function since we are already releasing the secattr
memory in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid().

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-31 19:27:04 -08:00
sergeh@us.ibm.com f71ea9ddf0 security: compile capabilities by default
Capabilities have long been the default when CONFIG_SECURITY=n,
and its help text suggests turning it on when CONFIG_SECURITY=y.
But it is set to default n.

Default it to y instead.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Matt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:18:21 +11:00
Adrian Bunk 374ea019ca selinux: make selinux_set_mnt_opts() static
selinux_set_mnt_opts() can become static.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:44 +11:00
Paul Moore 71f1cb05f7 SELinux: Add warning messages on network denial due to error
Currently network traffic can be sliently dropped due to non-avc errors which
can lead to much confusion when trying to debug the problem.  This patch adds
warning messages so that when these events occur there is a user visible
notification.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:30 +11:00
Paul Moore effad8df44 SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks
This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which allow
SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6 packets into
and out of the system.  Currently SELinux does not have proper control over
forwarded packets and this patch corrects this problem.

Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> whose earlier
work on this topic eventually led to this patch.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:30 +11:00
Paul Moore 5dbe1eb0cf SELinux: Allow NetLabel to directly cache SIDs
Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:27 +11:00
Paul Moore d621d35e57 SELinux: Enable dynamic enable/disable of the network access checks
This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK
are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each
subsystem.  In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry
is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and when the
entry is removed it is decreased.  In the case of SECMARK, when a SECMARK
target is created the reference count is increased and later decreased when the
target is removed.  These reference counters allow SELinux to quickly determine
if either of these subsystems are enabled.

NetLabel already has a similar mechanism which provides the netlbl_enabled()
function.

This patch also renames the selinux_relabel_packet_permission() function to
selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission() as the original name and
description were misleading in that they referenced a single packet label which
is not the case.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:26 +11:00
Paul Moore 220deb966e SELinux: Better integration between peer labeling subsystems
Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together.  This includes moving both subsystems to a
single "peer" object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer labels.
As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily
modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as
possible.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:25 +11:00
Paul Moore f67f4f315f SELinux: Add a new peer class and permissions to the Flask definitions
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new "peer" object class and
additional permissions to the netif, node, and packet object classes.  Also,
bring the kernel Flask definitions up to date with the Fedora SELinux policies
by adding the "flow_in" and "flow_out" permissions to the "packet" class.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:24 +11:00
Paul Moore 3bb56b25db SELinux: Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22.  This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:23 +11:00
Paul Moore 224dfbd81e SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions
This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
also modified to take advantage of this new functionality.  In addition, remove
the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
redundant since we already have the address family.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:23 +11:00
Paul Moore da5645a28a SELinux: Only store the network interface's ifindex
Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex.  This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:22 +11:00
Paul Moore e8bfdb9d0d SELinux: Convert the netif code to use ifindex values
The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device
struct pointer to lookup network interface information.  However, we don't
always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use
the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff.  This patch also
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is "dead code".

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:21 +11:00
Paul Moore 75e22910cf NetLabel: Add IP address family information to the netlbl_skbuff_getattr() function
In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:20 +11:00
Paul Moore 16efd45435 NetLabel: Add secid token support to the NetLabel secattr struct
This patch adds support to the NetLabel LSM secattr struct for a secid token
and a type field, paving the way for full LSM/SELinux context support and
"static" or "fallback" labels.  In addition, this patch adds a fair amount
of documentation to the core NetLabel structures used as part of the
NetLabel kernel API.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-30 08:17:19 +11:00
Patrick McHardy 6e23ae2a48 [NETFILTER]: Introduce NF_INET_ hook values
The IPv4 and IPv6 hook values are identical, yet some code tries to figure
out the "correct" value by looking at the address family. Introduce NF_INET_*
values for both IPv4 and IPv6. The old values are kept in a #ifndef __KERNEL__
section for userspace compatibility.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-28 14:53:55 -08:00
Stephen Smalley b1aa5301b9 selinux: fix labeling of /proc/net inodes
The proc net rewrite had a side effect on selinux, leading it to mislabel
the /proc/net inodes, thereby leading to incorrect denials.  Fix
security_genfs_sid to ignore extra leading / characters in the path supplied
by selinux_proc_get_sid since we now get "//net/..." rather than "/net/...".

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-26 12:16:16 +11:00
Linus Torvalds b47711bfbc Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  selinux: make mls_compute_sid always polyinstantiate
  security/selinux: constify function pointer tables and fields
  security: add a secctx_to_secid() hook
  security: call security_file_permission from rw_verify_area
  security: remove security_sb_post_mountroot hook
  Security: remove security.h include from mm.h
  Security: remove security_file_mmap hook sparse-warnings (NULL as 0).
  Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information
  security/selinux: Add missing "space"
2008-01-25 08:44:29 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 78a2d906b4 Kobject: convert remaining kobject_unregister() to kobject_put()
There is no need for kobject_unregister() anymore, thanks to Kay's
kobject cleanup changes, so replace all instances of it with
kobject_put().


Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-01-24 20:40:40 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 0ff21e4663 kobject: convert kernel_kset to be a kobject
kernel_kset does not need to be a kset, but a much simpler kobject now
that we have kobj_attributes.

We also rename kernel_kset to kernel_kobj to catch all users of this
symbol with a build error instead of an easy-to-ignore build warning.

Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-01-24 20:40:24 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman bd35b93d80 kset: convert kernel_subsys to use kset_create
Dynamically create the kset instead of declaring it statically.  We also
rename kernel_subsys to kernel_kset to catch all users of this symbol
with a build error instead of an easy-to-ignore build warning.

Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-01-24 20:40:14 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 69d8e13895 kobject: convert securityfs to use kobject_create
We don't need a kset here, a simple kobject will do just fine, so
dynamically create the kobject and use it.

Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-01-24 20:40:11 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 3514faca19 kobject: remove struct kobj_type from struct kset
We don't need a "default" ktype for a kset.  We should set this
explicitly every time for each kset.  This change is needed so that we
can make ksets dynamic, and cleans up one of the odd, undocumented
assumption that the kset/kobject/ktype model has.

This patch is based on a lot of help from Kay Sievers.

Nasty bug in the block code was found by Dave Young
<hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>

Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-01-24 20:40:10 -08:00
Eamon Walsh 2e08c0c1c3 selinux: make mls_compute_sid always polyinstantiate
This patch removes the requirement that the new and related object types
differ in order to polyinstantiate by MLS level.  This allows MLS
polyinstantiation to occur in the absence of explicit type_member rules or
when the type has not changed.

Potential users of this support include pam_namespace.so (directory
polyinstantiation) and the SELinux X support (property polyinstantiation).

Signed-off-by: Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-25 11:29:56 +11:00
Jan Engelhardt 1996a10948 security/selinux: constify function pointer tables and fields
Constify function pointer tables and fields.

Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@computergmbh.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-25 11:29:54 +11:00
David Howells 63cb344923 security: add a secctx_to_secid() hook
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook.  This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-25 11:29:53 +11:00
H. Peter Anvin bced95283e security: remove security_sb_post_mountroot hook
The security_sb_post_mountroot() hook is long-since obsolete, and is
fundamentally broken: it is never invoked if someone uses initramfs.
This is particularly damaging, because the existence of this hook has
been used as motivation for not using initramfs.

Stephen Smalley confirmed on 2007-07-19 that this hook was originally
used by SELinux but can now be safely removed:

     http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118485683612916&w=2

Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-25 11:29:50 +11:00
Eric Paris c9180a57a9 Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information
Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux.  This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose.  This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.

Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has.  I assume
future LSM's would do the same.  NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.

An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=.  If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.

An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM.  This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-25 11:29:46 +11:00
Joe Perches 19c5fc198c security/selinux: Add missing "space"
Add missing space.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-25 11:29:44 +11:00
Linus Torvalds 8b85eaadd5 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  selinux: fix memory leak in netlabel code
2008-01-21 19:45:49 -08:00
Andrew G. Morgan a6dbb1ef2f Fix filesystem capability support
In linux-2.6.24-rc1, security/commoncap.c:cap_inh_is_capped() was
introduced. It has the exact reverse of its intended behavior. This
led to an unintended privilege esculation involving a process'
inheritable capability set.

To be exposed to this bug, you need to have Filesystem Capabilities
enabled and in use. That is:

- CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES must be defined for the buggy code
  to be compiled in.

- You also need to have files on your system marked with fI bits raised.

Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2008-01-21 19:39:41 -08:00
Paul Moore 45c950e0f8 selinux: fix memory leak in netlabel code
Fix a memory leak in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() as reported here:
 * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=352281

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-22 09:31:00 +11:00
Eric Paris ab5a91a836 Security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space
On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
lower than mmap_min_addr.  Based on a suggestion from a developer in the
openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  It is
assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot
more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to
get the kernel to trip over itself.  It also means that programs like X
on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-12-06 00:24:30 +11:00
Stephen Smalley d313f94830 SELinux: detect dead booleans
Instead of using f_op to detect dead booleans, check the inode index
against the number of booleans and check the dentry name against the
boolean name for that index on reads and writes.  This prevents
incorrect use of a boolean file opened prior to a policy reload while
allowing valid use of it as long as it still corresponds to the same
boolean in the policy.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-12-06 00:24:09 +11:00
Stephen Smalley 0955dc03ae SELinux: do not clear f_op when removing entries
Do not clear f_op when removing entries since it isn't safe to do.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-12-06 00:23:46 +11:00
Serge E. Hallyn 8ec2328f11 file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs
An unprivileged process must be able to kill a setuid root program started
by the same user.  This is legacy behavior needed for instance for xinit to
kill X when the window manager exits.

When an unprivileged user runs a setuid root program in !SECURE_NOROOT
mode, fP, fI, and fE are set full on, so pP' and pE' are full on.  Then
cap_task_kill() prevents the user from signaling the setuid root task.
This is a change in behavior compared to when
!CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES.

This patch introduces a special check into cap_task_kill() just to check
whether a non-root user is signaling a setuid root program started by the
same user.  If so, then signal is allowed.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-29 09:24:53 -08:00
Serge E. Hallyn 91ad997a34 file capabilities: allow sigcont within session
Fix http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9247

Allow sigcont to be sent to a process with greater capabilities if it is in
the same session.  Otherwise, a shell from which I've started a root shell
and done 'suspend' can't be restarted by the parent shell.

Also don't do file-capabilities signaling checks when uids for the
processes don't match, since the standard check_kill_permission will have
done those checks.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Tested-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-14 18:45:44 -08:00
Stephen Smalley 45e5421eb5 SELinux: add more validity checks on policy load
Add more validity checks at policy load time to reject malformed
policies and prevent subsequent out-of-range indexing when in permissive
mode.  Resolves the NULL pointer dereference reported in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=357541.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-08 08:56:23 +11:00
KaiGai Kohei 6d2b685564 SELinux: fix bug in new ebitmap code.
The "e_iter = e_iter->next;" statement in the inner for loop is primally
bug.  It should be moved to outside of the for loop.

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-08 08:55:10 +11:00
Stephen Rothwell 57002bfb31 SELinux: suppress a warning for 64k pages.
On PowerPC allmodconfig build we get this:

security/selinux/xfrm.c:214: warning: comparison is always false due to limited range of data type

Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-08 08:55:04 +11:00
Linus Torvalds 48d2268473 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  SELinux: always check SIGCHLD in selinux_task_wait
2007-10-23 08:59:46 -07:00
Eric Paris 8a53514043 SELinux: always check SIGCHLD in selinux_task_wait
When checking if we can wait on a child we were looking at
p->exit_signal and trying to make the decision based on if the signal
would eventually be allowed.  One big flaw is that p->exit_signal is -1
for NPTL threads and so aignal_to_av was not actually checking SIGCHLD
which is what would have been sent.  Even is exit_signal was set to
something strange it wouldn't change the fact that the child was there
and needed to be waited on.  This patch just assumes wait is based on
SIGCHLD.  Specific permission checks are made when the child actually
attempts to send a signal.

This resolves the problem of things like using GDB on confined domains
such as in RH BZ 232371.  The confined domain did not have permission to
send a generic signal (exit_signal == -1) back to the unconfined GDB.
With this patch the GDB wait works and since the actual signal sent is
allowed everything functions as it should.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-10-23 08:47:48 +10:00
Serge E. Hallyn b68680e473 capabilities: clean up file capability reading
Simplify the vfs_cap_data structure.

Also fix get_file_caps which was declaring
__le32 v1caps[XATTR_CAPS_SZ] on the stack, but
XATTR_CAPS_SZ is already * sizeof(__le32).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-22 08:13:18 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn b460cbc581 pid namespaces: define is_global_init() and is_container_init()
is_init() is an ambiguous name for the pid==1 check.  Split it into
is_global_init() and is_container_init().

A cgroup init has it's tsk->pid == 1.

A global init also has it's tsk->pid == 1 and it's active pid namespace
is the init_pid_ns.  But rather than check the active pid namespace,
compare the task structure with 'init_pid_ns.child_reaper', which is
initialized during boot to the /sbin/init process and never changes.

Changelog:

	2.6.22-rc4-mm2-pidns1:
	- Use 'init_pid_ns.child_reaper' to determine if a given task is the
	  global init (/sbin/init) process. This would improve performance
	  and remove dependence on the task_pid().

	2.6.21-mm2-pidns2:

	- [Sukadev Bhattiprolu] Changed is_container_init() calls in {powerpc,
	  ppc,avr32}/traps.c for the _exception() call to is_global_init().
	  This way, we kill only the cgroup if the cgroup's init has a
	  bug rather than force a kernel panic.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment]
[sukadev@us.ibm.com: Use is_global_init() in arch/m32r/mm/fault.c]
[bunk@stusta.de: kernel/pid.c: remove unused exports]
[sukadev@us.ibm.com: Fix capability.c to work with threaded init]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Poetzel <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 11:53:37 -07:00
Stephen Hemminger c80544dc0b sparse pointer use of zero as null
Get rid of sparse related warnings from places that use integer as NULL
pointer.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-18 14:37:31 -07:00
Andrew Morgan 72c2d5823f V3 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap
The non-filesystem capability meaning of CAP_SETPCAP is that a process, p1,
can change the capabilities of another process, p2.  This is not the
meaning that was intended for this capability at all, and this
implementation came about purely because, without filesystem capabilities,
there was no way to use capabilities without one process bestowing them on
another.

Since we now have a filesystem support for capabilities we can fix the
implementation of CAP_SETPCAP.

The most significant thing about this change is that, with it in effect, no
process can set the capabilities of another process.

The capabilities of a program are set via the capability convolution
rules:

   pI(post-exec) = pI(pre-exec)
   pP(post-exec) = (X(aka cap_bset) & fP) | (pI(post-exec) & fI)
   pE(post-exec) = fE ? pP(post-exec) : 0

at exec() time.  As such, the only influence the pre-exec() program can
have on the post-exec() program's capabilities are through the pI
capability set.

The correct implementation for CAP_SETPCAP (and that enabled by this patch)
is that it can be used to add extra pI capabilities to the current process
- to be picked up by subsequent exec()s when the above convolution rules
are applied.

Here is how it works:

Let's say we have a process, p. It has capability sets, pE, pP and pI.
Generally, p, can change the value of its own pI to pI' where

   (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP = 0.

That is, the only new things in pI' that were not present in pI need to
be present in pP.

The role of CAP_SETPCAP is basically to permit changes to pI beyond
the above:

   if (pE & CAP_SETPCAP) {
      pI' = anything; /* ie., even (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP != 0  */
   }

This capability is useful for things like login, which (say, via
pam_cap) might want to raise certain inheritable capabilities for use
by the children of the logged-in user's shell, but those capabilities
are not useful to or needed by the login program itself.

One such use might be to limit who can run ping. You set the
capabilities of the 'ping' program to be "= cap_net_raw+i", and then
only shells that have (pI & CAP_NET_RAW) will be able to run
it. Without CAP_SETPCAP implemented as described above, login(pam_cap)
would have to also have (pP & CAP_NET_RAW) in order to raise this
capability and pass it on through the inheritable set.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-18 14:37:24 -07:00
Adrian Bunk cbfee34520 security/ cleanups
This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:
- remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix
- remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security
- remove some no longer required exit code
- remove a bunch of no longer used exports

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn b53767719b Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities.  This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.

This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php.  For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

Changelog:
	Nov 27:
	Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
	(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
	security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
	Fix Kconfig dependency.
	Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.

	Nov 13:
	Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
	capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.

	Nov 13:
	Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
	Dobriyan.

	Nov 09:
	Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
	when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
	up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
	function.

	Nov 08:
	For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
	them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

	Nov 07:
	Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
	check_cap_sanity().

	Nov 07:
	Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
	capabilities are the default.
	Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
	Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
	audit messages.

	Nov 05:
	Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
	task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
	cap support can be stacked.

	Sep 05:
	As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
	for capability code.

	Sep 01:
	Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
	task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
	they called a program with some fscaps.

	One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
	ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
	cpuset?

	It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
	allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check.  But since
	it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
	CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
	fixing it might be tough.

	     task_setscheduler
		 note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task.  Are we ok with
		     CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
	     task_setioprio
	     task_setnice
		 sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
		 process.  Need same checks as setrlimit

	Aug 21:
	Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
	euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
	might still have elevated caps.

	Aug 15:
	Handle endianness of xattrs.
	Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
	Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
	set, else return -EPERM.
	With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
	doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
	d_instantiate.

	Aug 10:
	Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
	caching it at d_instantiate.

[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
James Morris 20510f2f4e security: Convert LSM into a static interface
Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
overall security architecture.

Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
abuse.

Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
at boot.

The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.

In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM.  The modular interface
is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure.  It is used only by out-of-tree
modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
dangerous, e.g.  silently re-vectoring SELinux.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
David Howells 76181c134f KEYS: Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous
Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous to make it easier for
NFS to make use of them.  There are now accessor functions that do
asynchronous constructions, a wait function to wait for construction to
complete, and a completion function for the key type to indicate completion
of construction.

Note that the construction queue is now gone.  Instead, keys under
construction are linked in to the appropriate keyring in advance, and that
anyone encountering one must wait for it to be complete before they can use
it.  This is done automatically for userspace.

The following auxiliary changes are also made:

 (1) Key type implementation stuff is split from linux/key.h into
     linux/key-type.h.

 (2) AF_RXRPC provides a way to allocate null rxrpc-type keys so that AFS does
     not need to call key_instantiate_and_link() directly.

 (3) Adjust the debugging macros so that they're -Wformat checked even if
     they are disabled, and make it so they can be enabled simply by defining
     __KDEBUG to be consistent with other code of mine.

 (3) Documentation.

[alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk: keys: missing word in documentation]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 08:42:57 -07:00
KaiGai Kohei 087feb9804 SELinux: kills warnings in Improve SELinux performance when AVC misses
This patch kills ugly warnings when the "Improve SELinux performance
when ACV misses" patch.

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-10-17 08:59:36 +10:00
KaiGai Kohei 9fe79ad1e4 SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses.
* We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on
  any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance
  using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h.
  In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination
  of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse
  in performance aspect.
  This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry,
  so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen.
* struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get
  suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of
  shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated
  from general purpose slab.
* Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation
  in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are
  changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous
  version.
* The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars.

The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we
access many files which have different security context one after
another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so
any access always causes AVC misses.

      selinux-2.6      selinux-2.6-ebitmap
AVG:   22.763 [s]          8.750 [s]
STD:    0.265              0.019
------------------------------------------
1st:   22.558 [s]          8.786 [s]
2nd:   22.458 [s]          8.750 [s]
3rd:   22.478 [s]          8.754 [s]
4th:   22.724 [s]          8.745 [s]
5th:   22.918 [s]          8.748 [s]
6th:   22.905 [s]          8.764 [s]
7th:   23.238 [s]          8.726 [s]
8th:   22.822 [s]          8.729 [s]

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-10-17 08:59:34 +10:00
Eric Paris 3f12070e27 SELinux: policy selectable handling of unknown classes and perms
Allow policy to select, in much the same way as it selects MLS support, how
the kernel should handle access decisions which contain either unknown
classes or unknown permissions in known classes.  The three choices for the
policy flags are

0 - Deny unknown security access. (default)
2 - reject loading policy if it does not contain all definitions
4 - allow unknown security access

The policy's choice is exported through 2 booleans in
selinuxfs.  /selinux/deny_unknown and /selinux/reject_unknown.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-10-17 08:59:33 +10:00
Yuichi Nakamura 788e7dd4c2 SELinux: Improve read/write performance
It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check.  A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.

(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)

Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-10-17 08:59:31 +10:00
Yuichi Nakamura 3232c110b5 SELinux: tune avtab to reduce memory usage
This patch reduces memory usage of SELinux by tuning avtab. Number of hash
slots in avtab was 32768. Unused slots used memory when number of rules is
fewer. This patch decides number of hash slots dynamically based on number
of rules. (chain length)^2 is also printed out in avtab_hash_eval to see
standard deviation of avtab hash table.

Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-10-17 08:59:30 +10:00
David S. Miller a224be766b [SELINUX]: Update for netfilter ->hook() arg changes.
They take a "struct sk_buff *" instead of a "struct sk_buff **" now.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-15 12:26:44 -07:00
Stephen Hemminger 227b60f510 [INET]: local port range robustness
Expansion of original idea from Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>

Add robustness and locking to the local_port_range sysctl.
1. Enforce that low < high when setting.
2. Use seqlock to ensure atomic update.

The locking might seem like overkill, but there are
cases where sysadmin might want to change value in the
middle of a DoS attack.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 17:30:46 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman b4b510290b [NET]: Support multiple network namespaces with netlink
Each netlink socket will live in exactly one network namespace,
this includes the controlling kernel sockets.

This patch updates all of the existing netlink protocols
to only support the initial network namespace.  Request
by clients in other namespaces will get -ECONREFUSED.
As they would if the kernel did not have the support for
that netlink protocol compiled in.

As each netlink protocol is updated to be multiple network
namespace safe it can register multiple kernel sockets
to acquire a presence in the rest of the network namespaces.

The implementation in af_netlink is a simple filter implementation
at hash table insertion and hash table look up time.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 16:49:09 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman e9dc865340 [NET]: Make device event notification network namespace safe
Every user of the network device notifiers is either a protocol
stack or a pseudo device.  If a protocol stack that does not have
support for multiple network namespaces receives an event for a
device that is not in the initial network namespace it quite possibly
can get confused and do the wrong thing.

To avoid problems until all of the protocol stacks are converted
this patch modifies all netdev event handlers to ignore events on
devices that are not in the initial network namespace.

As the rest of the code is made network namespace aware these
checks can be removed.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 16:49:09 -07:00
Eric Paris 31e8793094 SELinux: fix array out of bounds when mounting with selinux options
Given an illegal selinux option it was possible for match_token to work in
random memory at the end of the match_table_t array.

Note that privilege is required to perform a context mount, so this issue is
effectively limited to root only.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-09-20 08:06:40 +10:00
Stephen Smalley 4ac212ad4e SELinux: clear parent death signal on SID transitions
Clear parent death signal on SID transitions to prevent unauthorized
signaling between SIDs.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>
2007-08-30 20:22:47 -04:00
Alan Cox 34b4e4aa3c fix NULL pointer dereference in __vm_enough_memory()
The new exec code inserts an accounted vma into an mm struct which is not
current->mm.  The existing memory check code has a hard coded assumption
that this does not happen as does the security code.

As the correct mm is known we pass the mm to the security method and the
helper function.  A new security test is added for the case where we need
to pass the mm and the existing one is modified to pass current->mm to
avoid the need to change large amounts of code.

(Thanks to Tobias for fixing rejects and testing)

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: WU Fengguang <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Cc: Tobias Diedrich <ranma+kernel@tdiedrich.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-08-22 19:52:45 -07:00
Steve G 3ad40d647d SELinux: correct error code in selinux_audit_rule_init
Corrects an error code so that it is valid to pass to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <linux_4ever@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@halo.namei>
2007-08-16 11:42:28 -04:00
Paul Moore 088999e98b SELinux: remove redundant pointer checks before calling kfree()
We don't need to check for NULL pointers before calling kfree().

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-08-02 11:52:23 -04:00
Paul Moore 9534f71ca3 SELinux: restore proper NetLabel caching behavior
A small fix to the SELinux/NetLabel glue code to ensure that the NetLabel
cache is utilized when possible.  This was broken when the SELinux/NetLabel
glue code was reorganized in the last kernel release.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-08-02 11:52:21 -04:00
Gabriel Craciunescu d133a9609e Typo fixes errror -> error
Typo fixes errror -> error

Signed-off-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@googlemail.com>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-31 15:39:42 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala 910949a668 SELinux: null-terminate context string in selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc
xfrm_audit_log() expects the context string to be null-terminated
which currently doesn't happen with user-supplied contexts.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-25 12:49:41 -04:00
Jesper Juhl 0ec8abd708 SELinux: fix memory leak in security_netlbl_cache_add()
Fix memory leak in security_netlbl_cache_add()
Note: The Coverity checker gets credit for spotting this one.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2007-07-23 09:35:37 -04:00
Al Viro 4259fa01a2 [PATCH] get rid of AVC_PATH postponed treatment
Selinux folks had been complaining about the lack of AVC_PATH
records when audit is disabled.  I must admit my stupidity - I assumed
that avc_audit() really couldn't use audit_log_d_path() because of
deadlocks (== could be called with dcache_lock or vfsmount_lock held).
Shouldn't have made that assumption - it never gets called that way.
It _is_ called under spinlocks, but not those.

        Since audit_log_d_path() uses ab->gfp_mask for allocations,
kmalloc() in there is not a problem.  IOW, the simple fix is sufficient:
let's rip AUDIT_AVC_PATH out and simply generate pathname as part of main
record.  It's trivial to do.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-22 09:57:02 -04:00
Paul Mundt 20c2df83d2 mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create().
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f22 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.

This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).

Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2007-07-20 10:11:58 +09:00
Linus Torvalds 721e2629fa Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel
  SELinux: enable dynamic activation/deactivation of NetLabel/SELinux enforcement
2007-07-19 14:42:40 -07:00
Kawai, Hidehiro 6c5d523826 coredump masking: reimplementation of dumpable using two flags
This patch changes mm_struct.dumpable to a pair of bit flags.

set_dumpable() converts three-value dumpable to two flags and stores it into
lower two bits of mm_struct.flags instead of mm_struct.dumpable.
get_dumpable() behaves in the opposite way.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export set_dumpable]
Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-19 10:04:46 -07:00
Paul Moore f36158c410 SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel
These changes will make NetLabel behave like labeled IPsec where there is an
access check for both labeled and unlabeled packets as well as providing the
ability to restrict domains to receiving only labeled packets when NetLabel is
in use.  The changes to the policy are straight forward with the following
necessary to receive labeled traffic (with SECINITSID_NETMSG defined as
"netlabel_peer_t"):

 allow mydom_t netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;

The policy for unlabeled traffic would be:

 allow mydom_t unlabeled_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;

These policy changes, as well as more general NetLabel support, are included in
the latest SELinux Reference Policy release 20070629 or later.  Users who make
use of NetLabel are strongly encouraged to upgrade their policy to avoid
network problems.  Users who do not make use of NetLabel will not notice any
difference.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-19 10:21:13 -04:00
Paul Moore 23bcdc1ade SELinux: enable dynamic activation/deactivation of NetLabel/SELinux enforcement
Create a new NetLabel KAPI interface, netlbl_enabled(), which reports on the
current runtime status of NetLabel based on the existing configuration.  LSMs
that make use of NetLabel, i.e. SELinux, can use this new function to determine
if they should perform NetLabel access checks.  This patch changes the
NetLabel/SELinux glue code such that SELinux only enforces NetLabel related
access checks when netlbl_enabled() returns true.

At present NetLabel is considered to be enabled when there is at least one
labeled protocol configuration present.  The result is that by default NetLabel
is considered to be disabled, however, as soon as an administrator configured
a CIPSO DOI definition NetLabel is enabled and SELinux starts enforcing
NetLabel related access controls - including unlabeled packet controls.

This patch also tries to consolidate the multiple "#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL"
blocks into a single block to ease future review as recommended by Linus.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-19 10:21:11 -04:00
Jeremy Fitzhardinge 86313c488a usermodehelper: Tidy up waiting
Rather than using a tri-state integer for the wait flag in
call_usermodehelper_exec, define a proper enum, and use that.  I've
preserved the integer values so that any callers I've missed should
still work OK.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bjorn.helgaas@hp.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2007-07-18 08:47:40 -07:00
Satyam Sharma 3bd858ab1c Introduce is_owner_or_cap() to wrap CAP_FOWNER use with fsuid check
Introduce is_owner_or_cap() macro in fs.h, and convert over relevant
users to it. This is done because we want to avoid bugs in the future
where we check for only effective fsuid of the current task against a
file's owning uid, without simultaneously checking for CAP_FOWNER as
well, thus violating its semantics.
[ XFS uses special macros and structures, and in general looked ...
untouchable, so we leave it alone -- but it has been looked over. ]

The (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) check in generic_permission() and
exec_permission_lite() is left alone, because those operations are
covered by CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. Similarly operations
falling under the purview of CAP_CHOWN and CAP_LEASE are also left alone.

Signed-off-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-17 12:00:03 -07:00
Miloslav Trmac 522ed7767e Audit: add TTY input auditing
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions.  This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons.  These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.

Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g.  the console ioctls still
work).

TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.

Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork ().  Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).

Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g.  for sshd restarted within an audited session.  To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g.  after daemon startup) opens a TTY.

See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 09:05:47 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 8d9107e8c5 Revert "SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel"
This reverts commit 9faf65fb6e.

It bit people like Michal Piotrowski:

  "My system is too secure, I can not login :)"

because it changed how CONFIG_NETLABEL worked, and broke older SElinux
policies.

As a result, quoth James Morris:

  "Can you please revert this patch?

   We thought it only affected people running MLS, but it will affect others.

   Sorry for the hassle."

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Michal Piotrowski <michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-13 16:53:18 -07:00
Adrian Bunk d4cf291526 security: unexport mmap_min_addr
Remove unneeded export.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:33 -04:00
Paul Moore 9faf65fb6e SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel
These changes will make NetLabel behave like labeled IPsec where there is an
access check for both labeled and unlabeled packets as well as providing the
ability to restrict domains to receiving only labeled packets when NetLabel
is in use.  The changes to the policy are straight forward with the
following necessary to receive labeled traffic (with SECINITSID_NETMSG
defined as "netlabel_peer_t"):

 allow mydom_t netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;

The policy for unlabeled traffic would be:

 allow mydom_t unlabeled_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;

These policy changes, as well as more general NetLabel support, are included
in the SELinux Reference Policy SVN tree, r2352 or later.  Users who enable
NetLabel support in the kernel are strongly encouraged to upgrade their
policy to avoid network problems.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:31 -04:00
Eric Paris ed03218951 security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap
Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting
to mmap to low area of the address space.  The amount of space protected is
indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to
0, preserving existing behavior.

This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect."  Policy already
contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being
one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its
best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also
want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of
the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other
memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time
we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:29 -04:00
Tobias Oed 13bddc2e9d SELinux: Use %lu for inode->i_no when printing avc
Inode numbers are unsigned long and so need to %lu as format string of printf.

Signed-off-by: Tobias Oed <tobias.oed@octant-fr.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:27 -04:00
Stephen Smalley 2c3c05dbcb SELinux: allow preemption between transition permission checks
In security_get_user_sids, move the transition permission checks
outside of the section holding the policy rdlock, and use the AVC to
perform the checks, calling cond_resched after each one.  These
changes should allow preemption between the individual checks and
enable caching of the results.  It may however increase the overall
time spent in the function in some cases, particularly in the cache
miss case.

The long term fix will be to take much of this logic to userspace by
exporting additional state via selinuxfs, and ultimately deprecating
and eliminating this interface from the kernel.

Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:25 -04:00
Eric Paris 9dc9978084 selinux: introduce schedule points in policydb_destroy()
During the LSPP testing we found that it was possible for
policydb_destroy() to take 10+ seconds of kernel time to complete.
Basically all policydb_destroy() does is walk some (possibly long) lists
and free the memory it finds.  Turning off slab debugging config options
made the problem go away since the actual functions which took most of
the time were (as seen by oprofile)

> 121202   23.9879  .check_poison_obj
> 78247    15.4864  .check_slabp

were caused by that.  So I decided to also add some voluntary schedule
points in that code so config voluntary preempt would be enough to solve
the problem.  Something similar was done in places like
shmem_free_pages() when we have to walk a list of memory and free it.
This was tested by the LSPP group on the hardware which could reproduce
the problem just loading a new policy and was found to not trigger the
softlock detector.  It takes just as much processing time, but the
kernel doesn't spend all that time stuck doing one thing and never
scheduling.

Someday a better way to handle memory might make the time needed in this
function a lot less, but this fixes the current issue as it stands
today.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:23 -04:00
Christopher J. PeBenito e47c8fc582 selinux: add selinuxfs structure for object class discovery
The structure is as follows (relative to selinuxfs root):

/class/file/index
/class/file/perms/read
/class/file/perms/write
...

Each class is allocated 33 inodes, 1 for the class index and 32 for
permissions.  Relative to SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET, the inode of the index file
DIV 33 is the class number.  The inode of the permission file % 33 is the
index of the permission for that class.

Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:20 -04:00
Christopher J. PeBenito 0dd4ae516e selinux: change sel_make_dir() to specify inode counter.
Specify the inode counter explicitly in sel_make_dir(), rather than always
using sel_last_ino.

Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:19 -04:00
Christopher J. PeBenito 0c92d7c73b selinux: rename sel_remove_bools() for more general usage.
sel_remove_bools() will also be used by the object class discovery, rename
it for more general use.

Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:17 -04:00
Christopher J. PeBenito 55fcf09b3f selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy
Add support to the SELinux security server for obtaining a list of classes,
and for obtaining a list of permissions for a specified class.

Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:15 -04:00
Paul Moore ba6ff9f2b5 [NetLabel]: consolidate the struct socket/sock handling to just struct sock
The current NetLabel code has some redundant APIs which allow both
"struct socket" and "struct sock" types to be used; this may have made
sense at some point but it is wasteful now.  Remove the functions that
operate on sockets and convert the callers.  Not only does this make
the code smaller and more consistent but it pushes the locking burden
up to the caller which can be more intelligent about the locks.  Also,
perform the same conversion (socket to sock) on the SELinux/NetLabel
glue code where it make sense.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-06-08 13:33:09 -07:00
David Sterba 3dde6ad8fc Fix trivial typos in Kconfig* files
Fix several typos in help text in Kconfig* files.

Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-05-09 07:12:20 +02:00
Randy Dunlap e63340ae6b header cleaning: don't include smp_lock.h when not used
Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed.
Suggested by Al Viro.

Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,
sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 11:15:07 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 98a27ba485 tty: introduce no_tty and use it in selinux
While researching the tty layer pid leaks I found a weird case in selinux when
we drop a controlling tty because of inadequate permissions we don't do the
normal hangup processing.  Which is a problem if it happens the session leader
has exec'd something that can no longer access the tty.

We already have code in the kernel to handle this case in the form of the
TIOCNOTTY ioctl.  So this patch factors out a helper function that is the
essence of that ioctl and calls it from the selinux code.

This removes the inconsistency in handling dropping of a controlling tty and
who knows it might even make some part of user space happy because it received
a SIGHUP it was expecting.

In addition since this removes the last user of proc_set_tty outside of
tty_io.c proc_set_tty is made static and removed from tty.h

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 11:15:04 -07:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 823bccfc40 remove "struct subsystem" as it is no longer needed
We need to work on cleaning up the relationship between kobjects, ksets and
ktypes.  The removal of 'struct subsystem' is the first step of this,
especially as it is not really needed at all.

Thanks to Kay for fixing the bugs in this patch.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2007-05-02 18:57:59 -07:00
Linus Torvalds a205752d1a Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  selinux: preserve boolean values across policy reloads
  selinux: change numbering of boolean directory inodes in selinuxfs
  selinux: remove unused enumeration constant from selinuxfs
  selinux: explicitly number all selinuxfs inodes
  selinux: export initial SID contexts via selinuxfs
  selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions
  SELinux: move security_skb_extlbl_sid() out of the security server
  MAINTAINERS: update selinux entry
  SELinux: rename selinux_netlabel.h to netlabel.h
  SELinux: extract the NetLabel SELinux support from the security server
  NetLabel: convert a BUG_ON in the CIPSO code to a runtime check
  NetLabel: cleanup and document CIPSO constants
2007-04-27 10:47:29 -07:00
David Howells 7318226ea2 [AF_RXRPC]: Key facility changes for AF_RXRPC
Export the keyring key type definition and document its availability.

Add alternative types into the key's type_data union to make it more useful.
Not all users necessarily want to use it as a list_head (AF_RXRPC doesn't, for
example), so make it clear that it can be used in other ways.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-26 15:46:23 -07:00
Stephen Smalley e900a7d90a selinux: preserve boolean values across policy reloads
At present, the userland policy loading code has to go through contortions to preserve
boolean values across policy reloads, and cannot do so atomically.
As this is what we always want to do for reloads, let the kernel preserve them instead.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-04-26 01:36:13 -04:00
James Carter bce34bc0ee selinux: change numbering of boolean directory inodes in selinuxfs
Change the numbering of the booleans directory inodes in selinuxfs to
provide more room for new inodes without a conflict in inode numbers and
to be consistent with how inode numbering is done in the
initial_contexts directory.

Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-04-26 01:36:11 -04:00
James Carter 68b00df9bb selinux: remove unused enumeration constant from selinuxfs
Remove the unused enumeration constant, SEL_AVC, from the sel_inos
enumeration in selinuxfs.

Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-04-26 01:36:10 -04:00
James Carter 6174eafce3 selinux: explicitly number all selinuxfs inodes
Explicitly number all selinuxfs inodes to prevent a conflict between
inodes numbered using last_ino when created with new_inode() and those
labeled explicitly.

Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-04-26 01:36:09 -04:00
James Carter f0ee2e467f selinux: export initial SID contexts via selinuxfs
Make the initial SID contexts accessible to userspace via selinuxfs.
An initial use of this support will be to make the unlabeled context
available to libselinux for use for invalidated userspace SIDs.

Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-04-26 01:36:00 -04:00
Stephen Smalley a764ae4b07 selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions
Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel
as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission
definitions and userland definitions may change.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-04-26 01:35:58 -04:00
Paul Moore 4f6a993f96 SELinux: move security_skb_extlbl_sid() out of the security server
As suggested, move the security_skb_extlbl_sid() function out of the security
server and into the SELinux hooks file.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-04-26 01:35:56 -04:00
Paul Moore c60475bf35 SELinux: rename selinux_netlabel.h to netlabel.h
In the beginning I named the file selinux_netlabel.h to avoid potential
namespace colisions.  However, over time I have realized that there are several
other similar cases of multiple header files with the same name so I'm changing
the name to something which better fits with existing naming conventions.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-04-26 01:35:50 -04:00
Paul Moore 5778eabd9c SELinux: extract the NetLabel SELinux support from the security server
Up until this patch the functions which have provided NetLabel support to
SELinux have been integrated into the SELinux security server, which for
various reasons is not really ideal.  This patch makes an effort to extract as
much of the NetLabel support from the security server as possibile and move it
into it's own file within the SELinux directory structure.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-04-26 01:35:48 -04:00
Patrick McHardy af65bdfce9 [NETLINK]: Switch cb_lock spinlock to mutex and allow to override it
Switch cb_lock to mutex and allow netlink kernel users to override it
with a subsystem specific mutex for consistent locking in dump callbacks.
All netlink_dump_start users have been audited not to rely on any
side-effects of the previously used spinlock.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25 22:29:03 -07:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo b529ccf279 [NETLINK]: Introduce nlmsg_hdr() helper
For the common "(struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data" sequence, so that we reduce the
number of direct accesses to skb->data and for consistency with all the other
cast skb member helpers.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25 22:26:34 -07:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 27a884dc3c [SK_BUFF]: Convert skb->tail to sk_buff_data_t
So that it is also an offset from skb->head, reduces its size from 8 to 4 bytes
on 64bit architectures, allowing us to combine the 4 bytes hole left by the
layer headers conversion, reducing struct sk_buff size to 256 bytes, i.e. 4
64byte cachelines, and since the sk_buff slab cache is SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN...
:-)

Many calculations that previously required that skb->{transport,network,
mac}_header be first converted to a pointer now can be done directly, being
meaningful as offsets or pointers.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25 22:26:28 -07:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo bbe735e424 [SK_BUFF]: Introduce skb_network_offset()
For the quite common 'skb->nh.raw - skb->data' sequence.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25 22:24:58 -07:00
Al Viro 04ff97086b [PATCH] sanitize security_getprocattr() API
have it return the buffer it had allocated

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-03-14 15:27:48 -07:00
Stephen Smalley 4f4acf3a47 Always initialize scontext and scontext_len
Always initialize *scontext and *scontext_len in security_sid_to_context.

(via http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/2/23/135)

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-02-26 14:43:15 -05:00
Eric Paris fadcdb4516 Reassign printk levels in selinux kernel code
Below is a patch which demotes many printk lines to KERN_DEBUG from
KERN_INFO.  It should help stop the spamming of logs with messages in
which users are not interested nor is there any action that users should
take.  It also promotes some KERN_INFO to KERN_ERR such as when there
are improper attempts to register/unregister security modules.

A similar patch was discussed a while back on list:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=116656343500003&r=1&w=2
This patch addresses almost all of the issues raised.  I believe the
only advice not taken was in the demoting of messages related to
undefined permissions and classes.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

 security/selinux/hooks.c       |   20 ++++++++++----------
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c    |    2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c |    6 +++---
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c   |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-02-26 14:43:07 -05:00
Stephen Smalley bbaca6c2e7 [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes
Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve).  So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below.  Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over
them.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14 08:10:00 -08:00
Eric W. Biederman b599fdfdb4 [PATCH] sysctl: fix the selinux_sysctl_get_sid
I goofed and when reenabling the fine grained selinux labels for
sysctls and forgot to add the "/sys" prefix before consulting
the policy database.  When computing the same path using
proc_dir_entries we got the "/sys" for free as it was part
of the tree, but it isn't true for clt_table trees.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14 08:10:00 -08:00
Eric W. Biederman 3fbfa98112 [PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables
It isn't needed anymore, all of the users are gone, and all of the ctl_table
initializers have been converted to use explicit names of the fields they are
initializing.

[akpm@osdl.org: NTFS fix]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14 08:10:00 -08:00
Tim Schmielau cd354f1ae7 [PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h
After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there.  Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.

To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.

Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm.  I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).

Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14 08:09:54 -08:00
Arjan van de Ven 9c2e08c592 [PATCH] mark struct file_operations const 9
Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const".  Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data.  In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12 09:48:46 -08:00
Robert P. J. Day b385a144ee [PATCH] Replace regular code with appropriate calls to container_of()
Replace a small number of expressions with a call to the "container_of()"
macro.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-11 11:18:06 -08:00
Robert P. J. Day c376222960 [PATCH] Transform kmem_cache_alloc()+memset(0) -> kmem_cache_zalloc().
Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the
corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-11 10:51:27 -08:00
David Howells 9ad0830f30 [PATCH] Keys: Fix key serial number collision handling
Fix the key serial number collision avoidance code in key_alloc_serial().

This didn't use to be so much of a problem as the key serial numbers were
allocated from a simple incremental counter, and it would have to go through
two billion keys before it could possibly encounter a collision.  However, now
that random numbers are used instead, collisions are much more likely.

This is fixed by finding a hole in the rbtree where the next unused serial
number ought to be and using that by going almost back to the top of the
insertion routine and redoing the insertion with the new serial number rather
than trying to be clever and attempting to work out the insertion point
pointer directly.

This fixes kernel BZ #7727.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-06 14:45:00 -08:00
Venkat Yekkirala 342a0cff0a [SELINUX]: Fix 2.6.20-rc6 build when no xfrm
This patch is an incremental fix to the flow_cache_genid
patch for selinux that breaks the build of 2.6.20-rc6 when
xfrm is not configured.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-01-26 19:03:48 -08:00
Venkat Yekkirala 334c85569b [SELINUX]: increment flow cache genid
Currently, old flow cache entries remain valid even after
a reload of SELinux policy.

This patch increments the flow cache generation id
on policy (re)loads so that flow cache entries are
revalidated as needed.

Thanks to Herbet Xu for pointing this out. See:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-netdev&m=116841378704536&w=2

There's also a general issue as well as a solution proposed
by David Miller for when flow_cache_genid wraps. I might be
submitting a separate patch for that later.

I request that this be applied to 2.6.20 since it's
a security relevant fix.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-01-23 20:25:41 -08:00
Paul Moore 7979512006 NetLabel: correct locking in selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid()
The spinlock protecting the update of the "sksec->nlbl_state" variable is not
currently softirq safe which can lead to problems.  This patch fixes this by
changing the spin_{un}lock() functions into spin_{un}lock_bh() functions.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-01-09 00:30:00 -08:00
Venkat Yekkirala 0efc61eaee selinux: Delete mls_copy_context
This deletes mls_copy_context() in favor of mls_context_cpy() and
replaces mls_scopy_context() with mls_context_cpy_low().

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-01-08 17:32:51 -05:00
Parag Warudkar 9883a13c72 [PATCH] selinux: fix selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() locking
do not call a sleeping lock API in an RCU read section.
lock_sock_nested can sleep, its BH counterpart doesn't.
selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() needs to use the BH counterpart
unconditionally.

Compile tested.

From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

added BH disabling, because this function can be called from non-atomic
contexts too, so a naked bh_lock_sock() would be deadlock-prone.

Boot-tested the resulting kernel.

Signed-off-by: Parag Warudkar <paragw@paragw.zapto.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2007-01-02 13:32:21 -08:00
Vadim Lobanov bbea9f6966 [PATCH] fdtable: Make fdarray and fdsets equal in size
Currently, each fdtable supports three dynamically-sized arrays of data: the
fdarray and two fdsets.  The code allows the number of fds supported by the
fdarray (fdtable->max_fds) to differ from the number of fds supported by each
of the fdsets (fdtable->max_fdset).

In practice, it is wasteful for these two sizes to differ: whenever we hit a
limit on the smaller-capacity structure, we will reallocate the entire fdtable
and all the dynamic arrays within it, so any delta in the memory used by the
larger-capacity structure will never be touched at all.

Rather than hogging this excess, we shouldn't even allocate it in the first
place, and keep the capacities of the fdarray and the fdsets equal.  This
patch removes fdtable->max_fdset.  As an added bonus, most of the supporting
code becomes simpler.

Signed-off-by: Vadim Lobanov <vlobanov@speakeasy.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-10 09:57:22 -08:00
Josef Sipek 3d5ff529ea [PATCH] struct path: convert selinux
Signed-off-by: Josef Sipek <jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 08:28:49 -08:00
Peter Zijlstra 24ec839c43 [PATCH] tty: ->signal->tty locking
Fix the locking of signal->tty.

Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used
by most other members of ->signal/->sighand.  And unless we are 'current'
or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway.

(NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules)

Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding
tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid.  Otherwise the lifetime of ttys
are governed by their open file handles.  This leaves some holes for tty
access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access).

It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing.

(NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to
       be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think
       it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info
       invocations)

[schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 08:28:38 -08:00
Peter Zijlstra 6cfd76a26d [PATCH] lockdep: name some old style locks
Name some of the remaning 'old_style_spin_init' locks

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:36 -08:00
Eric Sesterhenn 48ad504ee7 [PATCH] security/keys/*: user kmemdup()
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:25 -08:00
Christoph Lameter e18b890bb0 [PATCH] slab: remove kmem_cache_t
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.

The patch was generated using the following script:

	#!/bin/sh
	#
	# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
	#

	set -e

	for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
		quilt add $file
		sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
		mv /tmp/$$ $file
		quilt refresh
	done

The script was run like this

	sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:25 -08:00
Christoph Lameter e94b176609 [PATCH] slab: remove SLAB_KERNEL
SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:24 -08:00
Christoph Lameter 54e6ecb239 [PATCH] slab: remove SLAB_ATOMIC
SLAB_ATOMIC is an alias of GFP_ATOMIC

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:24 -08:00
David Howells 9db7372445 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
Conflicts:

	drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c
	include/linux/libata.h

Futher merge of Linus's head and compilation fixups.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2006-12-05 17:01:28 +00:00
David Howells 4c1ac1b491 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
Conflicts:

	drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c
	drivers/net/chelsio/cxgb2.c
	drivers/net/wireless/bcm43xx/bcm43xx_main.c
	drivers/net/wireless/prism54/islpci_eth.c
	drivers/usb/core/hub.h
	drivers/usb/input/hid-core.c
	net/core/netpoll.c

Fix up merge failures with Linus's head and fix new compilation failures.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2006-12-05 14:37:56 +00:00
Al Viro 87fcd70d98 [PATCH] selinux endianness annotations
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-04 19:32:44 -08:00
James Morris 6cbda6b6e2 Rename class_destroy to avoid namespace conflicts.
We're seeing increasing namespace conflicts between the global
class_destroy() function declared in linux/device.h, and the private
function in the SELinux core code.  This patch renames the SELinux
function to cls_destroy() to avoid this conflict.

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:31:39 -08:00
Paul Moore 0275276035 NetLabel: convert to an extensibile/sparse category bitmap
The original NetLabel category bitmap was a straight char bitmap which worked
fine for the initial release as it only supported 240 bits due to limitations
in the CIPSO restricted bitmap tag (tag type 0x01).  This patch converts that
straight char bitmap into an extensibile/sparse bitmap in order to lay the
foundation for other CIPSO tag types and protocols.

This patch also has a nice side effect in that all of the security attributes
passed by NetLabel into the LSM are now in a format which is in the host's
native byte/bit ordering which makes the LSM specific code much simpler; look
at the changes in security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c as an example.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:31:36 -08:00
James Morris bb22f58087 Compile fix for "peer secid consolidation for external network labeling"
Use a forward declaration instead of dragging in skbuff.h and
related junk.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:24:16 -08:00
Paul Moore 3de4bab5b9 SELinux: peer secid consolidation for external network labeling
Now that labeled IPsec makes use of the peer_sid field in the
sk_security_struct we can remove a lot of the special cases between labeled
IPsec and NetLabel.  In addition, create a new function,
security_skb_extlbl_sid(), which we can use in several places to get the
security context of the packet's external label which allows us to further
simplify the code in a few places.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:24:14 -08:00
Paul Moore 9f2ad66509 NetLabel: SELinux cleanups
This patch does a lot of cleanup in the SELinux NetLabel support code.  A
summary of the changes include:

* Use RCU locking for the NetLabel state variable in the skk_security_struct
  instead of using the inode_security_struct mutex.
* Remove unnecessary parameters in selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create().
* Rename selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security() to
  selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone() to better fit the other NetLabel
  sk_security functions.
* Improvements to selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to help reduce the cost of
  the common case.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:24:13 -08:00
Paul Moore 701a90bad9 NetLabel: make netlbl_lsm_secattr struct easier/quicker to understand
The existing netlbl_lsm_secattr struct required the LSM to check all of the
fields to determine if any security attributes were present resulting in a lot
of work in the common case of no attributes.  This patch adds a 'flags' field
which is used to indicate which attributes are present in the structure; this
should allow the LSM to do a quick comparison to determine if the structure
holds any security attributes.

Example:

 if (netlbl_lsm_secattr->flags)
	/* security attributes present */
 else
	/* NO security attributes present */

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:24:07 -08:00
Thomas Graf 6051e2f4fb [IPv6] prefix: Convert RTM_NEWPREFIX notifications to use the new netlink api
RTM_GETPREFIX is completely unused and is thus removed.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-02 21:22:45 -08:00
James Morris 2ee92d46c6 [SELinux]: Add support for DCCP
This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP
(http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in
operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers.

The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of
TCP.

A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol
differentation.  The permissions for this class inherit all of the
socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind,
name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled
networking is not, at this stage.

Patches for SELinux userspace are at:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/

I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as
expected.  Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real
difference being that it's a different protocol.

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-02 21:22:24 -08:00
Venkat Yekkirala 67f83cbf08 SELinux: Fix SA selection semantics
Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux
policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's.

With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:

1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:

allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }

2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:

allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:21:34 -08:00
Venkat Yekkirala 6b877699c6 SELinux: Return correct context for SO_PEERSEC
Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of
the peer (as represented by the SA from the peer) as opposed to the
SA used by the local/source socket.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:21:33 -08:00
Venkat Yekkirala c1a856c964 SELinux: Various xfrm labeling fixes
Since the upstreaming of the mlsxfrm modification a few months back,
testing has resulted in the identification of the following issues/bugs that
are resolved in this patch set.

1. Fix the security context used in the IKE negotiation to be the context
   of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule.

2. Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of
   the peer as opposed to the source.

3. Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
   context as the originating socket/flow.

The following would be the result of applying this patchset:

- SO_PEERSEC will now correctly return the peer's context.

- IKE deamons will receive the context of the source socket/flow
  as opposed to the SPD rule's context so that the negotiated SA
  will be at the same context as the source socket/flow.

- The SELinux policy will require one or more of the
  following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:

  1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:

     allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }

  2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:

     allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
     allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };

This Patch: Pass correct security context to IKE for use in negotiation

Fix the security context passed to IKE for use in negotiation to be the
context of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule so that
the SA carries the label of the originating socket/flow.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:21:31 -08:00
Linus Torvalds b07e3c3a1d Merge branch 'for-2.6.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-2.6.20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  SELinux: validate kernel object classes and permissions
  SELinux: ensure keys constant in hashtab_search
  SELinux: export object class and permission definitions
  SELinux: remove current object class and permission validation mechanism
2006-12-01 16:43:42 -08:00
Chad Sellers b94c7e677b SELinux: validate kernel object classes and permissions
This is a new object class and permission validation scheme that validates
against the defined kernel headers. This scheme allows extra classes
and permissions that do not conflict with the kernel definitions to be
added to the policy. This validation is now done for all policy loads,
not just subsequent loads after the first policy load.

The implementation walks the three structrures containing the defined
object class and permission values and ensures their values are the
same in the policy being loaded. This includes verifying the object
classes themselves, the permissions they contain, and the permissions
they inherit from commons. Classes or permissions that are present in the
kernel but missing from the policy cause a warning (printed to KERN_INFO)
to be printed, but do not stop the policy from loading, emulating current
behavior. Any other inconsistencies cause the load to fail.

Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-28 12:04:38 -05:00
Chad Sellers bb24249747 SELinux: ensure keys constant in hashtab_search
Makes the key argument passed into hashtab_search and all the functions
it calls constant. These functions include hash table function pointers
hash_value and keycmp. The only implementations of these currently
are symhash and symcmp, which do not modify the key. The key parameter
should never be changed by any of these, so it should be const. This
is necessary to allow calling these functions with keys found in kernel
object class and permission definitions.

Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-28 12:04:37 -05:00
Chad Sellers 5c45899879 SELinux: export object class and permission definitions
Moves the definition of the 3 structs containing object class and
permission definitions from avc.c to avc_ss.h so that the security
server can access them for validation on policy load. This also adds
a new struct type, defined_classes_perms_t, suitable for allowing the
security server to access these data structures from the avc.

Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-28 12:04:36 -05:00
Chad Sellers 5a64d4438e SELinux: remove current object class and permission validation mechanism
Removes the current SELinux object class and permission validation code,
as the current code makes it impossible to change or remove object classes
and permissions on a running system. Additionally, the current code does
not actually validate that the classes and permissions are correct, but
instead merely validates that they do not change between policy reloads.

Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-28 12:04:35 -05:00
Akinobu Mita fc5d81e69d selinux: fix dentry_open() error check
The return value of dentry_open() shoud be checked by IS_ERR().

Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-27 10:22:43 -05:00
David Howells 65f27f3844 WorkStruct: Pass the work_struct pointer instead of context data
Pass the work_struct pointer to the work function rather than context data.
The work function can use container_of() to work out the data.

For the cases where the container of the work_struct may go away the moment the
pending bit is cleared, it is made possible to defer the release of the
structure by deferring the clearing of the pending bit.

To make this work, an extra flag is introduced into the management side of the
work_struct.  This governs auto-release of the structure upon execution.

Ordinarily, the work queue executor would release the work_struct for further
scheduling or deallocation by clearing the pending bit prior to jumping to the
work function.  This means that, unless the driver makes some guarantee itself
that the work_struct won't go away, the work function may not access anything
else in the work_struct or its container lest they be deallocated..  This is a
problem if the auxiliary data is taken away (as done by the last patch).

However, if the pending bit is *not* cleared before jumping to the work
function, then the work function *may* access the work_struct and its container
with no problems.  But then the work function must itself release the
work_struct by calling work_release().

In most cases, automatic release is fine, so this is the default.  Special
initiators exist for the non-auto-release case (ending in _NAR).


Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2006-11-22 14:55:48 +00:00
Paul Moore f8687afefc [NetLabel]: protect the CIPSOv4 socket option from setsockopt()
This patch makes two changes to protect applications from either removing or
tampering with the CIPSOv4 IP option on a socket.  The first is the requirement
that applications have the CAP_NET_RAW capability to set an IPOPT_CIPSO option
on a socket; this prevents untrusted applications from setting their own
CIPSOv4 security attributes on the packets they send.  The second change is to
SELinux and it prevents applications from setting any IPv4 options when there
is an IPOPT_CIPSO option already present on the socket; this prevents
applications from removing CIPSOv4 security attributes from the packets they
send.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-10-30 15:24:49 -08:00
Paul Moore bf0edf3929 NetLabel: better error handling involving mls_export_cat()
Upon inspection it looked like the error handling for mls_export_cat() was
rather poor.  This patch addresses this by NULL'ing out kfree()'d pointers
before returning and checking the return value of the function everywhere
it is called.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-15 23:14:15 -07:00
Chad Sellers 6e8c751e07 SELinux: Bug fix in polidydb_destroy
This patch fixes two bugs in policydb_destroy. Two list pointers
(policydb.ocontexts[i] and policydb.genfs) were not being reset to NULL when
the lists they pointed to were being freed. This caused a problem when the
initial policy load failed, as the policydb being destroyed was not a
temporary new policydb that was thrown away, but rather was the global
(active) policydb. Consequently, later functions, particularly
sys_bind->selinux_socket_bind->security_node_sid and
do_rw_proc->selinux_sysctl->selinux_proc_get_sid->security_genfs_sid tried
to dereference memory that had previously been freed.

Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11 23:59:41 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala 5b368e61c2 IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matching
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.

The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.

This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).

Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL.  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.

The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).

This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.

This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.

Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11 23:59:37 -07:00
paul.moore@hp.com 388b24057f NetLabel: use SECINITSID_UNLABELED for a base SID
This patch changes NetLabel to use SECINITSID_UNLABLELED as it's source of
SELinux type information when generating a NetLabel context.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11 23:59:32 -07:00
paul.moore@hp.com ffb733c650 NetLabel: fix a cache race condition
Testing revealed a problem with the NetLabel cache where a cached entry could
be freed while in use by the LSM layer causing an oops and other problems.
This patch fixes that problem by introducing a reference counter to the cache
entry so that it is only freed when it is no longer in use.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11 23:59:29 -07:00
Matt LaPlante cab00891c5 Still more typo fixes
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-10-03 22:36:44 +02:00
Matt LaPlante 44c09201a4 more misc typo fixes
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-10-03 22:34:14 +02:00
Dave Hansen d8c76e6f45 [PATCH] r/o bind mount prepwork: inc_nlink() helper
This is mostly included for parity with dec_nlink(), where we will have some
more hooks.  This one should stay pretty darn straightforward for now.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-01 00:39:30 -07:00
David Woodhouse 2148ccc437 [PATCH] MLSXFRM: fix mis-labelling of child sockets
Accepted connections of types other than AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX won't
have an appropriate label derived from the peer, so don't use it.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 15:58:21 -07:00
Sukadev Bhattiprolu f400e198b2 [PATCH] pidspace: is_init()
This is an updated version of Eric Biederman's is_init() patch.
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/2/6/280).  It applies cleanly to 2.6.18-rc3 and
replaces a few more instances of ->pid == 1 with is_init().

Further, is_init() checks pid and thus removes dependency on Eric's other
patches for now.

Eric's original description:

	There are a lot of places in the kernel where we test for init
	because we give it special properties.  Most  significantly init
	must not die.  This results in code all over the kernel test
	->pid == 1.

	Introduce is_init to capture this case.

	With multiple pid spaces for all of the cases affected we are
	looking for only the first process on the system, not some other
	process that has pid == 1.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: <lxc-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 09:18:12 -07:00
Chris Wright 3bc1fa8ae1 [PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security module
This code has suffered from broken core design and lack of developer
attention.  Broken security modules are too dangerous to leave around.  It
is time to remove this one.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 09:18:10 -07:00
Cory Olmo 3528a95322 [PATCH] SELinux: support mls categories for context mounts
Allows commas to be embedded into context mount options (i.e.  "-o
context=some_selinux_context_t"), to better support multiple categories,
which are separated by commas and confuse mount.

For example, with the current code:

  mount -t iso9660 /dev/cdrom /media/cdrom -o \
  ro,context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1,c3,c4,exec

The context option that will be interpreted by SELinux is
context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1

instead of
context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1,c3,c4

The options that will be passed on to the file system will be
ro,c3,c4,exec.

The proposed solution is to allow/require the SELinux context option
specified to mount to use quotes when the context contains a comma.

This patch modifies the option parsing in parse_opts(), contained in
mount.c, to take options after finding a comma only if it hasn't seen a
quote or if the quotes are matched.  It also introduces a new function that
will strip the quotes from the context option prior to translation.  The
quotes are replaced after the translation is completed to insure that in
the event the raw context contains commas the kernel will be able to
interpret the correct context.

Signed-off-by: Cory Olmo <colmo@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 09:18:03 -07:00
Theodore Ts'o ba52de123d [PATCH] inode-diet: Eliminate i_blksize from the inode structure
This eliminates the i_blksize field from struct inode.  Filesystems that want
to provide a per-inode st_blksize can do so by providing their own getattr
routine instead of using the generic_fillattr() function.

Note that some filesystems were providing pretty much random (and incorrect)
values for i_blksize.

[bunk@stusta.de: cleanup]
[akpm@osdl.org: generic_fillattr() fix]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-27 08:26:18 -07:00
Theodore Ts'o 8e18e2941c [PATCH] inode_diet: Replace inode.u.generic_ip with inode.i_private
The following patches reduce the size of the VFS inode structure by 28 bytes
on a UP x86.  (It would be more on an x86_64 system).  This is a 10% reduction
in the inode size on a UP kernel that is configured in a production mode
(i.e., with no spinlock or other debugging functions enabled; if you want to
save memory taken up by in-core inodes, the first thing you should do is
disable the debugging options; they are responsible for a huge amount of bloat
in the VFS inode structure).

This patch:

The filesystem or device-specific pointer in the inode is inside a union,
which is pretty pointless given that all 30+ users of this field have been
using the void pointer.  Get rid of the union and rename it to i_private, with
a comment to explain who is allowed to use the void pointer.  This is just a
cleanup, but it allows us to reuse the union 'u' for something something where
the union will actually be used.

[judith@osdl.org: powerpc build fix]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Judith Lebzelter <judith@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-27 08:26:17 -07:00
Stephen Smalley b20c8122a3 [PATCH] selinux: fix tty locking
Take tty_mutex when accessing ->signal->tty in selinux code.  Noted by Alan
Cox.  Longer term, we are looking at refactoring the code to provide better
encapsulation of the tty layer, but this is a simple fix that addresses the
immediate bug.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:53 -07:00
Eric Paris bc7e982b84 [PATCH] SELinux: convert sbsec semaphore to a mutex
This patch converts the semaphore in the superblock security struct to a
mutex.  No locking changes or other code changes are done.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:53 -07:00
Eric Paris 2397074172 [PATCH] SELinux: change isec semaphore to a mutex
This patch converts the remaining isec->sem into a mutex.  Very similar
locking is provided as before only in the faster smaller mutex rather than a
semaphore.  An out_unlock path is introduced rather than the conditional
unlocking found in the original code.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:53 -07:00
Eric Paris 296fddf751 [PATCH] SELinux: eliminate inode_security_set_security
inode_security_set_sid is only called by security_inode_init_security, which
is called when a new file is being created and needs to have its incore
security state initialized and its security xattr set.  This helper used to be
called in other places in the past, but now only has the one.  So this patch
rolls inode_security_set_sid directly back into security_inode_init_security.
There also is no need to hold the isec->sem while doing this, as the inode is
not available to other threads at this point in time.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:53 -07:00
Darrel Goeddel f3f8771420 [PATCH] selinux: add support for range transitions on object classes
Introduces support for policy version 21.  This version of the binary
kernel policy allows for defining range transitions on security classes
other than the process security class.  As always, backwards compatibility
for older formats is retained.  The security class is read in as specified
when using the new format, while the "process" security class is assumed
when using an older policy format.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:52 -07:00
Stephen Smalley 016b9bdb81 [PATCH] selinux: enable configuration of max policy version
Enable configuration of SELinux maximum supported policy version to support
legacy userland (init) that does not gracefully handle kernels that support
newer policy versions two or more beyond the installed policy, as in FC3
and FC4.

[bunk@stusta.de: improve Kconfig help text]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:52 -07:00
Stephen Smalley 9a2f44f01a [PATCH] selinux: replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interface
Replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interface for
consistency with other interfaces.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:52 -07:00
Stephen Smalley 1a70cd40cb [PATCH] selinux: rename selinux_ctxid_to_string
Rename selinux_ctxid_to_string to selinux_sid_to_string to be
consistent with other interfaces.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:52 -07:00
Stephen Smalley 62bac0185a [PATCH] selinux: eliminate selinux_task_ctxid
Eliminate selinux_task_ctxid since it duplicates selinux_task_get_sid.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:52 -07:00
Paul Moore df2115c313 [NetLabel]: change the SELinux permissions
Change NetLabel to use the 'recvfrom' socket permission and the
SECINITSID_NETMSG SELinux SID as the NetLabel base SID for incoming packets.
This patch effectively makes the old, and currently unused, SELinux NETMSG
permissions NetLabel permissions.

Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-25 15:53:13 -07:00
Paul Moore 14a72f53fb [NetLabel]: correct improper handling of non-NetLabel peer contexts
Fix a problem where NetLabel would always set the value of 
sk_security_struct->peer_sid in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() to the context of
the socket, causing problems when users would query the context of the
connection.  This patch fixes this so that the value in
sk_security_struct->peer_sid is only set when the connection is NetLabel based,
otherwise the value is untouched.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-25 15:52:01 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala 4eb327b517 [SELINUX]: Fix bug in security_sid_mls_copy
The following fixes a bug where random mem is being tampered with in the
non-mls case; encountered by Jashua Brindle on a gentoo box.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-09-22 15:19:04 -07:00
Paul Moore 7a0e1d6022 [NetLabel]: add some missing #includes to various header files
Add some missing include files to the NetLabel related header files.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:18:39 -07:00
Paul Moore e448e93130 [NetLabel]: uninline selinux_netlbl_inode_permission()
Uninline the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() at the request of
Andrew Morton.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:18:38 -07:00
Paul Moore 7b3bbb926f [NetLabel]: Cleanup ebitmap_import()
Rewrite ebitmap_import() so it is a bit cleaner and easier to read.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:18:37 -07:00
Paul Moore c1b14c0a46 [NetLabel]: Comment corrections.
Fix some incorrect comments.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:18:36 -07:00