Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Support AES128-CCM ciphers in kTLS, from Vakul Garg.
2) Add fib_sync_mem to control the amount of dirty memory we allow to
queue up between synchronize RCU calls, from David Ahern.
3) Make flow classifier more lockless, from Vlad Buslov.
4) Add PHY downshift support to aquantia driver, from Heiner
Kallweit.
5) Add SKB cache for TCP rx and tx, from Eric Dumazet. This reduces
contention on SLAB spinlocks in heavy RPC workloads.
6) Partial GSO offload support in XFRM, from Boris Pismenny.
7) Add fast link down support to ethtool, from Heiner Kallweit.
8) Use siphash for IP ID generator, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Pull nexthops even further out from ipv4/ipv6 routes and FIB
entries, from David Ahern.
10) Move skb->xmit_more into a per-cpu variable, from Florian
Westphal.
11) Improve eBPF verifier speed and increase maximum program size,
from Alexei Starovoitov.
12) Eliminate per-bucket spinlocks in rhashtable, and instead use bit
spinlocks. From Neil Brown.
13) Allow tunneling with GUE encap in ipvs, from Jacky Hu.
14) Improve link partner cap detection in generic PHY code, from
Heiner Kallweit.
15) Add layer 2 encap support to bpf_skb_adjust_room(), from Alan
Maguire.
16) Remove SKB list implementation assumptions in SCTP, your's truly.
17) Various cleanups, optimizations, and simplifications in r8169
driver. From Heiner Kallweit.
18) Add memory accounting on TX and RX path of SCTP, from Xin Long.
19) Switch PHY drivers over to use dynamic featue detection, from
Heiner Kallweit.
20) Support flow steering without masking in dpaa2-eth, from Ioana
Ciocoi.
21) Implement ndo_get_devlink_port in netdevsim driver, from Jiri
Pirko.
22) Increase the strict parsing of current and future netlink
attributes, also export such policies to userspace. From Johannes
Berg.
23) Allow DSA tag drivers to be modular, from Andrew Lunn.
24) Remove legacy DSA probing support, also from Andrew Lunn.
25) Allow ll_temac driver to be used on non-x86 platforms, from Esben
Haabendal.
26) Add a generic tracepoint for TX queue timeouts to ease debugging,
from Cong Wang.
27) More indirect call optimizations, from Paolo Abeni"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1763 commits)
cxgb4: Fix error path in cxgb4_init_module
net: phy: improve pause mode reporting in phy_print_status
dt-bindings: net: Fix a typo in the phy-mode list for ethernet bindings
net: macb: Change interrupt and napi enable order in open
net: ll_temac: Improve error message on error IRQ
net/sched: remove block pointer from common offload structure
net: ethernet: support of_get_mac_address new ERR_PTR error
net: usb: smsc: fix warning reported by kbuild test robot
staging: octeon-ethernet: Fix of_get_mac_address ERR_PTR check
net: dsa: support of_get_mac_address new ERR_PTR error
net: dsa: sja1105: Fix status initialization in sja1105_get_ethtool_stats
vrf: sit mtu should not be updated when vrf netdev is the link
net: dsa: Fix error cleanup path in dsa_init_module
l2tp: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference
taprio: add null check on sched_nest to avoid potential null pointer dereference
net: mvpp2: cls: fix less than zero check on a u32 variable
net_sched: sch_fq: handle non connected flows
net_sched: sch_fq: do not assume EDT packets are ordered
net: hns3: use devm_kcalloc when allocating desc_cb
net: hns3: some cleanup for struct hns3_enet_ring
...
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add support for AEAD in simd
- Add fuzz testing to testmgr
- Add panic_on_fail module parameter to testmgr
- Use per-CPU struct instead multiple variables in scompress
- Change verify API for akcipher
Algorithms:
- Convert x86 AEAD algorithms over to simd
- Forbid 2-key 3DES in FIPS mode
- Add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Drivers:
- Set output IV with ctr-aes in crypto4xx
- Set output IV in rockchip
- Fix potential length overflow with hashing in sun4i-ss
- Fix computation error with ctr in vmx
- Add SM4 protected keys support in ccree
- Remove long-broken mxc-scc driver
- Add rfc4106(gcm(aes)) cipher support in cavium/nitrox"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (179 commits)
crypto: ccree - use a proper le32 type for le32 val
crypto: ccree - remove set but not used variable 'du_size'
crypto: ccree - Make cc_sec_disable static
crypto: ccree - fix spelling mistake "protedcted" -> "protected"
crypto: caam/qi2 - generate hash keys in-place
crypto: caam/qi2 - fix DMA mapping of stack memory
crypto: caam/qi2 - fix zero-length buffer DMA mapping
crypto: stm32/cryp - update to return iv_out
crypto: stm32/cryp - remove request mutex protection
crypto: stm32/cryp - add weak key check for DES
crypto: atmel - remove set but not used variable 'alg_name'
crypto: picoxcell - Use dev_get_drvdata()
crypto: crypto4xx - get rid of redundant using_sd variable
crypto: crypto4xx - use sync skcipher for fallback
crypto: crypto4xx - fix cfb and ofb "overran dst buffer" issues
crypto: crypto4xx - fix ctr-aes missing output IV
crypto: ecrdsa - select ASN1 and OID_REGISTRY for EC-RDSA
crypto: ux500 - use ccflags-y instead of CFLAGS_<basename>.o
crypto: ccree - handle tee fips error during power management resume
crypto: ccree - add function to handle cryptocell tee fips error
...
We currently have two levels of strict validation:
1) liberal (default)
- undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
- garbage at end of message accepted
2) strict (opt-in)
- NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
Split out parsing strictness into four different options:
* TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing
attributes (in message or nested)
* MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type
* UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries
* STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size
The default for future things should be *everything*.
The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE,
and is renamed to _deprecated_strict().
The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to
*_parse_deprecated().
Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags
even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in
this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to
not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going
forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply
to the POLICY flag.
We end up with the following renames:
* nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated
* nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict
* nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated
* nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict
* nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated
* nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated
Using spatch, of course:
@@
expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
@@
expression START, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions
yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong.
Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a
common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication.
Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every
new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the
next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is.
In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix undefined symbol issue in ecrdsa_generic module when ASN1
or OID_REGISTRY aren't enabled in the config by selecting these
options for CRYPTO_ECRDSA.
ERROR: "asn1_ber_decoder" [crypto/ecrdsa_generic.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "look_up_OID" [crypto/ecrdsa_generic.ko] undefined!
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Mark sm4 and missing aes using protected keys which are indetical to
same algs with no HW protected keys as tested.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The crypto_yield() in shash_ahash_digest() occurs after the entire
digest operation already happened, so there's no real point. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499df ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
GCM instances can be created by either the "gcm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "gcm(aes)"; or by "gcm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and ghash implementations, e.g.
"gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)".
However, a "gcm_base" instance prevents a "gcm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "gcm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "gcm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "gcm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"gcm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "gcm" instances, e.g.
"gcm(aes)" instead of "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
algorithm. It also requires starting to verify that the algorithms are
really ctr and ghash, not something else entirely. But it would be
bizarre if anyone were actually using non-gcm-compatible algorithms with
gcm_base, so this shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: d00aa19b50 ("[CRYPTO] gcm: Allow block cipher parameter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
shash_ahash_digest(), which is the ->digest() method for ahash tfms that
use an shash algorithm, has an optimization where crypto_shash_digest()
is called if the data is in a single page. But an off-by-one error
prevented this path from being taken unless the user happened to provide
extra data in the scatterlist. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove cryptd_alloc_ablkcipher() and the ability of cryptd to create
algorithms with the deprecated "ablkcipher" type.
This has been unused since commit 0e145b477d ("crypto: ablk_helper -
remove ablk_helper"). Instead, cryptd_alloc_skcipher() is used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In commit 71052dcf4b ("crypto: scompress - Use per-CPU struct instead
multiple variables") I accidentally initialized multiple times the memory on a
random CPU. I should have initialize the memory on every CPU like it has
been done earlier. I didn't notice this because the scheduler didn't
move the task to another CPU.
Guenter managed to do that and the code crashed as expected.
Allocate / free per-CPU memory on each CPU.
Fixes: 71052dcf4b ("crypto: scompress - Use per-CPU struct instead multiple variables")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use subsys_initcall for registration of all templates and generic
algorithm implementations, rather than module_init. Then change
cryptomgr to use arch_initcall, to place it before the subsys_initcalls.
This is needed so that when both a generic and optimized implementation
of an algorithm are built into the kernel (not loadable modules), the
generic implementation is registered before the optimized one.
Otherwise, the self-tests for the optimized implementation are unable to
allocate the generic implementation for the new comparison fuzz tests.
Note that on arm, a side effect of this change is that self-tests for
generic implementations may run before the unaligned access handler has
been installed. So, unaligned accesses will crash the kernel. This is
arguably a good thing as it makes it easier to detect that type of bug.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When the extra crypto self-tests are enabled, test each AEAD algorithm
against its generic implementation when one is available. This
involves: checking the algorithm properties for consistency, then
randomly generating test vectors using the generic implementation and
running them against the implementation under test. Both good and bad
inputs are tested.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When the extra crypto self-tests are enabled, test each skcipher
algorithm against its generic implementation when one is available.
This involves: checking the algorithm properties for consistency, then
randomly generating test vectors using the generic implementation and
running them against the implementation under test. Both good and bad
inputs are tested.
This has already detected a bug in the skcipher_walk API, a bug in the
LRW template, and an inconsistency in the cts implementations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When the extra crypto self-tests are enabled, test each hash algorithm
against its generic implementation when one is available. This
involves: checking the algorithm properties for consistency, then
randomly generating test vectors using the generic implementation and
running them against the implementation under test. Both good and bad
inputs are tested.
This has already detected a bug in the x86 implementation of poly1305,
bugs in crct10dif, and an inconsistency in cbcmac.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add some helper functions in preparation for fuzz testing algorithms
against their generic implementation.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation for fuzz testing algorithms against their generic
implementation, make error messages in testmgr identify test vectors by
name rather than index. Built-in test vectors are simply "named" by
their index in testmgr.h, as before. But (in later patches) generated
test vectors will be given more descriptive names to help developers
debug problems detected with them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Update testmgr to support testing for specific errors from setkey() and
digest() for hashes; setkey() and encrypt()/decrypt() for skciphers and
ciphers; and setkey(), setauthsize(), and encrypt()/decrypt() for AEADs.
This is useful because algorithms usually restrict the lengths or format
of the message, key, and/or authentication tag in some way. And bad
inputs should be tested too, not just good inputs.
As part of this change, remove the ambiguously-named 'fail' flag and
replace it with 'setkey_error = -EINVAL' for the only test vector that
used it -- the DES weak key test vector. Note that this tightens the
test to require -EINVAL rather than any error code, but AFAICS this
won't cause any test failure.
Other than that, these new fields aren't set on any test vectors yet.
Later patches will do so.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add testmgr test vectors for EC-RDSA algorithm for every of five
supported parameters (curves). Because there are no officially published
test vectors for the curves, the vectors are generated by gost-engine.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
ecc.c have algorithms that could be used togeter by ecdh and ecrdsa.
Make it separate module. Add CRYPTO_ECC into Kconfig. EXPORT_SYMBOL and
document to what seems appropriate. Move structs ecc_point and ecc_curve
from ecc_curve_defs.h into ecc.h.
No code changes.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Group RSA, DH, and ECDH into Public-key cryptography config section.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some public key algorithms (like EC-DSA) keep in parameters field
important data such as digest and curve OIDs (possibly more for
different EC-DSA variants). Thus, just setting a public key (as
for RSA) is not enough.
Append parameters into the key stream for akcipher_set_{pub,priv}_key.
Appended data is: (u32) algo OID, (u32) parameters length, parameters
data.
This does not affect current akcipher API nor RSA ciphers (they could
ignore it). Idea of appending parameters to the key stream is by Herbert
Xu.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Treat (struct public_key_signature)'s digest same as its signature (s).
Since digest should be already in the kmalloc'd memory do not kmemdup
digest value before calling {public,tpm}_key_verify_signature.
Patch is split from the previous as suggested by Herbert Xu.
Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation for new akcipher verify call remove sign/verify callbacks
from RSA backends and make PKCS1 driver call encrypt/decrypt instead.
This also complies with the well-known idea that raw RSA should never be
used for sign/verify. It only should be used with proper padding scheme
such as PKCS1 driver provides.
Cc: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Cc: qat-linux@intel.com
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Because with the introduction of EC-RDSA and change in workings of RSA
in regard to sign/verify, akcipher could have not all callbacks defined,
check the presence of callbacks in crypto_register_akcipher() and
provide default implementation if the callback is not implemented.
This is suggested by Herbert Xu instead of checking the presence of the
callback on every request.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds a requirement to the generic 3DES implementation
such that 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) is no longer allowed in FIPS mode.
We will also provide helpers that may be used by drivers that
implement 3DES to make the same check.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
salsa20-generic doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to the alignmask
being removed by commit b62b3db76f ("crypto: salsa20-generic - cleanup
and convert to skcipher API").
Since salsa20-generic does not update the IV and does not need any IV
alignment, update it to use req->iv instead of walk.iv.
Fixes: 2407d60872 ("[CRYPTO] salsa20: Salsa20 stream cipher")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
Fix this in the LRW template by checking the return value of
skcipher_walk_virt().
This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation. When the extra
self-tests were run on a KASAN-enabled kernel, a KASAN use-after-free
splat occured during lrw(aes) testing.
Fixes: c778f96bf3 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When we perform a walk in the completion function, we need to ensure
that it is atomic.
Fixes: ac3c8f36c3 ("crypto: lrw - Do not use auxiliary buffer")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When we perform a walk in the completion function, we need to ensure
that it is atomic.
Reported-by: syzbot+6f72c20560060c98b566@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 78105c7e76 ("crypto: xts - Drop use of auxiliary buffer")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The x86_64 implementation of Poly1305 produces the wrong result on some
inputs because poly1305_4block_avx2() incorrectly assumes that when
partially reducing the accumulator, the bits carried from limb 'd4' to
limb 'h0' fit in a 32-bit integer. This is true for poly1305-generic
which processes only one block at a time. However, it's not true for
the AVX2 implementation, which processes 4 blocks at a time and
therefore can produce intermediate limbs about 4x larger.
Fix it by making the relevant calculations use 64-bit arithmetic rather
than 32-bit. Note that most of the carries already used 64-bit
arithmetic, but the d4 -> h0 carry was different for some reason.
To be safe I also made the same change to the corresponding SSE2 code,
though that only operates on 1 or 2 blocks at a time. I don't think
it's really needed for poly1305_block_sse2(), but it doesn't hurt
because it's already x86_64 code. It *might* be needed for
poly1305_2block_sse2(), but overflows aren't easy to reproduce there.
This bug was originally detected by my patches that improve testmgr to
fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation. But also add a
test vector which reproduces it directly (in the AVX2 case).
Fixes: b1ccc8f4b6 ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a four block AVX2 variant for x86_64")
Fixes: c70f4abef0 ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.3+
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a module parameter cryptomgr.panic_on_fail which causes the kernel
to panic if any crypto self-tests fail.
Use cases:
- More easily detect crypto self-test failures by boot testing,
e.g. on KernelCI.
- Get a bug report if syzkaller manages to use the template system to
instantiate an algorithm that fails its self-tests.
The command-line option "fips=1" already does this, but it also makes
other changes not wanted for general testing, such as disabling
"unapproved" algorithms. panic_on_fail just does what it says.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
My patches to make testmgr fuzz algorithms against their generic
implementation detected that the arm64 implementations of
"cts(cbc(aes))" handle empty messages differently from the cts template.
Namely, the arm64 implementations forbids (with -EINVAL) all messages
shorter than the block size, including the empty message; but the cts
template permits empty messages as a special case.
No user should be CTS-encrypting/decrypting empty messages, but we need
to keep the behavior consistent. Unfortunately, as noted in the source
of OpenSSL's CTS implementation [1], there's no common specification for
CTS. This makes it somewhat debatable what the behavior should be.
However, all CTS specifications seem to agree that messages shorter than
the block size are not allowed, and OpenSSL follows this in both CTS
conventions it implements. It would also simplify the user-visible
semantics to have empty messages no longer be a special case.
Therefore, make the cts template return -EINVAL on *all* messages
shorter than the block size, including the empty message.
[1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/modes/cts128.c
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
If the rfc7539 template is instantiated with specific implementations,
e.g. "rfc7539(chacha20-generic,poly1305-generic)" rather than
"rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", then the implementation names end up
included in the instance's cra_name. This is incorrect because it then
prevents all users from allocating "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", if the
highest priority implementations of chacha20 and poly1305 were selected.
Also, the self-tests aren't run on an instance allocated in this way.
Fix it by setting the instance's cra_name from the underlying
algorithms' actual cra_names, rather than from the requested names.
This matches what other templates do.
Fixes: 71ebc4d1b2 ("crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Add a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction, RFC7539")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
skcipher_walk_done() assumes it's a bug if, after the "slow" path is
executed where the next chunk of data is processed via a bounce buffer,
the algorithm says it didn't process all bytes. Thus it WARNs on this.
However, this can happen legitimately when the message needs to be
evenly divisible into "blocks" but isn't, and the algorithm has a
'walksize' greater than the block size. For example, ecb-aes-neonbs
sets 'walksize' to 128 bytes and only supports messages evenly divisible
into 16-byte blocks. If, say, 17 message bytes remain but they straddle
scatterlist elements, the skcipher_walk code will take the "slow" path
and pass the algorithm all 17 bytes in the bounce buffer. But the
algorithm will only be able to process 16 bytes, triggering the WARN.
Fix this by just removing the WARN_ON(). Returning -EINVAL, as the code
already does, is the right behavior.
This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation.
Fixes: b286d8b1a6 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The ->digest() method of crct10dif-generic reads the current CRC value
from the shash_desc context. But this value is uninitialized, causing
crypto_shash_digest() to compute the wrong result. Fix it.
Probably this wasn't noticed before because lib/crc-t10dif.c only uses
crypto_shash_update(), not crypto_shash_digest(). Likewise,
crypto_shash_digest() is not yet tested by the crypto self-tests because
those only test the ahash API which only uses shash init/update/final.
This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation.
Fixes: 2d31e518a4 ("crypto: crct10dif - Wrap crc_t10dif function all to use crypto transform framework")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cacheline_aligned is a special section. It cannot be const at the same
time because it's not read-only. It doesn't give any MMU protection.
Mark it ____cacheline_aligned to not place it in a special section,
but just align it in .rodata
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Two per-CPU variables are allocated as pointer to per-CPU memory which
then are used as scratch buffers.
We could be smart about this and use instead a per-CPU struct which
contains the pointers already and then we need to allocate just the
scratch buffers.
Add a lock to the struct. By doing so we can avoid the get_cpu()
statement and gain lockdep coverage (if enabled) to ensure that the lock
is always acquired in the right context. On non-preemptible kernels the
lock vanishes.
It is okay to use raw_cpu_ptr() in order to get a pointer to the struct
since it is protected by the spinlock.
The diffstat of this is negative and according to size scompress.o:
text data bss dec hex filename
1847 160 24 2031 7ef dbg_before.o
1754 232 4 1990 7c6 dbg_after.o
1799 64 24 1887 75f no_dbg-before.o
1703 88 4 1795 703 no_dbg-after.o
The overall size increase difference is also negative. The increase in
the data section is only four bytes without lockdep.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
If scomp_acomp_comp_decomp() fails to allocate memory for the
destination then we never copy back the data we compressed.
It is probably best to return an error code instead 0 in case of
failure.
I haven't found any user that is using acomp_request_set_params()
without the `dst' buffer so there is probably no harm.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Spotted while reviewind patches from Eric Biggers.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In salsa20_docrypt(), use crypto_xor_cpy() instead of crypto_xor().
This avoids having to memcpy() the src buffer to the dst buffer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In chacha_docrypt(), use crypto_xor_cpy() instead of crypto_xor().
This avoids having to memcpy() the src buffer to the dst buffer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All crypto API algorithms are supposed to support the case where they
are called in a context where SIMD instructions are unusable, e.g. IRQ
context on some architectures. However, this isn't tested for by the
self-tests, causing bugs to go undetected.
Now that all algorithms have been converted to use crypto_simd_usable(),
update the self-tests to test the no-SIMD case. First, a bool
testvec_config::nosimd is added. When set, the crypto operation is
executed with preemption disabled and with crypto_simd_usable() mocked
out to return false on the current CPU.
A bool test_sg_division::nosimd is also added. For hash algorithms it's
honored by the corresponding ->update(). By setting just a subset of
these bools, the case where some ->update()s are done in SIMD context
and some are done in no-SIMD context is also tested.
These bools are then randomly set by generate_random_testvec_config().
For now, all no-SIMD testing is limited to the extra crypto self-tests,
because it might be a bit too invasive for the regular self-tests.
But this could be changed later.
This has already found bugs in the arm64 AES-GCM and ChaCha algorithms.
This would have found some past bugs as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Replace all calls to may_use_simd() in the shared SIMD helpers with
crypto_simd_usable(), in order to allow testing the no-SIMD code paths.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
So that the no-SIMD fallback code can be tested by the crypto
self-tests, add a macro crypto_simd_usable() which wraps may_use_simd(),
but also returns false if the crypto self-tests have set a per-CPU bool
to disable SIMD in crypto code on the current CPU.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The arm64 implementations of ChaCha and XChaCha are failing the extra
crypto self-tests following my patches to test the !may_use_simd() code
paths, which previously were untested. The problem is as follows:
When !may_use_simd(), the arm64 NEON implementations fall back to the
generic implementation, which uses the skcipher_walk API to iterate
through the src/dst scatterlists. Due to how the skcipher_walk API
works, walk.stride is set from the skcipher_alg actually being used,
which in this case is the arm64 NEON algorithm. Thus walk.stride is
5*CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, not CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE.
This unnecessarily large stride shouldn't cause an actual problem.
However, the generic implementation computes round_down(nbytes,
walk.stride). round_down() assumes the round amount is a power of 2,
which 5*CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE is not, so it gives the wrong result.
This causes the following case in skcipher_walk_done() to be hit,
causing a WARN() and failing the encryption operation:
if (WARN_ON(err)) {
/* unexpected case; didn't process all bytes */
err = -EINVAL;
goto finish;
}
Fix it by rounding down to CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE instead of walk.stride.
(Or we could replace round_down() with rounddown(), but that would add a
slow division operation every time, which I think we should avoid.)
Fixes: 2fe55987b2 ("crypto: arm64/chacha - use combined SIMD/ALU routine for more speed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.0+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all AEAD algorithms (that I have the hardware to test, at
least) have been fixed to not modify the user-provided aead_request,
remove the workaround from testmgr that reset aead_request::tfm after
each AEAD encryption/decryption.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the x86 implementations of MORUS-1280 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the x86 implementation of MORUS-640 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the x86 implementation of AEGIS-256 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the x86 implementation of AEGIS-128L to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the x86 implementation of AEGIS-128 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Update the crypto_simd module to support wrapping AEAD algorithms.
Previously it only supported skciphers. The code for each is similar.
I'll be converting the x86 implementations of AES-GCM, AEGIS, and MORUS
to use this. Currently they each independently implement the same
functionality. This will not only simplify the code, but it will also
fix the bug detected by the improved self-tests: the user-provided
aead_request is modified. This is because these algorithms currently
reuse the original request, whereas the crypto_simd helpers build a new
request in the original request's context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To prevent any issues with persistent data, separate lzo-rle from lzo so
that it is treated as a separate algorithm, and lzo is still available.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190205155944.16007-3-dave.rodgman@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer <markus@oberhumer.com>
Cc: Matt Sealey <matt.sealey@arm.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <nitingupta910@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@openedhand.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add helper for simple skcipher modes.
- Add helper to register multiple templates.
- Set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY when setkey fails.
- Require neither or both of export/import in shash.
- AEAD decryption test vectors are now generated from encryption
ones.
- New option CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS that includes random
fuzzing.
Algorithms:
- Conversions to skcipher and helper for many templates.
- Add more test vectors for nhpoly1305 and adiantum.
Drivers:
- Add crypto4xx prng support.
- Add xcbc/cmac/ecb support in caam.
- Add AES support for Exynos5433 in s5p.
- Remove sha384/sha512 from artpec7 as hardware cannot do partial
hash"
[ There is a merge of the Freescale SoC tree in order to pull in changes
required by patches to the caam/qi2 driver. ]
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (174 commits)
crypto: s5p - add AES support for Exynos5433
dt-bindings: crypto: document Exynos5433 SlimSSS
crypto: crypto4xx - add missing of_node_put after of_device_is_available
crypto: cavium/zip - fix collision with generic cra_driver_name
crypto: af_alg - use struct_size() in sock_kfree_s()
crypto: caam - remove redundant likely/unlikely annotation
crypto: s5p - update iv after AES-CBC op end
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Clear key material from stack in SSE2 variant
crypto: caam - generate hash keys in-place
crypto: caam - fix DMA mapping xcbc key twice
crypto: caam - fix hash context DMA unmap size
hwrng: bcm2835 - fix probe as platform device
crypto: s5p-sss - Use AES_BLOCK_SIZE define instead of number
crypto: stm32 - drop pointless static qualifier in stm32_hash_remove()
crypto: chelsio - Fixed Traffic Stall
crypto: marvell - Remove set but not used variable 'ivsize'
crypto: ccp - Update driver messages to remove some confusion
crypto: adiantum - add 1536 and 4096-byte test vectors
crypto: nhpoly1305 - add a test vector with len % 16 != 0
crypto: arm/aes-ce - update IV after partial final CTR block
...
Make use of the struct_size() helper instead of an open-coded version
in order to avoid any potential type mistakes, in particular in the
context in which this code is being used.
So, change the following form:
sizeof(*sgl) + sizeof(sgl->sg[0]) * (MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1)
to :
struct_size(sgl, sg, MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1)
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add 1536 and 4096-byte Adiantum test vectors so that the case where
there are multiple NH hashes is tested. This is already tested by the
nhpoly1305 test vectors, but it should be tested at the Adiantum level
too. Moreover the 4096-byte case is especially important.
As with the other Adiantum test vectors, these were generated by the
reference Python implementation at https://github.com/google/adiantum
and then automatically formatted for testmgr by a script.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This is needed to test that the end of the message is zero-padded when
the length is not a multiple of 16 (NH_MESSAGE_UNIT). It's already
tested indirectly by the 31-byte Adiantum test vector, but it should be
tested directly at the nhpoly1305 level too.
As with the other nhpoly1305 test vectors, this was generated by the
reference Python implementation at https://github.com/google/adiantum
and then automatically formatted for testmgr by a script.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Test that all CTR implementations update the IV buffer to contain the
next counter block, aka the IV to continue the encryption/decryption of
a larger message. When the length processed is a multiple of the block
size, users may rely on this for chaining.
When the length processed is *not* a multiple of the block size, simple
chaining doesn't work. However, as noted in commit 88a3f582be
("crypto: arm64/aes - don't use IV buffer to return final keystream
block"), the generic CCM implementation assumes that the CTR IV is
handled in some sane way, not e.g. overwritten with part of the
keystream. Since this was gotten wrong once already, it's desirable to
test for it. And, the most straightforward way to do this is to enforce
that all CTR implementations have the same behavior as the generic
implementation, which returns the *next* counter following the final
partial block. This behavior also has the advantage that if someone
does misuse this case for chaining, then the keystream won't be
repeated. Thus, this patch makes the tests expect this behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Test that all CBC implementations update the IV buffer to contain the
last ciphertext block, aka the IV to continue the encryption/decryption
of a larger message. Users may rely on this for chaining.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Allow skcipher test vectors to declare the value the IV buffer should be
updated to at the end of the encryption or decryption operation.
(This check actually used to be supported in testmgr, but it was never
used and therefore got removed except for the AES-Keywrap special case.
But it will be used by CBC and CTR now, so re-add it.)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
3DES only has an 8-byte block size, but the 3DES-CTR test vectors use
16-byte IVs. Remove the unused 8 bytes from the ends of the IVs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some arc4 cipher algorithm defines show up in two places:
crypto/arc4.c and drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.h.
Let's export them in a common header and update their users.
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Check that algorithms do not change the aead_request structure, as users
may rely on submitting the request again (e.g. after copying new data
into the same source buffer) without reinitializing everything.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Check that algorithms do not change the skcipher_request structure, as
users may rely on submitting the request again (e.g. after copying new
data into the same source buffer) without reinitializing everything.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert alg_test_hash() to use the new test framework, adding a list of
testvec_configs to test by default. When the extra self-tests are
enabled, randomly generated testvec_configs are tested as well.
This improves hash test coverage mainly because now all algorithms have
a variety of data layouts tested, whereas before each algorithm was
responsible for declaring its own chunked test cases which were often
missing or provided poor test coverage. The new code also tests both
the MAY_SLEEP and !MAY_SLEEP cases and buffers that cross pages.
This already found bugs in the hash walk code and in the arm32 and arm64
implementations of crct10dif.
I removed the hash chunked test vectors that were the same as
non-chunked ones, but left the ones that were unique.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert alg_test_aead() to use the new test framework, using the same
list of testvec_configs that skcipher testing uses.
This significantly improves AEAD test coverage mainly because previously
there was only very limited test coverage of the possible data layouts.
Now the data layouts to test are listed in one place for all algorithms
and optionally are also randomly generated. In fact, only one AEAD
algorithm (AES-GCM) even had a chunked test case before.
This already found bugs in all the AEGIS and MORUS implementations, the
x86 AES-GCM implementation, and the arm64 AES-CCM implementation.
I removed the AEAD chunked test vectors that were the same as
non-chunked ones, but left the ones that were unique.
Note: the rewritten test code allocates an aead_request just once per
algorithm rather than once per encryption/decryption, but some AEAD
algorithms incorrectly change the tfm pointer in the request. It's
nontrivial to fix these, so to move forward I'm temporarily working
around it by resetting the tfm pointer. But they'll need to be fixed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert alg_test_skcipher() to use the new test framework, adding a list
of testvec_configs to test by default. When the extra self-tests are
enabled, randomly generated testvec_configs are tested as well.
This improves skcipher test coverage mainly because now all algorithms
have a variety of data layouts tested, whereas before each algorithm was
responsible for declaring its own chunked test cases which were often
missing or provided poor test coverage. The new code also tests both
the MAY_SLEEP and !MAY_SLEEP cases, different IV alignments, and buffers
that cross pages.
This has already found a bug in the arm64 ctr-aes-neonbs algorithm.
It would have easily found many past bugs.
I removed the skcipher chunked test vectors that were the same as
non-chunked ones, but left the ones that were unique.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add functions that generate a random testvec_config, in preparation for
using it for randomized fuzz tests.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To achieve more comprehensive crypto test coverage, I'd like to add fuzz
tests that use random data layouts and request flags.
To be most effective these tests should be part of testmgr, so they
automatically run on every algorithm registered with the crypto API.
However, they will take much longer to run than the current tests and
therefore will only really be intended to be run by developers, whereas
the current tests have a wider audience.
Therefore, add a new kconfig option CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
that can be set by developers to enable these extra, expensive tests.
Similar to the regular tests, also add a module parameter
cryptomgr.noextratests to support disabling the tests.
Finally, another module parameter cryptomgr.fuzz_iterations is added to
control how many iterations the fuzz tests do. Note: for now setting
this to 0 will be equivalent to cryptomgr.noextratests=1. But I opted
for separate parameters to provide more flexibility to add other types
of tests under the "extra tests" category in the future.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Crypto algorithms must produce the same output for the same input
regardless of data layout, i.e. how the src and dst scatterlists are
divided into chunks and how each chunk is aligned. Request flags such
as CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP must not affect the result either.
However, testing of this currently has many gaps. For example,
individual algorithms are responsible for providing their own chunked
test vectors. But many don't bother to do this or test only one or two
cases, providing poor test coverage. Also, other things such as
misaligned IVs and CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP are never tested at all.
Test code is also duplicated between the chunked and non-chunked cases,
making it difficult to make other improvements.
To improve the situation, this patch series basically moves the chunk
descriptions into the testmgr itself so that they are shared by all
algorithms. However, it's done in an extensible way via a new struct
'testvec_config', which describes not just the scaled chunk lengths but
also all other aspects of the crypto operation besides the data itself
such as the buffer alignments, the request flags, whether the operation
is in-place or not, the IV alignment, and for hash algorithms when to
do each update() and when to use finup() vs. final() vs. digest().
Then, this patch series makes skcipher, aead, and hash algorithms be
tested against a list of default testvec_configs, replacing the current
test code. This improves overall test coverage, without reducing test
performance too much. Note that the test vectors themselves are not
changed, except for removing the chunk lists.
This series also adds randomized fuzz tests, enabled by a new kconfig
option intended for developer use only, where skcipher, aead, and hash
algorithms are tested against many randomly generated testvec_configs.
This provides much more comprehensive test coverage.
These improved tests have already exposed many bugs.
To start it off, this initial patch adds the testvec_config and various
helper functions that will be used by the skcipher, aead, and hash test
code that will be converted to use the new testvec_config framework.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Hash algorithms with an alignmask set, e.g. "xcbc(aes-aesni)" and
"michael_mic", fail the improved hash tests because they sometimes
produce the wrong digest. The bug is that in the case where a
scatterlist element crosses pages, not all the data is actually hashed
because the scatterlist walk terminates too early. This happens because
the 'nbytes' variable in crypto_hash_walk_done() is assigned the number
of bytes remaining in the page, then later interpreted as the number of
bytes remaining in the scatterlist element. Fix it.
Fixes: 900a081f69 ("crypto: ahash - Fix early termination in hash walk")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The generic MORUS implementations all fail the improved AEAD tests
because they produce the wrong result with some data layouts. The issue
is that they assume that if the skcipher_walk API gives 'nbytes' not
aligned to the walksize (a.k.a. walk.stride), then it is the end of the
data. In fact, this can happen before the end. Fix them.
Fixes: 396be41f16 ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The generic AEGIS implementations all fail the improved AEAD tests
because they produce the wrong result with some data layouts. The issue
is that they assume that if the skcipher_walk API gives 'nbytes' not
aligned to the walksize (a.k.a. walk.stride), then it is the end of the
data. In fact, this can happen before the end. Fix them.
Fixes: f606a88e58 ("crypto: aegis - Add generic AEGIS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRC32 is not a cryptographic hash algorithm,
so the FIPS restrictions should not apply to it.
(The CRC32C variant is already allowed.)
This CRC32 variant is used for in dm-crypt legacy TrueCrypt
IV implementation (tcw); detected by cryptsetup test suite
failure in FIPS mode.
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Instantiating "cryptd(crc32c)" causes a crypto self-test failure because
the crypto_alloc_shash() in alg_test_crc32c() fails. This is because
cryptd(crc32c) is an ahash algorithm, not a shash algorithm; so it can
only be accessed through the ahash API, unlike shash algorithms which
can be accessed through both the ahash and shash APIs.
As the test is testing the shash descriptor format which is only
applicable to shash algorithms, skip it for ahash algorithms.
(Note that it's still important to fix crypto self-test failures even
for weird algorithm instantiations like cryptd(crc32c) that no one
would really use; in fips_enabled mode unprivileged users can use them
to panic the kernel, and also they prevent treating a crypto self-test
failure as a bug when fuzzing the kernel.)
Fixes: 8e3ee85e68 ("crypto: crc32c - Test descriptor context format")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementation
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY confuses newcomers to the crypto API because it
sounds like it is requesting a weak key. Actually, it is requesting
that weak keys be forbidden (for algorithms that have the notion of
"weak keys"; currently only DES and XTS do).
Also it is only one letter away from CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY, with which
it can be easily confused. (This in fact happened in the UX500 driver,
though just in some debugging messages.)
Therefore, make the intent clear by renaming it to
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use crypto template array registering API to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use crypto template array registering API to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use crypto template array registering API to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use crypto template array registering API to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch add a helper to (un)register a array of templates. The
following patches will use this helper to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The license boiler plate text is not ideal for machine parsing. The kernel
uses SPDX license identifiers for that purpose, which replace the boiler
plate text.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The license boiler plate text is not ideal for machine parsing. The kernel
uses SPDX license identifiers for that purpose, which replace the boiler
plate text.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Precise and non-ambiguous license information is important. The recently
added aegis header file has a SPDX license identifier, which is nice, but
at the same time it has a contradictionary license boiler plate text.
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
versus
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
* Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
* any later version
Oh well.
As the other aegis related files are licensed under the GPL v2 or later,
it's assumed that the boiler plate code is correct, but the SPDX license
identifier is wrong.
Fix the SPDX identifier and remove the boiler plate as it is redundant.
Fixes: f606a88e58 ("crypto: aegis - Add generic AEGIS AEAD implementations")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently testmgr has separate encryption and decryption test vectors
for AEADs. That's massively redundant, since usually the decryption
tests are identical to the encryption tests, just with the input/result
swapped. And for some algorithms it was forgotten to add decryption
test vectors, so for them currently only encryption is being tested.
Therefore, eliminate the redundancy by removing the AEAD decryption test
vectors and updating testmgr to test both AEAD encryption and decryption
using what used to be the encryption test vectors. Naming is adjusted
accordingly: each aead_testvec now has a 'ptext' (plaintext), 'plen'
(plaintext length), 'ctext' (ciphertext), and 'clen' (ciphertext length)
instead of an 'input', 'ilen', 'result', and 'rlen'. "Ciphertext" here
refers to the full ciphertext, including the authentication tag.
For now the scatterlist divisions are just given for the plaintext
length, not also the ciphertext length. For decryption, the last
scatterlist element is just extended by the authentication tag length.
In total, this removes over 5000 lines from testmgr.h, with no reduction
in test coverage since prior patches already copied the few unique
decryption test vectors into the encryption test vectors.
The testmgr.h portion of this patch was automatically generated using
the following awk script, except that I also manually updated the
definition of 'struct aead_testvec' and fixed the location of the
comment describing the AEGIS-128 test vectors.
BEGIN { OTHER = 0; ENCVEC = 1; DECVEC = 2; DECVEC_TAIL = 3; mode = OTHER }
/^static const struct aead_testvec.*_enc_/ { sub("_enc", ""); mode = ENCVEC }
/^static const struct aead_testvec.*_dec_/ { mode = DECVEC }
mode == ENCVEC {
sub(/\.input[[:space:]]*=/, ".ptext\t=")
sub(/\.result[[:space:]]*=/, ".ctext\t=")
sub(/\.ilen[[:space:]]*=/, ".plen\t=")
sub(/\.rlen[[:space:]]*=/, ".clen\t=")
print
}
mode == DECVEC_TAIL && /[^[:space:]]/ { mode = OTHER }
mode == OTHER { print }
mode == ENCVEC && /^};/ { mode = OTHER }
mode == DECVEC && /^};/ { mode = DECVEC_TAIL }
Note that git's default diff algorithm gets confused by the testmgr.h
portion of this patch, and reports too many lines added and removed.
It's better viewed with 'git diff --minimal' (or 'git show --minimal'),
which reports "2 files changed, 1235 insertions(+), 6491 deletions(-)".
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
One "rfc4543(gcm(aes))" decryption test vector doesn't exactly match any of the
encryption test vectors with input and result swapped. In preparation
for removing the AEAD decryption test vectors and testing AEAD
decryption using the encryption test vectors, add this to the encryption
test vectors, so we don't lose any test coverage.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some "gcm(aes)" decryption test vectors don't exactly match any of the
encryption test vectors with input and result swapped. In preparation
for removing the AEAD decryption test vectors and testing AEAD
decryption using the encryption test vectors, add these to the
encryption test vectors, so we don't lose any test coverage.
In the case of the chunked test vector, I truncated the last scatterlist
element to the end of the plaintext.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some "ccm(aes)" decryption test vectors don't exactly match any of the
encryption test vectors with input and result swapped. In preparation
for removing the AEAD decryption test vectors and testing AEAD
decryption using the encryption test vectors, add these to the
encryption test vectors, so we don't lose any test coverage.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation for unifying the AEAD encryption and decryption test
vectors, skip AEAD test vectors with the 'novrfy' (verification failure
expected) flag set when testing encryption rather than decryption.
These test vectors only make sense for decryption.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
sk_alloc() already sets sock::sk_family to PF_ALG which is passed as the
'family' argument, so there's no need to set it again.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
af_alg_count_tsgl() iterates through a list without modifying it, so use
list_for_each_entry() rather than list_for_each_entry_safe(). Also make
the pointers 'const' to make it clearer that nothing is modified.
No actual change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some exported functions in af_alg.c aren't used outside of that file.
Therefore, un-export them and make them 'static'.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_cfg_mutex in crypto_user_stat.c is unused. Remove it.
Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fix an unaligned memory access in tgr192_transform() by using the
unaligned access helpers.
Fixes: 06ace7a9ba ("[CRYPTO] Use standard byte order macros wherever possible")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move the declaration of crypto_nlsk into internal/cryptouser.h. This
fixes the following sparse warning:
crypto/crypto_user_base.c:41:13: warning: symbol 'crypto_nlsk' was not declared. Should it be static?
Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The crc32c context is in CPU endianness, whereas the final digest is
little endian. alg_test_crc32c() got this mixed up. Fix it.
The test passes both before and after, but this patch fixes the
following sparse warning:
crypto/testmgr.c:1912:24: warning: cast to restricted __le32
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
streebog_uint512::qword needs to be __le64, not u64. This fixes a large
number of sparse warnings:
crypto/streebog_generic.c:25:9: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different base types)
crypto/streebog_generic.c:25:9: expected unsigned long long
crypto/streebog_generic.c:25:9: got restricted __le64 [usertype]
[omitted many similar warnings]
No actual change in behavior.
Cc: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Include internal/rsa.h in rsa-pkcs1pad.c to get the declaration of
rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl. This fixes the following sparse warning:
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:698:24: warning: symbol 'rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl' was not declared. Should it be static?
Cc: Andrzej Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In gcm_hash_len(), use be128 rather than u128. This fixes the following
sparse warnings:
crypto/gcm.c:252:19: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
crypto/gcm.c:252:19: expected unsigned long long [usertype] a
crypto/gcm.c:252:19: got restricted __be64 [usertype]
crypto/gcm.c:253:19: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
crypto/gcm.c:253:19: expected unsigned long long [usertype] b
crypto/gcm.c:253:19: got restricted __be64 [usertype]
No actual change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Before this, if akcipher_testvec have `public_key_vec' set to true
(i.e. having a public key) only sign/encrypt test is performed, but
verify/decrypt test is skipped.
With a public key we could do encrypt and verify, but to sign and decrypt
a private key is required.
This logic is correct for encrypt/decrypt tests (decrypt is skipped if
no private key). But incorrect for sign/verify tests - sign is performed
no matter if there is no private key, but verify is skipped if there is
a public key.
Rework `test_akcipher_one' to arrange tests properly depending on value
of `public_key_vec` and `siggen_sigver_test'.
No tests were missed since there is only one sign/verify test (which
have `siggen_sigver_test' set to true) and it has a private key, but
future tests could benefit from this improvement.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_init_shash_ops_async() only gives the ahash tfm non-NULL
->export() and ->import() if the underlying shash alg has these
non-NULL. This doesn't make sense because when an shash algorithm is
registered, shash_prepare_alg() sets a default ->export() and ->import()
if the implementor didn't provide them. And elsewhere it's assumed that
all shash algs and ahash tfms have non-NULL ->export() and ->import().
Therefore, remove these unnecessary, always-true conditions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Prevent registering shash algorithms that implement ->export() but not
->import(), or ->import() but not ->export(). Such cases don't make
sense and could confuse the check that shash_prepare_alg() does for just
->export().
I don't believe this affects any existing algorithms; this is just
preventing future mistakes.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
For example, in gcm.c, if the kzalloc() fails due to lack of memory,
then the CTR part of GCM will have the new key but GHASH will not.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails, to prevent the tfm from being
used until a new key is set.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed"
states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
Fixes: dc26c17f74 ("crypto: aead - prevent using AEADs without setting key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
For example, in lrw.c, if gf128mul_init_64k_bbe() fails due to lack of
memory, then priv::table will be left NULL. After that, encryption with
that tfm will cause a NULL pointer dereference.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a
key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed"
states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
Fixes: f8d33fac84 ("crypto: skcipher - prevent using skciphers without setting key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a
key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.
Note: we can't set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY for OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, so
->setkey() for those must nevertheless be atomic. That's fine for now
since only the crc32 and crc32c algorithms set OPTIONAL_KEY, and it's
not intended that OPTIONAL_KEY be used much.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed"
states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
Fixes: 9fa68f6200 ("crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
It took me a while to notice the bug where the adiantum template left
crypto_spawn::inst == NULL, because this only caused problems in certain
cases where algorithms are dynamically loaded/unloaded.
More improvements are needed, but for now make crypto_init_spawn()
reject this case and WARN(), so this type of bug will be noticed
immediately in the future.
Note: I checked all callers and the adiantum template was the only place
that had this wrong. So this WARN shouldn't trigger anymore.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that all "blkcipher" templates have been converted to "skcipher",
crypto_alloc_instance() is no longer used. And it's not useful any
longer as it creates an old-style weakly typed instance rather than a
new-style strongly typed instance. So remove it, and now that the name
is freed up rename crypto_alloc_instance2() to crypto_alloc_instance().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the "ecb-cipher_null" algorithm from the deprecated "blkcipher"
API to the "skcipher" API.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the "ecb(arc4)" algorithm from the deprecated "blkcipher" API to
the "skcipher" API.
(Note that this is really a stream cipher and not a block cipher in ECB
mode as the name implies, but that's a problem for another day...)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The PCBC template just wraps a single block cipher algorithm, so
simplify it by converting it to use skcipher_alloc_instance_simple().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Following commit 944585a64f ("crypto: x86/aes-ni - remove special
handling of AES in PCBC mode"), it's no longer needed for the PCBC
template to support wrapping a cipher that has the CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL
flag set. Thus, remove this now-unused functionality to make PCBC
consistent with the other single block cipher templates.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The OFB template just wraps a single block cipher algorithm, so simplify
it by converting it to use skcipher_alloc_instance_simple().
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the keywrap template from the deprecated "blkcipher" API to the
"skcipher" API, taking advantage of skcipher_alloc_instance_simple() to
simplify it considerably.
Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the ECB template from the deprecated "blkcipher" API to the
"skcipher" API, taking advantage of skcipher_alloc_instance_simple() to
simplify it considerably.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the CTR template from the deprecated "blkcipher" API to the
"skcipher" API, taking advantage of skcipher_alloc_instance_simple() to
simplify it considerably.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CFB template just wraps a single block cipher algorithm, so simplify
it by converting it to use skcipher_alloc_instance_simple().
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CBC template just wraps a single block cipher algorithm, so simplify
it by converting it to use skcipher_alloc_instance_simple().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The majority of skcipher templates (including both the existing ones and
the ones remaining to be converted from the "blkcipher" API) just wrap a
single block cipher algorithm. This includes cbc, cfb, ctr, ecb, kw,
ofb, and pcbc. Add a helper function skcipher_alloc_instance_simple()
that handles allocating an skcipher instance for this common case.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The memcpy()s in the PCBC implementation use walk->iv as both the source
and destination, which has undefined behavior. These memcpy()'s are
actually unneeded, because walk->iv is already used to hold the previous
plaintext block XOR'd with the previous ciphertext block. Thus,
walk->iv is already updated to its final value.
So remove the broken and unnecessary memcpy()s.
Fixes: 91652be5d1 ("[CRYPTO] pcbc: Add Propagated CBC template")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.21+
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fix multiple bugs in the OFB implementation:
1. It stored the per-request state 'cnt' in the tfm context, which can be
used by multiple threads concurrently (e.g. via AF_ALG).
2. It didn't support messages not a multiple of the block cipher size,
despite being a stream cipher.
3. It didn't set cra_blocksize to 1 to indicate it is a stream cipher.
To fix these, set the 'chunksize' property to the cipher block size to
guarantee that when walking through the scatterlist, a partial block can
only occur at the end. Then change the implementation to XOR a block at
a time at first, then XOR the partial block at the end if needed. This
is the same way CTR and CFB are implemented. As a bonus, this also
improves performance in most cases over the current approach.
Fixes: e497c51896 ("crypto: ofb - add output feedback mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The memcpy() in crypto_cfb_decrypt_inplace() uses walk->iv as both the
source and destination, which has undefined behavior. It is unneeded
because walk->iv is already used to hold the previous ciphertext block;
thus, walk->iv is already updated to its final value. So, remove it.
Also, note that in-place decryption is the only case where the previous
ciphertext block is not directly available. Therefore, as a related
cleanup I also updated crypto_cfb_encrypt_segment() to directly use the
previous ciphertext block rather than save it into walk->iv. This makes
it consistent with in-place encryption and out-of-place decryption; now
only in-place decryption is different, because it has to be.
Fixes: a7d85e06ed ("crypto: cfb - add support for Cipher FeedBack mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Like some other block cipher mode implementations, the CFB
implementation assumes that while walking through the scatterlist, a
partial block does not occur until the end. But the walk is incorrectly
being done with a blocksize of 1, as 'cra_blocksize' is set to 1 (since
CFB is a stream cipher) but no 'chunksize' is set. This bug causes
incorrect encryption/decryption for some scatterlist layouts.
Fix it by setting the 'chunksize'. Also extend the CFB test vectors to
cover this bug as well as cases where the message length is not a
multiple of the block size.
Fixes: a7d85e06ed ("crypto: cfb - add support for Cipher FeedBack mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
sm3_compress() calls rol32() with shift >= 32, which causes undefined
behavior. This is easily detected by enabling CONFIG_UBSAN.
Explicitly AND with 31 to make the behavior well defined.
Fixes: 4f0fc1600e ("crypto: sm3 - add OSCCA SM3 secure hash")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.15+
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_grab_*() doesn't set crypto_spawn::inst, so templates must set it
beforehand. Otherwise it will be left NULL, which causes a crash in
certain cases where algorithms are dynamically loaded/unloaded. E.g.
with CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64=m, the following caused a crash:
insmod chacha-x86_64.ko
python -c 'import socket; socket.socket(socket.AF_ALG, 5, 0).bind(("skcipher", "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)"))'
rmmod chacha-x86_64.ko
python -c 'import socket; socket.socket(socket.AF_ALG, 5, 0).bind(("skcipher", "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)"))'
Fixes: 059c2a4d8e ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte
'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key.
crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys.
However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is
longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends
before the next 4-byte aligned boundary. In this case, 'keylen -=
RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);' underflows to a value near UINT_MAX. This
causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey().
Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size.
Reproducer using AF_ALG:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "aead",
.salg_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
};
struct {
struct rtattr attr;
__be32 enckeylen;
char keys[1];
} __attribute__((packed)) key = {
.attr.rta_len = sizeof(key),
.attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */,
};
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &key, sizeof(key));
}
It caused:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000
PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 PUD 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155
[...]
Call Trace:
sha256_ni_finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c:321
crypto_shash_finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178
shash_digest_unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186
crypto_shash_digest+0x24/0x40 crypto/shash.c:202
hmac_setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0x2b/0xb0 crypto/shash.c:66
shash_async_setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223
crypto_ahash_setkey+0x2d/0xa0 crypto/ahash.c:202
crypto_authenc_setkey+0x68/0x100 crypto/authenc.c:96
crypto_aead_setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/aead.c:62
aead_setkey+0xc/0x10 crypto/algif_aead.c:526
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:223 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af_alg.c:256
__sys_setsockopt+0x6d/0xd0 net/socket.c:1902
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:1910
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: e236d4a89a ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
- support -y option for merge_config.sh to avoid downgrading =y to =m
- remove S_OTHER symbol type, and touch include/config/*.h files correctly
- fix file name and line number in lexer warnings
- fix memory leak when EOF is encountered in quotation
- resolve all shift/reduce conflicts of the parser
- warn no new line at end of file
- make 'source' statement more strict to take only string literal
- rewrite the lexer and remove the keyword lookup table
- convert to SPDX License Identifier
- compile C files independently instead of including them from zconf.y
- fix various warnings of gconfig
- misc cleanups
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1
iQIcBAABAgAGBQJcJieuAAoJED2LAQed4NsGHlIP/1s0fQ86XD9dIMyHzAO0gh2f
7rylfe2kEXJgIzJ0DyZdLu4iZtwbkEUqTQrRS1abriNGVemPkfBAnZdM5d92lOQX
3iREa700AJ2xo7V7gYZ6AbhZoG3p0S9U9Q2qE5S+tFTe8c2Gy4xtjnODF+Vel85r
S0P8tF5sE1/d00lm+yfMI/CJVfDjyNaMm+aVEnL0kZTPiRkaktjWgo6Fc2p4z1L5
HFmMMP6/iaXmRZ+tHJGPQ2AT70GFVZw5ePxPcl50EotUP25KHbuUdzs8wDpYm3U/
rcESVsIFpgqHWmTsdBk6dZk0q8yFZNkMlkaP/aYukVZpUn/N6oAXgTFckYl8dmQL
fQBkQi6DTfr9EBPVbj18BKm7xI3Y4DdQ2fzTfYkJ2XwNRGFA5r9N3sjd7ZTVGjxC
aeeMHCwvGdSx1x8PeZAhZfsUHW8xVDMSQiT713+ljBY+6cwzA+2NF0kP7B6OAqwr
ETFzd4Xu2/lZcL7gQRH8WU3L2S5iedmDG6RnZgJMXI0/9V4qAA+nlsWaCgnl1TgA
mpxYlLUMrd6AUJevE34FlnyFdk8IMn9iKRFsvF0f3doO5C7QzTVGqFdJu5a0CuWO
4NBJvZjFT8/4amoWLfnDlfApWXzTfwLbKG+r6V2F30fLuXpYg5LxWhBoGRPYLZSq
oi4xN1Mpx3TvXz6WcKVZ
=r3Fl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'kconfig-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kconfig updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- support -y option for merge_config.sh to avoid downgrading =y to =m
- remove S_OTHER symbol type, and touch include/config/*.h files correctly
- fix file name and line number in lexer warnings
- fix memory leak when EOF is encountered in quotation
- resolve all shift/reduce conflicts of the parser
- warn no new line at end of file
- make 'source' statement more strict to take only string literal
- rewrite the lexer and remove the keyword lookup table
- convert to SPDX License Identifier
- compile C files independently instead of including them from zconf.y
- fix various warnings of gconfig
- misc cleanups
* tag 'kconfig-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (39 commits)
kconfig: surround dbg_sym_flags with #ifdef DEBUG to fix gconf warning
kconfig: split images.c out of qconf.cc/gconf.c to fix gconf warnings
kconfig: add static qualifiers to fix gconf warnings
kconfig: split the lexer out of zconf.y
kconfig: split some C files out of zconf.y
kconfig: convert to SPDX License Identifier
kconfig: remove keyword lookup table entirely
kconfig: update current_pos in the second lexer
kconfig: switch to ASSIGN_VAL state in the second lexer
kconfig: stop associating kconf_id with yylval
kconfig: refactor end token rules
kconfig: stop supporting '.' and '/' in unquoted words
treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotes
microblaze: surround string default in Kconfig with double quotes
kconfig: use T_WORD instead of T_VARIABLE for variables
kconfig: use specific tokens instead of T_ASSIGN for assignments
kconfig: refactor scanning and parsing "option" properties
kconfig: use distinct tokens for type and default properties
kconfig: remove redundant token defines
kconfig: rename depends_list to comment_option_list
...
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add 1472-byte test to tcrypt for IPsec
- Reintroduced crypto stats interface with numerous changes
- Support incremental algorithm dumps
Algorithms:
- Add xchacha12/20
- Add nhpoly1305
- Add adiantum
- Add streebog hash
- Mark cts(cbc(aes)) as FIPS allowed
Drivers:
- Improve performance of arm64/chacha20
- Improve performance of x86/chacha20
- Add NEON-accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add SSE2 accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add AVX2 accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add support for 192/256-bit keys in gcmaes AVX
- Add SG support in gcmaes AVX
- ESN for inline IPsec tx in chcr
- Add support for CryptoCell 703 in ccree
- Add support for CryptoCell 713 in ccree
- Add SM4 support in ccree
- Add SM3 support in ccree
- Add support for chacha20 in caam/qi2
- Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/jr
- Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/qi2
- Add AEAD cipher support in cavium/nitrox"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (130 commits)
crypto: skcipher - remove remnants of internal IV generators
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Fix build with !CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
crypto: salsa20-generic - don't unnecessarily use atomic walk
crypto: skcipher - add might_sleep() to skcipher_walk_virt()
crypto: x86/chacha - avoid sleeping under kernel_fpu_begin()
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Added AEAD cipher support
crypto: mxc-scc - fix build warnings on ARM64
crypto: api - document missing stats member
crypto: user - remove unused dump functions
crypto: chelsio - Fix wrong error counter increments
crypto: chelsio - Reset counters on cxgb4 Detach
crypto: chelsio - Handle PCI shutdown event
crypto: chelsio - cleanup:send addr as value in function argument
crypto: chelsio - Use same value for both channel in single WR
crypto: chelsio - Swap location of AAD and IV sent in WR
crypto: chelsio - remove set but not used variable 'kctx_len'
crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in hash_set_dma_transfer
crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in cryp_set_dma_transfer
crypto: aesni - Add scatter/gather avx stubs, and use them in C
crypto: aesni - Introduce partial block macro
..
Pull RCU updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The biggest RCU changes in this cycle were:
- Convert RCU's BUG_ON() and similar calls to WARN_ON() and similar.
- Replace calls of RCU-bh and RCU-sched update-side functions to
their vanilla RCU counterparts. This series is a step towards
complete removal of the RCU-bh and RCU-sched update-side functions.
( Note that some of these conversions are going upstream via their
respective maintainers. )
- Documentation updates, including a number of flavor-consolidation
updates from Joel Fernandes.
- Miscellaneous fixes.
- Automate generation of the initrd filesystem used for rcutorture
testing.
- Convert spin_is_locked() assertions to instead use lockdep.
( Note that some of these conversions are going upstream via their
respective maintainers. )
- SRCU updates, especially including a fix from Dennis Krein for a
bag-on-head-class bug.
- RCU torture-test updates"
* 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (112 commits)
rcutorture: Don't do busted forward-progress testing
rcutorture: Use 100ms buckets for forward-progress callback histograms
rcutorture: Recover from OOM during forward-progress tests
rcutorture: Print forward-progress test age upon failure
rcutorture: Print time since GP end upon forward-progress failure
rcutorture: Print histogram of CB invocation at OOM time
rcutorture: Print GP age upon forward-progress failure
rcu: Print per-CPU callback counts for forward-progress failures
rcu: Account for nocb-CPU callback counts in RCU CPU stall warnings
rcutorture: Dump grace-period diagnostics upon forward-progress OOM
rcutorture: Prepare for asynchronous access to rcu_fwd_startat
torture: Remove unnecessary "ret" variables
rcutorture: Affinity forward-progress test to avoid housekeeping CPUs
rcutorture: Break up too-long rcu_torture_fwd_prog() function
rcutorture: Remove cbflood facility
torture: Bring any extra CPUs online during kernel startup
rcutorture: Add call_rcu() flooding forward-progress tests
rcutorture/formal: Replace synchronize_sched() with synchronize_rcu()
tools/kernel.h: Replace synchronize_sched() with synchronize_rcu()
net/decnet: Replace rcu_barrier_bh() with rcu_barrier()
...
Remove dead code related to internal IV generators, which are no longer
used since they've been replaced with the "seqiv" and "echainiv"
templates. The removed code includes:
- The "givcipher" (GIVCIPHER) algorithm type. No algorithms are
registered with this type anymore, so it's unneeded.
- The "const char *geniv" member of aead_alg, ablkcipher_alg, and
blkcipher_alg. A few algorithms still set this, but it isn't used
anymore except to show via /proc/crypto and CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG.
Just hardcode "<default>" or "<none>" in those cases.
- The 'skcipher_givcrypt_request' structure, which is never used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
salsa20-generic doesn't use SIMD instructions or otherwise disable
preemption, so passing atomic=true to skcipher_walk_virt() is
unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
skcipher_walk_virt() can still sleep even with atomic=true, since that
only affects the later calls to skcipher_walk_done(). But,
skcipher_walk_virt() only has to allocate memory for some input data
layouts, so incorrectly calling it with preemption disabled can go
undetected. Use might_sleep() so that it's detected reliably.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch removes unused dump functions for crypto_user_stats.
There are remains of the copy/paste of crypto_user_base to
crypto_user_stat and I forgot to remove them.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in
the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to
support bare file paths in the source statement.
I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of
ambiguity.
The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes,
and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals.
Make it treewide consistent now.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
crypto_alg_mod_lookup() takes a reference to the hash algorithm but
crypto_init_shash_spawn() doesn't take ownership of it, hence the
reference needs to be dropped in adiantum_create().
Fixes: 059c2a4d8e ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG in NLM_F_DUMP mode sometimes doesn't return all
registered crypto algorithms, because it doesn't support incremental
dumps. crypto_dump_report() only permits itself to be called once, yet
the netlink subsystem allocates at most ~64 KiB for the skb being dumped
to. Thus only the first recvmsg() returns data, and it may only include
a subset of the crypto algorithms even if the user buffer passed to
recvmsg() is large enough to hold all of them.
Fix this by using one of the arguments in the netlink_callback structure
to keep track of the current position in the algorithm list. Then
userspace can do multiple recvmsg() on the socket after sending the dump
request. This is the way netlink dumps work elsewhere in the kernel;
it's unclear why this was different (probably just an oversight).
Also fix an integer overflow when calculating the dump buffer size hint.
Fixes: a38f7907b9 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The 2018-11-28 revision of the Adiantum paper has revised some notation:
- 'M' was replaced with 'L' (meaning "Left", for the left-hand part of
the message) in the definition of Adiantum hashing, to avoid confusion
with the full message
- ε-almost-∆-universal is now abbreviated as ε-∆U instead of εA∆U
- "block" is now used only to mean block cipher and Poly1305 blocks
Also, Adiantum hashing was moved from the appendix to the main paper.
To avoid confusion, update relevant comments in the code to match.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The kernel's ChaCha20 uses the RFC7539 convention of the nonce being 12
bytes rather than 8, so actually I only appended 12 random bytes (not
16) to its test vectors to form 24-byte nonces for the XChaCha20 test
vectors. The other 4 bytes were just from zero-padding the stream
position to 8 bytes. Fix the comments above the test vectors.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There is a draft specification for XChaCha20 being worked on. Add the
XChaCha20 test vector from the appendix so that we can be extra sure the
kernel's implementation is compatible.
I also recomputed the ciphertext with XChaCha12 and added it there too,
to keep the tests for XChaCha20 and XChaCha12 in sync.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that the x86_64 SIMD implementations of ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 have
been refactored to support varying the number of rounds, add support for
XChaCha12. This is identical to XChaCha20 except for the number of
rounds, which is 12 instead of 20. This can be used by Adiantum.
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add an XChaCha20 implementation that is hooked up to the x86_64 SIMD
implementations of ChaCha20. This can be used by Adiantum.
An SSSE3 implementation of single-block HChaCha20 is also added so that
XChaCha20 can use it rather than the generic implementation. This
required refactoring the ChaCha permutation into its own function.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a 64-bit AVX2 implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal
hash function used in the Adiantum encryption mode. For now, only the
NH portion is actually AVX2-accelerated; the Poly1305 part is less
performance-critical so is just implemented in C.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a 64-bit SSE2 implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal
hash function used in the Adiantum encryption mode. For now, only the
NH portion is actually SSE2-accelerated; the Poly1305 part is less
performance-critical so is just implemented in C.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
If the stream cipher implementation is asynchronous, then the Adiantum
instance must be flagged as asynchronous as well. Otherwise someone
asking for a synchronous algorithm can get an asynchronous algorithm.
There are no asynchronous xchacha12 or xchacha20 implementations yet
which makes this largely a theoretical issue, but it should be fixed.
Fixes: 059c2a4d8e ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In order to have better coverage of algorithms operating on block
sizes that are in the ballpark of a VPN packet, add 1472 to the
block_sizes array.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch add the crypto_stats_init() function.
This will permit to remove some ifdef from __crypto_register_alg().
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since now all crypto stats are on their own structures, it is now
useless to have the algorithm name in the err_cnt member.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Like for userspace, this patch splits stats into multiple structures,
one for each algorithm class.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The use of the v64 intermediate variable is useless, and removing it
bring to much readable code.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some error count use the wrong name for getting this data.
But this had not caused any reporting problem, since all error count are shared in the same
union.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All crypto_stats functions use the struct xxx_request for feeding stats,
but in some case this structure could already be freed.
For fixing this, the needed parameters (len and alg) will be stored
before the request being executed.
Fixes: cac5818c25 ("crypto: user - Implement a generic crypto statistics")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6939a606a5305e9e9799@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
It is cleaner to have each stat in their own structures.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All the 32-bit fields need to be 64-bit. In some cases, UINT32_MAX crypto
operations can be done in seconds.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CRYPTO_STATS is using CRYPTO_USER stuff, so it should depends on it.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Even if CRYPTO_STATS is set to n, some part of CRYPTO_STATS are
compiled.
This patch made all part of crypto_user_stat uncompiled in that case.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since this user-space API is still undergoing significant changes,
this patch disables it for the current merge window.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull RCU changes from Paul E. McKenney:
- Convert RCU's BUG_ON() and similar calls to WARN_ON() and similar.
- Replace calls of RCU-bh and RCU-sched update-side functions
to their vanilla RCU counterparts. This series is a step
towards complete removal of the RCU-bh and RCU-sched update-side
functions.
( Note that some of these conversions are going upstream via their
respective maintainers. )
- Documentation updates, including a number of flavor-consolidation
updates from Joel Fernandes.
- Miscellaneous fixes.
- Automate generation of the initrd filesystem used for
rcutorture testing.
- Convert spin_is_locked() assertions to instead use lockdep.
( Note that some of these conversions are going upstream via their
respective maintainers. )
- SRCU updates, especially including a fix from Dennis Krein
for a bag-on-head-class bug.
- RCU torture-test updates.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
In multiple functions, the algorithm fields are read after its reference
is dropped through crypto_mod_put. In this case, the algorithm memory
may be freed, resulting in use-after-free bugs. This patch delays the
put operation until the algorithm is never used.
Fixes: 79c65d179a ("crypto: cbc - Convert to skcipher")
Fixes: a7d85e06ed ("crypto: cfb - add support for Cipher FeedBack mode")
Fixes: 043a44001b ("crypto: pcbc - Convert to skcipher")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that synchronize_rcu() waits for bh-disable regions of code as
well as RCU read-side critical sections, the synchronize_rcu_bh() in
pcrypt_cpumask_change_notify() can be replaced by synchronize_rcu().
This commit therefore makes this change.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a generic implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash
function used in the Adiantum encryption mode.
CONFIG_NHPOLY1305 is not selectable by itself since there won't be any
real reason to enable it without also enabling Adiantum support.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Expose a low-level Poly1305 API which implements the
ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function underlying the Poly1305 MAC
and supports block-aligned inputs only.
This is needed for Adiantum hashing, which builds an εA∆U hash function
from NH and a polynomial evaluation in GF(2^{130}-5); this polynomial
evaluation is identical to the one the Poly1305 MAC does. However, the
crypto_shash Poly1305 API isn't very appropriate for this because its
calling convention assumes it is used as a MAC, with a 32-byte "one-time
key" provided for every digest.
But by design, in Adiantum hashing the performance of the polynomial
evaluation isn't nearly as critical as NH. So it suffices to just have
some C helper functions. Thus, this patch adds such functions.
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation for exposing a low-level Poly1305 API which implements
the ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function underlying the Poly1305
MAC and supports block-aligned inputs only, create structures
poly1305_key and poly1305_state which hold the limbs of the Poly1305
"r" key and accumulator, respectively.
These structures could actually have the same type (e.g. poly1305_val),
but different types are preferable, to prevent misuse.
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation for adding XChaCha12 support, rename/refactor
chacha20-generic to support different numbers of rounds. The
justification for needing XChaCha12 support is explained in more detail
in the patch "crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support".
The only difference between ChaCha{8,12,20} are the number of rounds
itself; all other parts of the algorithm are the same. Therefore,
remove the "20" from all definitions, structures, functions, files, etc.
that will be shared by all ChaCha versions.
Also make ->setkey() store the round count in the chacha_ctx (previously
chacha20_ctx). The generic code then passes the round count through to
chacha_block(). There will be a ->setkey() function for each explicitly
allowed round count; the encrypt/decrypt functions will be the same. I
decided not to do it the opposite way (same ->setkey() function for all
round counts, with different encrypt/decrypt functions) because that
would have required more boilerplate code in architecture-specific
implementations of ChaCha and XChaCha.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the
application of the XSalsa20 construction
(https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the
ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe
it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
Supporting both variants is straightforward.
Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users
to seek to any position in the stream.
I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity of separate modules.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
chacha20-generic doesn't use SIMD instructions or otherwise disable
preemption, so passing atomic=true to skcipher_walk_virt() is
unnecessary.
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some algorithms initialize their .cra_list prior to registration.
But this is unnecessary since crypto_register_alg() will overwrite
.cra_list when adding the algorithm to the 'crypto_alg_list'.
Apparently the useless assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignments.
Exception: paes_s390.c uses cra_list to check whether the algorithm is
registered or not, so I left that as-is for now.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
ecc_point_mult is supposed to be used with a regularized scalar,
otherwise, it's possible to deduce the position of the top bit of the
scalar with timing attack. This is important when the scalar is a
private key.
ecc_point_mult is already using a regular algorithm (i.e. having an
operation flow independent of the input scalar) but regularization step
is not implemented.
Arrange scalar to always have fixed top bit by adding a multiple of the
curve order (n).
References:
The constant time regularization step is based on micro-ecc by Kenneth
MacKay and also referenced in the literature (Bernstein, D. J., & Lange,
T. (2017). Montgomery curves and the Montgomery ladder. (Cryptology
ePrint Archive; Vol. 2017/293). s.l.: IACR. Chapter 4.6.2.)
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE to header file, so it can be reused.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add testmgr and tcrypt tests and vectors for Streebog hash function
from RFC 6986 and GOST R 34.11-2012, for HMAC-Streebog vectors are
from RFC 7836 and R 50.1.113-2016.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Register Streebog hash function in Hash Info arrays to let IMA use
it for its purposes.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cts(cbc(aes)) as used in the kernel has been added to NIST
standard as CBC-CS3. Document it as such.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Suggested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently used scalar multiplication algorithm (Matthieu Rivain, 2011)
have invalid values for scalar == 1, n-1, and for regularized version
n-2, which was previously not checked. Verify that they are not used as
private keys.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As per Sp800-38A addendum from Oct 2010[1], cts(cbc(aes)) is
allowed as a FIPS mode algorithm. Mark it as such.
[1] https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/addendum/final
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There have been a pretty ridiculous number of issues with initializing
the report structures that are copied to userspace by NETLINK_CRYPTO.
Commit 4473710df1 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME
expansion") replaced some strncpy()s with strlcpy()s, thereby
introducing information leaks. Later two other people tried to replace
other strncpy()s with strlcpy() too, which would have introduced even
more information leaks:
- https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/954991/
- https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10434351/
Commit cac5818c25 ("crypto: user - Implement a generic crypto
statistics") also uses the buggy strlcpy() approach and therefore leaks
uninitialized memory to userspace. A fix was proposed, but it was
originally incomplete.
Seeing as how apparently no one can get this right with the current
approach, change all the reporting functions to:
- Start by memsetting the report structure to 0. This guarantees it's
always initialized, regardless of what happens later.
- Initialize all strings using strscpy(). This is safe after the
memset, ensures null termination of long strings, avoids unnecessary
work, and avoids the -Wstringop-truncation warnings from gcc.
- Use sizeof(var) instead of sizeof(type). This is more robust against
copy+paste errors.
For simplicity, also reuse the -EMSGSIZE return value from nla_put().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The acomp, akcipher, and kpp algorithm types already have .report
methods defined, so there's no need to duplicate this functionality in
crypto_user itself; the duplicate functions are actually never executed.
Remove the unused code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Passing string 'name' as the format specifier is potentially hazardous
because name could (although very unlikely to) have a format specifier
embedded in it causing issues when parsing the non-existent arguments
to these. Follow best practice by using the "%s" format string for
the string 'name'.
Cleans up clang warning:
crypto/pcrypt.c:397:40: warning: format string is not a string literal
(potentially insecure) [-Wformat-security]
Fixes: a3fb1e330d ("pcrypt: Added sysfs interface to pcrypt")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_cfb_decrypt_segment() incorrectly XOR'ed generated keystream with
IV, rather than with data stream, resulting in incorrect decryption.
Test vectors will be added in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Make the ARM scalar AES implementation closer to constant-time by
disabling interrupts and prefetching the tables into L1 cache. This is
feasible because due to ARM's "free" rotations, the main tables are only
1024 bytes instead of the usual 4096 used by most AES implementations.
On ARM Cortex-A7, the speed loss is only about 5%. The resulting code
is still over twice as fast as aes_ti.c. Responsiveness is potentially
a concern, but interrupts are only disabled for a single AES block.
Note that even after these changes, the implementation still isn't
necessarily guaranteed to be constant-time; see
https://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf for a discussion
of the many difficulties involved in writing truly constant-time AES
software. But it's valuable to make such attacks more difficult.
Much of this patch is based on patches suggested by Ard Biesheuvel.
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the "aes-fixed-time" AES implementation, disable interrupts while
accessing the S-box, in order to make cache-timing attacks more
difficult. Previously it was possible for the CPU to be interrupted
while the S-box was loaded into L1 cache, potentially evicting the
cachelines and causing later table lookups to be time-variant.
In tests I did on x86 and ARM, this doesn't affect performance
significantly. Responsiveness is potentially a concern, but interrupts
are only disabled for a single AES block.
Note that even after this change, the implementation still isn't
necessarily guaranteed to be constant-time; see
https://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf for a discussion
of the many difficulties involved in writing truly constant-time AES
software. But it's valuable to make such attacks more difficult.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
For preventing uninitialized data to be given to user-space (and so leak
potential useful data), the crypto_stat structure must be correctly
initialized.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: cac5818c25 ("crypto: user - Implement a generic crypto statistics")
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
[EB: also fix it in crypto_reportstat_one()]
[EB: use sizeof(var) rather than sizeof(type)]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The simd wrapper's skcipher request context structure consists
of a single subrequest whose size is taken from the subordinate
skcipher. However, in simd_skcipher_init(), the reqsize that is
retrieved is not from the subordinate skcipher but from the
cryptd request structure, whose size is completely unrelated to
the actual wrapped skcipher.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The sign operation can operate in a non-hashed mode by running the RSA
sign operation directly on the input. This assumes that the input is
less than key_size_in_bytes - 11. Since the TPM performs its own PKCS1
padding, it isn't possible to support 'raw' mode, only 'pkcs1'.
Alternatively, a hashed version is also possible. In this variant the
input is hashed (by userspace) via the selected hash function first.
Then this implementation takes care of converting the hash to ASN.1
format and the sign operation is performed on the result. This is
similar to the implementation inside crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c.
ASN1 templates were copied from crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c. There seems to
be no easy way to expose that functionality, but likely the templates
should be shared somehow.
The sign operation is implemented via TPM_Sign operation on the TPM.
It is assumed that the TPM wrapped key provided uses
TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_DER signature scheme. This allows the TPM_Sign
operation to work on data up to key_len_in_bytes - 11 bytes long.
In theory, we could also use TPM_Unbind instead of TPM_Sign, but we would
have to manually pkcs1 pad the digest first.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch implements the verify_signature operation. The public key
portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used. The operation is
performed entirely in software using the crypto API.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch implements the pkey_decrypt operation using the private key
blob. The blob is first loaded into the TPM via tpm_loadkey2. Once the
handle is obtained, tpm_unbind operation is used to decrypt the data on
the TPM and the result is returned. The key loaded by tpm_loadkey2 is
then evicted via tpm_flushspecific operation.
This patch assumes that the SRK authorization is a well known 20-byte of
zeros and the same holds for the key authorization of the provided key.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands.
Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm
key subtype and a module dependency is introduced.
In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the
asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch impelements the pkey_encrypt operation. The public key
portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used. The operation is
performed entirely in software using the crypto API.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This commit implements the pkey_query operation. This is accomplished
by utilizing the public key portion to obtain max encryption size
information for the operations that utilize the public key (encrypt,
verify). The private key size extracted from the TPM_Key data structure
is used to fill the information where the private key is used (decrypt,
sign).
The kernel uses a DER/BER format for public keys and does not support
setting the key via the raw binary form. To get around this a simple
DER/BER formatter is implemented which stores the DER/BER formatted key
and exponent in a temporary buffer for use by the crypto API.
The only exponent supported currently is 65537. This holds true for
other Linux TPM tools such as 'create_tpm_key' and
trousers-openssl_tpm_engine.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
For TPM based keys, the only standard seems to be described here:
http://david.woodhou.se/draft-woodhouse-cert-best-practice.html#rfc.section.4.4
Quote from the relevant section:
"Rather, a common form of storage for "wrapped" keys is to encode the
binary TCPA_KEY structure in a single ASN.1 OCTET-STRING, and store the
result in PEM format with the tag "-----BEGIN TSS KEY BLOB-----". "
This patch implements the above behavior. It is assumed that the PEM
encoding is stripped out by userspace and only the raw DER/BER format is
provided. This is similar to how PKCS7, PKCS8 and X.509 keys are
handled.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The parsed BER/DER blob obtained from user space contains a TPM_Key
structure. This structure has some information about the key as well as
the public key portion.
This patch extracts this information for future use.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The original pkcs1pad implementation allowed to pad/unpad raw RSA
output. However, this has been taken out in commit:
commit c0d20d22e0 ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present")
This patch restored this ability as it is needed by the asymmetric key
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key format [RFC 5208] parser for the
asymmetric key type. For the moment, this will only support unencrypted
DER blobs. PEM and decryption can be added later.
PKCS#8 keys can be loaded like this:
openssl pkcs8 -in private_key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | \
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Implement the encrypt, decrypt and sign operations for the software
asymmetric key subtype. This mostly involves offloading the call to the
crypto layer.
Note that the decrypt and sign operations require a private key to be
supplied. Encrypt (and also verify) will work with either a public or a
private key. A public key can be supplied with an X.509 certificate and a
private key can be supplied using a PKCS#8 blob:
# j=`openssl pkcs8 -in ~/pkcs7/firmwarekey2.priv -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s`
# keyctl pkey_query $j - enc=pkcs1
key_size=4096
max_data_size=512
max_sig_size=512
max_enc_size=512
max_dec_size=512
encrypt=y
decrypt=y
sign=y
verify=y
# keyctl pkey_encrypt $j 0 data enc=pkcs1 >/tmp/enc
# keyctl pkey_decrypt $j 0 /tmp/enc enc=pkcs1 >/tmp/dec
# cmp data /tmp/dec
# keyctl pkey_sign $j 0 data enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 >/tmp/sig
# keyctl pkey_verify $j 0 data /tmp/sig enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1
#
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Put a flag in the public_key struct to indicate if the structure is holding
a private key. The private key must be held ASN.1 encoded in the format
specified in RFC 3447 A.1.2. This is the form required by crypto/rsa.c.
The software encryption subtype's verification and query functions then
need to select the appropriate crypto function to set the key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide a query function for the software public key implementation. This
permits information about such a key to be obtained using
query_asymmetric_key() or KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers fill in the signature encoding type field
recently added to the public_key_signature struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This
include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature
already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this:
int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *enc, void *data);
int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the
encoding for verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This reverts commit dd979b4df8.
This broke tcp_poll for SMC fallback: An AF_SMC socket establishes an
internal TCP socket for the initial handshake with the remote peer.
Whenever the SMC connection can not be established this TCP socket is
used as a fallback. All socket operations on the SMC socket are then
forwarded to the TCP socket. In case of poll, the file->private_data
pointer references the SMC socket because the TCP socket has no file
assigned. This causes tcp_poll to wait on the wrong socket.
Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
After allocation, output and decomp_output both point to memory chunks of
size COMP_BUF_SIZE. Then, only the first bytes are zeroed out using
sizeof(COMP_BUF_SIZE) as parameter to memset(), because
sizeof(COMP_BUF_SIZE) provides the size of the constant and not the size of
allocated memory.
Instead, the whole allocated memory is meant to be zeroed out. Use
COMP_BUF_SIZE as parameter to memset() directly in order to accomplish
this.
Fixes: 336073840a ("crypto: testmgr - Allow different compression results")
Signed-off-by: Michael Schupikov <michael@schupikov.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use the correct __le32 annotation and accessors to perform the
single round of AES encryption performed inside the AEGIS transform.
Otherwise, tcrypt reports:
alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis128-generic
00000000: 6c 25 25 4a 3c 10 1d 27 2b c1 d4 84 9a ef 7f 6e
alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis128l-generic
00000000: cd c6 e3 b8 a0 70 9d 8e c2 4f 6f fe 71 42 df 28
alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis256-generic
00000000: aa ed 07 b1 96 1d e9 e6 f2 ed b5 8e 1c 5f dc 1c
Fixes: f606a88e58 ("crypto: aegis - Add generic AEGIS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Omit the endian swabbing when folding the lengths of the assoc and
crypt input buffers into the state to finalize the tag. This is not
necessary given that the memory representation of the state is in
machine native endianness already.
This fixes an error reported by tcrypt running on a big endian system:
alg: aead: Test 2 failed on encryption for morus640-generic
00000000: a8 30 ef fb e6 26 eb 23 b0 87 dd 98 57 f3 e1 4b
00000010: 21
alg: aead: Test 2 failed on encryption for morus1280-generic
00000000: 88 19 1b fb 1c 29 49 0e ee 82 2f cb 97 a6 a5 ee
00000010: 5f
Fixes: 396be41f16 ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Due to an unfortunate interaction between commit fbe1a850b3
("crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflow") and
commit c778f96bf3 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation"),
we ended up with a version of next_index() that always returns 127.
Fixes: c778f96bf3 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
For historical reasons, the AES-NI based implementation of the PCBC
chaining mode uses a special FPU chaining mode wrapper template to
amortize the FPU start/stop overhead over multiple blocks.
When this FPU wrapper was introduced, it supported widely used
chaining modes such as XTS and CTR (as well as LRW), but currently,
PCBC is the only remaining user.
Since there are no known users of pcbc(aes) in the kernel, let's remove
this special driver, and rely on the generic pcbc driver to encapsulate
the AES-NI core cipher.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
We already have OFB test vectors and tcrypt OFB speed tests.
Add OFB functional tests to tcrypt as well.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a generic version of output feedback mode. We already have support of
several hardware based transformations of this mode and the needed test
vectors but we somehow missed adding a generic software one. Fix this now.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add additional test vectors from "The SM4 Blockcipher Algorithm And Its
Modes Of Operations" draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-10 and register cipher speed
tests for sm4.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch implement a generic way to get statistics about all crypto
usages.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation for removal of VLAs due to skcipher requests on the stack
via SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage, this introduces the infrastructure
for the "sync skcipher" tfm, which is for handling the on-stack cases of
skcipher, which are always non-ASYNC and have a known limited request
size.
The crypto API additions:
struct crypto_sync_skcipher (wrapper for struct crypto_skcipher)
crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher()
crypto_free_sync_skcipher()
crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey()
crypto_sync_skcipher_get_flags()
crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags()
crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags()
crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize()
crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize()
crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm()
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm()
SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() (with tfm type check)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The encryption mode of pkcs1pad never uses out_sg and out_buf, so
there's no need to allocate the buffer, which presently is not even
being freed.
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds a test vector for lrw(aes) that triggers wrap-around of
the counter, which is a tricky corner case.
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When the LRW block counter overflows, the current implementation returns
128 as the index to the precomputed multiplication table, which has 128
entries. This patch fixes it to return the correct value (127).
Fixes: 64470f1b85 ("[CRYPTO] lrw: Liskov Rivest Wagner, a tweakable narrow block cipher mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.20+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In commit 9f480faec5 ("crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for
chacha20_block()"), I had missed that chacha20_block() can be called
directly on the buffer passed to get_random_bytes(), which can have any
alignment. So, while my commit didn't break anything, it didn't fully
solve the alignment problems.
Revert my solution and just update chacha20_block() to use
put_unaligned_le32(), so the output buffer need not be aligned.
This is simpler, and on many CPUs it's the same speed.
But, I kept the 'tmp' buffers in extract_crng_user() and
_get_random_bytes() 4-byte aligned, since that alignment is actually
needed for _crng_backtrack_protect() too.
Reported-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since commit acb9b159c7 ("crypto: gf128mul - define gf128mul_x_* in
gf128mul.h"), the gf128mul_x_*() functions are very fast and therefore
caching the computed XTS tweaks has only negligible advantage over
computing them twice.
In fact, since the current caching implementation limits the size of
the calls to the child ecb(...) algorithm to PAGE_SIZE (usually 4096 B),
it is often actually slower than the simple recomputing implementation.
This patch simplifies the XTS template to recompute the XTS tweaks from
scratch in the second pass and thus also removes the need to allocate a
dynamic buffer using kmalloc().
As discussed at [1], the use of kmalloc causes deadlocks with dm-crypt.
PERFORMANCE RESULTS
I measured time to encrypt/decrypt a memory buffer of varying sizes with
xts(ecb-aes-aesni) using a tool I wrote ([2]) and the results suggest
that after this patch the performance is either better or comparable for
both small and large buffers. Note that there is a lot of noise in the
measurements, but the overall difference is easy to see.
Old code:
ALGORITHM KEY (b) DATA (B) TIME ENC (ns) TIME DEC (ns)
xts(aes) 256 64 331 328
xts(aes) 384 64 332 333
xts(aes) 512 64 338 348
xts(aes) 256 512 889 920
xts(aes) 384 512 1019 993
xts(aes) 512 512 1032 990
xts(aes) 256 4096 2152 2292
xts(aes) 384 4096 2453 2597
xts(aes) 512 4096 3041 2641
xts(aes) 256 16384 9443 8027
xts(aes) 384 16384 8536 8925
xts(aes) 512 16384 9232 9417
xts(aes) 256 32768 16383 14897
xts(aes) 384 32768 17527 16102
xts(aes) 512 32768 18483 17322
New code:
ALGORITHM KEY (b) DATA (B) TIME ENC (ns) TIME DEC (ns)
xts(aes) 256 64 328 324
xts(aes) 384 64 324 319
xts(aes) 512 64 320 322
xts(aes) 256 512 476 473
xts(aes) 384 512 509 492
xts(aes) 512 512 531 514
xts(aes) 256 4096 2132 1829
xts(aes) 384 4096 2357 2055
xts(aes) 512 4096 2178 2027
xts(aes) 256 16384 6920 6983
xts(aes) 384 16384 8597 7505
xts(aes) 512 16384 7841 8164
xts(aes) 256 32768 13468 12307
xts(aes) 384 32768 14808 13402
xts(aes) 512 32768 15753 14636
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/23/1315
[2] https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Introduce a facility that can be used to receive a notification
callback when a new algorithm becomes available. This can be used by
existing crypto registrations to trigger a switch from a software-only
algorithm to a hardware-accelerated version.
A new CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_LOADED state is introduced to the existing crypto
notification chain, and the register/unregister functions are exported
so they can be called by subsystems outside of crypto.
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As it turns out, the AVX2 multibuffer SHA routines are currently
broken [0], in a way that would have likely been noticed if this
code were in wide use. Since the code is too complicated to be
maintained by anyone except the original authors, and since the
performance benefits for real-world use cases are debatable to
begin with, it is better to drop it entirely for the moment.
[0] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153476243825350&w=2
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this uses
the newly defined max alignment to perform unaligned hashing to avoid
VLAs, and drops the helper function while adding sanity checks on the
resulting buffer sizes. Additionally, the __aligned_largest macro is
removed since this helper was the only user.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
exposes a new general upper bound on crypto blocksize and alignmask
(higher than for the existing cipher limits) for VLA removal,
and introduces new checks.
At present, the highest cra_alignmask in the kernel is 63. The highest
cra_blocksize is 144 (SHA3_224_BLOCK_SIZE, 18 8-byte words). For the
new blocksize limit, I went with 160 (20 8-byte words).
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
removes the VLAs in SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK (via crypto_shash_descsize())
by using the maximum allowable size (which is now more clearly captured
in a macro), along with a few other cases. Similar limits are turned into
macros as well.
A review of existing sizes shows that SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE (64) is the
largest digest size and that sizeof(struct sha3_state) (360) is the
largest descriptor size. The corresponding maximums are reduced.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this drops
AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK by preallocating the ahash request area combined
with the skcipher area (which are not used at the same time).
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this uses
the maximum blocksize and adds a sanity check. For xcbc, the blocksize
must always be 16, so use that, since it's already being enforced during
instantiation.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by
anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about
its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end
devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before
that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck.
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This round brings couple of framework changes, a new driver and usual driver
updates:
- New managed helper for dmaengine framework registration
- Split dmaengine pause capability to pause and resume and allow drivers to
report that individually
- Update dma_request_chan_by_mask() to handle deferred probing
- Move imx-sdma to use virt-dma
- New driver for Actions Semi Owl family S900 controller
- Minor updates to intel, renesas, mv_xor, pl330 etc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=kbCC
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'dmaengine-4.19-rc1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma
Pull DMAengine updates from Vinod Koul:
"This round brings couple of framework changes, a new driver and usual
driver updates:
- new managed helper for dmaengine framework registration
- split dmaengine pause capability to pause and resume and allow
drivers to report that individually
- update dma_request_chan_by_mask() to handle deferred probing
- move imx-sdma to use virt-dma
- new driver for Actions Semi Owl family S900 controller
- minor updates to intel, renesas, mv_xor, pl330 etc"
* tag 'dmaengine-4.19-rc1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma: (46 commits)
dmaengine: Add Actions Semi Owl family S900 DMA driver
dt-bindings: dmaengine: Add binding for Actions Semi Owl SoCs
dmaengine: sh: rcar-dmac: Should not stop the DMAC by rcar_dmac_sync_tcr()
dmaengine: mic_x100_dma: use the new helper to simplify the code
dmaengine: add a new helper dmaenginem_async_device_register
dmaengine: imx-sdma: add memcpy interface
dmaengine: imx-sdma: add SDMA_BD_MAX_CNT to replace '0xffff'
dmaengine: dma_request_chan_by_mask() to handle deferred probing
dmaengine: pl330: fix irq race with terminate_all
dmaengine: Revert "dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: enable COMPILE_TEST"
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: use {lower,upper}_32_bits to configure HW descriptor address
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: enable COMPILE_TEST
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: move unmap to before callback
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: convert callback to helper function
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: kill the tasklets upon exit
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: explicitly freeup irq
dmaengine: sh: rcar-dmac: Add dma_pause operation
dmaengine: sh: rcar-dmac: add a new function to clear CHCR.DE with barrier
dmaengine: idma64: Support dmaengine_terminate_sync()
dmaengine: hsu: Support dmaengine_terminate_sync()
...
Replace the use of a magic number that indicates that verify_*_signature()
should use the secondary keyring with a symbol.
Signed-off-by: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"This adds support for EVM signatures based on larger digests, contains
a new audit record AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to differentiate the
IMA policy rules from the IMA-audit messages, addresses two deadlocks
due to either loading or searching for crypto algorithms, and cleans
up the audit messages"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()
integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.
evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures
evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable
integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled
ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set
ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string()
ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
Make it return -EINVAL if crypto_dh_key_len() is incorrect rather than
overflowing the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
It was forgotten to increase DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE to include 'q_size',
causing an out-of-bounds write of 4 bytes in crypto_dh_encode_key(), and
an out-of-bounds read of 4 bytes in crypto_dh_decode_key(). Fix it, and
fix the lengths of the test vectors to match this.
Reported-by: syzbot+6d38d558c25b53b8f4ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e3fe0ae129 ("crypto: dh - add public key verification test")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Like the skcipher_walk and blkcipher_walk cases:
scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of
bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the
dcache of the *previous* page. But in the error case of
ablkcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of
blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes.
This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request")
during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define
ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was
page-aligned as in that case walk->offset == 0.
Fix it by reorganizing ablkcipher_walk_done() to skip the
scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred.
Reported-by: Liu Chao <liuchao741@huawei.com>
Fixes: bf06099db1 ("crypto: skcipher - Add ablkcipher_walk interfaces")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.35+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Like the skcipher_walk case:
scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of
bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the
dcache of the *previous* page. But in the error case of
blkcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of
blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes.
This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request")
during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define
ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was
page-aligned as in that case walk->offset == 0.
Fix it by reorganizing blkcipher_walk_done() to skip the
scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred.
This bug was found by syzkaller fuzzing.
Reproducer, assuming ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "ecb(aes-generic)",
};
char buffer[4096] __attribute__((aligned(4096))) = { 0 };
int fd;
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, 16);
fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
write(fd, buffer, 15);
read(fd, buffer, 15);
}
Reported-by: Liu Chao <liuchao741@huawei.com>
Fixes: 5cde0af2a9 ("[CRYPTO] cipher: Added block cipher type")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.19+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of
bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the
dcache of the *previous* page. But in the error case of
skcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of
blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes.
This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request")
during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define
ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was
page-aligned as in that case walk->offset == 0.
Fix it by reorganizing skcipher_walk_done() to skip the
scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred.
This bug was found by syzkaller fuzzing.
Reproducer, assuming ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "cbc(aes-generic)",
};
char buffer[4096] __attribute__((aligned(4096))) = { 0 };
int fd;
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, 16);
fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
write(fd, buffer, 15);
read(fd, buffer, 15);
}
Reported-by: Liu Chao <liuchao741@huawei.com>
Fixes: b286d8b1a6 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Setting 'walk->nbytes = walk->total' in skcipher_walk_first() doesn't
make sense because actually walk->nbytes needs to be set to the length
of the first step in the walk, which may be less than walk->total. This
is done by skcipher_walk_next() which is called immediately afterwards.
Also walk->nbytes was already set to 0 in skcipher_walk_skcipher(),
which is a better default value in case it's forgotten to be set later.
Therefore, remove the unnecessary assignment to walk->nbytes.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All callers pass chain=0 to scatterwalk_crypto_chain().
Remove this unneeded parameter.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The ALIGN() macro needs to be passed the alignment, not the alignmask
(which is the alignment minus 1).
Fixes: b286d8b1a6 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Avoid RCU stalls in the case of non-preemptible kernel and lengthy
speed tests by rescheduling when advancing from one block size
to another.
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The wait_address argument is always directly derived from the filp
argument, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Make use of the swap macro and remove unnecessary variable *tmp*.
This makes the code easier to read and maintain.
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Make use of the swap macro and remove unnecessary variable *tmp*.
This makes the code easier to read and maintain.
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fix the b value to be compliant with FIPS 186-4 D.1.2.1. This fix is
required to make sure the SP800-56A public key test passes for P-192.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
By adding a zero byte-length for the DH parameter Q value, the public
key verification test is disabled for the given test.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CTR DRBG requires two SGLs pointing to input/output buffers for the
CTR AES operation. The used SGLs always have only one entry. Thus, the
SGL can be initialized during allocation time, preventing a
re-initialization of the SGLs during each call.
The performance is increased by about 1 to 3 percent depending on the
size of the requested buffer size.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In case memory resources for *base* were allocated, release them
before return.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1471702 ("Resource leak")
Fixes: e3fe0ae129 ("crypto: dh - add public key verification test")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes an allocation error-path bug in af_alg discovered by
syzkaller"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: af_alg - Initialize sg_num_bytes in error code path
When EVM attempts to appraise a file signed with a crypto algorithm the
kernel doesn't have support for, it will cause the kernel to trigger a
module load. If the EVM policy includes appraisal of kernel modules this
will in turn call back into EVM - since EVM is holding a lock until the
crypto initialisation is complete, this triggers a deadlock. Add a
CRYPTO_NOLOAD flag and skip module loading if it's set, and add that flag
in the EVM case in order to fail gracefully with an error message
instead of deadlocking.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The RX SGL in processing is already registered with the RX SGL tracking
list to support proper cleanup. The cleanup code path uses the
sg_num_bytes variable which must therefore be always initialized, even
in the error code path.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Reported-by: syzbot+9c251bdd09f83b92ba95@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
#syz test: https://github.com/google/kmsan.git master
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.14
Fixes: e870456d8e ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management")
Fixes: d887c52d6a ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The testmgr hash tests were testing init, digest, update and final
methods but not the finup method. Add a test for this one too.
While doing this, make sure we only run the partial tests once with
the digest tests and skip them with the final and finup tests since
they are the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some aead algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD. But this is
redundant with the C structure type ('struct aead_alg'), and
crypto_register_aead() already sets the type flag automatically,
clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless
assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignment from all the aead algorithms.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many shash algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But this
is redundant with the C structure type ('struct shash_alg'), and
crypto_register_shash() already sets the type flag automatically,
clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless
assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignment from all the shash algorithms.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
sha512-generic and sha384-generic had a cra_priority of 0, so it wasn't
possible to have a lower priority SHA-512 or SHA-384 implementation, as
is desired for sha512_mb which is only useful under certain workloads
and is otherwise extremely slow. Change them to priority 100, which is
the priority used for many of the other generic algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
sha256-generic and sha224-generic had a cra_priority of 0, so it wasn't
possible to have a lower priority SHA-256 or SHA-224 implementation, as
is desired for sha256_mb which is only useful under certain workloads
and is otherwise extremely slow. Change them to priority 100, which is
the priority used for many of the other generic algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
sha1-generic had a cra_priority of 0, so it wasn't possible to have a
lower priority SHA-1 implementation, as is desired for sha1_mb which is
only useful under certain workloads and is otherwise extremely slow.
Change it to priority 100, which is the priority used for many of the
other generic algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
According to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.1, the public key to be processed
for the DH operation shall be checked for appropriateness. The check
shall covers the full verification test in case the domain parameter Q
is provided as defined in SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.1. If Q is not
provided, the partial check according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is
performed.
The full verification test requires the presence of the domain parameter
Q. Thus, the patch adds the support to handle Q. It is permissible to
not provide the Q value as part of the domain parameters. This implies
that the interface is still backwards-compatible where so far only P and
G are to be provided. However, if Q is provided, it is imported.
Without the test, the NIST ACVP testing fails. After adding this check,
the NIST ACVP testing passes. Testing without providing the Q domain
parameter has been performed to verify the interface has not changed.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As of GCC 9.0.0 the build is reporting warnings like:
crypto/ablkcipher.c: In function ‘crypto_ablkcipher_report’:
crypto/ablkcipher.c:374:2: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound 64 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation]
strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "<default>",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv));
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This means the strnycpy might create a non null terminated string. Fix this by
explicitly performing '\0' termination.
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
According to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.1, the public key to be processed
for the ECDH operation shall be checked for appropriateness. When the
public key is considered to be an ephemeral key, the partial validation
test as defined in SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.4 can be applied.
The partial verification test requires the presence of the field
elements of a and b. For the implemented NIST curves, b is defined in
FIPS 186-4 appendix D.1.2. The element a is implicitly given with the
Weierstrass equation given in D.1.2 where a = p - 3.
Without the test, the NIST ACVP testing fails. After adding this check,
the NIST ACVP testing passes.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The function skcipher_walk_next declared as static and marked as
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL. It's a bit confusing for internal function to be
exported. The area of visibility for such function is its .c file
and all other modules. Other *.c files of the same module can't use it,
despite all other modules can. Relying on the fact that this is the
internal function and it's not a crucial part of the API, the patch
just removes the EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL marking of skcipher_walk_next.
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove the original version of the VMAC template that had the nonce
hardcoded to 0 and produced a digest with the wrong endianness. I'm
unsure whether this had users or not (there are no explicit in-kernel
references to it), but given that the hardcoded nonce made it wildly
insecure unless a unique key was used for each message, let's try
removing it and see if anyone complains.
Leave the new "vmac64" template that requires the nonce to be explicitly
specified as the first 16 bytes of data and uses the correct endianness
for the digest.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently the VMAC template uses a "nonce" hardcoded to 0, which makes
it insecure unless a unique key is set for every message. Also, the
endianness of the final digest is wrong: the implementation uses little
endian, but the VMAC specification has it as big endian, as do other
VMAC implementations such as the one in Crypto++.
Add a new VMAC template where the nonce is passed as the first 16 bytes
of data (similar to what is done for Poly1305's nonce), and the digest
is big endian. Call it "vmac64", since the old name of simply "vmac"
didn't clarify whether the implementation is of VMAC-64 or of VMAC-128
(which produce 64-bit and 128-bit digests respectively); so we fix the
naming ambiguity too.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
syzbot reported a crash in vmac_final() when multiple threads
concurrently use the same "vmac(aes)" transform through AF_ALG. The bug
is pretty fundamental: the VMAC template doesn't separate per-request
state from per-tfm (per-key) state like the other hash algorithms do,
but rather stores it all in the tfm context. That's wrong.
Also, vmac_final() incorrectly zeroes most of the state including the
derived keys and cached pseudorandom pad. Therefore, only the first
VMAC invocation with a given key calculates the correct digest.
Fix these bugs by splitting the per-tfm state from the per-request state
and using the proper init/update/final sequencing for requests.
Reproducer for the crash:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "vmac(aes)",
};
char buf[256] = { 0 };
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buf, 16);
fork();
fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
for (;;)
write(fd, buf, 256);
}
The immediate cause of the crash is that vmac_ctx_t.partial_size exceeds
VMAC_NHBYTES, causing vmac_final() to memset() a negative length.
Reported-by: syzbot+264bca3a6e8d645550d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f1939f7c56 ("crypto: vmac - New hash algorithm for intel_txt support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.32+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The VMAC template assumes the block cipher has a 128-bit block size, but
it failed to check for that. Thus it was possible to instantiate it
using a 64-bit block size cipher, e.g. "vmac(cast5)", causing
uninitialized memory to be used.
Add the needed check when instantiating the template.
Fixes: f1939f7c56 ("crypto: vmac - New hash algorithm for intel_txt support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.32+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The poll() changes were not well thought out, and completely
unexplained. They also caused a huge performance regression, because
"->poll()" was no longer a trivial file operation that just called down
to the underlying file operations, but instead did at least two indirect
calls.
Indirect calls are sadly slow now with the Spectre mitigation, but the
performance problem could at least be largely mitigated by changing the
"->get_poll_head()" operation to just have a per-file-descriptor pointer
to the poll head instead. That gets rid of one of the new indirections.
But that doesn't fix the new complexity that is completely unwarranted
for the regular case. The (undocumented) reason for the poll() changes
was some alleged AIO poll race fixing, but we don't make the common case
slower and more complex for some uncommon special case, so this all
really needs way more explanations and most likely a fundamental
redesign.
[ This revert is a revert of about 30 different commits, not reverted
individually because that would just be unnecessarily messy - Linus ]
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem fixes from James Morris:
- Smack: fix a regression caused by 1bbc55131e
- X.509: fix a (usually un-seen) bug in RSA signature parsing
* 'fixes-v4.18-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
X.509: unpack RSA signatureValue field from BIT STRING
Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode
The signatureValue field of a X.509 certificate is encoded as a BIT STRING.
For RSA signatures this BIT STRING is of so-called primitive subtype, which
contains a u8 prefix indicating a count of unused bits in the encoding.
We have to strip this prefix from signature data, just as we already do for
key data in x509_extract_key_data() function.
This wasn't noticed earlier because this prefix byte is zero for RSA key
sizes divisible by 8. Since BIT STRING is a big-endian encoding adding zero
prefixes has no bearing on its value.
The signature length, however was incorrect, which is a problem for RSA
implementations that need it to be exactly correct (like AMD CCP).
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Fixes: c26fd69fa0 ("X.509: Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) X.509 certificates")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
- Fix use after free in chtls
- Fix RBP breakage in sha3
- Fix use after free in hwrng_unregister
- Fix overread in morus640
- Move sleep out of kernel_neon in arm64/aes-blk
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
hwrng: core - Always drop the RNG in hwrng_unregister()
crypto: morus640 - Fix out-of-bounds access
crypto: don't optimize keccakf()
crypto: arm64/aes-blk - fix and move skcipher_walk_done out of kernel_neon_begin, _end
crypto: chtls - use after free in chtls_pt_recvmsg()
Trival fix to correct the indentation of a single statement
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds the sha384 pre-computed 0-length hash so that device
drivers can use it when an hardware engine does not support computing a
hash from a 0 length input.
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds the sha512 pre-computed 0-length hash so that device
drivers can use it when an hardware engine does not support computing a
hash from a 0 length input.
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the quest to remove VLAs from the kernel[1], this adjusts the
allocation of coefs and blocks to use the existing maximum values
(with one new define, MAX_DISKS for coefs, and a reuse of the
existing NDISKS for blocks).
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
Signed-off-by: Kyle Spiers <ksspiers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
We must load the block from the temporary variable here, not directly
from the input.
Also add forgotten zeroing-out of the uninitialized part of the
temporary block (as is done correctly in morus1280.c).
Fixes: 396be41f16 ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations")
Reported-by: syzbot+1fafa9c4cf42df33f716@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d82643ba80bf6937cd44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
keccakf() is the only function in kernel that uses __optimize() macro.
__optimize() breaks frame pointer unwinder as optimized code uses RBP,
and amusingly this always lead to degraded performance as gcc does not
inline across different optimizations levels, so keccakf() wasn't inlined
into its callers and keccakf_round() wasn't inlined into keccakf().
Drop __optimize() to resolve both problems.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: 83dee2ce1a ("crypto: sha3-generic - rewrite KECCAK transform to help the compiler optimize")
Reported-by: syzbot+37035ccfa9a0a017ffcf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+e073e4740cfbb3ae200b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Linus Torvalds