Declaration of VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK occures twice in the code.
Probably, it was happened after unsuccessful merge.
Signed-off-by: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() should not be called after emulating
a VM-entry failure during or after loading guest state
(nested_vmx_entry_failure()). Otherwise the L1 hypervisor is resumed
some number of bytes past vmcs->host_rip.
Fixes: eb27756217
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When the operand passed to VMPTRLD matches the address of the VMXON
region, the VMX instruction error code should be
VMXERR_VMPTRLD_VMXON_POINTER rather than VMXERR_VMCLEAR_VMXON_POINTER.
Signed-off-by: GanShun <ganshun@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
x86: userspace can now hide nested VMX features from guests; nested
VMX can now run Hyper-V in a guest; support for AVX512_4VNNIW and
AVX512_FMAPS in KVM; infrastructure support for virtual Intel GPUs.
PPC: support for KVM guests on POWER9; improved support for interrupt
polling; optimizations and cleanups.
s390: two small optimizations, more stuff is in flight and will be
in 4.11.
ARM: support for the GICv3 ITS on 32bit platforms.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2
iQExBAABCAAbBQJYTkP0FBxwYm9uemluaUByZWRoYXQuY29tAAoJEL/70l94x66D
lZIH/iT1n9OQXcuTpYYnQhuCenzI3GZZOIMTbCvK2i5bo0FIJKxVn0EiAAqZSXvO
nO185FqjOgLuJ1AD1kJuxzye5suuQp4HIPWWgNHcexLuy43WXWKZe0IQlJ4zM2Xf
u31HakpFmVDD+Cd1qN3yDXtDrRQ79/xQn2kw7CWb8olp+pVqwbceN3IVie9QYU+3
gCz0qU6As0aQIwq2PyalOe03sO10PZlm4XhsoXgWPG7P18BMRhNLTDqhLhu7A/ry
qElVMANT7LSNLzlwNdpzdK8rVuKxETwjlc1UP8vSuhrwad4zM2JJ1Exk26nC2NaG
D0j4tRSyGFIdx6lukZm7HmiSHZ0=
=mkoB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"Small release, the most interesting stuff is x86 nested virt
improvements.
x86:
- userspace can now hide nested VMX features from guests
- nested VMX can now run Hyper-V in a guest
- support for AVX512_4VNNIW and AVX512_FMAPS in KVM
- infrastructure support for virtual Intel GPUs.
PPC:
- support for KVM guests on POWER9
- improved support for interrupt polling
- optimizations and cleanups.
s390:
- two small optimizations, more stuff is in flight and will be in
4.11.
ARM:
- support for the GICv3 ITS on 32bit platforms"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (94 commits)
arm64: KVM: pmu: Reset PMSELR_EL0.SEL to a sane value before entering the guest
KVM: arm/arm64: timer: Check for properly initialized timer on init
KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-v2: Limit ITARGETSR bits to number of VCPUs
KVM: x86: Handle the kthread worker using the new API
KVM: nVMX: invvpid handling improvements
KVM: nVMX: check host CR3 on vmentry and vmexit
KVM: nVMX: introduce nested_vmx_load_cr3 and call it on vmentry
KVM: nVMX: propagate errors from prepare_vmcs02
KVM: nVMX: fix CR3 load if L2 uses PAE paging and EPT
KVM: nVMX: load GUEST_EFER after GUEST_CR0 during emulated VM-entry
KVM: nVMX: generate MSR_IA32_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 from guest CPUID
KVM: nVMX: fix checks on CR{0,4} during virtual VMX operation
KVM: nVMX: support restore of VMX capability MSRs
KVM: nVMX: generate non-true VMX MSRs based on true versions
KVM: x86: Do not clear RFLAGS.TF when a singlestep trap occurs.
KVM: x86: Add kvm_skip_emulated_instruction and use it.
KVM: VMX: Move skip_emulated_instruction out of nested_vmx_check_vmcs12
KVM: VMX: Reorder some skip_emulated_instruction calls
KVM: x86: Add a return value to kvm_emulate_cpuid
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Move prototypes for KVM functions into kvm_ppc.h
...
- Expose all invalidation types to the L1
- Reject invvpid instruction, if L1 passed zero vpid value to single
context invalidations
Signed-off-by: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This commit adds missing host CR3 checks. Before entering guest mode, the value
of CR3 is checked for reserved bits. After returning, nested_vmx_load_cr3 is
called to set the new CR3 value and check and load PDPTRs.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Loading CR3 as part of emulating vmentry is different from regular CR3 loads,
as implemented in kvm_set_cr3, in several ways.
* different rules are followed to check CR3 and it is desirable for the caller
to distinguish between the possible failures
* PDPTRs are not loaded if PAE paging and nested EPT are both enabled
* many MMU operations are not necessary
This patch introduces nested_vmx_load_cr3 suitable for CR3 loads as part of
nested vmentry and vmexit, and makes use of it on the nested vmentry path.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
It is possible that prepare_vmcs02 fails to load the guest state. This
patch adds the proper error handling for such a case. L1 will receive
an INVALID_STATE vmexit with the appropriate exit qualification if it
happens.
A failure to set guest CR3 is the only error propagated from prepare_vmcs02
at the moment.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
KVM does not correctly handle L1 hypervisors that emulate L2 real mode with
PAE and EPT, such as Hyper-V. In this mode, the L1 hypervisor populates guest
PDPTE VMCS fields and leaves guest CR3 uninitialized because it is not used
(see 26.3.2.4 Loading Page-Directory-Pointer-Table Entries). KVM always
dereferences CR3 and tries to load PDPTEs if PAE is on. This leads to two
related issues:
1) On the first nested vmentry, the guest PDPTEs, as populated by L1, are
overwritten in ept_load_pdptrs because the registers are believed to have
been loaded in load_pdptrs as part of kvm_set_cr3. This is incorrect. L2 is
running with PAE enabled but PDPTRs have been set up by L1.
2) When L2 is about to enable paging and loads its CR3, we, again, attempt
to load PDPTEs in load_pdptrs called from kvm_set_cr3. There are no guarantees
that this will succeed (it's just a CR3 load, paging is not enabled yet) and
if it doesn't, kvm_set_cr3 returns early without persisting the CR3 which is
then lost and L2 crashes right after it enables paging.
This patch replaces the kvm_set_cr3 call with a simple register write if PAE
and EPT are both on. CR3 is not to be interpreted in this case.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
vmx_set_cr0() modifies GUEST_EFER and "IA-32e mode guest" in the current
VMCS. Call vmx_set_efer() after vmx_set_cr0() so that emulated VM-entry
is more faithful to VMCS12.
This patch correctly causes VM-entry to fail when "IA-32e mode guest" is
1 and GUEST_CR0.PG is 0. Previously this configuration would succeed and
"IA-32e mode guest" would silently be disabled by KVM.
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
MSR_IA32_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 define which bits in CR0 and CR4 are allowed to
be 1 during VMX operation. Since the set of allowed-1 bits is the same
in and out of VMX operation, we can generate these MSRs entirely from
the guest's CPUID. This lets userspace avoiding having to save/restore
these MSRs.
This patch also initializes MSR_IA32_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 from the CPU's MSRs
by default. This is a saner than the current default of -1ull, which
includes bits that the host CPU does not support.
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
KVM emulates MSR_IA32_VMX_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 with the value -1ULL, meaning
all CR0 and CR4 bits are allowed to be 1 during VMX operation.
This does not match real hardware, which disallows the high 32 bits of
CR0 to be 1, and disallows reserved bits of CR4 to be 1 (including bits
which are defined in the SDM but missing according to CPUID). A guest
can induce a VM-entry failure by setting these bits in GUEST_CR0 and
GUEST_CR4, despite MSR_IA32_VMX_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 indicating they are
valid.
Since KVM has allowed all bits to be 1 in CR0 and CR4, the existing
checks on these registers do not verify must-be-0 bits. Fix these checks
to identify must-be-0 bits according to MSR_IA32_VMX_CR{0,4}_FIXED1.
This patch should introduce no change in behavior in KVM, since these
MSRs are still -1ULL.
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The VMX capability MSRs advertise the set of features the KVM virtual
CPU can support. This set of features varies across different host CPUs
and KVM versions. This patch aims to addresses both sources of
differences, allowing VMs to be migrated across CPUs and KVM versions
without guest-visible changes to these MSRs. Note that cross-KVM-
version migration is only supported from this point forward.
When the VMX capability MSRs are restored, they are audited to check
that the set of features advertised are a subset of what KVM and the
CPU support.
Since the VMX capability MSRs are read-only, they do not need to be on
the default MSR save/restore lists. The userspace hypervisor can set
the values of these MSRs or read them from KVM at VCPU creation time,
and restore the same value after every save/restore.
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The "non-true" VMX capability MSRs can be generated from their "true"
counterparts, by OR-ing the default1 bits. The default1 bits are fixed
and defined in the SDM.
Since we can generate the non-true VMX MSRs from the true versions,
there's no need to store both in struct nested_vmx. This also lets
userspace avoid having to restore the non-true MSRs.
Note this does not preclude emulating MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC[55]=0. To do so,
we simply need to set all the default1 bits in the true MSRs (such that
the true MSRs and the generated non-true MSRs are equal).
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction calls both
kvm_x86_ops->skip_emulated_instruction and kvm_vcpu_check_singlestep,
skipping the emulated instruction and generating a trap if necessary.
Replacing skip_emulated_instruction calls with
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction is straightforward, except for:
- ICEBP, which is already inside a trap, so avoid triggering another trap.
- Instructions that can trigger exits to userspace, such as the IO insns,
MOVs to CR8, and HALT. If kvm_skip_emulated_instruction does trigger a
KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP exit, and the handling code for
IN/OUT/MOV CR8/HALT also triggers an exit to userspace, the latter will
take precedence. The singlestep will be triggered again on the next
instruction, which is the current behavior.
- Task switch instructions which would require additional handling (e.g.
the task switch bit) and are instead left alone.
- Cases where VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME do not proceed to the next instruction,
which do not trigger singlestep traps as mentioned previously.
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
We can't return both the pass/fail boolean for the vmcs and the upcoming
continue/exit-to-userspace boolean for skip_emulated_instruction out of
nested_vmx_check_vmcs, so move skip_emulated_instruction out of it instead.
Additionally, VMENTER/VMRESUME only trigger singlestep exceptions when
they advance the IP to the following instruction, not when they a) succeed,
b) fail MSR validation or c) throw an exception. Add a separate call to
skip_emulated_instruction that will later not be converted to the variant
that checks the singlestep flag.
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The functions being moved ahead of skip_emulated_instruction here don't
need updated IPs, and skipping the emulated instruction at the end will
make it easier to return its value.
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Once skipping the emulated instruction can potentially trigger an exit to
userspace (via KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP) kvm_emulate_cpuid will need to
propagate a return value.
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
- Expose all invalidation types to the L1
- Reject invvpid instruction, if L1 passed zero vpid value to single
context invalidations
Signed-off-by: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
vmx_arm_hv_timer is only used in vmx.c, and should be static to
avoid compiling warning when with -Wmissing-prototypes option.
Signed-off-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
On some benchmarks (e.g. netperf with ioeventfd disabled), APICv
posted interrupts turn out to be slower than interrupt injection via
KVM_REQ_EVENT.
This patch optimizes a bit the IRR update, avoiding expensive atomic
operations in the common case where PI.ON=0 at vmentry or the PIR vector
is mostly zero. This saves at least 20 cycles (1%) per vmexit, as
measured by kvm-unit-tests' inl_from_qemu test (20 runs):
| enable_apicv=1 | enable_apicv=0
| mean stdev | mean stdev
----------|-----------------|------------------
before | 5826 32.65 | 5765 47.09
after | 5809 43.42 | 5777 77.02
Of course, any change in the right column is just placebo effect. :)
The savings are bigger if interrupts are frequent.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
These are never used by the host, but they can still be reflected to
the guest.
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since Paolo has removed irq-enable-operation in vmx_handle_external_intr
(KVM: x86: use guest_exit_irqoff), the original comment about the IF bit
in rflags is incorrect and stale now, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
We've had 10 page-sized bitmaps that were being allocated and freed one
by one when we could just use a cycle.
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic() and
vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic() differed only in the type.
Pass the type to a new function.
[Ordered and commented TPR intercept according to Paolo's suggestion.]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
All intercepts are enabled at the beginning, so they can only be used if
we disabled an intercept that we wanted to have enabled.
This was done for TMCCT to simplify a loop that disables all x2APIC MSR
intercepts, but just keeping TMCCT enabled yields better results.
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
When L0 establishes (or removes) an MSR entry in the VM-entry or VM-exit
MSR load lists, the change should affect the dormant VMCS as well as the
current VMCS. Moreover, the vmcs02 MSR-load addresses should be
initialized.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
When forwarding a hardware VM-entry failure to L1, fetch the
VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR field from vmcs02 before loading vmcs01.
(Note that there is an implicit assumption that the VM-entry failure was
on the first VM-entry to vmcs02 after nested_vmx_run; otherwise, L1 is
going to be very confused.)
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Renames x2apic_apicv_inactive msr_bitmaps to x2apic and original
x2apic bitmaps to x2apic_apicv.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
After a successful VM-entry with the "VMCS shadowing" VM-execution
control set, the shadow VMCS referenced by the VMCS link pointer field
in the current VMCS becomes active on the logical processor.
A VMCS that is made active on more than one logical processor may become
corrupted. Therefore, before an active VMCS can be migrated to another
logical processor, the first logical processor must execute a VMCLEAR
for the active VMCS. VMCLEAR both ensures that all VMCS data are written
to memory and makes the VMCS inactive.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-By: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <1477668579-22555-1-git-send-email-jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since commit a545ab6a00 ("kvm: x86: add tsc_offset field to struct
kvm_vcpu_arch", 2016-09-07) the offset between host and L1 TSC is
cached and need not be fished out of the VMCS or VMCB. This means
that we can implement adjust_tsc_offset_guest and read_l1_tsc
entirely in generic code. The simplification is particularly
significant for VMX code, where vmx->nested.vmcs01_tsc_offset
was duplicating what is now in vcpu->arch.tsc_offset. Therefore
the vmcs01_tsc_offset can be dropped completely.
More importantly, this fixes KVM_GET_CLOCK/KVM_SET_CLOCK
which, after commit 108b249c45 ("KVM: x86: introduce get_kvmclock_ns",
2016-09-01) called read_l1_tsc while the VMCS was not loaded.
It thus returned bogus values on Intel CPUs.
Fixes: 108b249c45
Reported-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Now that x86 always uses eager FPU switching on the host, there's no
need for KVM to manipulate the host's CR0.TS.
This should be both simpler and faster.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b212064922537c05d0c81d931fc4dbe769127ce7.1477951965.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Bitwise shifts by amounts greater than or equal to the width of the left
operand are undefined. A malicious guest can exploit this to crash a
32-bit host, due to the BUG_ON(1)'s in handle_{invept,invvpid}.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <1477496318-17681-1-git-send-email-jmattson@google.com>
[Change 1UL to 1, to match the range check on the shift count. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
All architectures:
Move `make kvmconfig` stubs from x86; use 64 bits for debugfs stats.
ARM:
Important fixes for not using an in-kernel irqchip; handle SError
exceptions and present them to guests if appropriate; proxying of GICV
access at EL2 if guest mappings are unsafe; GICv3 on AArch32 on ARMv8;
preparations for GICv3 save/restore, including ABI docs; cleanups and
a bit of optimizations.
MIPS:
A couple of fixes in preparation for supporting MIPS EVA host kernels;
MIPS SMP host & TLB invalidation fixes.
PPC:
Fix the bug which caused guests to falsely report lockups; other minor
fixes; a small optimization.
s390:
Lazy enablement of runtime instrumentation; up to 255 CPUs for nested
guests; rework of machine check deliver; cleanups and fixes.
x86:
IOMMU part of AMD's AVIC for vmexit-less interrupt delivery; Hyper-V
TSC page; per-vcpu tsc_offset in debugfs; accelerated INS/OUTS in
nVMX; cleanups and fixes.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQEcBAABCAAGBQJX9iDrAAoJEED/6hsPKofoOPoIAIUlgojkb9l2l1XVDgsXdgQL
sRVhYSVv7/c8sk9vFImrD5ElOPZd+CEAIqFOu45+NM3cNi7gxip9yftUVs7wI5aC
eDZRWm1E4trDZLe54ZM9ThcqZzZZiELVGMfR1+ZndUycybwyWzafpXYsYyaXp3BW
hyHM3qVkoWO3dxBWFwHIoO/AUJrWYkRHEByKyvlC6KPxSdBPSa5c1AQwMCoE0Mo4
K/xUj4gBn9eMelNhg4Oqu/uh49/q+dtdoP2C+sVM8bSdquD+PmIeOhPFIcuGbGFI
B+oRpUhIuntN39gz8wInJ4/GRSeTuR2faNPxMn4E1i1u4LiuJvipcsOjPfe0a18=
=fZRB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'kvm-4.9-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM updates from Radim Krčmář:
"All architectures:
- move `make kvmconfig` stubs from x86
- use 64 bits for debugfs stats
ARM:
- Important fixes for not using an in-kernel irqchip
- handle SError exceptions and present them to guests if appropriate
- proxying of GICV access at EL2 if guest mappings are unsafe
- GICv3 on AArch32 on ARMv8
- preparations for GICv3 save/restore, including ABI docs
- cleanups and a bit of optimizations
MIPS:
- A couple of fixes in preparation for supporting MIPS EVA host
kernels
- MIPS SMP host & TLB invalidation fixes
PPC:
- Fix the bug which caused guests to falsely report lockups
- other minor fixes
- a small optimization
s390:
- Lazy enablement of runtime instrumentation
- up to 255 CPUs for nested guests
- rework of machine check deliver
- cleanups and fixes
x86:
- IOMMU part of AMD's AVIC for vmexit-less interrupt delivery
- Hyper-V TSC page
- per-vcpu tsc_offset in debugfs
- accelerated INS/OUTS in nVMX
- cleanups and fixes"
* tag 'kvm-4.9-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (140 commits)
KVM: MIPS: Drop dubious EntryHi optimisation
KVM: MIPS: Invalidate TLB by regenerating ASIDs
KVM: MIPS: Split kernel/user ASID regeneration
KVM: MIPS: Drop other CPU ASIDs on guest MMU changes
KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Don't flush/sync without a working vgic
KVM: arm64: Require in-kernel irqchip for PMU support
KVM: PPC: Book3s PR: Allow access to unprivileged MMCR2 register
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Support 64kB page size on POWER8E and POWER8NVL
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Remove duplicate setting of the B field in tlbie
KVM: PPC: BookE: Fix a sanity check
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Take out virtual core piggybacking code
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Treat VTB as a per-subcore register, not per-thread
ARM: gic-v3: Work around definition of gic_write_bpr1
KVM: nVMX: Fix the NMI IDT-vectoring handling
KVM: VMX: Enable MSR-BASED TPR shadow even if APICv is inactive
KVM: nVMX: Fix reload apic access page warning
kvmconfig: add virtio-gpu to config fragment
config: move x86 kvm_guest.config to a common location
arm64: KVM: Remove duplicating init code for setting VMID
ARM: KVM: Support vgic-v3
...
Run kvm-unit-tests/eventinj.flat in L1:
Sending NMI to self
After NMI to self
FAIL: NMI
This test scenario is to test whether VMM can handle NMI IDT-vectoring info correctly.
At the beginning, L2 writes LAPIC to send a self NMI, the EPT page tables on both L1
and L0 are empty so:
- The L2 accesses memory can generate EPT violation which can be intercepted by L0.
The EPT violation vmexit occurred during delivery of this NMI, and the NMI info is
recorded in vmcs02's IDT-vectoring info.
- L0 walks L1's EPT12 and L0 sees the mapping is invalid, it injects the EPT violation into L1.
The vmcs02's IDT-vectoring info is reflected to vmcs12's IDT-vectoring info since
it is a nested vmexit.
- L1 receives the EPT violation, then fixes its EPT12.
- L1 executes VMRESUME to resume L2 which generates vmexit and causes L1 exits to L0.
- L0 emulates VMRESUME which is called from L1, then return to L2.
L0 merges the requirement of vmcs12's IDT-vectoring info and injects it to L2 through
vmcs02.
- The L2 re-executes the fault instruction and cause EPT violation again.
- Since the L1's EPT12 is valid, L0 can fix its EPT02
- L0 resume L2
The EPT violation vmexit occurred during delivery of this NMI again, and the NMI info
is recorded in vmcs02's IDT-vectoring info. L0 should inject the NMI through vmentry
event injection since it is caused by EPT02's EPT violation.
However, vmx_inject_nmi() refuses to inject NMI from IDT-vectoring info if vCPU is in
guest mode, this patch fix it by permitting to inject NMI from IDT-vectoring if it is
the L0's responsibility to inject NMI from IDT-vectoring info to L2.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Cc: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
I observed that kvmvapic(to optimize flexpriority=N or AMD) is used
to boost TPR access when testing kvm-unit-test/eventinj.flat tpr case
on my haswell desktop (w/ flexpriority, w/o APICv). Commit (8d14695f95
x86, apicv: add virtual x2apic support) disable virtual x2apic mode
completely if w/o APICv, and the author also told me that windows guest
can't enter into x2apic mode when he developed the APICv feature several
years ago. However, it is not truth currently, Interrupt Remapping and
vIOMMU is added to qemu and the developers from Intel test windows 8 can
work in x2apic mode w/ Interrupt Remapping enabled recently.
This patch enables TPR shadow for virtual x2apic mode to boost
windows guest in x2apic mode even if w/o APICv.
Can pass the kvm-unit-test.
Suggested-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Wincy Van <fanwenyi0529@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Wincy Van <fanwenyi0529@gmail.com>
Cc: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4230 at kernel/sched/core.c:7564 __might_sleep+0x7e/0x80
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff8d0de7f9>] prepare_to_swait+0x39/0xa0
CPU: 1 PID: 4230 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc5+ #47
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x99/0xd0
__warn+0xd1/0xf0
warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4f/0x60
? prepare_to_swait+0x39/0xa0
? prepare_to_swait+0x39/0xa0
__might_sleep+0x7e/0x80
__gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0x156/0x480 [kvm]
gfn_to_pfn+0x2a/0x30 [kvm]
gfn_to_page+0xe/0x20 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page+0x32/0xa0 [kvm]
nested_vmx_vmexit+0x765/0xca0 [kvm_intel]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x80
vmx_check_nested_events+0x49/0x1f0 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable+0x2d/0xe0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_check_block+0x12/0x60 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_block+0x94/0x4c0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x619/0x1aa0 [kvm]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xdf1/0x1aa0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d3/0x7c0 [kvm]
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.8.0-rc5+ #47 Not tainted
-------------------------------
./include/linux/kvm_host.h:535 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by qemu-system-x86/4230:
#0: (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc062975c>] vcpu_load+0x1c/0x60 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 4230 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc5+ #47
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x99/0xd0
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120
gfn_to_memslot+0x12a/0x140 [kvm]
gfn_to_pfn+0x12/0x30 [kvm]
gfn_to_page+0xe/0x20 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page+0x32/0xa0 [kvm]
nested_vmx_vmexit+0x765/0xca0 [kvm_intel]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x80
vmx_check_nested_events+0x49/0x1f0 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable+0x2d/0xe0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_check_block+0x12/0x60 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_block+0x94/0x4c0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x619/0x1aa0 [kvm]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xdf1/0x1aa0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d3/0x7c0 [kvm]
? __fget+0xfd/0x210
? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x70
do_vfs_ioctl+0x96/0x6a0
? __fget+0x11c/0x210
? __fget+0x5/0x210
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x81/0x220
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
These can be triggered by running kvm-unit-test: ./x86-run x86/vmx.flat
The nested preemption timer is based on hrtimer which is started on L2
entry, stopped on L2 exit and evaluated via the new check_nested_events
hook. The current logic adds vCPU to a simple waitqueue (TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE)
if need to yield pCPU and w/o holding srcu read lock when accesses memslots,
both can be in nested preemption timer evaluation path which results in
the warning above.
This patch fix it by leveraging request bit to async reload APIC access
page before vmentry in order to avoid to reload directly during the nested
preemption timer evaluation, it is safe since the vmcs01 is loaded and
current is nested vmexit.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Yunhong Jiang <yunhong.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The TSC offset can now be read directly from struct kvm_arch_vcpu.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Expose the feature to L1 hypervisor if host CPU supports it, since
certain hypervisors requires it for own purposes.
According to Intel SDM A.1, if CPU supports the feature,
VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO field of VMCS will contain detailed information
about INS/OUTS instructions handling. This field is already copied to
VMCS12 for L1 hypervisor (see prepare_vmcs12 routine) independently
feature presence.
Signed-off-by: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
setup_vmcs_config takes a pointer to the vmcs_config global. The
indirection is somewhat pointless, but just keep things consistent
for now.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
These are mostly related to nested VMX. They needn't have
a loglevel as high as KERN_WARN, and mustn't be allowed to
pollute the host logs.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If EPT support is exposed to L1 hypervisor, guest linear-address field
of VMCS should contain GVA of L2, the access to which caused EPT violation.
Signed-off-by: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Commit 61abdbe0bc ("kvm: x86: make lapic hrtimer pinned") pins the emulated
lapic timer. This patch does the same for the emulated nested preemption
timer to avoid vmexit an unrelated vCPU and the latency of kicking IPI to
another vCPU.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Yunhong Jiang <yunhong.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The validity check for the guest line address is inefficient,
check the invalid value instead of enumerating the valid ones.
Signed-off-by: Liang Li <liang.z.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When the host supported TSC scaling, L2 would use a TSC multiplier of
0, which causes a VM entry failure. Now L2's TSC uses the same
multiplier as L1.
Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If vmcs12 does not intercept APIC_BASE writes, then KVM will handle the
write with vmcs02 as the current VMCS.
This will incorrectly apply modifications intended for vmcs01 to vmcs02
and L2 can use it to gain access to L0's x2APIC registers by disabling
virtualized x2APIC while using msr bitmap that assumes enabled.
Postpone execution of vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode until vmcs01 is the
current VMCS. An alternative solution would temporarily make vmcs01 the
current VMCS, but it requires more care.
Fixes: 8d14695f95 ("x86, apicv: add virtual x2apic support")
Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
msr bitmap can be used to avoid a VM exit (interception) on guest MSR
accesses. In some configurations of VMX controls, the guest can even
directly access host's x2APIC MSRs. See SDM 29.5 VIRTUALIZING MSR-BASED
APIC ACCESSES.
L2 could read all L0's x2APIC MSRs and write TPR, EOI, and SELF_IPI.
To do so, L1 would first trick KVM to disable all possible interceptions
by enabling APICv features and then would turn those features off;
nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap() only disabled interceptions, so VMX would
not intercept previously enabled MSRs even though they were not safe
with the new configuration.
Correctly re-enabling interceptions is not enough as a second bug would
still allow L1+L2 to access host's MSRs: msr bitmap was shared for all
VMCSs, so L1 could trigger a race to get the desired combination of msr
bitmap and VMX controls.
This fix allocates a msr bitmap for every L1 VCPU, allows only safe
x2APIC MSRs from L1's msr bitmap, and disables msr bitmaps if they would
have to intercept everything anyway.
Fixes: 3af18d9c5f ("KVM: nVMX: Prepare for using hardware MSR bitmap")
Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Suggested-by: Wincy Van <fanwenyi0529@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Jan Dakinevich