Pull VFS updates from Al Viro,
Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch
create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated
create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and
seq_file etc).
7kloc removed.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits)
don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables
proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h
proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs
proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE
take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c
ppc: Clean up scanlog
ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat
hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name
drm: Constify drm_proc_list[]
zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug
reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show()
proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent
airo: Use remove_proc_subtree()
rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE
rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/
proc: Add proc_mkdir_data()
proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h}
proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c
...
Split the proc namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.h.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"A nasty bug in fs/namespace.c caught by Andrey + a couple of less
serious unpleasantness - ecryptfs misc device playing hopeless games
with try_module_get() and palinfo procfs support being... not quite
correctly done, to be polite."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
mnt: release locks on error path in do_loopback
palinfo fixes
procfs: add proc_remove_subtree()
ecryptfs: close rmmod race
... and provide namespace_lock() as a trivial wrapper;
switch to those two consistently.
Result is patterned after rtnl_lock/rtnl_unlock pair.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
global list of release_mounts() fodder, protected by namespace_sem;
eventually, all umount_tree() callers will use it as kill list.
Helper picking the contents of that list, releasing namespace_sem
and doing release_mounts() on what it got.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
do_loopback calls lock_mount(path) and forget to unlock_mount
if clone_mnt or copy_mnt fails.
[ 77.661566] ================================================
[ 77.662939] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ]
[ 77.664104] 3.9.0-rc5+ #17 Not tainted
[ 77.664982] ------------------------------------------------
[ 77.666488] mount/514 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
[ 77.668027] 2 locks held by mount/514:
[ 77.668817] #0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca22>] lock_mount+0x32/0xe0
[ 77.671755] #1: (&namespace_sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca3a>] lock_mount+0x4a/0xe0
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.
proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.
Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.
In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
When a read-only bind mount is copied from mount namespace in a higher
privileged user namespace to a mount namespace in a lesser privileged
user namespace, it should not be possible to remove the the read-only
restriction.
Add a MNT_LOCK_READONLY mount flag to indicate that a mount must
remain read-only.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
It's safe only under namespace_sem or vfsmount_lock; all places
in fs/namespace.c that want mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns actually want to use
current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns (note the calls of check_mnt() in
there).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The compiler may optimize the while loop and make the check just be done once,
so we should use ACCESS_ONCE() to guard access to ->mnt_flags
Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns. With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.
However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.
Which made the following nasty sequence possible.
pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
char path[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
setns(fd, 0);
system("su -");
}
Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.
A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.
This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.
We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.
I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Change return value from -EINVAL to -EPERM when the permission check fails.
Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that are safe to mount as
an unprivileged user.
- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that don't need MNT_NODEV
when mounted by an unprivileged user.
- Relax the permission checks to allow unprivileged users that have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN permissions in the user namespace referred to by the
current mount namespace to be allowed to mount, unmount, and move
filesystems.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Sharing mount subtress with mount namespaces created by unprivileged
users allows unprivileged mounts created by unprivileged users to
propagate to mount namespaces controlled by privileged users.
Prevent nasty consequences by changing shared subtrees to slave
subtress when an unprivileged users creates a new mount namespace.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This will allow for support for unprivileged mounts in a new user namespace.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
setns support for the mount namespace is a little tricky as an
arbitrary decision must be made about what to set fs->root and
fs->pwd to, as there is no expectation of a relationship between
the two mount namespaces. Therefore I arbitrarily find the root
mount point, and follow every mount on top of it to find the top
of the mount stack. Then I set fs->root and fs->pwd to that
location. The topmost root of the mount stack seems like a
reasonable place to be.
Bind mount support for the mount namespace inodes has the
possibility of creating circular dependencies between mount
namespaces. Circular dependencies can result in loops that
prevent mount namespaces from every being freed. I avoid
creating those circular dependencies by adding a sequence number
to the mount namespace and require all bind mounts be of a
younger mount namespace into an older mount namespace.
Add a helper function proc_ns_inode so it is possible to
detect when we are attempting to bind mound a namespace inode.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.
For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.
This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.
Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
normally we deal with lock_mount()/umount races by checking that
mountpoint to be is still in our namespace after lock_mount() has
been done. However, do_add_mount() skips that check when called
with MNT_SHRINKABLE in flags (i.e. from finish_automount()). The
reason is that ->mnt_ns may be a temporary namespace created exactly
to contain automounts a-la NFS4 referral handling. It's not the
namespace of the caller, though, so check_mnt() would fail here.
We still need to check that ->mnt_ns is non-NULL in that case,
though.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Most of places where we want freeze protection coincides with the places where
we also have remount-ro protection. So make mnt_want_write() and
mnt_drop_write() (and their _file alternative) prevent freezing as well.
For the few cases that are really interested only in remount-ro protection
provide new function variants.
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/897421
Tested-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Peter M. Petrakis <peter.petrakis@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Dann Frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Massimo Morana <massimo.morana@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add comments describing what the directions "up" and "down" mean and ref count
handling to the VFS mount following family of functions.
Signed-off-by: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com> (Original author)
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
copy_tree() can theoretically fail in a case other than ENOMEM, but always
returns NULL which is interpreted by callers as -ENOMEM. Change it to return
an explicit error.
Also change clone_mnt() for consistency and because union mounts will add new
error cases.
Thanks to Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> for a bug fix.
[AV: folded braino fix by Dan Carpenter]
Original-author: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Valerie Aurora <valerie.aurora@gmail.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
don't rely on proc_mounts->m being the first field; container_of()
is there for purpose. No need to bother with ->private, while
we are at it - the same container_of will do nicely.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
it's enough to set ->mnt_ns of internal vfsmounts to something
distinct from all struct mnt_namespace out there; then we can
just use the check for ->mnt_ns != NULL in the fast path of
mntput_no_expire()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
__mnt_make_shortterm() in there undoes the effect of __mnt_make_longterm()
we'd done back when we set ->mnt_ns non-NULL; it should not be done to
vfsmounts that had never gone through commit_tree() and friends. Kudos to
lczerner for catching that one...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
lglocks and brlocks are currently generated with some complicated macros
in lglock.h. But there's no reason to not just use common utility
functions and put all the data into a common data structure.
In preparation, this patch changes the API to look more like normal
function calls with pointers, not magic macros.
The patch is rather large because I move over all users in one go to keep
it bisectable. This impacts the VFS somewhat in terms of lines changed.
But no actual behaviour change.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (53 commits)
Kconfig: acpi: Fix typo in comment.
misc latin1 to utf8 conversions
devres: Fix a typo in devm_kfree comment
btrfs: free-space-cache.c: remove extra semicolon.
fat: Spelling s/obsolate/obsolete/g
SCSI, pmcraid: Fix spelling error in a pmcraid_err() call
tools/power turbostat: update fields in manpage
mac80211: drop spelling fix
types.h: fix comment spelling for 'architectures'
typo fixes: aera -> area, exntension -> extension
devices.txt: Fix typo of 'VMware'.
sis900: Fix enum typo 'sis900_rx_bufer_status'
decompress_bunzip2: remove invalid vi modeline
treewide: Fix comment and string typo 'bufer'
hyper-v: Update MAINTAINERS
treewide: Fix typos in various parts of the kernel, and fix some comments.
clockevents: drop unknown Kconfig symbol GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIGR
gpio: Kconfig: drop unknown symbol 'CS5535_GPIO'
leds: Kconfig: Fix typo 'D2NET_V2'
sound: Kconfig: drop unknown symbol ARCH_CLPS7500
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in arch/powerpc/platforms/40x/Kconfig (some new
kconfig additions, close to removed commented-out old ones)
If there are any inodes on the super block that have been unlinked
(i_nlink == 0) but have not yet been deleted then prevent the
remounting the super block read-only.
Reported-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently remouting superblock read-only is racy in a major way.
With the per mount read-only infrastructure it is now possible to
prevent most races, which this patch attempts.
Before starting the remount read-only, iterate through all mounts
belonging to the superblock and if none of them have any pending
writes, set sb->s_readonly_remount. This indicates that remount is in
progress and no further write requests are allowed. If the remount
succeeds set MS_RDONLY and reset s_readonly_remount.
If the remounting is unsuccessful just reset s_readonly_remount.
This can result in transient EROFS errors, despite the fact the
remount failed. Unfortunately hodling off writes is difficult as
remount itself may touch the filesystem (e.g. through load_nls())
which would deadlock.
A later patch deals with delayed writes due to nlink going to zero.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Keep track of vfsmounts belonging to a superblock. List is protected
by vfsmount_lock.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Almost all fields of struct vfsmount are used only by core VFS (and
a fairly small part of it, at that). The plan: embed struct vfsmount
into struct mount, making the latter visible only to core parts of VFS.
Then move fields from vfsmount to mount, eventually leaving only
mnt_root/mnt_sb/mnt_flags in struct vfsmount. Filesystem code still
gets pointers to struct vfsmount and remains unchanged; all such
pointers go to struct vfsmount embedded into the instances of struct
mount allocated by fs/namespace.c. When fs/namespace.c et.al. get
a pointer to vfsmount, they turn it into pointer to mount (using
container_of) and work with that.
This is the first part of series; struct mount is introduced,
allocation switched to using it.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
a) mount --move is checking that ->mnt_parent is non-NULL before
looking if that parent happens to be shared; ->mnt_parent is never
NULL and it's not even an misspelled !mnt_has_parent()
b) pivot_root open-codes is_path_reachable(), poorly.
c) so does path_is_under(), while we are at it.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
vfsmounts have ->mnt_parent pointing either to a different vfsmount
or to itself; it's never NULL and termination condition in loops
traversing the tree towards root is mnt == mnt->mnt_parent. At least
one place (see the next patch) is confused about what's going on;
let's add an explicit helper checking it right way and use it in
all places where we need it. Not that there had been too many,
but...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
mnt_{inc,dec}_count() is not cleaner than doing the corresponding
mnt_add_count() directly and mnt_set_count() is not used at all.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
__d_path() API is asking for trouble and in case of apparmor d_namespace_path()
getting just that. The root cause is that when __d_path() misses the root
it had been told to look for, it stores the location of the most remote ancestor
in *root. Without grabbing references. Sure, at the moment of call it had
been pinned down by what we have in *path. And if we raced with umount -l, we
could have very well stopped at vfsmount/dentry that got freed as soon as
prepend_path() dropped vfsmount_lock.
It is safe to compare these pointers with pre-existing (and known to be still
alive) vfsmount and dentry, as long as all we are asking is "is it the same
address?". Dereferencing is not safe and apparmor ended up stepping into
that. d_namespace_path() really wants to examine the place where we stopped,
even if it's not connected to our namespace. As the result, it looked
at ->d_sb->s_magic of a dentry that might've been already freed by that point.
All other callers had been careful enough to avoid that, but it's really
a bad interface - it invites that kind of trouble.
The fix is fairly straightforward, even though it's bigger than I'd like:
* prepend_path() root argument becomes const.
* __d_path() is never called with NULL/NULL root. It was a kludge
to start with. Instead, we have an explicit function - d_absolute_root().
Same as __d_path(), except that it doesn't get root passed and stops where
it stops. apparmor and tomoyo are using it.
* __d_path() returns NULL on path outside of root. The main
caller is show_mountinfo() and that's precisely what we pass root for - to
skip those outside chroot jail. Those who don't want that can (and do)
use d_path().
* __d_path() root argument becomes const. Everyone agrees, I hope.
* apparmor does *NOT* try to use __d_path() or any of its variants
when it sees that path->mnt is an internal vfsmount. In that case it's
definitely not mounted anywhere and dentry_path() is exactly what we want
there. Handling of sysctl()-triggered weirdness is moved to that place.
* if apparmor is asked to do pathname relative to chroot jail
and __d_path() tells it we it's not in that jail, the sucker just calls
d_absolute_path() instead. That's the other remaining caller of __d_path(),
BTW.
* seq_path_root() does _NOT_ return -ENAMETOOLONG (it's stupid anyway -
the normal seq_file logics will take care of growing the buffer and redoing
the call of ->show() just fine). However, if it gets path not reachable
from root, it returns SEQ_SKIP. The only caller adjusted (i.e. stopped
ignoring the return value as it used to do).
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
ACKed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
d'oh... we'd carefully pinned mnt->mnt_sb down, dropped mnt and attempt
to grab s_umount on mnt->mnt_sb. The trouble is, *mnt might've been
overwritten by now...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
takes vfsmount and relative path, does lookup within that vfsmount
(possibly triggering automounts) and returns the result as root
of subtree suitable for return by ->mount() (i.e. a reference to
dentry and an active reference to its superblock grabbed, superblock
locked exclusive).
btrfs and nfs switched to it instead of open-coding the sucker.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Life is much saner if create_mnt_ns(mnt) drops mnt in case of error...
Switch it to such calling conventions, switch callers, fix double mntput() in
fs/nfs/super.c one.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
I was studying the code and I saw that the out label is not being used
at all so I removed it and its usage from the function.
Signed-off-by: Kautuk Consul <consul.kautuk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
nfsiostat was failing to find mounted filesystems on kernels after
2.6.38 because of changes to show_vfsstat() by commit
c7f404b40a. This patch adds back the
"device" tag before the nfs server entry so scripts can parse the
mountstats file correctly.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
CC: stable@kernel.org [>=2.6.39]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Linus Torvalds