A feature was added to the eCryptfs umount helper to automatically
unlink the keys used for an eCryptfs mount from the kernel keyring upon
umount. This patch keeps the unrecognized mount option warnings for
ecryptfs_unlink_sigs out of the logs.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Copies the lower inode attributes to the upper inode before passing the
upper inode to d_instantiate(). This is important for
security_d_instantiate().
The problem was discovered by a user seeing SELinux denials like so:
type=AVC msg=audit(1236812817.898:47): avc: denied { 0x100000 } for
pid=3584 comm="httpd" name="testdir" dev=ecryptfs ino=943872
scontext=root:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=root:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0 tclass=file
Notice target class is file while testdir is really a directory,
confusing the permission translation (0x100000) due to the wrong i_mode.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.
This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption
Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils
userspace package versions 61 or later support this option.
When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper
will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption
in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user
interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the
mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will
then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting
by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has
already entered for encrypting the file contents.
When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for
the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key
must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes
care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount
helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring
with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.
The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev
transport is a simpler solution. This patch removes the netlink code and
makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace
transport.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is a much better version of a previous patch to make the parser
tables constant. Rather than changing the typedef, we put the "const" in
all the various places where its required, allowing the __initconst
exception for nfsroot which was the cause of the previous trouble.
This was posted for review some time ago and I believe its been in -mm
since then.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <aviro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Kmem cache passed to constructor is only needed for constructors that are
themselves multiplexeres. Nobody uses this "feature", nor does anybody uses
passed kmem cache in non-trivial way, so pass only pointer to object.
Non-trivial places are:
arch/powerpc/mm/init_64.c
arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c
This is flag day, yes.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/slab.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix ubifs]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is no good reason to immediately open the lower file, and that can
cause problems with files that the user does not intend to immediately
open, such as device nodes.
This patch removes the persistent file open from the interpose step and
pushes that to the locations where eCryptfs really does need the lower
persistent file, such as just before reading or writing the metadata
stored in the lower file header.
Two functions are jumping to out_dput when they should just be jumping to
out on error paths. This patch also fixes these.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When creating device nodes, eCryptfs needs to delay actually opening the lower
persistent file until an application tries to open. Device handles may not be
backed by anything when they first come into existence.
[Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu}
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Clean up overcomplicated string copy, which also gets rid of this
bogus warning:
fs/ecryptfs/main.c: In function 'ecryptfs_parse_options':
include/asm/arch/string_32.h:75: warning: array subscript is above array bounds
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Mounting with invalid key signatures should probably fail, if they were
specifically requested but not available.
Also fix case checks in process_request_key_err() for the right sign of
the errnos, as spotted by Jan Tluka.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Tluka <jtluka@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
eCryptfs would really like to have read-write access to all files in the
lower filesystem. Right now, the persistent lower file may be opened
read-only if the attempt to open it read-write fails. One way to keep
from having to do that is to have a privileged kthread that can open the
lower persistent file on behalf of the user opening the eCryptfs file;
this patch implements this functionality.
This patch will properly allow a less-privileged user to open the eCryptfs
file, followed by a more-privileged user opening the eCryptfs file, with
the first user only being able to read and the second user being able to
both read and write. eCryptfs currently does this wrong; it will wind up
calling vfs_write() on a file that was opened read-only. This is fixed in
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
vfsmount of a struct path in the right order
* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path)
* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.
Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
<dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:
without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux
with patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux
This patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Jeff Moyer pointed out that a mount; umount loop of ecryptfs, with the same
cipher & other mount options, created a new ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache item
each time, and the cache could grow quite large this way.
Looking at this with mhalcrow, we saw that ecryptfs_parse_options()
unconditionally called ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(), which is what was adding
these items.
Refactor ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name() to create a new
helper function, ecryptfs_tfm_exists(), which checks for the cipher on the
cached key_tfm_list, and sets a pointer to it if it exists. This can then
be called from ecryptfs_parse_options(), and new key_tfm's can be added
only when a cached one is not found.
With list locking changes suggested by akpm.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ecryptfs_debug really should not be a mount option; it is not per-mount,
but rather sets a global "ecryptfs_verbosity" variable which affects all
mounted filesysytems. It's already settable as a module load option,
I think we can leave it at that.
Also, if set, since secret values come out in debug messages, kick
things off with a stern warning.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove internal references to header extents; just keep track of header bytes
instead. Headers can easily span multiple pages with the recent persistent
file changes.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- make the following needlessly global code static:
- crypto.c:ecryptfs_lower_offset_for_extent()
- crypto.c:key_tfm_list
- crypto.c:key_tfm_list_mutex
- inode.c:ecryptfs_getxattr()
- main.c:ecryptfs_init_persistent_file()
- remove the no longer used mmap.c:ecryptfs_lower_page_cache
- #if 0 the unused read_write.c:ecryptfs_read()
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is no need for kobject_unregister() anymore, thanks to Kay's
kobject cleanup changes, so replace all instances of it with
kobject_put().
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Using a kset for this trivial directory is an overkill.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This file violates the one-value-per-file sysfs rule.
If you all want it added back, please do something like a per-feature
file to show what is present and what isn't.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Switch all dynamically created ksets, that export simple attributes,
to kobj_attribute from subsys_attribute. Struct subsys_attribute will
be removed.
Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This also renames fs_subsys to fs_kobj to catch all current users with a
build error instead of a build warning which can easily be missed.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Dynamically create the kset instead of declaring it statically.
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
We don't need a "default" ktype for a kset. We should set this
explicitly every time for each kset. This change is needed so that we
can make ksets dynamic, and cleans up one of the odd, undocumented
assumption that the kset/kobject/ktype model has.
This patch is based on a lot of help from Kay Sievers.
Nasty bug in the block code was found by Dave Young
<hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
It isn't that hard to add simple kset attributes, so don't go through
all the gyrations of creating your own object type and show and store
functions. Just use the functions that are already present. This makes
things much simpler.
Note, the version_str string violates the "one value per file" rule for
sysfs. I suggest changing this now (individual files per type supported
is one suggested way.)
Cc: Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael C. Thompson <mcthomps@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@ou.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Thanks to Jeff Moyer for pointing this out.
If the RDWR dentry_open() in ecryptfs_init_persistent_file fails,
it will do a dput/mntput. Need to re-take references if we
retry as RDONLY.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
eCryptfs wasn't setting s_blocksize in it's superblock; just pick it up
from the lower FS. Having an s_blocksize of 0 made things like "filefrag"
which call FIGETBSZ unhappy.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch cleans up duplicate includes in
fs/ecryptfs/
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael A Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Slab constructors currently have a flags parameter that is never used. And
the order of the arguments is opposite to other slab functions. The object
pointer is placed before the kmem_cache pointer.
Convert
ctor(void *object, struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags)
to
ctor(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
throughout the kernel
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coupla fixes]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The switch to read_write.c routines and the persistent file make a number of
functions unnecessary. This patch removes them.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch sets up and destroys the persistent lower file for each eCryptfs
inode.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The error paths and the module exit code need work. sysfs
unregistration is not the right place to tear down the crypto
subsystem, and the code to undo subsystem initializations on various
error paths is unnecessarily duplicated. This patch addresses those
issues.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void)
>
> ecryptfs_destroy_crypto would be more grammatically correct ;)
Grammatical fix for some function names.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_1_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:557: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_3_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:690: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_11_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:836: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_1_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1413: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1413: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'long unsigned int'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_11_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1472: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_3_packet':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1663: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1663: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'long unsigned int'
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set':
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1778: warning: passing argument 2 of 'write_tag_11_packet' from incompatible pointer type
fs/ecryptfs/main.c: In function 'ecryptfs_parse_options':
fs/ecryptfs/main.c:363: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'size_t'
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce kmem_cache objects for handling multiple keys per inode. Add calls
in the module init and exit code to call the key list
initialization/destruction functions.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in crypt_stat
contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that should be used for
encrypting each file's File Encryption Key (FEK). For now, each inode
inherits this list from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, via the
ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function.
This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide crypt_stat
struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing with the various
inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's keyring for FEK's parsed
from the existing file metadata, so the user can make keys available at any
time before or after mounting.
Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we need to
be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code for writing out
packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits more explicit, uniformly
expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ecryptfs_init() exits without doing any cleanup jobs if
ecryptfs_init_messaging() fails. In that case, eCryptfs leaves
sysfs entries, leaks memory, and causes an invalid page fault.
This patch fixes the problem.
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f22 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.
This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
sysfs is now completely out of driver/module lifetime game. After
deletion, a sysfs node doesn't access anything outside sysfs proper,
so there's no reason to hold onto the attribute owners. Note that
often the wrong modules were accounted for as owners leading to
accessing removed modules.
This patch kills now unnecessary attribute->owner. Note that with
this change, userland holding a sysfs node does not prevent the
backing module from being unloaded.
For more info regarding lifetime rule cleanup, please read the
following message.
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/510293
(tweaked by Greg to not delete the field just yet, to make it easier to
merge things properly.)
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <htejun@gmail.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
SLAB_CTOR_CONSTRUCTOR is always specified. No point in checking it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <aia21@cantab.net>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: David Chinner <dgc@sgi.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I have never seen a use of SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL. It is only supported by
SLAB.
I think its purpose was to have a callback after an object has been freed
to verify that the state is the constructor state again? The callback is
performed before each freeing of an object.
I would think that it is much easier to check the object state manually
before the free. That also places the check near the code object
manipulation of the object.
Also the SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL callback is only performed if the kernel was
compiled with SLAB debugging on. If there would be code in a constructor
handling SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL then it would have to be conditional on
SLAB_DEBUG otherwise it would just be dead code. But there is no such code
in the kernel. I think SLUB_DEBUG_INITIAL is too problematic to make real
use of, difficult to understand and there are easier ways to accomplish the
same effect (i.e. add debug code before kfree).
There is a related flag SLAB_CTOR_VERIFY that is frequently checked to be
clear in fs inode caches. Remove the pointless checks (they would even be
pointless without removeal of SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL) from the fs constructors.
This is the last slab flag that SLUB did not support. Remove the check for
unimplemented flags from SLUB.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We need to work on cleaning up the relationship between kobjects, ksets and
ktypes. The removal of 'struct subsystem' is the first step of this,
especially as it is not really needed at all.
Thanks to Kay for fixing the bugs in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
- Currently after path_lookup succeed we dot't have any guarantie what
it is DIR. This must be explicitly demanded.
- path_lookup can't return negative dentry, So inode check is useless.
Signed-off-by: Dmitriy Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Dmitriy Monakhov wrote:
> if path_lookup() return non zero code we don't have to worry about
> 'nd' parameter, but ecryptfs_read_super does path_release(&nd) after
> path_lookup has failed, and dentry counter becomes negative
Do not do a path_release after a path_lookup error.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitriy Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Al Viro