Commit Graph

363 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David Howells ee18d64c1f KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.

To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.

The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.

Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.

This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18

	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		key_serial_t keyring, key;
		long ret;

		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");

		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
		OSERROR(key, "add_key");

		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");

		return 0;
	}

Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a

Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:22 +10:00
Paul Moore 2b980dbd77 lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver
The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules,
such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by
TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as
QEMU and KVM.  This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the
creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are:

 * security_tun_dev_create()
   Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices

 * security_tun_dev_post_create()
   Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly
   created TUN devices

 * security_tun_dev_attach()
   Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices
   and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-01 08:29:48 +10:00
Eric Paris 9188499cdb security: introducing security_request_module
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
new module into the kernel.  This can be a dangerous event if the process
able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
binary or the module binary.  This patch adds a new security hook to
request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
to call request_module().

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-14 11:18:37 +10:00
Ingo Molnar 9e48858f7d security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check
The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
a retval convention.

Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.

[ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-25 00:18:05 +10:00
Christoph Lameter e0a94c2a63 security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY.
It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096.

mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes
with CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Looks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-04 12:07:48 +10:00
David Howells 800a964787 CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles
Export a number of functions for CacheFiles's use.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
2009-04-03 16:42:40 +01:00
Paul Moore 8651d5c0b1 lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook
The socket_post_accept() hook is not currently used by any in-tree modules
and its existence continues to cause problems by confusing people about
what can be safely accomplished using this hook.  If a legitimate need for
this hook arises in the future it can always be reintroduced.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-03-28 15:01:37 +11:00
James Morris ac8cc0fa53 Merge branch 'next' into for-linus 2009-01-07 09:58:22 +11:00
David Howells 3699c53c48 CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #3]
Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:

	commit 3b11a1dece
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100

	    CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task

The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.

There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.

Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds.  However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.

One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.

The affected capability check is in generic_permission():

	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
		if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
			return 0;

This change passes the set of credentials to be tested down into the commoncap
and SELinux code.  The security functions called by capable() and
has_capability() select the appropriate set of credentials from the process
being checked.

This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:

/*
 *  t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
 *
 *  Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
 *  Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
 */
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"

static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
    perror(msg);
    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */

static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
    printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */

int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int fd, perm, uid, gid;
    char *testpath;
    char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];

    testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
    perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
    uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
    gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;

    unlink(testpath);

    fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
    if (fd == -1) errExit("open");

    if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
    if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
    close(fd);

    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
    system(cmd);

    if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");

    accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");

    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */

This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem.  If successful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

If unsuccessful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-07 09:38:48 +11:00
James Morris 29881c4502 Revert "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]"
This reverts commit 14eaddc967.

David has a better version to come.
2009-01-07 09:21:54 +11:00
David Howells 14eaddc967 CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]
Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:

	commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000

	    CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task

The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.

There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.

Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds.  However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.

One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.

The affected capability check is in generic_permission():

	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
		if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
			return 0;

This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and
SELinux code.  The capable() security op now only deals with the current
process, and uses the current process's subjective creds.  A new security op -
task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds.

strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the
task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since
two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers.

This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:

/*
 *  t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
 *
 *  Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
 *  Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
 */
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"

static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
    perror(msg);
    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */

static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
    printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */

int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int fd, perm, uid, gid;
    char *testpath;
    char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];

    testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
    perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
    uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
    gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;

    unlink(testpath);

    fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
    if (fd == -1) errExit("open");

    if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
    if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
    close(fd);

    snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
    system(cmd);

    if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");

    accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
    accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");

    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */

This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem.  If successful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

If unsuccessful, it will show:

	[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
	---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
	access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
	access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1

I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-05 11:17:04 +11:00
Kentaro Takeda be6d3e56a6 introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks.  Call them on directory-modifying
operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-31 18:07:37 -05:00
James Morris 12204e24b1 security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()
Pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount(), so security modules
can determine if a mount operation is being performed by the kernel.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2008-12-20 09:02:39 +11:00
Hannes Eder 200036ca9b CRED: fix sparse warnings
Impact: fix sparse warnings

Fix the following sparse warnings:

  security/security.c:228:2: warning: returning void-valued expression
  security/security.c:233:2: warning: returning void-valued expression
  security/security.c:616:2: warning: returning void-valued expression

Signed-off-by: Hannes Eder <hannes@hanneseder.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-25 06:33:17 +05:30
David Howells 3a3b7ce933 CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then
using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of
a task.

This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the
cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a
potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
credentials.

This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:

 (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
     with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).

 (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the
     security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that
     a task creates.

The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the
LSM functions:

 (1) prepare_kernel_cred()

     Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on
     a daemon's credentials or on init_cred.  All the keyrings are cleared.

 (2) set_security_override()

     Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security
     context, assuming permission from the LSM policy.

 (3) set_security_override_from_ctx()

     As (2), but takes the security context as a string.

 (4) set_create_files_as()

     Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the
     same as that on a particular inode.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:28 +11:00
David Howells a6f76f23d2 CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
     replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred).  This means that
     all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
     of no return with no possibility of failure.

     I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:

	cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)

     but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
     (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
     be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).

     The following sequence of events now happens:

     (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
     	 locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
     	 creds that we make.

     (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
     	 task's credentials and prepare it.  This copy is then assigned to
     	 bprm->cred.

  	 This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
     	 unnecessary, and so they've been removed.

     (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
     	 after (a) rather than later on in the code.  The result is stored in
     	 bprm->unsafe for future reference.

     (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.

     	 (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
     	     attached to bprm->cred.  Personality bit clearance is recorded,
     	     but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
     	     fail.

         (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds().  This should
	     calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.

	     This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
	     security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
	     Anything that might fail must be done at this point.

         (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.

	     bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
	     calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes.  This allows SELinux
	     in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
	     not on the interpreter.

     (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution.  This
     	 performs the following steps with regard to credentials:

	 (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
	     may not be covered by commit_creds().

         (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
             (c.i).

     (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
     	 new credentials.  This performs the following steps with regard to
     	 credentials:

         (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
             requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
             must be done before the credentials are changed.

	     This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
	     security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
	     This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
	     must have been done in (c.ii).

         (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
             assignment (more or less).  Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
             should be part of struct creds.

	 (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
	     PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.

         (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
             are now immutable.

         (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
             alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
             SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.

     (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
     	 to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
     	 cred_replace_mutex.  No changes to the credentials will have been
     	 made.

 (2) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
     (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()

     	 Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()

     	 Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
     	 security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()

     	 Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()

     	 New.  The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
     	 as appropriate.  bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
     	 second and subsequent calls.

     (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()

     	 New.  Apply the security effects of the new credentials.  This
     	 includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux.  This function may not
     	 fail.  When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
     	 to the process; when the latter is called, they have.

 	 The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.

 (3) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
     	 the credentials-under-construction approach.

     (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
     	 to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:24 +11:00
David Howells d84f4f992c CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
David Howells 745ca2475a CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.

The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:22 +11:00
David Howells f1752eec61 CRED: Detach the credentials from task_struct
Detach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()
and releasing them in __put_task_struct().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:17 +11:00
David Howells 15a2460ed0 CRED: Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks
Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:15 +11:00
David Howells 1cdcbec1a3 CRED: Neuter sys_capset()
Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.

This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.

This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:

 (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.

 (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:14 +11:00
Eric Paris 06112163f5 Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to
make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision.  Currently
this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use
the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom
algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less
likely to be killed.  These types of security system requests should not be
audited or logged since they are not really security decisions.  It would be
possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that
interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex
indirection.

This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not
flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 22:02:50 +11:00
Alan Cox 731572d39f nfsd: fix vm overcommit crash
Junjiro R.  Okajima reported a problem where knfsd crashes if you are
using it to export shmemfs objects and run strict overcommit.  In this
situation the current->mm based modifier to the overcommit goes through a
NULL pointer.

We could simply check for NULL and skip the modifier but we've caught
other real bugs in the past from mm being NULL here - cases where we did
need a valid mm set up (eg the exec bug about a year ago).

To preserve the checks and get the logic we want shuffle the checking
around and add a new helper to the vm_ security wrappers

Also fix a current->mm reference in nommu that should use the passed mm

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Reported-by: Junjiro R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-30 11:38:47 -07:00
James Morris 86d688984d Merge branch 'master' into next 2008-08-28 10:47:34 +10:00
Randy Dunlap 3f23d815c5 security: add/fix security kernel-doc
Add security/inode.c functions to the kernel-api docbook.
Use '%' on constants in kernel-doc notation.
Fix several typos/spellos in security function descriptions.

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-20 20:16:32 +10:00
David Howells 5cd9c58fbe security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.

__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags.  This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.

This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:

 (1) security_ptrace_may_access().  This passes judgement on whether one
     process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
     PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
     current is the parent.

 (2) security_ptrace_traceme().  This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
     and takes only a pointer to the parent process.  current is the child.

     In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
     the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
     This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().

Of the places that were using __capable():

 (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
     process.  All of these now use has_capability().

 (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
     whether the parent was allowed to trace any process.  As mentioned above,
     these have been split.  For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
     used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.

 (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().

 (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
     after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
     switched and capable() is used instead.

 (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
     receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.

 (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
     whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.

I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-14 22:59:43 +10:00
Miklos Szeredi b1da47e29e [patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_change
The FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl() calls notify_change() to change
the file mode before changing the inode attributes.  Replace with
explicit calls to security_inode_setattr(), fat_setattr() and
fsnotify_change().

This is equivalent to the original.  The reason it is needed, is that
later in the series we move the immutable check into notify_change().
That would break the FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, as it needs to
perform the mode change regardless of the immutability of the file.

[Fix error if fat is built as a module.  Thanks to OGAWA Hirofumi for
noticing.]

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:27 -04:00
Al Viro b77b0646ef [PATCH] pass MAY_OPEN to vfs_permission() explicitly
... and get rid of the last "let's deduce mask from nameidata->flags"
bit.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:22 -04:00
James Morris 6f0f0fd496 security: remove register_security hook
The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability
module is always registered.  LSMs wishing to stack capability as
a secondary module should do so explicitly.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-07-14 15:04:06 +10:00
Miklos Szeredi 5915eb5386 security: remove dummy module
Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default.

Compile and boot tested.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14 15:03:04 +10:00
Miklos Szeredi b478a9f988 security: remove unused sb_get_mnt_opts hook
The sb_get_mnt_opts() hook is unused, and is superseded by the
sb_show_options() hook.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14 15:02:05 +10:00
Eric Paris 2069f45784 LSM/SELinux: show LSM mount options in /proc/mounts
This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts.  As
with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored.  Other LSM's
will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own
security_sb_show_options() function.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14 15:02:05 +10:00
James Morris 65fc766800 security: fix return of void-valued expressions
Fix several warnings generated by sparse of the form
"returning void-valued expression".

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-07-14 15:02:03 +10:00
Stephen Smalley 006ebb40d3 Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach
Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested.  This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access.  The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.

Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target.  The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.

In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label.  This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit).  At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).

This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).

Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0).  I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-14 15:01:47 +10:00
David Howells 7bf570dc8d Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdata
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 13:22:56 -07:00
David Howells 70a5bb72b5 keys: add keyctl function to get a security label
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.

The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:

 (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
		    size_t buflen)

     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
     attached to a key in the buffer provided.

     Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
     produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
     will take place.

     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
     in force then an empty string will be returned.

     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
     successful.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:16 -07:00
David Howells 8f0cfa52a1 xattr: add missing consts to function arguments
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:06:06 -07:00
Andrew G. Morgan 3898b1b4eb capabilities: implement per-process securebits
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead.  That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.

Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege.  Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.

Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege.  In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.

The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0.  This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()).  This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.

With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:

  prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);

This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 08:58:26 -07:00
Al Viro b5266eb4c8 [PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to path
Namely, ones from namespace.c

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-21 23:13:23 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 3925e6fc1f Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
  security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable
  Security: Introduce security= boot parameter
  Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
  SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
  Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
  LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
  SELinux: remove redundant exports
  Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
  Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
  SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
  LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
2008-04-18 18:18:30 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 334d094504 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26: (1090 commits)
  [NET]: Fix and allocate less memory for ->priv'less netdevices
  [IPV6]: Fix dangling references on error in fib6_add().
  [NETLABEL]: Fix NULL deref in netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen() if ifindex not found
  [PKT_SCHED]: Fix datalen check in tcf_simp_init().
  [INET]: Uninline the __inet_inherit_port call.
  [INET]: Drop the inet_inherit_port() call.
  SCTP: Initialize partial_bytes_acked to 0, when all of the data is acked.
  [netdrvr] forcedeth: internal simplifications; changelog removal
  phylib: factor out get_phy_id from within get_phy_device
  PHY: add BCM5464 support to broadcom PHY driver
  cxgb3: Fix __must_check warning with dev_dbg.
  tc35815: Statistics cleanup
  natsemi: fix MMIO for PPC 44x platforms
  [TIPC]: Cleanup of TIPC reference table code
  [TIPC]: Optimized initialization of TIPC reference table
  [TIPC]: Remove inlining of reference table locking routines
  e1000: convert uint16_t style integers to u16
  ixgb: convert uint16_t style integers to u16
  sb1000.c: make const arrays static
  sb1000.c: stop inlining largish static functions
  ...
2008-04-18 18:02:35 -07:00
James Morris 7cea51be4e security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable
security_module_enable() can only be called during kernel init.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-19 10:00:59 +10:00
Ahmed S. Darwish 076c54c5bc Security: Introduce security= boot parameter
Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM
registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module.

User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no
security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM
asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security
module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen.

LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register
by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux
and SMACK to do so.

Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on
boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and
the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done.

Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-19 10:00:51 +10:00
Ahmed S. Darwish 03d37d25e0 LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules
by adding the following new LSM hooks:

audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule)
audit_rule_known(krule)
audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx)
audit_rule_free(rule)

Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-04-19 09:52:36 +10:00
Ahmed S. Darwish 8a076191f3 LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid)
LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported
SELinux interfaces.

Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default
if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to
NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid
secid exists.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-04-19 09:52:32 +10:00
Harvey Harrison dd6f953adb security: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrences
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__

Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-18 20:26:07 +10:00
Paul Moore 03e1ad7b5d LSM: Make the Labeled IPsec hooks more stack friendly
The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs
on the stack to work around the LSM API.  This patch attempts to fix that
problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security"
pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the
security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-04-12 19:07:52 -07:00
Eric Paris e000752989 LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options
Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount
options.  This includes a new string parsing function exported from the
LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security
data blob.  This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary
mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be
handled by the loaded LSM.  Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK
when dealing with binary mount data.  If the binary mount data is less
than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an
illegal page fault and boom.  Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code
since they were broken by past NFS changes.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-06 08:40:53 +11:00
Eric Paris a5ecbcb8c1 security: allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection
Since it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn't
be turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to
set a default at compile time.  This value is still tunable after boot
in /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr

Discussion:
http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.html

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-02-06 21:39:46 +08:00
David P. Quigley 4249259404 VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting buffer
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.

Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook.  This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.

The patch also removed the unused err parameter.  The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.

Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 09:44:20 -08:00
David Howells 63cb344923 security: add a secctx_to_secid() hook
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook.  This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-25 11:29:53 +11:00
H. Peter Anvin bced95283e security: remove security_sb_post_mountroot hook
The security_sb_post_mountroot() hook is long-since obsolete, and is
fundamentally broken: it is never invoked if someone uses initramfs.
This is particularly damaging, because the existence of this hook has
been used as motivation for not using initramfs.

Stephen Smalley confirmed on 2007-07-19 that this hook was originally
used by SELinux but can now be safely removed:

     http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118485683612916&w=2

Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-25 11:29:50 +11:00
Eric Paris c9180a57a9 Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information
Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux.  This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose.  This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.

Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has.  I assume
future LSM's would do the same.  NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.

An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=.  If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.

An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM.  This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-25 11:29:46 +11:00
Adrian Bunk cbfee34520 security/ cleanups
This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:
- remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix
- remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security
- remove some no longer required exit code
- remove a bunch of no longer used exports

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn b53767719b Implement file posix capabilities
Implement file posix capabilities.  This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.

This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php.  For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

Changelog:
	Nov 27:
	Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
	(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
	security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
	Fix Kconfig dependency.
	Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.

	Nov 13:
	Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
	capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.

	Nov 13:
	Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
	Dobriyan.

	Nov 09:
	Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
	when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
	up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
	function.

	Nov 08:
	For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
	them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.

	Nov 07:
	Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
	check_cap_sanity().

	Nov 07:
	Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
	capabilities are the default.
	Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
	Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
	audit messages.

	Nov 05:
	Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
	task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
	cap support can be stacked.

	Sep 05:
	As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
	for capability code.

	Sep 01:
	Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
	task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
	they called a program with some fscaps.

	One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
	ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
	cpuset?

	It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
	allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check.  But since
	it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
	CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
	fixing it might be tough.

	     task_setscheduler
		 note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task.  Are we ok with
		     CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
	     task_setioprio
	     task_setnice
		 sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
		 process.  Need same checks as setrlimit

	Aug 21:
	Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
	euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
	might still have elevated caps.

	Aug 15:
	Handle endianness of xattrs.
	Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
	Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
	set, else return -EPERM.
	With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
	doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
	d_instantiate.

	Aug 10:
	Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
	caching it at d_instantiate.

[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
James Morris 20510f2f4e security: Convert LSM into a static interface
Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
overall security architecture.

Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
abuse.

Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
at boot.

The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.

In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM.  The modular interface
is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure.  It is used only by out-of-tree
modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
dangerous, e.g.  silently re-vectoring SELinux.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Adrian Bunk d4cf291526 security: unexport mmap_min_addr
Remove unneeded export.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:33 -04:00
Eric Paris ed03218951 security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap
Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting
to mmap to low area of the address space.  The amount of space protected is
indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to
0, preserving existing behavior.

This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect."  Policy already
contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being
one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its
best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also
want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of
the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other
memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time
we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-07-11 22:52:29 -04:00
Tim Schmielau cd354f1ae7 [PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h
After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there.  Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.

To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.

Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm.  I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).

Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14 08:09:54 -08:00
Jörn Engel 6ab3d5624e Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>
Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-06-30 19:25:36 +02:00
Chris Wright 12b5989be1 [PATCH] refactor capable() to one implementation, add __capable() helper
Move capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate
implementations.  Add __capable() function which can be used to check for
capabiilty of any process.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-25 08:22:56 -08:00
Randy.Dunlap c59ede7b78 [PATCH] move capable() to capability.h
- Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h;

- Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used
	(in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/,
	mm/, security/, & sound/;
	many more drivers/ to go)

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-11 18:42:13 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00