Both of these options are poorly named. The features they provide are
necessary for system security and should not be considered debug only.
Change the names to CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to better describe what these options do.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
There are multiple architectures that support CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and
CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX. These options also now have the ability to be
turned off at runtime. Move these to an architecture independent
location and make these options def_bool y for almost all of those
arches.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The meaning of "leak" can be both "untracked resource allocation" and
"memory content disclosure". This document's use was entirely of the
latter meaning, so avoid the confusion by using the Common Weakness
Enumeration name for this: Information Exposure (CWE-200). Additionally
adds a section on structure randomization.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This document attempts to codify the intent around kernel self-protection
along with discussion of both existing and desired technologies, with
attention given to the rationale behind them, and the expectations of
their usage.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
[jc: applied fixes suggested by Randy]
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Laura Abbott