The use of kmap_atomic() is being deprecated in favor of
kmap_local_page()[1].
The main difference between atomic and local mappings is that local
mappings don't disable page faults or preemption.
There're 2 reasons we can use kmap_local_page() here:
1. SEV is 64-bit only and kmap_local_page() doesn't disable migration in
this case, but here the function clflush_cache_range() uses CLFLUSHOPT
instruction to flush, and on x86 CLFLUSHOPT is not CPU-local and flushes
the page out of the entire cache hierarchy on all CPUs (APM volume 3,
chapter 3, CLFLUSHOPT). So there's no need to disable preemption to ensure
CPU-local.
2. clflush_cache_range() doesn't need to disable pagefault and the mapping
is still valid even if sleeps. This is also true for sched out/in when
preempted.
In addition, though kmap_local_page() is a thin wrapper around
page_address() on 64-bit, kmap_local_page() should still be used here in
preference to page_address() since page_address() isn't suitable to be used
in a generic function (like sev_clflush_pages()) where the page passed in
is not easy to determine the source of allocation. Keeping the kmap* API in
place means it can be used for things other than highmem mappings[2].
Therefore, sev_clflush_pages() is a function that should use
kmap_local_page() in place of kmap_atomic().
Convert the calls of kmap_atomic() / kunmap_atomic() to kmap_local_page() /
kunmap_local().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220813220034.806698-1-ira.weiny@intel.com
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5d667258-b58b-3d28-3609-e7914c99b31b@intel.com/
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220928092748.463631-1-zhao1.liu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Rename reserved fields on all structs in arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
following their offset within the structs. Include compile time checks for
this in the same place where other BUILD_BUG_ON for the structs are.
This also solves that fields of struct sev_es_save_area are named by their
order of appearance, but right now they jump from reserved_5 to reserved_7.
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/10/22/376
Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20221024164448.203351-1-carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
[Use ASSERT_STRUCT_OFFSET + fix a couple wrong offsets. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Explicitly print the VMSA dump at KERN_DEBUG log level, KERN_CONT uses
KERNEL_DEFAULT if the previous log line has a newline, i.e. if there's
nothing to continuing, and as a result the VMSA gets dumped when it
shouldn't.
The KERN_CONT documentation says it defaults back to KERNL_DEFAULT if the
previous log line has a newline. So switch from KERN_CONT to
print_hex_dump_debug().
Jarkko pointed this out in reference to the original patch. See:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/YuPMeWX4uuR1Tz3M@kernel.org/
print_hex_dump(KERN_DEBUG, ...) was pointed out there, but
print_hex_dump_debug() should similar.
Fixes: 6fac42f127 ("KVM: SVM: Dump Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA) to klog")
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Harald Hoyer <harald@profian.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Message-Id: <20221104142220.469452-1-pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The svm_data percpu variable is a pointer, but it is allocated via
svm_hardware_setup() when KVM is loaded. Unlike hardware_enable()
this means that it is never NULL for the whole lifetime of KVM, and
static allocation does not waste any memory compared to the status quo.
It is also more efficient and more easily handled from assembly code,
so do it and don't look back.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Disable SEV-ES if MMIO caching is disabled as SEV-ES relies on MMIO SPTEs
generating #NPF(RSVD), which are reflected by the CPU into the guest as
a #VC. With SEV-ES, the untrusted host, a.k.a. KVM, doesn't have access
to the guest instruction stream or register state and so can't directly
emulate in response to a #NPF on an emulated MMIO GPA. Disabling MMIO
caching means guest accesses to emulated MMIO ranges cause #NPF(!PRESENT),
and those flavors of #NPF cause automatic VM-Exits, not #VC.
Adjust KVM's MMIO masks to account for the C-bit location prior to doing
SEV(-ES) setup, and document that dependency between adjusting the MMIO
SPTE mask and SEV(-ES) setup.
Fixes: b09763da4d ("KVM: x86/mmu: Add module param to disable MMIO caching (for testing)")
Reported-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Tested-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220803224957.1285926-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM/s390, KVM/x86 and common infrastructure changes for 5.20
x86:
* Permit guests to ignore single-bit ECC errors
* Fix races in gfn->pfn cache refresh; do not pin pages tracked by the cache
* Intel IPI virtualization
* Allow getting/setting pending triple fault with KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS
* PEBS virtualization
* Simplify PMU emulation by just using PERF_TYPE_RAW events
* More accurate event reinjection on SVM (avoid retrying instructions)
* Allow getting/setting the state of the speaker port data bit
* Refuse starting the kvm-intel module if VM-Entry/VM-Exit controls are inconsistent
* "Notify" VM exit (detect microarchitectural hangs) for Intel
* Cleanups for MCE MSR emulation
s390:
* add an interface to provide a hypervisor dump for secure guests
* improve selftests to use TAP interface
* enable interpretive execution of zPCI instructions (for PCI passthrough)
* First part of deferred teardown
* CPU Topology
* PV attestation
* Minor fixes
Generic:
* new selftests API using struct kvm_vcpu instead of a (vm, id) tuple
x86:
* Use try_cmpxchg64 instead of cmpxchg64
* Bugfixes
* Ignore benign host accesses to PMU MSRs when PMU is disabled
* Allow disabling KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behavior
* x86/MMU: Allow NX huge pages to be disabled on a per-vm basis
* Port eager page splitting to shadow MMU as well
* Enable CMCI capability by default and handle injected UCNA errors
* Expose pid of vcpu threads in debugfs
* x2AVIC support for AMD
* cleanup PIO emulation
* Fixes for LLDT/LTR emulation
* Don't require refcounted "struct page" to create huge SPTEs
x86 cleanups:
* Use separate namespaces for guest PTEs and shadow PTEs bitmasks
* PIO emulation
* Reorganize rmap API, mostly around rmap destruction
* Do not workaround very old KVM bugs for L0 that runs with nesting enabled
* new selftests API for CPUID
As Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA) is essential in troubleshooting
attestation, dump it to the klog with the KERN_DEBUG level of priority.
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Harald Hoyer <harald@profian.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com>
Message-Id: <20220728050919.24113-1-jarkko@profian.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The target VMCBs during an intra-host migration need to correctly setup
for running SEV and SEV-ES guests. Add sev_init_vmcb() function and make
sev_es_init_vmcb() static. sev_init_vmcb() uses the now private function
to init SEV-ES guests VMCBs when needed.
Fixes: 0b020f5af0 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration")
Fixes: b56639318b ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Message-Id: <20220623173406.744645-1-pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Adding the accounting flag when allocating pages within the SEV function,
since these memory pages should belong to individual VM.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220623171858.2083637-1-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Wrap the manipulation of @role and the manual mutex_{release,acquire}()
invocations in CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y to squash a clang-15 warning. When
building with -Wunused-but-set-parameter and CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC=n,
clang-15 seees there's no usage of @role in mutex_lock_killable_nested()
and yells. PROVE_LOCKING selects DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC, and the only reason
KVM manipulates @role is to make PROVE_LOCKING happy.
To avoid true ugliness, use "i" and "j" to detect the first pass in the
loops; the "idx" field that's used by kvm_for_each_vcpu() is guaranteed
to be '0' on the first pass as it's simply the first entry in the vCPUs
XArray, which is fully KVM controlled. kvm_for_each_vcpu() passes '0'
for xa_for_each_range()'s "start", and xa_for_each_range() will not enter
the loop if there's no entry at '0'.
Fixes: 0c2c7c0692 ("KVM: SEV: Mark nested locking of vcpu->lock")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220613214237.2538266-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* ultravisor communication device driver
* fix TEID on terminating storage key ops
RISC-V:
* Added Sv57x4 support for G-stage page table
* Added range based local HFENCE functions
* Added remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
* Added ISA extension registers in ONE_REG interface
* Updated KVM RISC-V maintainers entry to cover selftests support
ARM:
* Add support for the ARMv8.6 WFxT extension
* Guard pages for the EL2 stacks
* Trap and emulate AArch32 ID registers to hide unsupported features
* Ability to select and save/restore the set of hypercalls exposed
to the guest
* Support for PSCI-initiated suspend in collaboration with userspace
* GICv3 register-based LPI invalidation support
* Move host PMU event merging into the vcpu data structure
* GICv3 ITS save/restore fixes
* The usual set of small-scale cleanups and fixes
x86:
* New ioctls to get/set TSC frequency for a whole VM
* Allow userspace to opt out of hypercall patching
* Only do MSR filtering for MSRs accessed by rdmsr/wrmsr
AMD SEV improvements:
* Add KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN metadata for SEV-ES
* V_TSC_AUX support
Nested virtualization improvements for AMD:
* Support for "nested nested" optimizations (nested vVMLOAD/VMSAVE,
nested vGIF)
* Allow AVIC to co-exist with a nested guest running
* Fixes for LBR virtualizations when a nested guest is running,
and nested LBR virtualization support
* PAUSE filtering for nested hypervisors
Guest support:
* Decoupling of vcpu_is_preempted from PV spinlocks
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"S390:
- ultravisor communication device driver
- fix TEID on terminating storage key ops
RISC-V:
- Added Sv57x4 support for G-stage page table
- Added range based local HFENCE functions
- Added remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
- Added ISA extension registers in ONE_REG interface
- Updated KVM RISC-V maintainers entry to cover selftests support
ARM:
- Add support for the ARMv8.6 WFxT extension
- Guard pages for the EL2 stacks
- Trap and emulate AArch32 ID registers to hide unsupported features
- Ability to select and save/restore the set of hypercalls exposed to
the guest
- Support for PSCI-initiated suspend in collaboration with userspace
- GICv3 register-based LPI invalidation support
- Move host PMU event merging into the vcpu data structure
- GICv3 ITS save/restore fixes
- The usual set of small-scale cleanups and fixes
x86:
- New ioctls to get/set TSC frequency for a whole VM
- Allow userspace to opt out of hypercall patching
- Only do MSR filtering for MSRs accessed by rdmsr/wrmsr
AMD SEV improvements:
- Add KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN metadata for SEV-ES
- V_TSC_AUX support
Nested virtualization improvements for AMD:
- Support for "nested nested" optimizations (nested vVMLOAD/VMSAVE,
nested vGIF)
- Allow AVIC to co-exist with a nested guest running
- Fixes for LBR virtualizations when a nested guest is running, and
nested LBR virtualization support
- PAUSE filtering for nested hypervisors
Guest support:
- Decoupling of vcpu_is_preempted from PV spinlocks"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (199 commits)
KVM: x86: Fix the intel_pt PMI handling wrongly considered from guest
KVM: selftests: x86: Sync the new name of the test case to .gitignore
Documentation: kvm: reorder ARM-specific section about KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SUSPEND
x86, kvm: use correct GFP flags for preemption disabled
KVM: LAPIC: Drop pending LAPIC timer injection when canceling the timer
x86/kvm: Alloc dummy async #PF token outside of raw spinlock
KVM: x86: avoid calling x86 emulator without a decoded instruction
KVM: SVM: Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel data leak
x86/fpu: KVM: Set the base guest FPU uABI size to sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)
s390/uv_uapi: depend on CONFIG_S390
KVM: selftests: x86: Fix test failure on arch lbr capable platforms
KVM: LAPIC: Trace LAPIC timer expiration on every vmentry
KVM: s390: selftest: Test suppression indication on key prot exception
KVM: s390: Don't indicate suppression on dirtying, failing memop
selftests: drivers/s390x: Add uvdevice tests
drivers/s390/char: Add Ultravisor io device
MAINTAINERS: Update KVM RISC-V entry to cover selftests support
RISC-V: KVM: Introduce ISA extension register
RISC-V: KVM: Cleanup stale TLB entries when host CPU changes
RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
...
For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe
less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data
that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory
that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data.
Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these
sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.
Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eaf78265a4 ("KVM: SVM: Move SEV code to separate file")
Fixes: 2c07ded064 ("KVM: SVM: add support for SEV attestation command")
Fixes: 4cfdd47d6d ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command")
Fixes: d3d1af85e2 ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command")
Fixes: eba04b20e4 ("KVM: x86: Account a variety of miscellaneous allocations")
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220516154310.3685678-1-Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
- Added Sv57x4 support for G-stage page table
- Added range based local HFENCE functions
- Added remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
- Added ISA extension registers in ONE_REG interface
- Updated KVM RISC-V maintainers entry to cover selftests support
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Merge tag 'kvm-riscv-5.19-1' of https://github.com/kvm-riscv/linux into HEAD
KVM/riscv changes for 5.19
- Added Sv57x4 support for G-stage page table
- Added range based local HFENCE functions
- Added remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests
- Added ISA extension registers in ONE_REG interface
- Updated KVM RISC-V maintainers entry to cover selftests support
- Add support for the ARMv8.6 WFxT extension
- Guard pages for the EL2 stacks
- Trap and emulate AArch32 ID registers to hide unsupported features
- Ability to select and save/restore the set of hypercalls exposed
to the guest
- Support for PSCI-initiated suspend in collaboration with userspace
- GICv3 register-based LPI invalidation support
- Move host PMU event merging into the vcpu data structure
- GICv3 ITS save/restore fixes
- The usual set of small-scale cleanups and fixes
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Merge tag 'kvmarm-5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 updates for 5.19
- Add support for the ARMv8.6 WFxT extension
- Guard pages for the EL2 stacks
- Trap and emulate AArch32 ID registers to hide unsupported features
- Ability to select and save/restore the set of hypercalls exposed
to the guest
- Support for PSCI-initiated suspend in collaboration with userspace
- GICv3 register-based LPI invalidation support
- Move host PMU event merging into the vcpu data structure
- GICv3 ITS save/restore fixes
- The usual set of small-scale cleanups and fixes
[Due to the conflict, KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM is relocated
from 4 to 6. - Paolo]
Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection
against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory
remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the
hypervisor.
At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse
map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get
assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets
accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an
appropriate action.
In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a SNP
guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch.
And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the
previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and
not just bolted on.
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Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull AMD SEV-SNP support from Borislav Petkov:
"The third AMD confidential computing feature called Secure Nested
Paging.
Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection
against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory
remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the
hypervisor.
At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse
map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get
assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets
accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an
appropriate action.
In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a
SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch.
And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the
previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and
not just bolted on"
* tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
x86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation
x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap
x86/sev: Annotate stack change in the #VC handler
x86/sev: Remove duplicated assignment to variable info
x86/sev: Fix address space sparse warning
x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page
x86/sev: Add missing __init annotations to SEV init routines
virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest
virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support
x86/boot: Put globals that are accessed early into the .data section
x86/boot: Add an efi.h header for the decompressor
virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value
virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages()
x86/sev-es: Replace open-coded hlt-loop with sev_es_terminate()
virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
...
svm_vm_migrate_from() uses sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration() to lock all
source and target vcpu->locks. Unfortunately there is an 8 subclass
limit, so a new subclass cannot be used for each vCPU. Instead maintain
ownership of the first vcpu's mutex.dep_map using a role specific
subclass: source vs target. Release the other vcpu's mutex.dep_maps.
Fixes: b56639318b ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Reported-by: John Sperbeck<jsperbeck@google.com>
Suggested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220502165807.529624-1-pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The TSC_AUX virtualization feature allows AMD SEV-ES guests to securely use
TSC_AUX (auxiliary time stamp counter data) in the RDTSCP and RDPID
instructions. The TSC_AUX value is set using the WRMSR instruction to the
TSC_AUX MSR (0xC0000103). It is read by the RDMSR, RDTSCP and RDPID
instructions. If the read/write of the TSC_AUX MSR is intercepted, then
RDTSCP and RDPID must also be intercepted when TSC_AUX virtualization
is present. However, the RDPID instruction can't be intercepted. This means
that when TSC_AUX virtualization is present, RDTSCP and TSC_AUX MSR
read/write must not be intercepted for SEV-ES (or SEV-SNP) guests.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <165040164424.1399644.13833277687385156344.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fixes for (relatively) old bugs, to be merged in both the -rc and next
development trees.
The merge reconciles the ABI fixes for KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT between
5.18 and commit c24a950ec7 ("KVM, SEV: Add KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN metadata
for SEV-ES", 2022-04-13).
Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.
Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.
KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.
Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christpherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-4-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use clflush_cache_range() to flush the confidential memory when
SME_COHERENT is supported in AMD CPU. Cache flush is still needed since
SME_COHERENT only support cache invalidation at CPU side. All confidential
cache lines are still incoherent with DMA devices.
Cc: stable@vger.kerel.org
Fixes: add5e2f045 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-ES VMSA")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-3-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Rework sev_flush_guest_memory() to explicitly handle only a single page,
and harden it to fall back to WBINVD if VM_PAGE_FLUSH fails. Per-page
flushing is currently used only to flush the VMSA, and in its current
form, the helper is completely broken with respect to flushing actual
guest memory, i.e. won't work correctly for an arbitrary memory range.
VM_PAGE_FLUSH takes a host virtual address, and is subject to normal page
walks, i.e. will fault if the address is not present in the host page
tables or does not have the correct permissions. Current AMD CPUs also
do not honor SMAP overrides (undocumented in kernel versions of the APM),
so passing in a userspace address is completely out of the question. In
other words, KVM would need to manually walk the host page tables to get
the pfn, ensure the pfn is stable, and then use the direct map to invoke
VM_PAGE_FLUSH. And the latter might not even work, e.g. if userspace is
particularly evil/clever and backs the guest with Secret Memory (which
unmaps memory from the direct map).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Fixes: add5e2f045 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-ES VMSA")
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-2-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If an SEV-ES guest requests termination, exit to userspace with
KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT and a dedicated SEV_TERM type instead of -EINVAL
so that userspace can take appropriate action.
See AMD's GHCB spec section '4.1.13 Termination Request' for more details.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220407210233.782250-1-pgonda@google.com>
[Add documentatino. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since current AVIC implementation cannot support encrypted memory,
inhibit AVIC for SEV-enabled guest.
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220408133710.54275-1-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The save area for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests, as used by the hardware, is
different from the save area of a non SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guest.
This is the first step in defining the multiple save areas to keep them
separate and ensuring proper operation amongst the different types of
guests. Create an SEV-ES/SEV-SNP save area and adjust usage to the new
save area definition where needed.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405182743.308853-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com
Add resched to avoid warning from sev_clflush_pages() with large number
of pages.
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Message-Id: <20220330164306.2376085-1-pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Exit to userspace if setup_vmgexit_scratch() fails due to OOM or because
copying data from guest (userspace) memory failed/faulted. The OOM
scenario is clearcut, it's userspace's decision as to whether it should
terminate the guest, free memory, etc...
As for -EFAULT, arguably, any guest issue is a violation of the guest's
contract with userspace, and thus userspace needs to decide how to
proceed. E.g. userspace defines what is RAM vs. MMIO and communicates
that directly to the guest, KVM is not involved in deciding what is/isn't
RAM nor in communicating that information to the guest. If the scratch
GPA doesn't resolve to a memslot, then the guest is not honoring the
memory configuration as defined by userspace.
And if userspace unmaps an hva for whatever reason, then exiting to
userspace with -EFAULT is absolutely the right thing to do. KVM's ABI
currently sucks and doesn't provide enough information to act on the
-EFAULT, but that will hopefully be remedied in the future as there are
multiple use cases, e.g. uffd and virtiofs truncation, that shouldn't
require any work in KVM beyond returning -EFAULT with a small amount of
metadata.
KVM could define its ABI such that failure to access the scratch area is
reflected into the guest, i.e. establish a contract with userspace, but
that's undesirable as it limits KVM's options in the future, e.g. in the
potential uffd case any failure on a uaccess needs to kick out to
userspace. KVM does have several cases where it reflects these errors
into the guest, e.g. kvm_pv_clock_pairing() and Hyper-V emulation, but
KVM would preferably "fix" those instead of propagating the falsehood
that any memory failure is the guest's fault.
Lastly, returning a boolean as an "error" for that a helper that isn't
named accordingly never works out well.
Fixes: ad5b353240 ("KVM: SVM: Do not terminate SEV-ES guests on GHCB validation failure")
Cc: Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com>
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220225205209.3881130-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES VMs with mirrors to be intra-host migrated they need to be
able to migrate with the mirror. This is due to that fact that all VMSAs
need to be added into the VM with LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA before
lAUNCH_FINISH. Allowing migration with mirrors allows users of SEV-ES to
keep the mirror VMs VMSAs during migration.
Adds a list of mirror VMs for the original VM iterate through during its
migration. During the iteration the owner pointers can be updated from
the source to the destination. This fixes the ASID leaking issue which
caused the blocking of migration of VMs with mirrors.
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Message-Id: <20220211193634.3183388-1-pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Massage SVM's implementation names that still diverge from kvm_x86_ops to
allow for wiring up all SVM-defined functions via kvm-x86-ops.h.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220128005208.4008533-22-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Rename svm_vm_copy_asid_from() and svm_vm_migrate_from() to conform to
the names used by kvm_x86_ops, and opportunistically use "sev" instead of
"svm" to more precisely identify the role of the hooks.
svm_vm_copy_asid_from() in particular was poorly named as the function
does much more than simply copy the ASID.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220128005208.4008533-21-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use slightly more verbose names for the so called "memory encrypt",
a.k.a. "mem enc", kvm_x86_ops hooks to bridge the gap between the current
super short kvm_x86_ops names and SVM's more verbose, but non-conforming
names. This is a step toward using kvm-x86-ops.h with KVM_X86_CVM_OP()
to fill svm_x86_ops.
Opportunistically rename mem_enc_op() to mem_enc_ioctl() to better
reflect its true nature, as it really is a full fledged ioctl() of its
own. Ideally, the hook would be named confidential_vm_ioctl() or so, as
the ioctl() is a gateway to more than just memory encryption, and because
its underlying purpose to support Confidential VMs, which can be provided
without memory encryption, e.g. if the TCB of the guest includes the host
kernel but not host userspace, or by isolation in hardware without
encrypting memory. But, diverging from KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP even
further is undeseriable, and short of creating alises for all related
ioctl()s, which introduces a different flavor of divergence, KVM is stuck
with the nomenclature.
Defer renaming SVM's functions to a future commit as there are additional
changes needed to make SVM fully conforming and to match reality (looking
at you, svm_vm_copy_asid_from()).
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220128005208.4008533-20-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM performs the VMSAVE to the host save area for both regular and SEV-ES
guests, so hoist it up to svm_prepare_guest_switch. And because
sev_es_prepare_guest_switch does not really need to know the details
of struct svm_cpu_data *, just pass it the pointer to the host save area
inside the HSAVE page.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a sanity check on DECODEASSIST being support if SEV is supported, as
KVM cannot read guest private memory and thus relies on the CPU to
provide the instruction byte stream on #NPF for emulation. The intent of
the check is to document the dependency, it should never fail in practice
as producing hardware that supports SEV but not DECODEASSISTS would be
non-sensical.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Both source and dest vms' kvm->locks are held in sev_lock_two_vms.
Mark one with a different subtype to avoid false positives from lockdep.
Fixes: c9d61dcb0b (KVM: SEV: accept signals in sev_lock_two_vms)
Reported-by: Yiru Xu <xyru1999@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jinrong Liang <cloudliang@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1641364863-26331-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Everywhere we use kvm_for_each_vpcu(), we use an int as the vcpu
index. Unfortunately, we're about to move rework the iterator,
which requires this to be upgrade to an unsigned long.
Let's bite the bullet and repaint all of it in one go.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20211116160403.4074052-7-maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Currently, an SEV-ES guest is terminated if the validation of the VMGEXIT
exit code or exit parameters fails.
The VMGEXIT instruction can be issued from userspace, even though
userspace (likely) can't update the GHCB. To prevent userspace from being
able to kill the guest, return an error through the GHCB when validation
fails rather than terminating the guest. For cases where the GHCB can't be
updated (e.g. the GHCB can't be mapped, etc.), just return back to the
guest.
The new error codes are documented in the lasest update to the GHCB
specification.
Fixes: 291bd20d5d ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <b57280b5562893e2616257ac9c2d4525a9aeeb42.1638471124.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use kvzalloc() to allocate KVM's buffer for SEV-ES's GHCB scratch area so
that KVM falls back to __vmalloc() if physically contiguous memory isn't
available. The buffer is purely a KVM software construct, i.e. there's
no need for it to be physically contiguous.
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109222350.2266045-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Return appropriate error codes if setting up the GHCB scratch area for an
SEV-ES guest fails. In particular, returning -EINVAL instead of -ENOMEM
when allocating the kernel buffer could be confusing as userspace would
likely suspect a guest issue.
Fixes: 8f423a80d2 ("KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest")
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109222350.2266045-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Generally, kvm->lock is not taken for a long time, but
sev_lock_two_vms is different: it takes vCPU locks
inside, so userspace can hold it back just by calling
a vCPU ioctl. Play it safe and use mutex_lock_killable.
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-13-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Taking the lock is useless since there are no other references,
and there are already accesses (e.g. to sev->enc_context_owner)
that do not take it. So get rid of it.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-12-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
VMs that mirror an encryption context rely on the owner to keep the
ASID allocated. Performing a KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM
would cause a dangling ASID:
1. copy context from A to B (gets ref to A)
2. move context from A to L (moves ASID from A to L)
3. close L (releases ASID from L, B still references it)
The right way to do the handoff instead is to create a fresh mirror VM
on the destination first:
1. copy context from A to B (gets ref to A)
[later] 2. close B (releases ref to A)
3. move context from A to L (moves ASID from A to L)
4. copy context from L to M
So, catch the situation by adding a count of how many VMs are
mirroring this one's encryption context.
Fixes: 0b020f5af0 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration")
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-11-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Now that we have a facility to lock two VMs with deadlock
protection, use it for the creation of mirror VMs as well. One of
COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM(dst, src) and COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM(src, dst)
would always fail, so the combination is nonsensical and it is okay to
return -EBUSY if it is attempted.
This sidesteps the question of what happens if a VM is
MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM'd at the same time as it is
COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM'd: the locking prevents that from
happening.
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-10-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Allow intra-host migration of a mirror VM; the destination VM will be
a mirror of the same ASID as the source.
Fixes: b56639318b ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-8-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This was broken before the introduction of KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM,
but technically harmless because the region list was unused for a mirror
VM. However, it is untidy and it now causes a NULL pointer access when
attempting to move the encryption context of a mirror VM.
Fixes: 54526d1fd5 ("KVM: x86: Support KVM VMs sharing SEV context")
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-7-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Encapsulate the handling of the migration_in_progress flag for both VMs in
two functions sev_lock_two_vms and sev_unlock_two_vms. It does not matter
if KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM locks the destination struct kvm a bit
later, and this change 1) keeps the cleanup chain of labels smaller 2)
makes it possible for KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM to reuse the logic.
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-6-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
list_replace_init cannot be used if the source is an empty list,
because "new->next->prev = new" will overwrite "old->next":
new old
prev = new, next = new prev = old, next = old
new->next = old->next prev = new, next = old prev = old, next = old
new->next->prev = new prev = new, next = old prev = old, next = new
new->prev = old->prev prev = old, next = old prev = old, next = old
new->next->prev = new prev = old, next = old prev = new, next = new
The desired outcome instead would be to leave both old and new the same
as they were (two empty circular lists). Use list_cut_before, which
already has the necessary check and is documented to discard the
previous contents of the list that will hold the result.
Fixes: b56639318b ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-5-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* Fixes for Xen emulation
* Kill kvm_map_gfn() / kvm_unmap_gfn() and broken gfn_to_pfn_cache
* Fixes for migration of 32-bit nested guests on 64-bit hypervisor
* Compilation fixes
* More SEV cleanups
Rename cmd_allowed_from_miror() to is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(), fixing
a typo and making it obvious that the result is a boolean where
false means "not allowed".
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109215101.2211373-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Remove a fully redundant write to sev->asid during SEV/SEV-ES guest
initialization. The ASID is set a few lines earlier prior to the call to
sev_platform_init(), which doesn't take "sev" as a param, i.e. can't
muck with the ASID barring some truly magical behind-the-scenes code.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109215101.2211373-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Set sev_info.active during SEV/SEV-ES activation before calling any code
that can potentially consume sev_info.es_active, e.g. set "active" and
"es_active" as a pair immediately after the initial sanity checks. KVM
generally expects that es_active can be true if and only if active is
true, e.g. sev_asid_new() deliberately avoids sev_es_guest() so that it
doesn't get a false negative. This will allow WARNing in sev_es_guest()
if the VM is tagged as SEV-ES but not SEV.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109215101.2211373-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Zhao Liu