Commit Graph

103 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Willem de Bruijn 21774fd81a kernfs: bring names in comments in line with code
Fix two stragglers in the comments of the below rename operation.

Fixes: adc5e8b58f ("kernfs: drop s_ prefix from kernfs_node members")
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201015185726.1386868-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-11-09 18:12:39 +01:00
Daniel Xu 0c47383ba3 kernfs: Add option to enable user xattrs
User extended attributes are useful as metadata storage for kernfs
consumers like cgroups. Especially in the case of cgroups, it is useful
to have a central metadata store that multiple processes/services can
use to coordinate actions.

A concrete example is for userspace out of memory killers. We want to
let delegated cgroup subtree owners (running as non-root) to be able to
say "please avoid killing this cgroup". This is especially important for
desktop linux as delegated subtrees owners are less likely to run as
root.

This patch introduces a new flag, KERNFS_ROOT_SUPPORT_USER_XATTR, that
lets kernfs consumers enable user xattr support. An initial limit of 128
entries or 128KB -- whichever is hit first -- is placed per cgroup
because xattrs come from kernel memory and we don't want to let
unprivileged users accidentally eat up too much kernel memory.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Acked-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2020-03-16 15:53:47 -04:00
Tejun Heo 40430452fd kernfs: use 64bit inos if ino_t is 64bit
Each kernfs_node is identified with a 64bit ID.  The low 32bit is
exposed as ino and the high gen.  While this already allows using inos
as keys by looking up with wildcard generation number of 0, it's
adding unnecessary complications for 64bit ino archs which can
directly use kernfs_node IDs as inos to uniquely identify each cgroup
instance.

This patch exposes IDs directly as inos on 64bit ino archs.  The
conversion is mostly straight-forward.

* 32bit ino archs behave the same as before.  64bit ino archs now use
  the whole 64bit ID as ino and the generation number is fixed at 1.

* 64bit inos still use the same idr allocator which gurantees that the
  lower 32bits identify the current live instance uniquely and the
  high 32bits are incremented whenever the low bits wrap.  As the
  upper 32bits are no longer used as gen and we don't wanna start ino
  allocation with 33rd bit set, the initial value for highbits
  allocation is changed to 0 on 64bit ino archs.

* blktrace exposes two 32bit numbers - (INO,GEN) pair - to identify
  the issuing cgroup.  Userland builds FILEID_INO32_GEN fids from
  these numbers to look up the cgroups.  To remain compatible with the
  behavior, always output (LOW32,HIGH32) which will be constructed
  back to the original 64bit ID by __kernfs_fh_to_dentry().

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
2019-11-12 08:18:04 -08:00
Tejun Heo fe0f726c9f kernfs: combine ino/id lookup functions into kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_id()
kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_ino() looks the kernfs_node matching the
specified ino.  On top of that, kernfs_get_node_by_id() and
kernfs_fh_get_inode() implement full ID matching by testing the rest
of ID.

On surface, confusingly, the two are slightly different in that the
latter uses 0 gen as wildcard while the former doesn't - does it mean
that the latter can't uniquely identify inodes w/ 0 gen?  In practice,
this is a distinction without a difference because generation number
starts at 1.  There are no actual IDs with 0 gen, so it can always
safely used as wildcard.

Let's simplify the code by renaming kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_ino()
to kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_id(), moving all lookup logics into it,
and removing now unnecessary kernfs_get_node_by_id().

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-12 08:18:04 -08:00
Tejun Heo 67c0496e87 kernfs: convert kernfs_node->id from union kernfs_node_id to u64
kernfs_node->id is currently a union kernfs_node_id which represents
either a 32bit (ino, gen) pair or u64 value.  I can't see much value
in the usage of the union - all that's needed is a 64bit ID which the
current code is already limited to.  Using a union makes the code
unnecessarily complicated and prevents using 64bit ino without adding
practical benefits.

This patch drops union kernfs_node_id and makes kernfs_node->id a u64.
ino is stored in the lower 32bits and gen upper.  Accessors -
kernfs[_id]_ino() and kernfs[_id]_gen() - are added to retrieve the
ino and gen.  This simplifies ID handling less cumbersome and will
allow using 64bit inos on supported archs.

This patch doesn't make any functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-11-12 08:18:03 -08:00
Tejun Heo e23f568aa6 kernfs: fix ino wrap-around detection
When the 32bit ino wraps around, kernfs increments the generation
number to distinguish reused ino instances.  The wrap-around detection
tests whether the allocated ino is lower than what the cursor but the
cursor is pointing to the next ino to allocate so the condition never
triggers.

Fix it by remembering the last ino and comparing against that.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 4a3ef68aca ("kernfs: implement i_generation")
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
2019-11-12 08:18:03 -08:00
Thomas Gleixner 55716d2643 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 428
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this file is released under the gplv2

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 68 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190114.292346262@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-05 17:37:16 +02:00
Linus Torvalds f72dae2089 selinux/stable-5.2 PR 20190507
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190507' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "We've got a few SELinux patches for the v5.2 merge window, the
  highlights are below:

   - Add LSM hooks, and the SELinux implementation, for proper labeling
     of kernfs. While we are only including the SELinux implementation
     here, the rest of the LSM folks have given the hooks a thumbs-up.

   - Update the SELinux mdp (Make Dummy Policy) script to actually work
     on a modern system.

   - Disallow userspace to change the LSM credentials via
     /proc/self/attr when the task's credentials are already overridden.

     The change was made in procfs because all the LSM folks agreed this
     was the Right Thing To Do and duplicating it across each LSM was
     going to be annoying"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20190507' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials
  selinux: Check address length before reading address family
  kernfs: fix xattr name handling in LSM helpers
  MAINTAINERS: update SELinux file patterns
  selinux: avoid uninitialized variable warning
  selinux: remove useless assignments
  LSM: lsm_hooks.h - fix missing colon in docstring
  selinux: Make selinux_kernfs_init_security static
  kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
  selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook
  LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization
  kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes
  selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems
  kernfs: do not alloc iattrs in kernfs_xattr_get
  kernfs: clean up struct kernfs_iattrs
  scripts/selinux: fix build
  selinux: use kernel linux/socket.h for genheaders and mdp
  scripts/selinux: modernize mdp
2019-05-07 18:48:09 -07:00
Christina Quast 0d1a393d61 fs: kernfs: Corrected spelling mistake
flies => files

Signed-off-by: Christina Quast <cquast@hanoverdisplays.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-25 21:41:35 +02:00
Ondrej Mosnacek 1537ad15c9 kernfs: fix xattr name handling in LSM helpers
The implementation of kernfs_security_xattr_*() helpers reuses the
kernfs_node_xattr_*() functions, which take the suffix of the xattr name
and extract full xattr name from it using xattr_full_name(). However,
this function relies on the fact that the suffix passed to xattr
handlers from VFS is always constructed from the full name by just
incerementing the pointer. This doesn't necessarily hold for the callers
of kernfs_security_xattr_*(), so their usage will easily lead to
out-of-bounds access.

Fix this by moving the xattr name reconstruction to the VFS xattr
handlers and replacing the kernfs_security_xattr_*() helpers with more
general kernfs_xattr_*() helpers that take full xattr name and allow
accessing all kernfs node's xattrs.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Fixes: b230d5aba2 ("LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization")
Fixes: ec882da5cd ("selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-04-04 09:00:27 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek b230d5aba2 LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization
This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for
initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which
provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to
operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an
associated inode at the moment of creation).

The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of
the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of
security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic
for handling the creation of new nodes.

This patch also adds helper functions to <linux/kernfs.h> for
getting/setting security xattrs of a kernfs node so that LSMs hooks are
able to do their job. Other important attributes should be accessible
direcly in the kernfs_node fields (in case there is need for more, then
new helpers should be added to kernfs.h along with the patch that needs
them).

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: more manual merge fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-03-20 22:01:02 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 7b47a9e7c8 Merge branch 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro:
 "The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the
  old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point
  conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some
  are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series
  outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing
  stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted
  filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the
  next cycle fodder.

  It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is
  probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the
  commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting
  the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better
  to fix it up after -rc1 instead.

  That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which
  should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size
  increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to
  shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next
  cycle"

* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
  afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
  afs: Add fs_context support
  vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
  vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
  vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
  vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
  hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
  cpuset: Use fs_context
  kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
  cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper
  cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions
  cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic()
  cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree()
  cgroup: start switching to fs_context
  ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
  proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
  ...
2019-03-12 14:08:19 -07:00
Johannes Weiner 147e1a97c4 fs: kernfs: add poll file operation
Patch series "psi: pressure stall monitors", v3.

Android is adopting psi to detect and remedy memory pressure that
results in stuttering and decreased responsiveness on mobile devices.

Psi gives us the stall information, but because we're dealing with
latencies in the millisecond range, periodically reading the pressure
files to detect stalls in a timely fashion is not feasible.  Psi also
doesn't aggregate its averages at a high enough frequency right now.

This patch series extends the psi interface such that users can
configure sensitive latency thresholds and use poll() and friends to be
notified when these are breached.

As high-frequency aggregation is costly, it implements an aggregation
method that is optimized for fast, short-interval averaging, and makes
the aggregation frequency adaptive, such that high-frequency updates
only happen while monitored stall events are actively occurring.

With these patches applied, Android can monitor for, and ward off,
mounting memory shortages before they cause problems for the user.  For
example, using memory stall monitors in userspace low memory killer
daemon (lmkd) we can detect mounting pressure and kill less important
processes before device becomes visibly sluggish.

In our memory stress testing psi memory monitors produce roughly 10x
less false positives compared to vmpressure signals.  Having ability to
specify multiple triggers for the same psi metric allows other parts of
Android framework to monitor memory state of the device and act
accordingly.

The new interface is straightforward.  The user opens one of the
pressure files for writing and writes a trigger description into the
file descriptor that defines the stall state - some or full, and the
maximum stall time over a given window of time.  E.g.:

        /* Signal when stall time exceeds 100ms of a 1s window */
        char trigger[] = "full 100000 1000000";
        fd = open("/proc/pressure/memory");
        write(fd, trigger, sizeof(trigger));
        while (poll() >= 0) {
                ...
        }
        close(fd);

When the monitored stall state is entered, psi adapts its aggregation
frequency according to what the configured time window requires in order
to emit event signals in a timely fashion.  Once the stalling subsides,
aggregation reverts back to normal.

The trigger is associated with the open file descriptor.  To stop
monitoring, the user only needs to close the file descriptor and the
trigger is discarded.

Patches 1-4 prepare the psi code for polling support.  Patch 5
implements the adaptive polling logic, the pressure growth detection
optimized for short intervals, and hooks up write() and poll() on the
pressure files.

The patches were developed in collaboration with Johannes Weiner.

This patch (of 5):

Kernfs has a standardized poll/notification mechanism for waking all
pollers on all fds when a filesystem node changes.  To allow polling for
custom events, add a .poll callback that can override the default.

This is in preparation for pollable cgroup pressure files which have
per-fd trigger configurations.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190124211518.244221-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-05 21:07:17 -08:00
David Howells 23bf1b6be9 kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
Make kernfs support superblock creation/mount/remount with fs_context.

This requires that sysfs, cgroup and intel_rdt, which are built on kernfs,
be made to support fs_context also.

Notes:

 (1) A kernfs_fs_context struct is created to wrap fs_context and the
     kernfs mount parameters are moved in here (or are in fs_context).

 (2) kernfs_mount{,_ns}() are made into kernfs_get_tree().  The extra
     namespace tag parameter is passed in the context if desired

 (3) kernfs_free_fs_context() is provided as a destructor for the
     kernfs_fs_context struct, but for the moment it does nothing except
     get called in the right places.

 (4) sysfs doesn't wrap kernfs_fs_context since it has no parameters to
     pass, but possibly this should be done anyway in case someone wants to
     add a parameter in future.

 (5) A cgroup_fs_context struct is created to wrap kernfs_fs_context and
     the cgroup v1 and v2 mount parameters are all moved there.

 (6) cgroup1 parameter parsing error messages are now handled by invalf(),
     which allows userspace to collect them directly.

 (7) cgroup1 parameter cleanup is now done in the context destructor rather
     than in the mount/get_tree and remount functions.

Weirdies:

 (*) cgroup_do_get_tree() calls cset_cgroup_from_root() with locks held,
     but then uses the resulting pointer after dropping the locks.  I'm
     told this is okay and needs commenting.

 (*) The cgroup refcount web.  This really needs documenting.

 (*) cgroup2 only has one root?

Add a suggestion from Thomas Gleixner in which the RDT enablement code is
placed into its own function.

[folded a leak fix from Andrey Vagin]

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28 03:29:34 -05:00
Al Viro 6d7fbce7da kill kernfs_pin_sb()
unused now and impossible to use safely anyway.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-01-17 12:02:57 -05:00
Konstantin Khlebnikov 8f5be0ec23 kernfs: update comment about kernfs_path() return value
Now it returns the length of the full path or error code.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Fixes: 3abb1d90f5 ("kernfs: make kernfs_path*() behave in the style of strlcpy()")
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-16 22:37:16 +02:00
Dmitry Torokhov 488dee96bb kernfs: allow creating kernfs objects with arbitrary uid/gid
This change allows creating kernfs files and directories with arbitrary
uid/gid instead of always using GLOBAL_ROOT_UID/GID by extending
kernfs_create_dir_ns() and kernfs_create_file_ns() with uid/gid arguments.
The "simple" kernfs_create_file() and kernfs_create_dir() are left alone
and always create objects belonging to the global root.

When creating symlinks ownership (uid/gid) is taken from the target kernfs
object.

Co-Developed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-20 23:44:35 -07:00
Shaohua Li 69fd5c3917 blktrace: add an option to allow displaying cgroup path
By default we output cgroup id in blktrace. This adds an option to
display cgroup path. Since get cgroup path is a relativly heavy
operation, we don't enable it by default.

with the option enabled, blktrace will output something like this:
dd-1353  [007] d..2   293.015252:   8,0   /test/level  D   R 24 + 8 [dd]

Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2017-07-29 09:00:03 -06:00
Shaohua Li aa81882534 kernfs: add exportfs operations
Now we have the facilities to implement exportfs operations. The idea is
cgroup can export the fhandle info to userspace, then userspace uses
fhandle to find the cgroup name. Another example is userspace can get
fhandle for a cgroup and BPF uses the fhandle to filter info for the
cgroup.

Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2017-07-29 09:00:03 -06:00
Shaohua Li c53cd490b1 kernfs: introduce kernfs_node_id
inode number and generation can identify a kernfs node. We are going to
export the identification by exportfs operations, so put ino and
generation into a separate structure. It's convenient when later patches
use the identification.

Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2017-07-29 09:00:03 -06:00
Shaohua Li 4a3ef68aca kernfs: implement i_generation
Set i_generation for kernfs inode. This is required to implement
exportfs operations. The generation is 32-bit, so it's possible the
generation wraps up and we find stale files. To reduce the posssibility,
we don't reuse inode numer immediately. When the inode number allocation
wraps, we increase generation number. In this way generation/inode
number consist of a 64-bit number which is unlikely duplicated. This
does make the idr tree more sparse and waste some memory. Since idr
manages 32-bit keys, idr uses a 6-level radix tree, each level covers 6
bits of the key. In a 100k inode kernfs, the worst case will have around
300k radix tree node. Each node is 576bytes, so the tree will use about
~150M memory. Sounds not too bad, if this really is a problem, we should
find better data structure.

Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2017-07-29 09:00:03 -06:00
Shaohua Li 7d35079f82 kernfs: use idr instead of ida to manage inode number
kernfs uses ida to manage inode number. The problem is we can't get
kernfs_node from inode number with ida. Switching to use idr, next patch
will add an API to get kernfs_node from inode number.

Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2017-07-29 09:00:03 -06:00
Tejun Heo 0e67db2f9f kernfs: add kernfs_ops->open/release() callbacks
Add ->open/release() methods to kernfs_ops.  ->open() is called when
the file is opened and ->release() when the file is either released or
severed.  These callbacks can be used, for example, to manage
persistent caching objects over multiple seq_file iterations.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Acked-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
2016-12-27 14:49:03 -05:00
Tejun Heo a1d82aff5d kernfs: make kernfs_open_file->mmapped a bitfield
More kernfs_open_file->mutex synchronized flags are planned to be
added.  Convert ->mmapped to a bitfield in preparation.

While at it, make kernfs_fop_mmap() use "true" instead of "1" on
->mmapped.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Acked-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
2016-12-27 14:49:02 -05:00
Tejun Heo bb09c8634b kernfs: remove kernfs_path_len()
It doesn't have any in-kernel user and the same result can be obtained
from kernfs_path(@kn, NULL, 0).  Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2016-08-10 11:23:44 -04:00
Tejun Heo 3abb1d90f5 kernfs: make kernfs_path*() behave in the style of strlcpy()
kernfs_path*() functions always return the length of the full path but
the path content is undefined if the length is larger than the
provided buffer.  This makes its behavior different from strlcpy() and
requires error handling in all its users even when they don't care
about truncation.  In addition, the implementation can actully be
simplified by making it behave properly in strlcpy() style.

* Update kernfs_path_from_node_locked() to always fill up the buffer
  with path.  If the buffer is not large enough, the output is
  truncated and terminated.

* kernfs_path() no longer needs error handling.  Make it a simple
  inline wrapper around kernfs_path_from_node().

* sysfs_warn_dup()'s use of kernfs_path() doesn't need error handling.
  Updated accordingly.

* cgroup_path()'s use of kernfs_path() updated to retain the old
  behavior.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2016-08-10 11:23:44 -04:00
Tejun Heo 0e0b2afdf6 kernfs: add dummy implementation of kernfs_path_from_node()
The dummy version of kernfs_path_from_node() was missing.  This
currently doesn't break anything.  Let's add it for consistency and to
ease adding wrappers around it.

v2: Removed stray ';' which was causing build failures.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-08-10 11:23:43 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 3aa2fc1667 driver core update for 4.7-rc1
Here's the "big" driver core update for 4.7-rc1.
 
 Mostly just debugfs changes, the long-known and messy races with removing
 debugfs files should be fixed thanks to the great work of Nicolai Stange.  We
 also have some isa updates in here (the x86 maintainers told me to take it
 through this tree), a new warning when we run out of dynamic char major
 numbers, and a few other assorted changes, details in the shortlog.
 
 All have been in linux-next for some time with no reported issues.
 
 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v2
 
 iEYEABECAAYFAlc/0mwACgkQMUfUDdst+ynjXACgjNxR5nMUiM8ZuuD0i4Xj7VXd
 hnIAoM08+XDCv41noGdAcKv+2WZVZWMC
 =i+0H
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'driver-core-4.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core

Pull driver core updates from Greg KH:
 "Here's the "big" driver core update for 4.7-rc1.

  Mostly just debugfs changes, the long-known and messy races with
  removing debugfs files should be fixed thanks to the great work of
  Nicolai Stange.  We also have some isa updates in here (the x86
  maintainers told me to take it through this tree), a new warning when
  we run out of dynamic char major numbers, and a few other assorted
  changes, details in the shortlog.

  All have been in linux-next for some time with no reported issues"

* tag 'driver-core-4.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (32 commits)
  Revert "base: dd: don't remove driver_data in -EPROBE_DEFER case"
  gpio: ws16c48: Utilize the ISA bus driver
  gpio: 104-idio-16: Utilize the ISA bus driver
  gpio: 104-idi-48: Utilize the ISA bus driver
  gpio: 104-dio-48e: Utilize the ISA bus driver
  watchdog: ebc-c384_wdt: Utilize the ISA bus driver
  iio: stx104: Utilize the module_isa_driver and max_num_isa_dev macros
  iio: stx104: Add X86 dependency to STX104 Kconfig option
  Documentation: Add ISA bus driver documentation
  isa: Implement the max_num_isa_dev macro
  isa: Implement the module_isa_driver macro
  pnp: pnpbios: Add explicit X86_32 dependency to PNPBIOS
  isa: Decouple X86_32 dependency from the ISA Kconfig option
  driver-core: use 'dev' argument in dev_dbg_ratelimited stub
  base: dd: don't remove driver_data in -EPROBE_DEFER case
  kernfs: Move faulting copy_user operations outside of the mutex
  devcoredump: add scatterlist support
  debugfs: unproxify files created through debugfs_create_u32_array()
  debugfs: unproxify files created through debugfs_create_blob()
  debugfs: unproxify files created through debugfs_create_bool()
  ...
2016-05-20 21:26:15 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn 4f41fc5962 cgroup, kernfs: make mountinfo show properly scoped path for cgroup namespaces
Patch summary:

When showing a cgroupfs entry in mountinfo, show the path of the mount
root dentry relative to the reader's cgroup namespace root.

Short explanation (courtesy of mkerrisk):

If we create a new cgroup namespace, then we want both /proc/self/cgroup
and /proc/self/mountinfo to show cgroup paths that are correctly
virtualized with respect to the cgroup mount point.  Previous to this
patch, /proc/self/cgroup shows the right info, but /proc/self/mountinfo
does not.

Long version:

When a uid 0 task which is in freezer cgroup /a/b, unshares a new cgroup
namespace, and then mounts a new instance of the freezer cgroup, the new
mount will be rooted at /a/b.  The root dentry field of the mountinfo
entry will show '/a/b'.

 cat > /tmp/do1 << EOF
 mount -t cgroup -o freezer freezer /mnt
 grep freezer /proc/self/mountinfo
 EOF

 unshare -Gm  bash /tmp/do1
 > 330 160 0:34 / /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime - cgroup cgroup rw,freezer
 > 355 133 0:34 /a/b /mnt rw,relatime - cgroup freezer rw,freezer

The task's freezer cgroup entry in /proc/self/cgroup will simply show
'/':

 grep freezer /proc/self/cgroup
 9:freezer:/

If instead the same task simply bind mounts the /a/b cgroup directory,
the resulting mountinfo entry will again show /a/b for the dentry root.
However in this case the task will find its own cgroup at /mnt/a/b,
not at /mnt:

 mount --bind /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/a/b /mnt
 130 25 0:34 /a/b /mnt rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime shared:21 - cgroup cgroup rw,freezer

In other words, there is no way for the task to know, based on what is
in mountinfo, which cgroup directory is its own.

Example (by mkerrisk):

First, a little script to save some typing and verbiage:

echo -e "\t/proc/self/cgroup:\t$(cat /proc/self/cgroup | grep freezer)"
cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep freezer |
        awk '{print "\tmountinfo:\t\t" $4 "\t" $5}'

Create cgroup, place this shell into the cgroup, and look at the state
of the /proc files:

2653
2653                         # Our shell
14254                        # cat(1)
        /proc/self/cgroup:      10:freezer:/a/b
        mountinfo:              /       /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer

Create a shell in new cgroup and mount namespaces. The act of creating
a new cgroup namespace causes the process's current cgroups directories
to become its cgroup root directories. (Here, I'm using my own version
of the "unshare" utility, which takes the same options as the util-linux
version):

Look at the state of the /proc files:

        /proc/self/cgroup:      10:freezer:/
        mountinfo:              /       /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer

The third entry in /proc/self/cgroup (the pathname of the cgroup inside
the hierarchy) is correctly virtualized w.r.t. the cgroup namespace, which
is rooted at /a/b in the outer namespace.

However, the info in /proc/self/mountinfo is not for this cgroup
namespace, since we are seeing a duplicate of the mount from the
old mount namespace, and the info there does not correspond to the
new cgroup namespace. However, trying to create a new mount still
doesn't show us the right information in mountinfo:

                                      # propagating to other mountns
        /proc/self/cgroup:      7:freezer:/
        mountinfo:              /a/b    /mnt/freezer

The act of creating a new cgroup namespace caused the process's
current freezer directory, "/a/b", to become its cgroup freezer root
directory. In other words, the pathname directory of the directory
within the newly mounted cgroup filesystem should be "/",
but mountinfo wrongly shows us "/a/b". The consequence of this is
that the process in the cgroup namespace cannot correctly construct
the pathname of its cgroup root directory from the information in
/proc/PID/mountinfo.

With this patch, the dentry root field in mountinfo is shown relative
to the reader's cgroup namespace.  So the same steps as above:

        /proc/self/cgroup:      10:freezer:/a/b
        mountinfo:              /       /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer
        /proc/self/cgroup:      10:freezer:/
        mountinfo:              /../..  /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer
        /proc/self/cgroup:      10:freezer:/
        mountinfo:              /       /mnt/freezer

cgroup.clone_children  freezer.parent_freezing  freezer.state      tasks
cgroup.procs           freezer.self_freezing    notify_on_release
3164
2653                   # First shell that placed in this cgroup
3164                   # Shell started by 'unshare'
14197                  # cat(1)

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Tested-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 12:15:03 -04:00
Chris Wilson e4234a1fc3 kernfs: Move faulting copy_user operations outside of the mutex
A fault in a user provided buffer may lead anywhere, and lockdep warns
that we have a potential deadlock between the mm->mmap_sem and the
kernfs file mutex:

[   82.811702] ======================================================
[   82.811705] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
[   82.811709] 4.5.0-rc4-gfxbench+ #1 Not tainted
[   82.811711] -------------------------------------------------------
[   82.811714] kms_setmode/5859 is trying to acquire lock:
[   82.811717]  (&dev->struct_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8150d9c1>] drm_gem_mmap+0x1a1/0x270
[   82.811731]
but task is already holding lock:
[   82.811734]  (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8117b364>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x44/0xa0
[   82.811745]
which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   82.811749]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   82.811752]
-> #3 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}:
[   82.811761]        [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0
[   82.811766]        [<ffffffff8118bc65>] __might_fault+0x75/0xa0
[   82.811771]        [<ffffffff8124da4a>] kernfs_fop_write+0x8a/0x180
[   82.811787]        [<ffffffff811d1023>] __vfs_write+0x23/0xe0
[   82.811792]        [<ffffffff811d1d74>] vfs_write+0xa4/0x190
[   82.811797]        [<ffffffff811d2c14>] SyS_write+0x44/0xb0
[   82.811801]        [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73
[   82.811807]
-> #2 (s_active#6){++++.+}:
[   82.811814]        [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0
[   82.811819]        [<ffffffff8124c070>] __kernfs_remove+0x210/0x2f0
[   82.811823]        [<ffffffff8124d040>] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x40/0xa0
[   82.811828]        [<ffffffff8124e9e0>] sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x10/0x20
[   82.811832]        [<ffffffff815318d4>] device_del+0x124/0x250
[   82.811837]        [<ffffffff81531a19>] device_unregister+0x19/0x60
[   82.811841]        [<ffffffff8153c051>] cpu_cache_sysfs_exit+0x51/0xb0
[   82.811846]        [<ffffffff8153c628>] cacheinfo_cpu_callback+0x38/0x70
[   82.811851]        [<ffffffff8109ae89>] notifier_call_chain+0x39/0xa0
[   82.811856]        [<ffffffff8109aef9>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0x9/0x10
[   82.811860]        [<ffffffff810786de>] cpu_notify+0x1e/0x40
[   82.811865]        [<ffffffff81078779>] cpu_notify_nofail+0x9/0x20
[   82.811869]        [<ffffffff81078ac3>] _cpu_down+0x233/0x340
[   82.811874]        [<ffffffff81079019>] disable_nonboot_cpus+0xc9/0x350
[   82.811878]        [<ffffffff810d2e11>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x5a1/0xb50
[   82.811883]        [<ffffffff810d3903>] pm_suspend+0x543/0x8d0
[   82.811888]        [<ffffffff810d1b77>] state_store+0x77/0xe0
[   82.811892]        [<ffffffff813fa68f>] kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20
[   82.811897]        [<ffffffff8124e740>] sysfs_kf_write+0x40/0x50
[   82.811902]        [<ffffffff8124dafc>] kernfs_fop_write+0x13c/0x180
[   82.811906]        [<ffffffff811d1023>] __vfs_write+0x23/0xe0
[   82.811910]        [<ffffffff811d1d74>] vfs_write+0xa4/0x190
[   82.811914]        [<ffffffff811d2c14>] SyS_write+0x44/0xb0
[   82.811918]        [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73
[   82.811923]
-> #1 (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}:
[   82.811929]        [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0
[   82.811933]        [<ffffffff817b6f72>] mutex_lock_nested+0x62/0x3b0
[   82.811940]        [<ffffffff810784c1>] get_online_cpus+0x61/0x80
[   82.811944]        [<ffffffff811170eb>] stop_machine+0x1b/0xe0
[   82.811949]        [<ffffffffa0178edd>] gen8_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x2d/0x30 [i915]
[   82.812009]        [<ffffffffa017d3a6>] ggtt_bind_vma+0x46/0x70 [i915]
[   82.812045]        [<ffffffffa017eb70>] i915_vma_bind+0x140/0x290 [i915]
[   82.812081]        [<ffffffffa01862b9>] i915_gem_object_do_pin+0x899/0xb00 [i915]
[   82.812117]        [<ffffffffa0186555>] i915_gem_object_pin+0x35/0x40 [i915]
[   82.812154]        [<ffffffffa019a23e>] intel_init_pipe_control+0xbe/0x210 [i915]
[   82.812192]        [<ffffffffa0197312>] intel_logical_rings_init+0xe2/0xde0 [i915]
[   82.812232]        [<ffffffffa0186fe3>] i915_gem_init+0xf3/0x130 [i915]
[   82.812278]        [<ffffffffa02097ed>] i915_driver_load+0xf2d/0x1770 [i915]
[   82.812318]        [<ffffffff81512474>] drm_dev_register+0xa4/0xb0
[   82.812323]        [<ffffffff8151467e>] drm_get_pci_dev+0xce/0x1e0
[   82.812328]        [<ffffffffa01472cf>] i915_pci_probe+0x2f/0x50 [i915]
[   82.812360]        [<ffffffff8143f907>] pci_device_probe+0x87/0xf0
[   82.812366]        [<ffffffff81535f89>] driver_probe_device+0x229/0x450
[   82.812371]        [<ffffffff81536233>] __driver_attach+0x83/0x90
[   82.812375]        [<ffffffff81533c61>] bus_for_each_dev+0x61/0xa0
[   82.812380]        [<ffffffff81535879>] driver_attach+0x19/0x20
[   82.812384]        [<ffffffff8153535f>] bus_add_driver+0x1ef/0x290
[   82.812388]        [<ffffffff81536e9b>] driver_register+0x5b/0xe0
[   82.812393]        [<ffffffff8143e83b>] __pci_register_driver+0x5b/0x60
[   82.812398]        [<ffffffff81514866>] drm_pci_init+0xd6/0x100
[   82.812402]        [<ffffffffa027c094>] 0xffffffffa027c094
[   82.812406]        [<ffffffff810003de>] do_one_initcall+0xae/0x1d0
[   82.812412]        [<ffffffff811595a0>] do_init_module+0x5b/0x1cb
[   82.812417]        [<ffffffff81106160>] load_module+0x1c20/0x2480
[   82.812422]        [<ffffffff81106bae>] SyS_finit_module+0x7e/0xa0
[   82.812428]        [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73
[   82.812433]
-> #0 (&dev->struct_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[   82.812439]        [<ffffffff810cbe59>] __lock_acquire+0x1fc9/0x20f0
[   82.812443]        [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0
[   82.812456]        [<ffffffff8150d9e7>] drm_gem_mmap+0x1c7/0x270
[   82.812460]        [<ffffffff81196a14>] mmap_region+0x334/0x580
[   82.812466]        [<ffffffff81196fc4>] do_mmap+0x364/0x410
[   82.812470]        [<ffffffff8117b38d>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0
[   82.812474]        [<ffffffff811950f4>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x184/0x220
[   82.812479]        [<ffffffff8100a0fd>] SyS_mmap+0x1d/0x20
[   82.812484]        [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73
[   82.812489]
other info that might help us debug this:

[   82.812493] Chain exists of:
  &dev->struct_mutex --> s_active#6 --> &mm->mmap_sem

[   82.812502]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   82.812506]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   82.812508]        ----                    ----
[   82.812510]   lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[   82.812514]                                lock(s_active#6);
[   82.812519]                                lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[   82.812522]   lock(&dev->struct_mutex);
[   82.812526]
 *** DEADLOCK ***

[   82.812531] 1 lock held by kms_setmode/5859:
[   82.812533]  #0:  (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8117b364>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x44/0xa0
[   82.812541]
stack backtrace:
[   82.812547] CPU: 0 PID: 5859 Comm: kms_setmode Not tainted 4.5.0-rc4-gfxbench+ #1
[   82.812550] Hardware name:                  /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0040.2015.0814.1353 08/14/2015
[   82.812553]  0000000000000000 ffff880079407bf0 ffffffff813f8505 ffffffff825fb270
[   82.812560]  ffffffff825c4190 ffff880079407c30 ffffffff810c84ac ffff880079407c90
[   82.812566]  ffff8800797ed328 ffff8800797ecb00 0000000000000001 ffff8800797ed350
[   82.812573] Call Trace:
[   82.812578]  [<ffffffff813f8505>] dump_stack+0x67/0x92
[   82.812582]  [<ffffffff810c84ac>] print_circular_bug+0x1fc/0x310
[   82.812586]  [<ffffffff810cbe59>] __lock_acquire+0x1fc9/0x20f0
[   82.812590]  [<ffffffff810cc883>] lock_acquire+0xc3/0x1d0
[   82.812594]  [<ffffffff8150d9c1>] ? drm_gem_mmap+0x1a1/0x270
[   82.812599]  [<ffffffff8150d9e7>] drm_gem_mmap+0x1c7/0x270
[   82.812603]  [<ffffffff8150d9c1>] ? drm_gem_mmap+0x1a1/0x270
[   82.812608]  [<ffffffff81196a14>] mmap_region+0x334/0x580
[   82.812612]  [<ffffffff81196fc4>] do_mmap+0x364/0x410
[   82.812616]  [<ffffffff8117b38d>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0
[   82.812629]  [<ffffffff811950f4>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x184/0x220
[   82.812633]  [<ffffffff8100a0fd>] SyS_mmap+0x1d/0x20
[   82.812637]  [<ffffffff817bb81b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73

Highly unlikely though this scenario is, we can avoid the issue entirely
by moving the copy operation from out under the kernfs_get_active()
tracking by assigning the preallocated buffer its own mutex. The
temporary buffer allocation doesn't require mutex locking as it is
entirely local.

The locked section was extended by the addition of the preallocated buf
to speed up md user operations in

commit 2b75869bba
Author: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Date:   Mon Oct 13 16:41:28 2014 +1100

    sysfs/kernfs: allow attributes to request write buffer be pre-allocated.

Reported-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=94350
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-30 10:05:05 -07:00
Aditya Kali fb3c831565 kernfs: define kernfs_node_dentry
Add a new kernfs api is added to lookup the dentry for a particular
kernfs path.

Signed-off-by: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2016-02-16 13:04:58 -05:00
Aditya Kali 9f6df573a4 kernfs: Add API to generate relative kernfs path
The new function kernfs_path_from_node() generates and returns kernfs
path of a given kernfs_node relative to a given parent kernfs_node.

Signed-off-by: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2016-02-16 13:04:58 -05:00
Tejun Heo bd96f76a24 kernfs: implement kernfs_walk_and_get()
Implement kernfs_walk_and_get() which is similar to
kernfs_find_and_get() but can walk a path instead of just a name.

v2: Use strlcpy() instead of strlen() + memcpy() as suggested by
    David.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-20 15:55:52 -05:00
Tejun Heo 9acee9c551 kernfs: implement kernfs_path_len()
Add a function to determine the path length of a kernfs node.  This
for now will be used by writeback tracepoint updates.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
2015-08-18 15:49:15 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 0cbee99269 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
  that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
  permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
  if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.

  Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
  be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
  proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
  sysfs.  Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.

  There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement.  Only filesystems
  mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
  the test for empty directories was insufficient.  So in my tree
  directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
  created specially.  Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
  directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
  shows that the directory is empty.  Special creation of directories
  for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
  it's purpose.  I asked container developers from the various container
  projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
  points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.

  This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
  mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
  proc and sysfs.  I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
  unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
  proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
  on the previous mount of proc and sysfs.  So for now only the atime,
  read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
  consistent are enforced.  Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
  attributes remains for another time.

  This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
  descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed.  Recently readlink of
  /proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
  meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
  converted) and is not now actively wrong.

  There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
  I will mention briefly.

  It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
  At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
  be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem.  With user
  namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
  allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
  to outside of the bind mount.  This is challenging to fix and doubly
  so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
  performance part of pathname resolution.

  As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
  developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
  files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
  in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
  such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
  they are recognized"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
  mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
  sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
  sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
  kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
  proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
  sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
  fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
  vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
  mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
  mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
2015-07-03 15:20:57 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman ea015218f2 kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
Add a new function kernfs_create_empty_dir that can be used to create
directory that can not be modified.

Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting a
permanently empty directory to the vfs.

Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-01 10:36:43 -05:00
Tejun Heo fb02915f47 kernfs: make kernfs_get_inode() public
Move kernfs_get_inode() prototype from fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h to
include/linux/kernfs.h.  It obtains the matching inode for a
kernfs_node.

It will be used by cgroup for inode based permission checks for now
but is generally useful.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-06-18 16:54:28 -04:00
Tejun Heo dfeb0750b6 kernfs: remove KERNFS_STATIC_NAME
When a new kernfs node is created, KERNFS_STATIC_NAME is used to avoid
making a separate copy of its name.  It's currently only used for sysfs
attributes whose filenames are required to stay accessible and unchanged.
There are rare exceptions where these names are allocated and formatted
dynamically but for the vast majority of cases they're consts in the
rodata section.

Now that kernfs is converted to use kstrdup_const() and kfree_const(),
there's little point in keeping KERNFS_STATIC_NAME around.  Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-13 21:21:36 -08:00
NeilBrown 2b75869bba sysfs/kernfs: allow attributes to request write buffer be pre-allocated.
md/raid allows metadata management to be performed in user-space.
A various times, particularly on device failure, the metadata needs
to be updated before further writes can be permitted.
This means that the user-space program which updates metadata much
not block on writeout, and so must not allocate memory.

mlockall(MCL_CURRENT|MCL_FUTURE) and pre-allocation can avoid all
memory allocation issues for user-memory, but that does not help
kernel memory.
Several kernel objects can be pre-allocated.  e.g. files opened before
any writes to the array are permitted.
However some kernel allocation happens in places that cannot be
pre-allocated.
In particular, writes to sysfs files (to tell md that it can now
allow writes to the array) allocate a buffer using GFP_KERNEL.

This patch allows attributes to be marked as "PREALLOC".  In that case
the maximal buffer is allocated when the file is opened, and then used
on each write instead of allocating a new buffer.

As the same buffer is now shared for all writes on the same file
description, the mutex is extended to cover full use of the buffer
including the copy_from_user().

The new __ATTR_PREALLOC() 'or's a new flag in to the 'mode', which is
inspected by sysfs_add_file_mode_ns() to determine if the file should be
marked as requiring prealloc.

Despite the comment, we *do* use ->seq_show together with ->prealloc
in this patch.  The next patch fixes that.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown  <neilb@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-11-07 10:53:25 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 40f6123737 Merge branch 'for-3.16-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
 "Mostly fixes for the fallouts from the recent cgroup core changes.

  The decoupled nature of cgroup dynamic hierarchy management
  (hierarchies are created dynamically on mount but may or may not be
  reused once unmounted depending on remaining usages) led to more
  ugliness being added to kernfs.

  Hopefully, this is the last of it"

* 'for-3.16-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  cpuset: break kernfs active protection in cpuset_write_resmask()
  cgroup: fix a race between cgroup_mount() and cgroup_kill_sb()
  kernfs: introduce kernfs_pin_sb()
  cgroup: fix mount failure in a corner case
  cpuset,mempolicy: fix sleeping function called from invalid context
  cgroup: fix broken css_has_online_children()
2014-07-10 11:38:23 -07:00
Tejun Heo ecca47ce82 kernfs: kernfs_notify() must be useable from non-sleepable contexts
d911d98748 ("kernfs: make kernfs_notify() trigger inotify events
too") added fsnotify triggering to kernfs_notify() which requires a
sleepable context.  There are already existing users of
kernfs_notify() which invoke it from an atomic context and in general
it's silly to require a sleepable context for triggering a
notification.

The following is an invalid context bug triggerd by md invoking
sysfs_notify() from IO completion path.

 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:586
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 0, name: swapper/1
 2 locks held by swapper/1/0:
  #0:  (&(&vblk->vq_lock)->rlock){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa0039042>] virtblk_done+0x42/0xe0 [virtio_blk]
  #1:  (&(&bitmap->counts.lock)->rlock){-.....}, at: [<ffffffff81633718>] bitmap_endwrite+0x68/0x240
 irq event stamp: 33518
 hardirqs last  enabled at (33515): [<ffffffff8102544f>] default_idle+0x1f/0x230
 hardirqs last disabled at (33516): [<ffffffff818122ed>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x72
 softirqs last  enabled at (33518): [<ffffffff810a1272>] _local_bh_enable+0x22/0x50
 softirqs last disabled at (33517): [<ffffffff810a29e0>] irq_enter+0x60/0x80
 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.16.0-0.rc2.git2.1.fc21.x86_64 #1
 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  0000000000000000 f90db13964f4ee05 ffff88007d403b80 ffffffff81807b4c
  0000000000000000 ffff88007d403ba8 ffffffff810d4f14 0000000000000000
  0000000000441800 ffff880078fa1780 ffff88007d403c38 ffffffff8180caf2
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff81807b4c>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
  [<ffffffff810d4f14>] __might_sleep+0x184/0x240
  [<ffffffff8180caf2>] mutex_lock_nested+0x42/0x440
  [<ffffffff812d76a0>] kernfs_notify+0x90/0x150
  [<ffffffff8163377c>] bitmap_endwrite+0xcc/0x240
  [<ffffffffa00de863>] close_write+0x93/0xb0 [raid1]
  [<ffffffffa00df029>] r1_bio_write_done+0x29/0x50 [raid1]
  [<ffffffffa00e0474>] raid1_end_write_request+0xe4/0x260 [raid1]
  [<ffffffff813acb8b>] bio_endio+0x6b/0xa0
  [<ffffffff813b46c4>] blk_update_request+0x94/0x420
  [<ffffffff813bf0ea>] blk_mq_end_io+0x1a/0x70
  [<ffffffffa00392c2>] virtblk_request_done+0x32/0x80 [virtio_blk]
  [<ffffffff813c0648>] __blk_mq_complete_request+0x88/0x120
  [<ffffffff813c070a>] blk_mq_complete_request+0x2a/0x30
  [<ffffffffa0039066>] virtblk_done+0x66/0xe0 [virtio_blk]
  [<ffffffffa002535a>] vring_interrupt+0x3a/0xa0 [virtio_ring]
  [<ffffffff81116177>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x77/0x340
  [<ffffffff8111647d>] handle_irq_event+0x3d/0x60
  [<ffffffff81119436>] handle_edge_irq+0x66/0x130
  [<ffffffff8101c3e4>] handle_irq+0x84/0x150
  [<ffffffff818146ad>] do_IRQ+0x4d/0xe0
  [<ffffffff818122f2>] common_interrupt+0x72/0x72
  <EOI>  [<ffffffff8105f706>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10
  [<ffffffff81025454>] default_idle+0x24/0x230
  [<ffffffff81025f9f>] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20
  [<ffffffff810f5adc>] cpu_startup_entry+0x37c/0x7b0
  [<ffffffff8104df1b>] start_secondary+0x25b/0x300

This patch fixes it by punting the notification delivery through a
work item.  This ends up adding an extra pointer to kernfs_elem_attr
enlarging kernfs_node by a pointer, which is not ideal but not a very
big deal either.  If this turns out to be an actual issue, we can move
kernfs_elem_attr->size to kernfs_node->iattr later.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-07-02 09:32:09 -07:00
Li Zefan 4e26445faa kernfs: introduce kernfs_pin_sb()
kernfs_pin_sb() tries to get a refcnt of the superblock.

This will be used by cgroupfs.

v2:
- make kernfs_pin_sb() return the superblock.
- drop kernfs_drop_sb().

tj: Updated the comment a bit.

[ This is a prerequisite for a bugfix. ]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.15
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2014-06-30 10:16:25 -04:00
Jianyu Zhan 26fc9cd200 kernfs: move the last knowledge of sysfs out from kernfs
There is still one residue of sysfs remaining: the sb_magic
SYSFS_MAGIC. However this should be kernfs user specific,
so this patch moves it out. Kerrnfs user should specify their
magic number while mouting.

Signed-off-by: Jianyu Zhan <nasa4836@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-05-27 14:33:17 -07:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman cbfef53360 Merge 3.15-rc6 into driver-core-next
We want the kernfs fixes in this branch as well for testing.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-05-23 10:13:53 +09:00
Tejun Heo 555724a831 kernfs, sysfs, cgroup: restrict extra perm check on open to sysfs
The kernfs open method - kernfs_fop_open() - inherited extra
permission checks from sysfs.  While the vfs layer allows ignoring the
read/write permissions checks if the issuer has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
sysfs explicitly denied open regardless of the cap if the file doesn't
have any of the UGO perms of the requested access or doesn't implement
the requested operation.  It can be debated whether this was a good
idea or not but the behavior is too subtle and dangerous to change at
this point.

After cgroup got converted to kernfs, this extra perm check also got
applied to cgroup breaking libcgroup which opens write-only files with
O_RDWR as root.  This patch gates the extra open permission check with
a new flag KERNFS_ROOT_EXTRA_OPEN_PERM_CHECK and enables it for sysfs.
For sysfs, nothing changes.  For cgroup, root now can perform any
operation regardless of the permissions as it was before kernfs
conversion.  Note that kernfs still fails unimplemented operations
with -EINVAL.

While at it, add comments explaining KERNFS_ROOT flags.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Andrey Wagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Wagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
References: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/CANaxB-xUm3rJ-Cbp72q-rQJO5mZe1qK6qXsQM=vh0U8upJ44+A@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 2bd59d48eb ("cgroup: convert to kernfs")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-05-13 13:21:40 +02:00
Tejun Heo 7d568a8383 kernfs: implement kernfs_root->supers list
Currently, there's no way to find out which super_blocks are
associated with a given kernfs_root.  Let's implement it - the planned
inotify extension to kernfs_notify() needs it.

Make kernfs_super_info point back to the super_block and chain it at
kernfs_root->supers.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-04-25 11:43:31 -07:00
Tejun Heo b7ce40cff0 kernfs: cache atomic_write_len in kernfs_open_file
While implementing atomic_write_len, 4d3773c4bb ("kernfs: implement
kernfs_ops->atomic_write_len") moved data copy from userland inside
kernfs_get_active() and kernfs_open_file->mutex so that
kernfs_ops->atomic_write_len can be accessed before copying buffer
from userland; unfortunately, this could lead to locking order
inversion involving mmap_sem if copy_from_user() takes a page fault.

  ======================================================
  [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
  3.14.0-rc4-next-20140228-sasha-00011-g4077c67-dirty #26 Tainted: G        W
  -------------------------------------------------------
  trinity-c236/10658 is trying to acquire lock:
   (&of->mutex#2){+.+.+.}, at: [<fs/kernfs/file.c:487>] kernfs_fop_mmap+0x54/0x120

  but task is already holding lock:
   (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<mm/util.c:397>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x6e/0xe0

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}:
	 [<kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1945 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2131>] validate_chain+0x6c5/0x7b0
	 [<kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3182>] __lock_acquire+0x4cd/0x5a0
	 [<arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3602>] lock_acquire+0x182/0x1d0
	 [<mm/memory.c:4188>] might_fault+0x7e/0xb0
	 [<arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:713 fs/kernfs/file.c:291>] kernfs_fop_write+0xd8/0x190
	 [<fs/read_write.c:473>] vfs_write+0xe3/0x1d0
	 [<fs/read_write.c:523 fs/read_write.c:515>] SyS_write+0x5d/0xa0
	 [<arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:749>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

 -> #0 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.+.}:
	 [<kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1840>] check_prev_add+0x13f/0x560
	 [<kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1945 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2131>] validate_chain+0x6c5/0x7b0
	 [<kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3182>] __lock_acquire+0x4cd/0x5a0
	 [<arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3602>] lock_acquire+0x182/0x1d0
	 [<kernel/locking/mutex.c:470 kernel/locking/mutex.c:571>] mutex_lock_nested+0x6a/0x510
	 [<fs/kernfs/file.c:487>] kernfs_fop_mmap+0x54/0x120
	 [<mm/mmap.c:1573>] mmap_region+0x310/0x5c0
	 [<mm/mmap.c:1365>] do_mmap_pgoff+0x385/0x430
	 [<mm/util.c:399>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x8f/0xe0
	 [<mm/mmap.c:1416 mm/mmap.c:1374>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x1b0/0x210
	 [<arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:72>] SyS_mmap+0x1d/0x20
	 [<arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:749>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

  other info that might help us debug this:

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
				 lock(&of->mutex#2);
				 lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
    lock(&of->mutex#2);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  1 lock held by trinity-c236/10658:
   #0:  (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<mm/util.c:397>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x6e/0xe0

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 2 PID: 10658 Comm: trinity-c236 Tainted: G        W 3.14.0-rc4-next-20140228-sasha-00011-g4077c67-dirty #26
   0000000000000000 ffff88011911fa48 ffffffff8438e945 0000000000000000
   0000000000000000 ffff88011911fa98 ffffffff811a0109 ffff88011911fab8
   ffff88011911fab8 ffff88011911fa98 ffff880119128cc0 ffff880119128cf8
  Call Trace:
   [<lib/dump_stack.c:52>] dump_stack+0x52/0x7f
   [<kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1213>] print_circular_bug+0x129/0x160
   [<kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1840>] check_prev_add+0x13f/0x560
   [<include/linux/spinlock.h:343 mm/slub.c:1933>] ? deactivate_slab+0x511/0x550
   [<kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1945 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2131>] validate_chain+0x6c5/0x7b0
   [<kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3182>] __lock_acquire+0x4cd/0x5a0
   [<mm/mmap.c:1552>] ? mmap_region+0x24a/0x5c0
   [<arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3602>] lock_acquire+0x182/0x1d0
   [<fs/kernfs/file.c:487>] ? kernfs_fop_mmap+0x54/0x120
   [<kernel/locking/mutex.c:470 kernel/locking/mutex.c:571>] mutex_lock_nested+0x6a/0x510
   [<fs/kernfs/file.c:487>] ? kernfs_fop_mmap+0x54/0x120
   [<kernel/sched/core.c:2477>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50
   [<fs/kernfs/file.c:487>] ? kernfs_fop_mmap+0x54/0x120
   [<fs/kernfs/file.c:487>] kernfs_fop_mmap+0x54/0x120
   [<mm/mmap.c:1573>] mmap_region+0x310/0x5c0
   [<mm/mmap.c:1365>] do_mmap_pgoff+0x385/0x430
   [<mm/util.c:397>] ? vm_mmap_pgoff+0x6e/0xe0
   [<mm/util.c:399>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x8f/0xe0
   [<kernel/rcu/update.c:97>] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x44/0xb0
   [<fs/file.c:641>] ? dup_fd+0x3c0/0x3c0
   [<mm/mmap.c:1416 mm/mmap.c:1374>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x1b0/0x210
   [<arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:72>] SyS_mmap+0x1d/0x20
   [<arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:749>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

Fix it by caching atomic_write_len in kernfs_open_file during open so
that it can be determined without accessing kernfs_ops in
kernfs_fop_write().  This restores the structure of kernfs_fop_write()
before 4d3773c4bb with updated @len determination logic.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
References: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/53113485.2090407@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-03-08 22:08:29 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 13df797743 Merge 3.14-rc5 into driver-core-next
We want the fixes in here.
2014-03-02 20:09:08 -08:00
Li Zefan fed95bab8d sysfs: fix namespace refcnt leak
As mount() and kill_sb() is not a one-to-one match, we shoudn't get
ns refcnt unconditionally in sysfs_mount(), and instead we should
get the refcnt only when kernfs_mount() allocated a new superblock.

v2:
- Changed the name of the new argument, suggested by Tejun.
- Made the argument optional, suggested by Tejun.

v3:
- Make the new argument as second-to-last arg, suggested by Tejun.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
 ---
 fs/kernfs/mount.c      | 8 +++++++-
 fs/sysfs/mount.c       | 5 +++--
 include/linux/kernfs.h | 9 +++++----
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-02-25 07:37:52 -08:00
Tejun Heo ba341d55a4 kernfs: add CONFIG_KERNFS
As sysfs was kernfs's only user, kernfs has been piggybacking on
CONFIG_SYSFS; however, kernfs is scheduled to grow a new user very
soon.  Introduce a separate config option CONFIG_KERNFS which is to be
selected by kernfs users.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-02-07 16:08:57 -08:00