Commit Graph

118 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexei Starovoitov fdfaf64e75 x86: bpf_jit: support negative offsets
Commit a998d43423 claimed to introduce negative offset support to x86 jit,
but it couldn't be working, since at the time of the execution
of LD+ABS or LD+IND instructions via call into
bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper() the %edx (3rd argument of this func)
had junk value instead of access size in bytes (1 or 2 or 4).

Store size into %edx instead of %ecx (what original commit intended to do)

Fixes: a998d43423 ("bpf jit: Let the x86 jit handle negative offsets")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Jan Seiffert <kaffeemonster@googlemail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-11 23:25:22 -04:00
Eric Dumazet aee636c480 bpf: do not use reciprocal divide
At first Jakub Zawadzki noticed that some divisions by reciprocal_divide
were not correct. (off by one in some cases)
http://www.wireshark.org/~darkjames/reciprocal-buggy.c

He could also show this with BPF:
http://www.wireshark.org/~darkjames/set-and-dump-filter-k-bug.c

The reciprocal divide in linux kernel is not generic enough,
lets remove its use in BPF, as it is not worth the pain with
current cpus.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl>
Cc: Mircea Gherzan <mgherzan@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dxchgb@gmail.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Matt Evans <matt@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-15 17:02:08 -08:00
Andrey Vagin 98bbc06aab net: x86: bpf: don't forget to free sk_filter (v2)
sk_filter isn't freed if bpf_func is equal to sk_run_filter.

This memory leak was introduced by v3.12-rc3-224-gd45ed4a4
"net: fix unsafe set_memory_rw from softirq".

Before this patch sk_filter was freed in sk_filter_release_rcu,
now it should be freed in bpf_jit_free.

Here is output of kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff8800b774eab0 (size 128):
  comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294669014 (age 124.062s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 0b 00 00 00 20 63 7f b7 00 88 ff ff  ........ c......
    60 d4 55 81 ff ff ff ff 30 d9 55 81 ff ff ff ff  `.U.....0.U.....
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff816444be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
    [<ffffffff811845af>] __kmalloc+0xef/0x260
    [<ffffffff81534028>] sock_kmalloc+0x38/0x60
    [<ffffffff8155d4dd>] sk_attach_filter+0x5d/0x190
    [<ffffffff815378a1>] sock_setsockopt+0x991/0x9e0
    [<ffffffff81531bd6>] SyS_setsockopt+0xb6/0xd0
    [<ffffffff8165f3e9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
    [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

v2: add extra { } after else

Fixes: d45ed4a4e3 ("net: fix unsafe set_memory_rw from softirq")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-11-07 19:06:52 -05:00
Alexei Starovoitov d45ed4a4e3 net: fix unsafe set_memory_rw from softirq
on x86 system with net.core.bpf_jit_enable = 1

sudo tcpdump -i eth1 'tcp port 22'

causes the warning:
[   56.766097]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   56.766097]
[   56.780146]        CPU0
[   56.786807]        ----
[   56.793188]   lock(&(&vb->lock)->rlock);
[   56.799593]   <Interrupt>
[   56.805889]     lock(&(&vb->lock)->rlock);
[   56.812266]
[   56.812266]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   56.812266]
[   56.830670] 1 lock held by ksoftirqd/1/13:
[   56.836838]  #0:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8118f44c>] vm_unmap_aliases+0x8c/0x380
[   56.849757]
[   56.849757] stack backtrace:
[   56.862194] CPU: 1 PID: 13 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 3.12.0-rc3+ #45
[   56.868721] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P8Z77 WS, BIOS 3007 07/26/2012
[   56.882004]  ffffffff821944c0 ffff88080bbdb8c8 ffffffff8175a145 0000000000000007
[   56.895630]  ffff88080bbd5f40 ffff88080bbdb928 ffffffff81755b14 0000000000000001
[   56.909313]  ffff880800000001 ffff880800000000 ffffffff8101178f 0000000000000001
[   56.923006] Call Trace:
[   56.929532]  [<ffffffff8175a145>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76
[   56.936067]  [<ffffffff81755b14>] print_usage_bug+0x1f7/0x208
[   56.942445]  [<ffffffff8101178f>] ? save_stack_trace+0x2f/0x50
[   56.948932]  [<ffffffff810cc0a0>] ? check_usage_backwards+0x150/0x150
[   56.955470]  [<ffffffff810ccb52>] mark_lock+0x282/0x2c0
[   56.961945]  [<ffffffff810ccfed>] __lock_acquire+0x45d/0x1d50
[   56.968474]  [<ffffffff810cce6e>] ? __lock_acquire+0x2de/0x1d50
[   56.975140]  [<ffffffff81393bf5>] ? cpumask_next_and+0x55/0x90
[   56.981942]  [<ffffffff810cef72>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1d0
[   56.988745]  [<ffffffff8118f52a>] ? vm_unmap_aliases+0x16a/0x380
[   56.995619]  [<ffffffff817628f1>] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50
[   57.002493]  [<ffffffff8118f52a>] ? vm_unmap_aliases+0x16a/0x380
[   57.009447]  [<ffffffff8118f52a>] vm_unmap_aliases+0x16a/0x380
[   57.016477]  [<ffffffff8118f44c>] ? vm_unmap_aliases+0x8c/0x380
[   57.023607]  [<ffffffff810436b0>] change_page_attr_set_clr+0xc0/0x460
[   57.030818]  [<ffffffff810cfb8d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[   57.037896]  [<ffffffff811a8330>] ? kmem_cache_free+0xb0/0x2b0
[   57.044789]  [<ffffffff811b59c3>] ? free_object_rcu+0x93/0xa0
[   57.051720]  [<ffffffff81043d9f>] set_memory_rw+0x2f/0x40
[   57.058727]  [<ffffffff8104e17c>] bpf_jit_free+0x2c/0x40
[   57.065577]  [<ffffffff81642cba>] sk_filter_release_rcu+0x1a/0x30
[   57.072338]  [<ffffffff811108e2>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x202/0x7c0
[   57.078962]  [<ffffffff81057f17>] __do_softirq+0xf7/0x3f0
[   57.085373]  [<ffffffff81058245>] run_ksoftirqd+0x35/0x70

cannot reuse jited filter memory, since it's readonly,
so use original bpf insns memory to hold work_struct

defer kfree of sk_filter until jit completed freeing

tested on x86_64 and i386

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-10-07 15:16:45 -04:00
Eric Dumazet 314beb9bca x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks
hpa bringed into my attention some security related issues
with BPF JIT on x86.

This patch makes sure the bpf generated code is marked read only,
as other kernel text sections.

It also splits the unused space (we vmalloc() and only use a fraction of
the page) in two parts, so that the generated bpf code not starts at a
known offset in the page, but a pseudo random one.

Refs:
http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html

Reported-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-05-19 23:55:41 -07:00
Eric Dumazet 650c849670 x86: bpf_jit_comp: can call module_free() from any context
It looks like we can call module_free()/vfree() from softirq context,
so no longer need a wrapper and a work_struct.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-05-17 17:37:19 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann 79617801ea filter: bpf_jit_comp: refactor and unify BPF JIT image dump output
If bpf_jit_enable > 1, then we dump the emitted JIT compiled image
after creation. Currently, only SPARC and PowerPC has similar output
as in the reference implementation on x86_64. Make a small helper
function in order to reduce duplicated code and make the dump output
uniform across architectures x86_64, SPARC, PPC, ARM (e.g. on ARM
flen, pass and proglen are currently not shown, but would be
interesting to know as well), also for future BPF JIT implementations
on other archs.

Cc: Mircea Gherzan <mgherzan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matt Evans <matt@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@google.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-03-21 17:25:56 -04:00
Eric Dumazet 3b58908a92 x86: bpf_jit_comp: add pkt_type support
Supporting access to skb->pkt_type is a bit tricky if we want
to have a generic code, allowing pkt_type to be moved in struct sk_buff

pkt_type is a bit field, so compiler cannot really help us to find
its offset. Let's use a helper for this : It will throw a one time
message if pkt_type no longer starts at a byte boundary or is
no longer a 3bit field.

Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-30 22:38:34 -05:00
Eric Dumazet 855ddb56d8 x86: bpf_jit_comp: add vlan tag support
This patch is a follow-up for patch "net: filter: add vlan tag access"
to support the new VLAN_TAG/VLAN_TAG_PRESENT accessors in BPF JIT.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ani Sinha <ani@aristanetworks.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <danborkmann@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-10-31 14:00:15 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann 82c93fcc2e x86: bpf_jit_comp: add XOR instruction for BPF JIT
This patch is a follow-up for patch "filter: add XOR instruction for use
with X/K" that implements BPF x86 JIT parts for the BPF XOR operation.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel.borkmann@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-24 16:54:35 -04:00
Eric Dumazet 280050cc81 x86 bpf_jit: support MOD operation
commit b6069a9570 (filter: add MOD operation) added generic
support for modulus operation in BPF.

This patch brings JIT support for x86_64

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: George Bakos <gbakos@alpinista.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-10 17:08:48 -04:00
Eric Dumazet 4bfaddf15b x86 bpf_jit: support BPF_S_ANC_ALU_XOR_X instruction
commit ffe06c17af  (filter: add XOR operation) added generic support
for XOR operation.

This patch implements the XOR instruction in x86 jit.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-06-06 09:42:44 -07:00
Jan Seiffert a998d43423 bpf jit: Let the x86 jit handle negative offsets
Now the helper function from filter.c for negative offsets is exported,
it can be used it in the jit to handle negative offsets.

First modify the asm load helper functions to handle:
- know positive offsets
- know negative offsets
- any offset

then the compiler can be modified to explicitly use these helper
when appropriate.

This fixes the case of a negative X register and allows to lift
the restriction that bpf programs with negative offsets can't
be jited.

Signed-of-by: Jan Seiffert <kaffeemonster@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-04-03 18:01:41 -04:00
zhuangfeiran@ict.ac.cn 1d24fb3684 x86 bpf_jit: fix a bug in emitting the 16-bit immediate operand of AND
When K >= 0xFFFF0000, AND needs the two least significant bytes of K as
its operand, but EMIT2() gives it the least significant byte of K and
0x2. EMIT() should be used here to replace EMIT2().

Signed-off-by: Feiran Zhuang  <zhuangfeiran@ict.ac.cn>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-03-29 18:12:59 -04:00
Eric Dumazet dc72d99dab net: bpf_jit: fix BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH compilation
Matt Evans spotted that x86 bpf_jit was incorrectly handling negative
constant offsets in BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH instruction.

We need to abort JIT compilation like we do in common_load so that
filter uses the interpreter code and can call __load_pointer()

Reference: http://lists.openwall.net/netdev/2011/07/19/11

Thanks to Indan Zupancic to bring back this issue.

Reported-by: Matt Evans <matt@ozlabs.org>
Reported-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-03-19 17:41:44 -04:00
Eric Dumazet d00a9dd21b net: bpf_jit: fix divide by 0 generation
Several problems fixed in this patch :

1) Target of the conditional jump in case a divide by 0 is performed
   by a bpf is wrong.

2) Must 'generate' the full function prologue/epilogue at pass=0,
   or else we can stop too early in pass=1 if the proglen doesnt change.
   (if the increase of prologue/epilogue equals decrease of all
    instructions length because some jumps are converted to near jumps)

3) Change the wrong length detection at the end of code generation to
   issue a more explicit message, no need for a full stack trace.

Reported-by: Phil Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-18 16:04:26 -05:00
Markus Kötter a03ffcf873 net: bpf_jit: fix an off-one bug in x86_64 cond jump target
x86 jump instruction size is 2 or 5 bytes (near/long jump), not 2 or 6
bytes.

In case a conditional jump is followed by a long jump, conditional jump
target is one byte past the start of target instruction.

Signed-off-by: Markus Kötter <nepenthesdev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-12-19 15:47:29 -05:00
Eric Dumazet 0a14842f5a net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64
In order to speedup packet filtering, here is an implementation of a
JIT compiler for x86_64

It is disabled by default, and must be enabled by the admin.

echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable

It uses module_alloc() and module_free() to get memory in the 2GB text
kernel range since we call helpers functions from the generated code.

EAX : BPF A accumulator
EBX : BPF X accumulator
RDI : pointer to skb   (first argument given to JIT function)
RBP : frame pointer (even if CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=n)
r9d : skb->len - skb->data_len (headlen)
r8  : skb->data

To get a trace of generated code, use :

echo 2 >/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable

Example of generated code :

# tcpdump -p -n -s 0 -i eth1 host 192.168.20.0/24

flen=18 proglen=147 pass=3 image=ffffffffa00b5000
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5000: 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 60 48 89 5d f8 44 8b 4f 60
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5010: 44 2b 4f 64 4c 8b 87 b8 00 00 00 be 0c 00 00 00
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5020: e8 24 7b f7 e0 3d 00 08 00 00 75 28 be 1a 00 00
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5030: 00 e8 fe 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 74 49 be
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5040: 1e 00 00 00 e8 eb 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5050: 74 36 eb 3b 3d 06 08 00 00 74 07 3d 35 80 00 00
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5060: 75 2d be 1c 00 00 00 e8 c8 7a f7 e0 24 00 3d 00
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5070: 14 a8 c0 74 13 be 26 00 00 00 e8 b5 7a f7 e0 24
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5080: 00 3d 00 14 a8 c0 75 07 b8 ff ff 00 00 eb 02 31
JIT code: ffffffffa00b5090: c0 c9 c3

BPF program is 144 bytes long, so native program is almost same size ;)

(000) ldh      [12]
(001) jeq      #0x800           jt 2    jf 8
(002) ld       [26]
(003) and      #0xffffff00
(004) jeq      #0xc0a81400      jt 16   jf 5
(005) ld       [30]
(006) and      #0xffffff00
(007) jeq      #0xc0a81400      jt 16   jf 17
(008) jeq      #0x806           jt 10   jf 9
(009) jeq      #0x8035          jt 10   jf 17
(010) ld       [28]
(011) and      #0xffffff00
(012) jeq      #0xc0a81400      jt 16   jf 13
(013) ld       [38]
(014) and      #0xffffff00
(015) jeq      #0xc0a81400      jt 16   jf 17
(016) ret      #65535
(017) ret      #0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-04-27 23:05:08 -07:00