media: af9005: Fix null-ptr-deref in af9005_i2c_xfer
In af9005_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach af9005_i2c_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.
Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd76
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
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@ -422,6 +422,10 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
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if (ret == 0)
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ret = 2;
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} else {
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if (msg[0].len < 2) {
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ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
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goto unlock;
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}
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/* write one or more registers */
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reg = msg[0].buf[0];
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addr = msg[0].addr;
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@ -431,6 +435,7 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
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ret = 1;
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}
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unlock:
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mutex_unlock(&d->i2c_mutex);
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return ret;
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}
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