ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/debugfs.h>
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#include <linux/acpi.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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@ -29,6 +30,11 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
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struct acpi_table_header table;
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acpi_status status;
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int ret;
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ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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if (!(*ppos)) {
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/* parse the table header to get the table length */
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@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
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LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS,
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LOCKDOWN_IOPORT,
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LOCKDOWN_MSR,
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LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES,
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LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
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LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
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};
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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
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[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
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[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
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[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
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[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
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[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
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[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
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};
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