hv_sock: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values
For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer. Ensure that invalid values cannot cause data being copied out of the bounds of the source buffer in hvs_stream_dequeue(). Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220428145107.7878-4-parri.andrea@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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@ -1696,6 +1696,11 @@ static inline u32 hv_pkt_datalen(const struct vmpacket_descriptor *desc)
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return (desc->len8 << 3) - (desc->offset8 << 3);
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}
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/* Get packet length associated with descriptor */
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static inline u32 hv_pkt_len(const struct vmpacket_descriptor *desc)
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{
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return desc->len8 << 3;
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}
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struct vmpacket_descriptor *
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hv_pkt_iter_first_raw(struct vmbus_channel *channel);
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@ -577,12 +577,18 @@ static bool hvs_dgram_allow(u32 cid, u32 port)
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static int hvs_update_recv_data(struct hvsock *hvs)
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{
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struct hvs_recv_buf *recv_buf;
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u32 payload_len;
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u32 pkt_len, payload_len;
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pkt_len = hv_pkt_len(hvs->recv_desc);
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if (pkt_len < HVS_HEADER_LEN)
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return -EIO;
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recv_buf = (struct hvs_recv_buf *)(hvs->recv_desc + 1);
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payload_len = recv_buf->hdr.data_size;
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if (payload_len > HVS_MTU_SIZE)
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if (payload_len > pkt_len - HVS_HEADER_LEN ||
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payload_len > HVS_MTU_SIZE)
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return -EIO;
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if (payload_len == 0)
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