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Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip 

Pull x86 core updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Note that in this cycle most of the x86 topics interacted at a level
  that caused them to be merged into tip:x86/asm - but this should be a
  temporary phenomenon, hopefully we'll back to the usual patterns in
  the next merge window.

  The main changes in this cycle were:

  Hardware enablement:

   - Add support for the Intel UMIP (User Mode Instruction Prevention)
     CPU feature. This is a security feature that disables certain
     instructions such as SGDT, SLDT, SIDT, SMSW and STR. (Ricardo Neri)

     [ Note that this is disabled by default for now, there are some
       smaller enhancements in the pipeline that I'll follow up with in
       the next 1-2 days, which allows this to be enabled by default.]

   - Add support for the AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) CPU
     feature, on top of SME (Secure Memory Encryption) support that was
     added in v4.14. (Tom Lendacky, Brijesh Singh)

   - Enable new SSE/AVX/AVX512 CPU features: AVX512_VBMI2, GFNI, VAES,
     VPCLMULQDQ, AVX512_VNNI, AVX512_BITALG. (Gayatri Kammela)

  Other changes:

   - A big series of entry code simplifications and enhancements (Andy
     Lutomirski)

   - Make the ORC unwinder default on x86 and various objtool
     enhancements. (Josh Poimboeuf)

   - 5-level paging enhancements (Kirill A. Shutemov)

   - Micro-optimize the entry code a bit (Borislav Petkov)

   - Improve the handling of interdependent CPU features in the early
     FPU init code (Andi Kleen)

   - Build system enhancements (Changbin Du, Masahiro Yamada)

   - ... plus misc enhancements, fixes and cleanups"

* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (118 commits)
  x86/build: Make the boot image generation less verbose
  selftests/x86: Add tests for the STR and SLDT instructions
  selftests/x86: Add tests for User-Mode Instruction Prevention
  x86/traps: Fix up general protection faults caused by UMIP
  x86/umip: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention at runtime
  x86/umip: Force a page fault when unable to copy emulated result to user
  x86/umip: Add emulation code for UMIP instructions
  x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions
  x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 16-bit address encodings
  x86/insn-eval: Handle 32-bit address encodings in virtual-8086 mode
  x86/insn-eval: Add wrapper function for 32 and 64-bit addresses
  x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 32-bit address encodings
  x86/insn-eval: Compute linear address in several utility functions
  resource: Fix resource_size.cocci warnings
  X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
  X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active
  percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED
  x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
  x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2017-11-13 14:13:48 -08:00
parent 3e2014637c 91a6a6cfee
commit d6ec9d9a4d
110 changed files with 4068 additions and 1146 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

30
Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
View File

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
Secure Memory Encryption (SME) and Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) are
features found on AMD processors.
SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
the standard x86 page tables. A page that is marked encrypted will be
@ -6,24 +7,38 @@ automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
DRAM. SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
attacks on the system.
SEV enables running encrypted virtual machines (VMs) in which the code and data
of the guest VM are secured so that a decrypted version is available only
within the VM itself. SEV guest VMs have the concept of private and shared
memory. Private memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared
memory may be encrypted with hypervisor key. When SME is enabled, the hypervisor
key is the same key which is used in SME.
A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
below on how to determine its position). The encryption bit can also be
specified in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each
successive level of page tables can also be encrypted by setting the encryption
bit in the page table entry that points to the next table. This allows the full
page table hierarchy to be encrypted. Note, this means that just because the
encryption bit is set in cr3, doesn't imply the full hierarchy is encyrpted.
encryption bit is set in cr3, doesn't imply the full hierarchy is encrypted.
Each page table entry in the hierarchy needs to have the encryption bit set to
achieve that. So, theoretically, you could have the encryption bit set in cr3
so that the PGD is encrypted, but not set the encryption bit in the PGD entry
for a PUD which results in the PUD pointed to by that entry to not be
encrypted.
Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
When SEV is enabled, instruction pages and guest page tables are always treated
as private. All the DMA operations inside the guest must be performed on shared
memory. Since the memory encryption bit is controlled by the guest OS when it
is operating in 64-bit or 32-bit PAE mode, in all other modes the SEV hardware
forces the memory encryption bit to 1.
Support for SME and SEV can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The
CPUID function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
0x8000001f[eax]:
Bit[0] indicates support for SME
Bit[1] indicates support for SEV
0x8000001f[ebx]:
Bits[5:0] pagetable bit number used to activate memory
encryption
@ -39,6 +54,13 @@ determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
Bit[23] 0 = memory encryption features are disabled
1 = memory encryption features are enabled
If SEV is supported, MSR 0xc0010131 (MSR_AMD64_SEV) can be used to determine if
SEV is active:
0xc0010131:
Bit[0] 0 = memory encryption is not active
1 = memory encryption is active
Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource

2
Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt
View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ ORC unwinder
Overview
--------
The kernel CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER option enables the ORC unwinder, which is
The kernel CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC option enables the ORC unwinder, which is
similar in concept to a DWARF unwinder. The difference is that the
format of the ORC data is much simpler than DWARF, which in turn allows
the ORC unwinder to be much simpler and faster.

2
Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
View File

@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ ff92000000000000 - ffd1ffffffffffff (=54 bits) vmalloc/ioremap space
ffd2000000000000 - ffd3ffffffffffff (=49 bits) hole
ffd4000000000000 - ffd5ffffffffffff (=49 bits) virtual memory map (512TB)
... unused hole ...
ffd8000000000000 - fff7ffffffffffff (=53 bits) kasan shadow memory (8PB)
ffdf000000000000 - fffffc0000000000 (=53 bits) kasan shadow memory (8PB)
... unused hole ...
ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits) %esp fixup stacks
... unused hole ...

4
Makefile
View File

@ -934,8 +934,8 @@ ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
ifeq ($(has_libelf),1)
objtool_target := tools/objtool FORCE
else
ifdef CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER
$(error "Cannot generate ORC metadata for CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER=y, please install libelf-dev, libelf-devel or elfutils-libelf-devel")
ifdef CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC
$(error "Cannot generate ORC metadata for CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC=y, please install libelf-dev, libelf-devel or elfutils-libelf-devel")
else
$(warning "Cannot use CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y, please install libelf-dev, libelf-devel or elfutils-libelf-devel")
endif

12
arch/powerpc/kernel/machine_kexec_file_64.c
View File

@ -91,11 +91,13 @@ int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
* and that value will be returned. If all free regions are visited without
* func returning non-zero, then zero will be returned.
*/
int arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
int arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf,
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
{
int ret = 0;
u64 i;
phys_addr_t mstart, mend;
struct resource res = { };
if (kbuf->top_down) {
for_each_free_mem_range_reverse(i, NUMA_NO_NODE, 0,
@ -105,7 +107,9 @@ int arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
* range while in kexec, end points to the last byte
* in the range.
*/
ret = func(mstart, mend - 1, kbuf);
res.start = mstart;
res.end = mend - 1;
ret = func(&res, kbuf);
if (ret)
break;
}
@ -117,7 +121,9 @@ int arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
* range while in kexec, end points to the last byte
* in the range.
*/
ret = func(mstart, mend - 1, kbuf);
res.start = mstart;
res.end = mend - 1;
ret = func(&res, kbuf);
if (ret)
break;
}

13
arch/x86/Kconfig
View File

@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ config X86
select HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
select HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE if X86_64 && FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER && STACK_VALIDATION
select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE if X86_64 && UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER && STACK_VALIDATION
select HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION if X86_64
select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
@ -303,7 +303,6 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
config KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET
hex
depends on KASAN
default 0xdff8000000000000 if X86_5LEVEL
default 0xdffffc0000000000
config HAVE_INTEL_TXT
@ -1803,6 +1802,16 @@ config X86_SMAP
If unsure, say Y.
config X86_INTEL_UMIP
def_bool n
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
prompt "Intel User Mode Instruction Prevention" if EXPERT
---help---
The User Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) is a security
feature in newer Intel processors. If enabled, a general
protection fault is issued if the instructions SGDT, SLDT,
SIDT, SMSW and STR are executed in user mode.
config X86_INTEL_MPX
prompt "Intel MPX (Memory Protection Extensions)"
def_bool n

39
arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
View File

@ -359,28 +359,14 @@ config PUNIT_ATOM_DEBUG
choice
prompt "Choose kernel unwinder"
default FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER
default UNWINDER_ORC if X86_64
default UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER if X86_32
---help---
This determines which method will be used for unwinding kernel stack
traces for panics, oopses, bugs, warnings, perf, /proc/<pid>/stack,
livepatch, lockdep, and more.
config FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER
bool "Frame pointer unwinder"
select FRAME_POINTER
---help---
This option enables the frame pointer unwinder for unwinding kernel
stack traces.
The unwinder itself is fast and it uses less RAM than the ORC
unwinder, but the kernel text size will grow by ~3% and the kernel's
overall performance will degrade by roughly 5-10%.
This option is recommended if you want to use the livepatch
consistency model, as this is currently the only way to get a
reliable stack trace (CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE).
config ORC_UNWINDER
config UNWINDER_ORC
bool "ORC unwinder"
depends on X86_64
select STACK_VALIDATION
@ -396,7 +382,22 @@ config ORC_UNWINDER
Enabling this option will increase the kernel's runtime memory usage
by roughly 2-4MB, depending on your kernel config.
config GUESS_UNWINDER
config UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER
bool "Frame pointer unwinder"
select FRAME_POINTER
---help---
This option enables the frame pointer unwinder for unwinding kernel
stack traces.
The unwinder itself is fast and it uses less RAM than the ORC
unwinder, but the kernel text size will grow by ~3% and the kernel's
overall performance will degrade by roughly 5-10%.
This option is recommended if you want to use the livepatch
consistency model, as this is currently the only way to get a
reliable stack trace (CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE).
config UNWINDER_GUESS
bool "Guess unwinder"
depends on EXPERT
---help---
@ -411,7 +412,7 @@ config GUESS_UNWINDER
endchoice
config FRAME_POINTER
depends on !ORC_UNWINDER && !GUESS_UNWINDER
depends on !UNWINDER_ORC && !UNWINDER_GUESS
bool
endmenu

3
arch/x86/boot/.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -7,3 +7,6 @@ zoffset.h
setup
setup.bin
setup.elf
fdimage
mtools.conf
image.iso

59
arch/x86/boot/Makefile
View File

@ -123,63 +123,26 @@ image_cmdline = default linux $(FDARGS) $(if $(FDINITRD),initrd=initrd.img,)
$(obj)/mtools.conf: $(src)/mtools.conf.in
sed -e 's|@OBJ@|$(obj)|g' < $< > $@
quiet_cmd_genimage = GENIMAGE $3
cmd_genimage = sh $(srctree)/$(src)/genimage.sh $2 $3 $(obj)/bzImage \
$(obj)/mtools.conf '$(image_cmdline)' $(FDINITRD)
# This requires write access to /dev/fd0
bzdisk: $(obj)/bzImage $(obj)/mtools.conf
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mformat a: ; sync
syslinux /dev/fd0 ; sync
echo '$(image_cmdline)' | \
MTOOLSRC=$(src)/mtools.conf mcopy - a:syslinux.cfg
if [ -f '$(FDINITRD)' ] ; then \
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy '$(FDINITRD)' a:initrd.img ; \
fi
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy $(obj)/bzImage a:linux ; sync
$(call cmd,genimage,bzdisk,/dev/fd0)
# These require being root or having syslinux 2.02 or higher installed
fdimage fdimage144: $(obj)/bzImage $(obj)/mtools.conf
dd if=/dev/zero of=$(obj)/fdimage bs=1024 count=1440
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mformat v: ; sync
syslinux $(obj)/fdimage ; sync
echo '$(image_cmdline)' | \
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy - v:syslinux.cfg
if [ -f '$(FDINITRD)' ] ; then \
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy '$(FDINITRD)' v:initrd.img ; \
fi
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy $(obj)/bzImage v:linux ; sync
$(call cmd,genimage,fdimage144,$(obj)/fdimage)
@$(kecho) 'Kernel: $(obj)/fdimage is ready'
fdimage288: $(obj)/bzImage $(obj)/mtools.conf
dd if=/dev/zero of=$(obj)/fdimage bs=1024 count=2880
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mformat w: ; sync
syslinux $(obj)/fdimage ; sync
echo '$(image_cmdline)' | \
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy - w:syslinux.cfg
if [ -f '$(FDINITRD)' ] ; then \
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy '$(FDINITRD)' w:initrd.img ; \
fi
MTOOLSRC=$(obj)/mtools.conf mcopy $(obj)/bzImage w:linux ; sync
$(call cmd,genimage,fdimage288,$(obj)/fdimage)
@$(kecho) 'Kernel: $(obj)/fdimage is ready'
isoimage: $(obj)/bzImage
-rm -rf $(obj)/isoimage
mkdir $(obj)/isoimage
for i in lib lib64 share end ; do \
if [ -f /usr/$$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin ] ; then \
cp /usr/$$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin $(obj)/isoimage ; \
if [ -f /usr/$$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 ]; then \
cp /usr/$$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 $(obj)/isoimage ; \
fi ; \
break ; \
fi ; \
if [ $$i = end ] ; then exit 1 ; fi ; \
done
cp $(obj)/bzImage $(obj)/isoimage/linux
echo '$(image_cmdline)' > $(obj)/isoimage/isolinux.cfg
if [ -f '$(FDINITRD)' ] ; then \
cp '$(FDINITRD)' $(obj)/isoimage/initrd.img ; \
fi
mkisofs -J -r -o $(obj)/image.iso -b isolinux.bin -c boot.cat \
-no-emul-boot -boot-load-size 4 -boot-info-table \
$(obj)/isoimage
isohybrid $(obj)/image.iso 2>/dev/null || true
rm -rf $(obj)/isoimage
$(call cmd,genimage,isoimage,$(obj)/image.iso)
@$(kecho) 'Kernel: $(obj)/image.iso is ready'
bzlilo: $(obj)/bzImage
if [ -f $(INSTALL_PATH)/vmlinuz ]; then mv $(INSTALL_PATH)/vmlinuz $(INSTALL_PATH)/vmlinuz.old; fi

1
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
View File

@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += $(obj)/early_serial_console.o
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += $(obj)/kaslr.o
ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += $(obj)/pagetable.o
vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/mem_encrypt.o
endif
$(obj)/eboot.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar -mno-red-zone

16
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
View File

@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
/*
* Build early 4G boot pagetable
*/
/*
* If SEV is active then set the encryption mask in the page tables.
* This will insure that when the kernel is copied and decompressed
* it will be done so encrypted.
*/
call get_sev_encryption_bit
xorl %edx, %edx
testl %eax, %eax
jz 1f
subl $32, %eax /* Encryption bit is always above bit 31 */
bts %eax, %edx /* Set encryption mask for page tables */
1:
/* Initialize Page tables to 0 */
leal pgtable(%ebx), %edi
xorl %eax, %eax
@ -141,12 +154,14 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
leal pgtable + 0(%ebx), %edi
leal 0x1007 (%edi), %eax
movl %eax, 0(%edi)
addl %edx, 4(%edi)
/* Build Level 3 */
leal pgtable + 0x1000(%ebx), %edi
leal 0x1007(%edi), %eax
movl $4, %ecx
1: movl %eax, 0x00(%edi)
addl %edx, 0x04(%edi)
addl $0x00001000, %eax
addl $8, %edi
decl %ecx
@ -157,6 +172,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
movl $0x00000183, %eax
movl $2048, %ecx
1: movl %eax, 0(%edi)
addl %edx, 4(%edi)
addl $0x00200000, %eax
addl $8, %edi
decl %ecx

120
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
/*
* AMD Memory Encryption Support
*
* Copyright (C) 2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
*
* Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
.text
.code32
ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
xor %eax, %eax
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
push %ebx
push %ecx
push %edx
push %edi
/*
* RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
* variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
* sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
*/
call 1f
1: popl %edi
subl $1b, %edi
movl enc_bit(%edi), %eax
cmpl $0, %eax
jge .Lsev_exit
/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
movl $1, %eax
cpuid
bt $31, %ecx /* Check the hypervisor bit */
jnc .Lno_sev
movl $0x80000000, %eax /* CPUID to check the highest leaf */
cpuid
cmpl $0x8000001f, %eax /* See if 0x8000001f is available */
jb .Lno_sev
/*
* Check for the SEV feature:
* CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 1
* CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
* Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
*/
movl $0x8000001f, %eax
cpuid
bt $1, %eax /* Check if SEV is available */
jnc .Lno_sev
movl $MSR_AMD64_SEV, %ecx /* Read the SEV MSR */
rdmsr
bt $MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT, %eax /* Check if SEV is active */
jnc .Lno_sev
movl %ebx, %eax
andl $0x3f, %eax /* Return the encryption bit location */
movl %eax, enc_bit(%edi)
jmp .Lsev_exit
.Lno_sev:
xor %eax, %eax
movl %eax, enc_bit(%edi)
.Lsev_exit:
pop %edi
pop %edx
pop %ecx
pop %ebx
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
ret
ENDPROC(get_sev_encryption_bit)
.code64
ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_mask)
xor %rax, %rax
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
push %rbp
push %rdx
movq %rsp, %rbp /* Save current stack pointer */
call get_sev_encryption_bit /* Get the encryption bit position */
testl %eax, %eax
jz .Lno_sev_mask
xor %rdx, %rdx
bts %rax, %rdx /* Create the encryption mask */
mov %rdx, %rax /* ... and return it */
.Lno_sev_mask:
movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */
pop %rdx
pop %rbp
#endif
ret
ENDPROC(get_sev_encryption_mask)
.data
enc_bit:
.int 0xffffffff

2
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
View File

@ -109,4 +109,6 @@ static inline void console_init(void)
{ }
#endif
unsigned long get_sev_encryption_mask(void);
#endif

8
arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c
View File

@ -77,16 +77,18 @@ static unsigned long top_level_pgt;
* Mapping information structure passed to kernel_ident_mapping_init().
* Due to relocation, pointers must be assigned at run time not build time.
*/
static struct x86_mapping_info mapping_info = {
.page_flag = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
};
static struct x86_mapping_info mapping_info;
/* Locates and clears a region for a new top level page table. */
void initialize_identity_maps(void)
{
unsigned long sev_me_mask = get_sev_encryption_mask();
/* Init mapping_info with run-time function/buffer pointers. */
mapping_info.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page;
mapping_info.context = &pgt_data;
mapping_info.page_flag = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC | sev_me_mask;
mapping_info.kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE | sev_me_mask;
/*
* It should be impossible for this not to already be true,

124
arch/x86/boot/genimage.sh Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
#!/bin/sh
#
# This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public
# License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of this archive
# for more details.
#
# Copyright (C) 2017 by Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
#
# Adapted from code in arch/x86/boot/Makefile by H. Peter Anvin and others
#
# "make fdimage/fdimage144/fdimage288/isoimage" script for x86 architecture
#
# Arguments:
# $1 - fdimage format
# $2 - target image file
# $3 - kernel bzImage file
# $4 - mtool configuration file
# $5 - kernel cmdline
# $6 - inird image file
#
# Use "make V=1" to debug this script
case "${KBUILD_VERBOSE}" in
*1*)
set -x
;;
esac
verify () {
if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then
echo "" 1>&2
echo " *** Missing file: $1" 1>&2
echo "" 1>&2
exit 1
fi
}
export MTOOLSRC=$4
FIMAGE=$2
FBZIMAGE=$3
KCMDLINE=$5
FDINITRD=$6
# Make sure the files actually exist
verify "$FBZIMAGE"
verify "$MTOOLSRC"
genbzdisk() {
mformat a:
syslinux $FIMAGE
echo "$KCMDLINE" | mcopy - a:syslinux.cfg
if [ -f "$FDINITRD" ] ; then
mcopy "$FDINITRD" a:initrd.img
fi
mcopy $FBZIMAGE a:linux
}
genfdimage144() {
dd if=/dev/zero of=$FIMAGE bs=1024 count=1440 2> /dev/null
mformat v:
syslinux $FIMAGE
echo "$KCMDLINE" | mcopy - v:syslinux.cfg
if [ -f "$FDINITRD" ] ; then
mcopy "$FDINITRD" v:initrd.img
fi
mcopy $FBZIMAGE v:linux
}
genfdimage288() {
dd if=/dev/zero of=$FIMAGE bs=1024 count=2880 2> /dev/null
mformat w:
syslinux $FIMAGE
echo "$KCMDLINE" | mcopy - W:syslinux.cfg
if [ -f "$FDINITRD" ] ; then
mcopy "$FDINITRD" w:initrd.img
fi
mcopy $FBZIMAGE w:linux
}
genisoimage() {
tmp_dir=`dirname $FIMAGE`/isoimage
rm -rf $tmp_dir
mkdir $tmp_dir
for i in lib lib64 share end ; do
for j in syslinux ISOLINUX ; do
if [ -f /usr/$i/$j/isolinux.bin ] ; then
isolinux=/usr/$i/$j/isolinux.bin
cp $isolinux $tmp_dir
fi
done
for j in syslinux syslinux/modules/bios ; do
if [ -f /usr/$i/$j/ldlinux.c32 ]; then
ldlinux=/usr/$i/$j/ldlinux.c32
cp $ldlinux $tmp_dir
fi
done
if [ -n "$isolinux" -a -n "$ldlinux" ] ; then
break
fi
if [ $i = end -a -z "$isolinux" ] ; then
echo 'Need an isolinux.bin file, please install syslinux/isolinux.'
exit 1
fi
done
cp $FBZIMAGE $tmp_dir/linux
echo "$KCMDLINE" > $tmp_dir/isolinux.cfg
if [ -f "$FDINITRD" ] ; then
cp "$FDINITRD" $tmp_dir/initrd.img
fi
mkisofs -J -r -input-charset=utf-8 -quiet -o $FIMAGE -b isolinux.bin \
-c boot.cat -no-emul-boot -boot-load-size 4 -boot-info-table \
$tmp_dir
isohybrid $FIMAGE 2>/dev/null || true
rm -rf $tmp_dir
}
case $1 in
bzdisk) genbzdisk;;
fdimage144) genfdimage144;;
fdimage288) genfdimage288;;
isoimage) genisoimage;;
*) echo 'Unknown image format'; exit 1;
esac

4
arch/x86/configs/tiny.config
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
CONFIG_NOHIGHMEM=y
# CONFIG_HIGHMEM4G is not set
# CONFIG_HIGHMEM64G is not set
CONFIG_GUESS_UNWINDER=y
# CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER is not set
CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS=y
# CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER is not set

1
arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
View File

@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA_TEST is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_BOOT_PARAMS=y
CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING=y
CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC=y
CONFIG_SECURITY=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y

65
arch/x86/entry/calling.h
View File

@ -142,56 +142,25 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset
.endm
.macro RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS offset=0
movq 0*8+\offset(%rsp), %r15
movq 1*8+\offset(%rsp), %r14
movq 2*8+\offset(%rsp), %r13
movq 3*8+\offset(%rsp), %r12
movq 4*8+\offset(%rsp), %rbp
movq 5*8+\offset(%rsp), %rbx
UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset extra=0
.macro POP_EXTRA_REGS
popq %r15
popq %r14
popq %r13
popq %r12
popq %rbp
popq %rbx
.endm
.macro RESTORE_C_REGS_HELPER rstor_rax=1, rstor_rcx=1, rstor_r11=1, rstor_r8910=1, rstor_rdx=1
.if \rstor_r11
movq 6*8(%rsp), %r11
.endif
.if \rstor_r8910
movq 7*8(%rsp), %r10
movq 8*8(%rsp), %r9
movq 9*8(%rsp), %r8
.endif
.if \rstor_rax
movq 10*8(%rsp), %rax
.endif
.if \rstor_rcx
movq 11*8(%rsp), %rcx
.endif
.if \rstor_rdx
movq 12*8(%rsp), %rdx
.endif
movq 13*8(%rsp), %rsi
movq 14*8(%rsp), %rdi
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=16*8
.endm
.macro RESTORE_C_REGS
RESTORE_C_REGS_HELPER 1,1,1,1,1
.endm
.macro RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RAX
RESTORE_C_REGS_HELPER 0,1,1,1,1
.endm
.macro RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX
RESTORE_C_REGS_HELPER 1,0,1,1,1
.endm
.macro RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_R11
RESTORE_C_REGS_HELPER 1,1,0,1,1
.endm
.macro RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11
RESTORE_C_REGS_HELPER 1,0,0,1,1
.endm
.macro REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK addskip=0
subq $-(15*8+\addskip), %rsp
.macro POP_C_REGS
popq %r11
popq %r10
popq %r9
popq %r8
popq %rax
popq %rcx
popq %rdx
popq %rsi
popq %rdi
.endm
.macro icebp

141
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
View File

@ -221,10 +221,9 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
TRACE_IRQS_ON /* user mode is traced as IRQs on */
movq RIP(%rsp), %rcx
movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11
RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11
movq RSP(%rsp), %rsp
addq $6*8, %rsp /* skip extra regs -- they were preserved */
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
USERGS_SYSRET64
jmp .Lpop_c_regs_except_rcx_r11_and_sysret
1:
/*
@ -246,17 +245,18 @@ entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path:
call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */
return_from_SYSCALL_64:
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ /* we're about to change IF */
/*
* Try to use SYSRET instead of IRET if we're returning to
* a completely clean 64-bit userspace context.
* a completely clean 64-bit userspace context. If we're not,
* go to the slow exit path.
*/
movq RCX(%rsp), %rcx
movq RIP(%rsp), %r11
cmpq %rcx, %r11 /* RCX == RIP */
jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
cmpq %rcx, %r11 /* SYSRET requires RCX == RIP */
jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
/*
* On Intel CPUs, SYSRET with non-canonical RCX/RIP will #GP
@ -274,14 +274,14 @@ return_from_SYSCALL_64:
/* If this changed %rcx, it was not canonical */
cmpq %rcx, %r11
jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
cmpq $__USER_CS, CS(%rsp) /* CS must match SYSRET */
jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
movq R11(%rsp), %r11
cmpq %r11, EFLAGS(%rsp) /* R11 == RFLAGS */
jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
/*
* SYSCALL clears RF when it saves RFLAGS in R11 and SYSRET cannot
@ -302,12 +302,12 @@ return_from_SYSCALL_64:
* would never get past 'stuck_here'.
*/
testq $(X86_EFLAGS_RF|X86_EFLAGS_TF), %r11
jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed
jnz swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
/* nothing to check for RSP */
cmpq $__USER_DS, SS(%rsp) /* SS must match SYSRET */
jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
/*
* We win! This label is here just for ease of understanding
@ -315,14 +315,20 @@ return_from_SYSCALL_64:
*/
syscall_return_via_sysret:
/* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */
RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11
movq RSP(%rsp), %rsp
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
POP_EXTRA_REGS
.Lpop_c_regs_except_rcx_r11_and_sysret:
popq %rsi /* skip r11 */
popq %r10
popq %r9
popq %r8
popq %rax
popq %rsi /* skip rcx */
popq %rdx
popq %rsi
popq %rdi
movq RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsp
USERGS_SYSRET64
opportunistic_sysret_failed:
SWAPGS
jmp restore_c_regs_and_iret
END(entry_SYSCALL_64)
ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64)
@ -423,8 +429,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
movq %rsp, %rdi
call syscall_return_slowpath /* returns with IRQs disabled */
TRACE_IRQS_ON /* user mode is traced as IRQS on */
SWAPGS
jmp restore_regs_and_iret
jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
1:
/* kernel thread */
@ -612,8 +617,21 @@ GLOBAL(retint_user)
mov %rsp,%rdi
call prepare_exit_to_usermode
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
GLOBAL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
/* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */
testb $3, CS(%rsp)
jnz 1f
ud2
1:
#endif
SWAPGS
jmp restore_regs_and_iret
POP_EXTRA_REGS
POP_C_REGS
addq $8, %rsp /* skip regs->orig_ax */
INTERRUPT_RETURN
/* Returning to kernel space */
retint_kernel:
@ -633,15 +651,17 @@ retint_kernel:
*/
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
/*
* At this label, code paths which return to kernel and to user,
* which come from interrupts/exception and from syscalls, merge.
*/
GLOBAL(restore_regs_and_iret)
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
restore_c_regs_and_iret:
RESTORE_C_REGS
REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 8
GLOBAL(restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel)
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
/* Assert that pt_regs indicates kernel mode. */
testb $3, CS(%rsp)
jz 1f
ud2
1:
#endif
POP_EXTRA_REGS
POP_C_REGS
addq $8, %rsp /* skip regs->orig_ax */
INTERRUPT_RETURN
ENTRY(native_iret)
@ -818,7 +838,7 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
ASM_CLAC
.ifeq \has_error_code
.if \has_error_code == 0
pushq $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
.endif
@ -1059,6 +1079,7 @@ idtentry int3 do_int3 has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 shift_ist=DEBUG_STACK
idtentry stack_segment do_stack_segment has_error_code=1
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
idtentry xennmi do_nmi has_error_code=0
idtentry xendebug do_debug has_error_code=0
idtentry xenint3 do_int3 has_error_code=0
#endif
@ -1112,17 +1133,14 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG
testl %ebx, %ebx /* swapgs needed? */
jnz paranoid_exit_no_swapgs
jnz .Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
jmp paranoid_exit_restore
paranoid_exit_no_swapgs:
jmp .Lparanoid_exit_restore
.Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs:
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
paranoid_exit_restore:
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
RESTORE_C_REGS
REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 8
INTERRUPT_RETURN
.Lparanoid_exit_restore:
jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
END(paranoid_exit)
/*
@ -1223,10 +1241,13 @@ ENTRY(error_exit)
jmp retint_user
END(error_exit)
/* Runs on exception stack */
/* XXX: broken on Xen PV */
/*
* Runs on exception stack. Xen PV does not go through this path at all,
* so we can use real assembly here.
*/
ENTRY(nmi)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
/*
* We allow breakpoints in NMIs. If a breakpoint occurs, then
* the iretq it performs will take us out of NMI context.
@ -1284,7 +1305,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
* stacks lest we corrupt the "NMI executing" variable.
*/
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
swapgs
cld
movq %rsp, %rdx
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
@ -1328,8 +1349,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
* Return back to user mode. We must *not* do the normal exit
* work, because we don't want to enable interrupts.
*/
SWAPGS
jmp restore_regs_and_iret
jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
.Lnmi_from_kernel:
/*
@ -1450,7 +1470,7 @@ nested_nmi_out:
popq %rdx
/* We are returning to kernel mode, so this cannot result in a fault. */
INTERRUPT_RETURN
iretq
first_nmi:
/* Restore rdx. */
@ -1481,7 +1501,7 @@ first_nmi:
pushfq /* RFLAGS */
pushq $__KERNEL_CS /* CS */
pushq $1f /* RIP */
INTERRUPT_RETURN /* continues at repeat_nmi below */
iretq /* continues at repeat_nmi below */
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
1:
#endif
@ -1544,29 +1564,34 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
nmi_swapgs:
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
nmi_restore:
RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
RESTORE_C_REGS
POP_EXTRA_REGS
POP_C_REGS
/* Point RSP at the "iret" frame. */
REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 6*8
/*
* Skip orig_ax and the "outermost" frame to point RSP at the "iret"
* at the "iret" frame.
*/
addq $6*8, %rsp
/*
* Clear "NMI executing". Set DF first so that we can easily
* distinguish the remaining code between here and IRET from
* the SYSCALL entry and exit paths. On a native kernel, we
* could just inspect RIP, but, on paravirt kernels,
* INTERRUPT_RETURN can translate into a jump into a
* hypercall page.
* the SYSCALL entry and exit paths.
*
* We arguably should just inspect RIP instead, but I (Andy) wrote
* this code when I had the misapprehension that Xen PV supported
* NMIs, and Xen PV would break that approach.
*/
std
movq $0, 5*8(%rsp) /* clear "NMI executing" */
/*
* INTERRUPT_RETURN reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI
* stack in a single instruction. We are returning to kernel
* mode, so this cannot result in a fault.
* iretq reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI stack in a
* single instruction. We are returning to kernel mode, so this
* cannot result in a fault. Similarly, we don't need to worry
* about espfix64 on the way back to kernel mode.
*/
INTERRUPT_RETURN
iretq
END(nmi)
ENTRY(ignore_sysret)

3
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
View File

@ -337,8 +337,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
/* Go back to user mode. */
TRACE_IRQS_ON
SWAPGS
jmp restore_regs_and_iret
jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
END(entry_INT80_compat)
ENTRY(stub32_clone)

4
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/Makefile
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
out := $(obj)/../../include/generated/asm
uapi := $(obj)/../../include/generated/uapi/asm
out := arch/$(SRCARCH)/include/generated/asm
uapi := arch/$(SRCARCH)/include/generated/uapi/asm
# Create output directory if not already present
_dummy := $(shell [ -d '$(out)' ] || mkdir -p '$(out)') \

5
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
View File

@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ static int vvar_fault(const struct vm_special_mapping *sm,
struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvti =
pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va();
if (pvti && vclock_was_used(VCLOCK_PVCLOCK)) {
ret = vm_insert_pfn(
ret = vm_insert_pfn_prot(
vma,
vmf->address,
__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot));
}
} else if (sym_offset == image->sym_hvclock_page) {
struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page *tsc_pg = hv_get_tsc_page();

8
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
View File

@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static inline bool rdrand_long(unsigned long *v)
bool ok;
unsigned int retry = RDRAND_RETRY_LOOPS;
do {
asm volatile(RDRAND_LONG "\n\t"
asm volatile(RDRAND_LONG
CC_SET(c)
: CC_OUT(c) (ok), "=a" (*v));
if (ok)
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static inline bool rdrand_int(unsigned int *v)
bool ok;
unsigned int retry = RDRAND_RETRY_LOOPS;
do {
asm volatile(RDRAND_INT "\n\t"
asm volatile(RDRAND_INT
CC_SET(c)
: CC_OUT(c) (ok), "=a" (*v));
if (ok)
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static inline bool rdrand_int(unsigned int *v)
static inline bool rdseed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
bool ok;
asm volatile(RDSEED_LONG "\n\t"
asm volatile(RDSEED_LONG
CC_SET(c)
: CC_OUT(c) (ok), "=a" (*v));
return ok;
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static inline bool rdseed_long(unsigned long *v)
static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
bool ok;
asm volatile(RDSEED_INT "\n\t"
asm volatile(RDSEED_INT
CC_SET(c)
: CC_OUT(c) (ok), "=a" (*v));
return ok;

10
arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h
View File

@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static __always_inline void __clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
static __always_inline bool clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte(long nr, volatile unsigned long *addr)
{
bool negative;
asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "andb %2,%1\n\t"
asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "andb %2,%1"
CC_SET(s)
: CC_OUT(s) (negative), ADDR
: "ir" ((char) ~(1 << nr)) : "memory");
@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static __always_inline bool __test_and_set_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long *
{
bool oldbit;
asm("bts %2,%1\n\t"
asm("bts %2,%1"
CC_SET(c)
: CC_OUT(c) (oldbit), ADDR
: "Ir" (nr));
@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static __always_inline bool __test_and_clear_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned long
{
bool oldbit;
asm volatile("btr %2,%1\n\t"
asm volatile("btr %2,%1"
CC_SET(c)
: CC_OUT(c) (oldbit), ADDR
: "Ir" (nr));
@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ static __always_inline bool __test_and_change_bit(long nr, volatile unsigned lon
{
bool oldbit;
asm volatile("btc %2,%1\n\t"
asm volatile("btc %2,%1"
CC_SET(c)
: CC_OUT(c) (oldbit), ADDR
: "Ir" (nr) : "memory");
@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static __always_inline bool variable_test_bit(long nr, volatile const unsigned l
{
bool oldbit;
asm volatile("bt %2,%1\n\t"
asm volatile("bt %2,%1"
CC_SET(c)
: CC_OUT(c) (oldbit)
: "m" (*(unsigned long *)addr), "Ir" (nr));

1
arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h
View File

@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/user32.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>

9
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
View File

@ -126,11 +126,10 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
#define boot_cpu_has(bit) cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, bit)
#define set_cpu_cap(c, bit) set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)((c)->x86_capability))
#define clear_cpu_cap(c, bit) clear_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)((c)->x86_capability))
#define setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit) do { \
clear_cpu_cap(&boot_cpu_data, bit); \
set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared); \
} while (0)
extern void setup_clear_cpu_cap(unsigned int bit);
extern void clear_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int bit);
#define setup_force_cpu_cap(bit) do { \
set_cpu_cap(&boot_cpu_data, bit); \
set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_set); \

147
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
View File

@ -20,9 +20,12 @@
* Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used
* in /proc/cpuinfo instead of the macro name. If the string is "",
* this feature bit is not displayed in /proc/cpuinfo at all.
*
* When adding new features here that depend on other features,
* please update the table in kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c as well.
*/
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000001 (edx), word 0 */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000001 (EDX), word 0 */
#define X86_FEATURE_FPU ( 0*32+ 0) /* Onboard FPU */
#define X86_FEATURE_VME ( 0*32+ 1) /* Virtual Mode Extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_DE ( 0*32+ 2) /* Debugging Extensions */
@ -37,8 +40,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_MTRR ( 0*32+12) /* Memory Type Range Registers */
#define X86_FEATURE_PGE ( 0*32+13) /* Page Global Enable */
#define X86_FEATURE_MCA ( 0*32+14) /* Machine Check Architecture */
#define X86_FEATURE_CMOV ( 0*32+15) /* CMOV instructions */
/* (plus FCMOVcc, FCOMI with FPU) */
#define X86_FEATURE_CMOV ( 0*32+15) /* CMOV instructions (plus FCMOVcc, FCOMI with FPU) */
#define X86_FEATURE_PAT ( 0*32+16) /* Page Attribute Table */
#define X86_FEATURE_PSE36 ( 0*32+17) /* 36-bit PSEs */
#define X86_FEATURE_PN ( 0*32+18) /* Processor serial number */
@ -58,15 +60,15 @@
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000001, word 1 */
/* Don't duplicate feature flags which are redundant with Intel! */
#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL ( 1*32+11) /* SYSCALL/SYSRET */
#define X86_FEATURE_MP ( 1*32+19) /* MP Capable. */
#define X86_FEATURE_MP ( 1*32+19) /* MP Capable */
#define X86_FEATURE_NX ( 1*32+20) /* Execute Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_MMXEXT ( 1*32+22) /* AMD MMX extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT ( 1*32+25) /* FXSAVE/FXRSTOR optimizations */
#define X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES ( 1*32+26) /* "pdpe1gb" GB pages */
#define X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP ( 1*32+27) /* RDTSCP */
#define X86_FEATURE_LM ( 1*32+29) /* Long Mode (x86-64) */
#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOWEXT ( 1*32+30) /* AMD 3DNow! extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOW ( 1*32+31) /* 3DNow! */
#define X86_FEATURE_LM ( 1*32+29) /* Long Mode (x86-64, 64-bit support) */
#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOWEXT ( 1*32+30) /* AMD 3DNow extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOW ( 1*32+31) /* 3DNow */
/* Transmeta-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80860001, word 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RECOVERY ( 2*32+ 0) /* CPU in recovery mode */
@ -79,66 +81,67 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR ( 3*32+ 1) /* AMD K6 nonstandard MTRRs */
#define X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR ( 3*32+ 2) /* Cyrix ARRs (= MTRRs) */
#define X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR ( 3*32+ 3) /* Centaur MCRs (= MTRRs) */
/* cpu types for specific tunings: */
/* CPU types for specific tunings: */
#define X86_FEATURE_K8 ( 3*32+ 4) /* "" Opteron, Athlon64 */
#define X86_FEATURE_K7 ( 3*32+ 5) /* "" Athlon */
#define X86_FEATURE_P3 ( 3*32+ 6) /* "" P3 */
#define X86_FEATURE_P4 ( 3*32+ 7) /* "" P4 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC ( 3*32+ 8) /* TSC ticks at a constant rate */
#define X86_FEATURE_UP ( 3*32+ 9) /* smp kernel running on up */
#define X86_FEATURE_ART ( 3*32+10) /* Platform has always running timer (ART) */
#define X86_FEATURE_UP ( 3*32+ 9) /* SMP kernel running on UP */
#define X86_FEATURE_ART ( 3*32+10) /* Always running timer (ART) */
#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON ( 3*32+11) /* Intel Architectural PerfMon */
#define X86_FEATURE_PEBS ( 3*32+12) /* Precise-Event Based Sampling */
#define X86_FEATURE_BTS ( 3*32+13) /* Branch Trace Store */
#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32 ( 3*32+14) /* "" syscall in ia32 userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in ia32 userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16) /* rep microcode works well */
#define X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+17) /* "" Mfence synchronizes RDTSC */
#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) /* "" Lfence synchronizes RDTSC */
#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32 ( 3*32+14) /* "" syscall in IA32 userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */
#define X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+17) /* "" MFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */
#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) /* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */
#define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */
#define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS ( 3*32+21) /* "" Always-present feature */
#define X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY ( 3*32+22) /* cpu topology enum extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY ( 3*32+22) /* CPU topology enum extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE ( 3*32+23) /* TSC is known to be reliable */
#define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC ( 3*32+24) /* TSC does not stop in C states */
#define X86_FEATURE_CPUID ( 3*32+25) /* CPU has CPUID instruction itself */
#define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID ( 3*32+26) /* has extended APICID (8 bits) */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM ( 3*32+27) /* multi-node processor */
#define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF ( 3*32+28) /* APERFMPERF */
#define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID ( 3*32+26) /* Extended APICID (8 bits) */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM ( 3*32+27) /* AMD multi-node processor */
#define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF ( 3*32+28) /* P-State hardware coordination feedback capability (APERF/MPERF MSRs) */
#define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 ( 3*32+30) /* TSC doesn't stop in S3 state */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ ( 3*32+31) /* TSC has known frequency */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000001 (ecx), word 4 */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000001 (ECX), word 4 */
#define X86_FEATURE_XMM3 ( 4*32+ 0) /* "pni" SSE-3 */
#define X86_FEATURE_PCLMULQDQ ( 4*32+ 1) /* PCLMULQDQ instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_DTES64 ( 4*32+ 2) /* 64-bit Debug Store */
#define X86_FEATURE_MWAIT ( 4*32+ 3) /* "monitor" Monitor/Mwait support */
#define X86_FEATURE_DSCPL ( 4*32+ 4) /* "ds_cpl" CPL Qual. Debug Store */
#define X86_FEATURE_MWAIT ( 4*32+ 3) /* "monitor" MONITOR/MWAIT support */
#define X86_FEATURE_DSCPL ( 4*32+ 4) /* "ds_cpl" CPL-qualified (filtered) Debug Store */
#define X86_FEATURE_VMX ( 4*32+ 5) /* Hardware virtualization */
#define X86_FEATURE_SMX ( 4*32+ 6) /* Safer mode */
#define X86_FEATURE_SMX ( 4*32+ 6) /* Safer Mode eXtensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_EST ( 4*32+ 7) /* Enhanced SpeedStep */
#define X86_FEATURE_TM2 ( 4*32+ 8) /* Thermal Monitor 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_SSSE3 ( 4*32+ 9) /* Supplemental SSE-3 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CID ( 4*32+10) /* Context ID */
#define X86_FEATURE_SDBG ( 4*32+11) /* Silicon Debug */
#define X86_FEATURE_FMA ( 4*32+12) /* Fused multiply-add */
#define X86_FEATURE_CX16 ( 4*32+13) /* CMPXCHG16B */
#define X86_FEATURE_CX16 ( 4*32+13) /* CMPXCHG16B instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_XTPR ( 4*32+14) /* Send Task Priority Messages */
#define X86_FEATURE_PDCM ( 4*32+15) /* Performance Capabilities */
#define X86_FEATURE_PDCM ( 4*32+15) /* Perf/Debug Capabilities MSR */
#define X86_FEATURE_PCID ( 4*32+17) /* Process Context Identifiers */
#define X86_FEATURE_DCA ( 4*32+18) /* Direct Cache Access */
#define X86_FEATURE_XMM4_1 ( 4*32+19) /* "sse4_1" SSE-4.1 */
#define X86_FEATURE_XMM4_2 ( 4*32+20) /* "sse4_2" SSE-4.2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_X2APIC ( 4*32+21) /* x2APIC */
#define X86_FEATURE_X2APIC ( 4*32+21) /* X2APIC */
#define X86_FEATURE_MOVBE ( 4*32+22) /* MOVBE instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_POPCNT ( 4*32+23) /* POPCNT instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER ( 4*32+24) /* Tsc deadline timer */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER ( 4*32+24) /* TSC deadline timer */
#define X86_FEATURE_AES ( 4*32+25) /* AES instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVE ( 4*32+26) /* XSAVE/XRSTOR/XSETBV/XGETBV */
#define X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE ( 4*32+27) /* "" XSAVE enabled in the OS */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVE ( 4*32+26) /* XSAVE/XRSTOR/XSETBV/XGETBV instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE ( 4*32+27) /* "" XSAVE instruction enabled in the OS */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX ( 4*32+28) /* Advanced Vector Extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_F16C ( 4*32+29) /* 16-bit fp conversions */
#define X86_FEATURE_RDRAND ( 4*32+30) /* The RDRAND instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_F16C ( 4*32+29) /* 16-bit FP conversions */
#define X86_FEATURE_RDRAND ( 4*32+30) /* RDRAND instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR ( 4*32+31) /* Running on a hypervisor */
/* VIA/Cyrix/Centaur-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0xC0000001, word 5 */
@ -153,10 +156,10 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PMM ( 5*32+12) /* PadLock Montgomery Multiplier */
#define X86_FEATURE_PMM_EN ( 5*32+13) /* PMM enabled */
/* More extended AMD flags: CPUID level 0x80000001, ecx, word 6 */
/* More extended AMD flags: CPUID level 0x80000001, ECX, word 6 */
#define X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM ( 6*32+ 0) /* LAHF/SAHF in long mode */
#define X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY ( 6*32+ 1) /* If yes HyperThreading not valid */
#define X86_FEATURE_SVM ( 6*32+ 2) /* Secure virtual machine */
#define X86_FEATURE_SVM ( 6*32+ 2) /* Secure Virtual Machine */
#define X86_FEATURE_EXTAPIC ( 6*32+ 3) /* Extended APIC space */
#define X86_FEATURE_CR8_LEGACY ( 6*32+ 4) /* CR8 in 32-bit mode */
#define X86_FEATURE_ABM ( 6*32+ 5) /* Advanced bit manipulation */
@ -170,16 +173,16 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_WDT ( 6*32+13) /* Watchdog timer */
#define X86_FEATURE_LWP ( 6*32+15) /* Light Weight Profiling */
#define X86_FEATURE_FMA4 ( 6*32+16) /* 4 operands MAC instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_TCE ( 6*32+17) /* translation cache extension */
#define X86_FEATURE_TCE ( 6*32+17) /* Translation Cache Extension */
#define X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR ( 6*32+19) /* NodeId MSR */
#define X86_FEATURE_TBM ( 6*32+21) /* trailing bit manipulations */
#define X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT ( 6*32+22) /* topology extensions CPUID leafs */
#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE ( 6*32+23) /* core performance counter extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_TBM ( 6*32+21) /* Trailing Bit Manipulations */
#define X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT ( 6*32+22) /* Topology extensions CPUID leafs */
#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE ( 6*32+23) /* Core performance counter extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_NB ( 6*32+24) /* NB performance counter extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_BPEXT (6*32+26) /* data breakpoint extension */
#define X86_FEATURE_PTSC ( 6*32+27) /* performance time-stamp counter */
#define X86_FEATURE_BPEXT ( 6*32+26) /* Data breakpoint extension */
#define X86_FEATURE_PTSC ( 6*32+27) /* Performance time-stamp counter */
#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_LLC ( 6*32+28) /* Last Level Cache performance counter extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_MWAITX ( 6*32+29) /* MWAIT extension (MONITORX/MWAITX) */
#define X86_FEATURE_MWAITX ( 6*32+29) /* MWAIT extension (MONITORX/MWAITX instructions) */
/*
* Auxiliary flags: Linux defined - For features scattered in various
@ -187,7 +190,7 @@
*
* Reuse free bits when adding new feature flags!
*/
#define X86_FEATURE_RING3MWAIT ( 7*32+ 0) /* Ring 3 MONITOR/MWAIT */
#define X86_FEATURE_RING3MWAIT ( 7*32+ 0) /* Ring 3 MONITOR/MWAIT instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT ( 7*32+ 1) /* Intel CPUID faulting */
#define X86_FEATURE_CPB ( 7*32+ 2) /* AMD Core Performance Boost */
#define X86_FEATURE_EPB ( 7*32+ 3) /* IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS support */
@ -201,8 +204,8 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW ( 7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS ( 7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
#define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
@ -213,19 +216,19 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_EPT ( 8*32+ 3) /* Intel Extended Page Table */
#define X86_FEATURE_VPID ( 8*32+ 4) /* Intel Virtual Processor ID */
#define X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL ( 8*32+15) /* Prefer vmmcall to vmcall */
#define X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL ( 8*32+15) /* Prefer VMMCALL to VMCALL */
#define X86_FEATURE_XENPV ( 8*32+16) /* "" Xen paravirtual guest */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ebx), word 9 */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* {RD/WR}{FS/GS}BASE instructions*/
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST ( 9*32+ 1) /* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3b */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST ( 9*32+ 1) /* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */
#define X86_FEATURE_BMI1 ( 9*32+ 3) /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_HLE ( 9*32+ 4) /* Hardware Lock Elision */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX2 ( 9*32+ 5) /* AVX2 instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_SMEP ( 9*32+ 7) /* Supervisor Mode Execution Protection */
#define X86_FEATURE_BMI2 ( 9*32+ 8) /* 2nd group bit manipulation extensions */
#define X86_FEATURE_ERMS ( 9*32+ 9) /* Enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB */
#define X86_FEATURE_ERMS ( 9*32+ 9) /* Enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID ( 9*32+10) /* Invalidate Processor Context ID */
#define X86_FEATURE_RTM ( 9*32+11) /* Restricted Transactional Memory */
#define X86_FEATURE_CQM ( 9*32+12) /* Cache QoS Monitoring */
@ -233,8 +236,8 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RDT_A ( 9*32+15) /* Resource Director Technology Allocation */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512F ( 9*32+16) /* AVX-512 Foundation */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512DQ ( 9*32+17) /* AVX-512 DQ (Double/Quad granular) Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_RDSEED ( 9*32+18) /* The RDSEED instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_ADX ( 9*32+19) /* The ADCX and ADOX instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_RDSEED ( 9*32+18) /* RDSEED instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_ADX ( 9*32+19) /* ADCX and ADOX instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_SMAP ( 9*32+20) /* Supervisor Mode Access Prevention */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512IFMA ( 9*32+21) /* AVX-512 Integer Fused Multiply-Add instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT ( 9*32+23) /* CLFLUSHOPT instruction */
@ -246,25 +249,25 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW ( 9*32+30) /* AVX-512 BW (Byte/Word granular) Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL ( 9*32+31) /* AVX-512 VL (128/256 Vector Length) Extensions */
/* Extended state features, CPUID level 0x0000000d:1 (eax), word 10 */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT (10*32+ 0) /* XSAVEOPT */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC (10*32+ 1) /* XSAVEC */
#define X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1 (10*32+ 2) /* XGETBV with ECX = 1 */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVES (10*32+ 3) /* XSAVES/XRSTORS */
/* Extended state features, CPUID level 0x0000000d:1 (EAX), word 10 */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT (10*32+ 0) /* XSAVEOPT instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC (10*32+ 1) /* XSAVEC instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1 (10*32+ 2) /* XGETBV with ECX = 1 instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVES (10*32+ 3) /* XSAVES/XRSTORS instructions */
/* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:0 (edx), word 11 */
/* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:0 (EDX), word 11 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC (11*32+ 1) /* LLC QoS if 1 */
/* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:1 (edx), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC (12*32+ 0) /* LLC occupancy monitoring if 1 */
/* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:1 (EDX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC (12*32+ 0) /* LLC occupancy monitoring */
#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL (12*32+ 1) /* LLC Total MBM monitoring */
#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL (12*32+ 2) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+ 1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
#define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
#define X86_FEATURE_IDA (14*32+ 1) /* Intel Dynamic Acceleration */
#define X86_FEATURE_ARAT (14*32+ 2) /* Always Running APIC Timer */
@ -276,7 +279,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_EPP (14*32+10) /* HWP Energy Perf. Preference */
#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_PKG_REQ (14*32+11) /* HWP Package Level Request */
/* AMD SVM Feature Identification, CPUID level 0x8000000a (edx), word 15 */
/* AMD SVM Feature Identification, CPUID level 0x8000000a (EDX), word 15 */
#define X86_FEATURE_NPT (15*32+ 0) /* Nested Page Table support */
#define X86_FEATURE_LBRV (15*32+ 1) /* LBR Virtualization support */
#define X86_FEATURE_SVML (15*32+ 2) /* "svm_lock" SVM locking MSR */
@ -291,18 +294,25 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD (15*32+15) /* Virtual VMSAVE VMLOAD */
#define X86_FEATURE_VGIF (15*32+16) /* Virtual GIF */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx), word 16 */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ECX), word 16 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512VBMI (16*32+ 1) /* AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation instructions*/
#define X86_FEATURE_UMIP (16*32+ 2) /* User Mode Instruction Protection */
#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (16*32+ 3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (16*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2 (16*32+ 6) /* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_GFNI (16*32+ 8) /* Galois Field New Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_VAES (16*32+ 9) /* Vector AES */
#define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ (16*32+10) /* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VNNI (16*32+11) /* Vector Neural Network Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BITALG (16*32+12) /* Support for VPOPCNT[B,W] and VPSHUF-BITQMB instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ (16*32+14) /* POPCNT for vectors of DW/QW */
#define X86_FEATURE_LA57 (16*32+16) /* 5-level page tables */
#define X86_FEATURE_RDPID (16*32+22) /* RDPID instruction */
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (ebx), word 17 */
#define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV (17*32+0) /* MCA overflow recovery support */
#define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */
#define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+3) /* Scalable MCA */
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */
#define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV (17*32+ 0) /* MCA overflow recovery support */
#define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+ 1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */
#define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+ 3) /* Scalable MCA */
/*
* BUG word(s)
@ -329,4 +339,5 @@
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

8
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
View File

@ -16,6 +16,12 @@
# define DISABLE_MPX (1<<(X86_FEATURE_MPX & 31))
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_UMIP
# define DISABLE_UMIP 0
#else
# define DISABLE_UMIP (1<<(X86_FEATURE_UMIP & 31))
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
# define DISABLE_VME (1<<(X86_FEATURE_VME & 31))
# define DISABLE_K6_MTRR (1<<(X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR & 31))
@ -63,7 +69,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK13 0
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
#define DISABLED_MASK15 0
#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57)
#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)

10
arch/x86/include/asm/inat.h
View File

@ -97,6 +97,16 @@
#define INAT_MAKE_GROUP(grp) ((grp << INAT_GRP_OFFS) | INAT_MODRM)
#define INAT_MAKE_IMM(imm) (imm << INAT_IMM_OFFS)
/* Identifiers for segment registers */
#define INAT_SEG_REG_IGNORE 0
#define INAT_SEG_REG_DEFAULT 1
#define INAT_SEG_REG_CS 2
#define INAT_SEG_REG_SS 3
#define INAT_SEG_REG_DS 4
#define INAT_SEG_REG_ES 5
#define INAT_SEG_REG_FS 6
#define INAT_SEG_REG_GS 7
/* Attribute search APIs */
extern insn_attr_t inat_get_opcode_attribute(insn_byte_t opcode);
extern int inat_get_last_prefix_id(insn_byte_t last_pfx);

23
arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_INSN_EVAL_H
#define _ASM_X86_INSN_EVAL_H
/*
* A collection of utility functions for x86 instruction analysis to be
* used in a kernel context. Useful when, for instance, making sense
* of the registers indicated by operands.
*/
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#define INSN_CODE_SEG_ADDR_SZ(params) ((params >> 4) & 0xf)
#define INSN_CODE_SEG_OPND_SZ(params) (params & 0xf)
#define INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(oper_sz, addr_sz) (oper_sz | (addr_sz << 4))
void __user *insn_get_addr_ref(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
int insn_get_modrm_rm_off(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs);
unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx);
char insn_get_code_seg_params(struct pt_regs *regs);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_EVAL_H */

39
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
View File

@ -266,6 +266,21 @@ static inline void slow_down_io(void)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
extern struct static_key_false sev_enable_key;
static inline bool sev_key_active(void)
{
return static_branch_unlikely(&sev_enable_key);
}
#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
static inline bool sev_key_active(void) { return false; }
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
#define BUILDIO(bwl, bw, type) \
static inline void out##bwl(unsigned type value, int port) \
{ \
@ -296,14 +311,34 @@ static inline unsigned type in##bwl##_p(int port) \
\
static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count) \
{ \
if (sev_key_active()) { \
unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr; \
while (count) { \
out##bwl(*value, port); \
value++; \
count--; \
} \
} else { \
asm volatile("rep; outs" #bwl \
: "+S"(addr), "+c"(count) : "d"(port) : "memory"); \
: "+S"(addr), "+c"(count) \
: "d"(port) : "memory"); \
} \
} \
\
static inline void ins##bwl(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count) \
{ \
if (sev_key_active()) { \
unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr; \
while (count) { \
*value = in##bwl(port); \
value++; \
count--; \
} \
} else { \
asm volatile("rep; ins" #bwl \
: "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) : "d"(port) : "memory"); \
: "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) \
: "d"(port) : "memory"); \
} \
}
BUILDIO(b, b, char)

14
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
View File

@ -42,11 +42,17 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void);
void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void);
void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
bool sme_active(void);
bool sev_active(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
#define sme_me_mask 0ULL
@ -64,6 +70,14 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline int __init
early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
static inline int __init
early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
/*

2
arch/x86/include/asm/module.h
View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
#include <asm/orc_types.h>
struct mod_arch_specific {
#ifdef CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER
#ifdef CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC
unsigned int num_orcs;
int *orc_unwind_ip;
struct orc_entry *orc_unwind;

3
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
View File

@ -324,6 +324,9 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET 0xc001103b
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4 0xc001103d
#define MSR_AMD64_IBS_REG_COUNT_MAX 8 /* includes MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET */
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV 0xc0010131
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT 0
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)
/* Fam 17h MSRs */
#define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9

5
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
View File

@ -16,10 +16,9 @@
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
static inline void load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss,
struct thread_struct *thread)
static inline void load_sp0(unsigned long sp0)
{
PVOP_VCALL2(pv_cpu_ops.load_sp0, tss, thread);
PVOP_VCALL1(pv_cpu_ops.load_sp0, sp0);
}
/* The paravirtualized CPUID instruction. */

2
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h
View File

@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ struct pv_cpu_ops {
void (*alloc_ldt)(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries);
void (*free_ldt)(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries);
void (*load_sp0)(struct tss_struct *tss, struct thread_struct *t);
void (*load_sp0)(unsigned long sp0);
void (*set_iopl_mask)(unsigned mask);

2
arch/x86/include/asm/percpu.h
View File

@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ static inline bool x86_this_cpu_variable_test_bit(int nr,
{
bool oldbit;
asm volatile("bt "__percpu_arg(2)",%1\n\t"
asm volatile("bt "__percpu_arg(2)",%1"
CC_SET(c)
: CC_OUT(c) (oldbit)
: "m" (*(unsigned long __percpu *)addr), "Ir" (nr));

3
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
View File

@ -200,10 +200,9 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
#define _PAGE_ENC (_AT(pteval_t, sme_me_mask))
#define _PAGE_TABLE (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | \
_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ENC)
#define _KERNPG_TABLE (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | \
_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ENC)
#define _PAGE_TABLE (_KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC_WP (__PAGE_KERNEL_WP | _PAGE_ENC)

52
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
View File

@ -431,7 +431,9 @@ typedef struct {
struct thread_struct {
/* Cached TLS descriptors: */
struct desc_struct tls_array[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
unsigned long sp0;
#endif
unsigned long sp;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
unsigned long sysenter_cs;
@ -518,16 +520,9 @@ static inline void native_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask)
}
static inline void
native_load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss, struct thread_struct *thread)
native_load_sp0(unsigned long sp0)
{
tss->x86_tss.sp0 = thread->sp0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* Only happens when SEP is enabled, no need to test "SEP"arately: */
if (unlikely(tss->x86_tss.ss1 != thread->sysenter_cs)) {
tss->x86_tss.ss1 = thread->sysenter_cs;
wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, thread->sysenter_cs, 0);
}
#endif
this_cpu_write(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0, sp0);
}
static inline void native_swapgs(void)
@ -547,15 +542,20 @@ static inline unsigned long current_top_of_stack(void)
#endif
}
static inline bool on_thread_stack(void)
{
return (unsigned long)(current_top_of_stack() -
current_stack_pointer) < THREAD_SIZE;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#else
#define __cpuid native_cpuid
static inline void load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss,
struct thread_struct *thread)
static inline void load_sp0(unsigned long sp0)
{
native_load_sp0(tss, thread);
native_load_sp0(sp0);
}
#define set_iopl_mask native_set_iopl_mask
@ -804,6 +804,15 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
#define TOP_OF_INIT_STACK ((unsigned long)&init_stack + sizeof(init_stack) - \
TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING)
#define task_top_of_stack(task) ((unsigned long)(task_pt_regs(task) + 1))
#define task_pt_regs(task) \
({ \
unsigned long __ptr = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(task); \
__ptr += THREAD_SIZE - TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING; \
((struct pt_regs *)__ptr) - 1; \
})
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* User space process size: 3GB (default).
@ -823,23 +832,6 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
.addr_limit = KERNEL_DS, \
}
/*
* TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING reserves 8 bytes on top of the ring0 stack.
* This is necessary to guarantee that the entire "struct pt_regs"
* is accessible even if the CPU haven't stored the SS/ESP registers
* on the stack (interrupt gate does not save these registers
* when switching to the same priv ring).
* Therefore beware: accessing the ss/esp fields of the
* "struct pt_regs" is possible, but they may contain the
* completely wrong values.
*/
#define task_pt_regs(task) \
({ \
unsigned long __ptr = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(task); \
__ptr += THREAD_SIZE - TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING; \
((struct pt_regs *)__ptr) - 1; \
})
#define KSTK_ESP(task) (task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
#else
@ -873,11 +865,9 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
#define STACK_TOP_MAX TASK_SIZE_MAX
#define INIT_THREAD { \
.sp0 = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK, \
.addr_limit = KERNEL_DS, \
}
#define task_pt_regs(tsk) ((struct pt_regs *)(tsk)->thread.sp0 - 1)
extern unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */

6
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
View File

@ -136,9 +136,9 @@ static inline int v8086_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static inline bool user_64bit_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#ifndef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
/*
* On non-paravirt systems, this is the only long mode CPL 3
@ -149,8 +149,12 @@ static inline bool user_64bit_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
/* Headers are too twisted for this to go in paravirt.h. */
return regs->cs == __USER_CS || regs->cs == pv_info.extra_user_64bit_cs;
#endif
#else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
return false;
#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#define current_user_stack_pointer() current_pt_regs()->sp
#define compat_user_stack_pointer() current_pt_regs()->sp
#endif

2
arch/x86/include/asm/rmwcc.h
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ cc_label: \
#define __GEN_RMWcc(fullop, var, cc, clobbers, ...) \
do { \
bool c; \
asm volatile (fullop ";" CC_SET(cc) \
asm volatile (fullop CC_SET(cc) \
: [counter] "+m" (var), CC_OUT(cc) (c) \
: __VA_ARGS__ : clobbers); \
return c; \

24
arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
View File

@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_SWITCH_TO_H
#define _ASM_X86_SWITCH_TO_H
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
struct task_struct; /* one of the stranger aspects of C forward declarations */
struct task_struct *__switch_to_asm(struct task_struct *prev,
@ -73,4 +75,26 @@ do { \
((last) = __switch_to_asm((prev), (next))); \
} while (0)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
static inline void refresh_sysenter_cs(struct thread_struct *thread)
{
/* Only happens when SEP is enabled, no need to test "SEP"arately: */
if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.x86_tss.ss1) == thread->sysenter_cs))
return;
this_cpu_write(cpu_tss.x86_tss.ss1, thread->sysenter_cs);
wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, thread->sysenter_cs, 0);
}
#endif
/* This is used when switching tasks or entering/exiting vm86 mode. */
static inline void update_sp0(struct task_struct *task)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
load_sp0(task->thread.sp0);
#else
load_sp0(task_top_of_stack(task));
#endif
}
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SWITCH_TO_H */

2
arch/x86/include/asm/syscalls.h
View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long, unsigned long, int);
asmlinkage long sys_iopl(unsigned int);
/* kernel/ldt.c */
asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int, void __user *, unsigned long);
asmlinkage long sys_modify_ldt(int, void __user *, unsigned long);
/* kernel/signal.c */
asmlinkage long sys_rt_sigreturn(void);

10
arch/x86/include/asm/trace/fpu.h
View File

@ -34,11 +34,6 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(x86_fpu,
)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_state,
TP_PROTO(struct fpu *fpu),
TP_ARGS(fpu)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_before_save,
TP_PROTO(struct fpu *fpu),
TP_ARGS(fpu)
@ -74,11 +69,6 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_activate_state,
TP_ARGS(fpu)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_deactivate_state,
TP_PROTO(struct fpu *fpu),
TP_ARGS(fpu)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(x86_fpu, x86_fpu_init_state,
TP_PROTO(struct fpu *fpu),
TP_ARGS(fpu)

20
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
View File

@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ asmlinkage void simd_coprocessor_error(void);
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV)
asmlinkage void xen_divide_error(void);
asmlinkage void xen_xennmi(void);
asmlinkage void xen_xendebug(void);
asmlinkage void xen_xenint3(void);
asmlinkage void xen_nmi(void);
asmlinkage void xen_overflow(void);
asmlinkage void xen_bounds(void);
asmlinkage void xen_invalid_op(void);
@ -145,4 +145,22 @@ enum {
X86_TRAP_IRET = 32, /* 32, IRET Exception */
};
/*
* Page fault error code bits:
*
* bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault
* bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access
* bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access
* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected
* bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch
* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
*/
enum x86_pf_error_code {
X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0,
X86_PF_WRITE = 1 << 1,
X86_PF_USER = 1 << 2,
X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5,
};
#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */

12
arch/x86/include/asm/umip.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_UMIP_H
#define _ASM_X86_UMIP_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_UMIP
bool fixup_umip_exception(struct pt_regs *regs);
#else
static inline bool fixup_umip_exception(struct pt_regs *regs) { return false; }
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_UMIP */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_UMIP_H */

8
arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
View File

@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ struct unwind_state {
struct task_struct *task;
int graph_idx;
bool error;
#if defined(CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER)
#if defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)
bool signal, full_regs;
unsigned long sp, bp, ip;
struct pt_regs *regs;
#elif defined(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER)
#elif defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)
bool got_irq;
unsigned long *bp, *orig_sp, ip;
struct pt_regs *regs;
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ void unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct task_struct *task,
__unwind_start(state, task, regs, first_frame);
}
#if defined(CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER) || defined(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER)
#if defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) || defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)
static inline struct pt_regs *unwind_get_entry_regs(struct unwind_state *state)
{
if (unwind_done(state))
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline struct pt_regs *unwind_get_entry_regs(struct unwind_state *state)
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER
#ifdef CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC
void unwind_init(void);
void unwind_module_init(struct module *mod, void *orc_ip, size_t orc_ip_size,
void *orc, size_t orc_size);

1
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
View File

@ -110,5 +110,4 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data {
#define KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED KVM_PV_EOI_MASK
#define KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED 0x0
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_KVM_PARA_H */

5
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
View File

@ -105,6 +105,8 @@
#define X86_CR4_OSFXSR _BITUL(X86_CR4_OSFXSR_BIT)
#define X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT_BIT 10 /* enable unmasked SSE exceptions */
#define X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT _BITUL(X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT_BIT)
#define X86_CR4_UMIP_BIT 11 /* enable UMIP support */
#define X86_CR4_UMIP _BITUL(X86_CR4_UMIP_BIT)
#define X86_CR4_LA57_BIT 12 /* enable 5-level page tables */
#define X86_CR4_LA57 _BITUL(X86_CR4_LA57_BIT)
#define X86_CR4_VMXE_BIT 13 /* enable VMX virtualization */
@ -152,5 +154,8 @@
#define CX86_ARR_BASE 0xc4
#define CX86_RCR_BASE 0xdc
#define CR0_STATE (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_ET | \
X86_CR0_NE | X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM | \
X86_CR0_PG)
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_FLAGS_H */

9
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
View File

@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_head$(BITS).o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_dumpstack.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_dumpstack_$(BITS).o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_stacktrace.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_paravirt.o := n
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_head_$(BITS).o := y
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_relocate_kernel_$(BITS).o := y
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ftrace_$(BITS).o := y
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_test_nx.o := y
@ -127,10 +127,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += sysfb_efi.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += perf_regs.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TRACING) += tracepoint.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SCHED_MC_PRIO) += itmt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_UMIP) += umip.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER) += unwind_orc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER) += unwind_frame.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GUESS_UNWINDER) += unwind_guess.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
###
# 64 bit specific files

26
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
View File

@ -442,7 +442,6 @@ static void alternatives_smp_lock(const s32 *start, const s32 *end,
{
const s32 *poff;
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
for (poff = start; poff < end; poff++) {
u8 *ptr = (u8 *)poff + *poff;
@ -452,7 +451,6 @@ static void alternatives_smp_lock(const s32 *start, const s32 *end,
if (*ptr == 0x3e)
text_poke(ptr, ((unsigned char []){0xf0}), 1);
}
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
static void alternatives_smp_unlock(const s32 *start, const s32 *end,
@ -460,7 +458,6 @@ static void alternatives_smp_unlock(const s32 *start, const s32 *end,
{
const s32 *poff;
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
for (poff = start; poff < end; poff++) {
u8 *ptr = (u8 *)poff + *poff;
@ -470,7 +467,6 @@ static void alternatives_smp_unlock(const s32 *start, const s32 *end,
if (*ptr == 0xf0)
text_poke(ptr, ((unsigned char []){0x3E}), 1);
}
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
struct smp_alt_module {
@ -489,8 +485,7 @@ struct smp_alt_module {
struct list_head next;
};
static LIST_HEAD(smp_alt_modules);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smp_alt);
static bool uniproc_patched = false; /* protected by smp_alt */
static bool uniproc_patched = false; /* protected by text_mutex */
void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_module_add(struct module *mod,
char *name,
@ -499,7 +494,7 @@ void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_module_add(struct module *mod,
{
struct smp_alt_module *smp;
mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
if (!uniproc_patched)
goto unlock;
@ -526,14 +521,14 @@ void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_module_add(struct module *mod,
smp_unlock:
alternatives_smp_unlock(locks, locks_end, text, text_end);
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_module_del(struct module *mod)
{
struct smp_alt_module *item;
mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(item, &smp_alt_modules, next) {
if (mod != item->mod)
continue;
@ -541,7 +536,7 @@ void __init_or_module alternatives_smp_module_del(struct module *mod)
kfree(item);
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
void alternatives_enable_smp(void)
@ -551,7 +546,7 @@ void alternatives_enable_smp(void)
/* Why bother if there are no other CPUs? */
BUG_ON(num_possible_cpus() == 1);
mutex_lock(&smp_alt);
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
if (uniproc_patched) {
pr_info("switching to SMP code\n");
@ -563,10 +558,13 @@ void alternatives_enable_smp(void)
mod->text, mod->text_end);
uniproc_patched = false;
}
mutex_unlock(&smp_alt);
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
/* Return 1 if the address range is reserved for smp-alternatives */
/*
* Return 1 if the address range is reserved for SMP-alternatives.
* Must hold text_mutex.
*/
int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end)
{
struct smp_alt_module *mod;
@ -574,6 +572,8 @@ int alternatives_text_reserved(void *start, void *end)
u8 *text_start = start;
u8 *text_end = end;
lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(mod, &smp_alt_modules, next) {
if (mod->text > text_end || mod->text_end < text_start)
continue;

1
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
View File

@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ obj-y += rdrand.o
obj-y += match.o
obj-y += bugs.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_FREQ) += aperfmperf.o
obj-y += cpuid-deps.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o

54
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
View File

@ -329,6 +329,28 @@ static __always_inline void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/* Check the boot processor, plus build option for UMIP. */
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_UMIP))
goto out;
/* Check the current processor's cpuid bits. */
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_UMIP))
goto out;
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
return;
out:
/*
* Make sure UMIP is disabled in case it was enabled in a
* previous boot (e.g., via kexec).
*/
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
}
/*
* Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
*/
@ -1147,9 +1169,10 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Disable the PN if appropriate */
squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c);
/* Set up SMEP/SMAP */
/* Set up SMEP/SMAP/UMIP */
setup_smep(c);
setup_smap(c);
setup_umip(c);
/*
* The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
@ -1301,18 +1324,16 @@ void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
pr_cont(")\n");
}
static __init int setup_disablecpuid(char *arg)
/*
* clearcpuid= was already parsed in fpu__init_parse_early_param.
* But we need to keep a dummy __setup around otherwise it would
* show up as an environment variable for init.
*/
static __init int setup_clearcpuid(char *arg)
{
int bit;
if (get_option(&arg, &bit) && bit >= 0 && bit < NCAPINTS * 32)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit);
else
return 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("clearcpuid=", setup_disablecpuid);
__setup("clearcpuid=", setup_clearcpuid);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
DEFINE_PER_CPU_FIRST(union irq_stack_union,
@ -1572,9 +1593,13 @@ void cpu_init(void)
initialize_tlbstate_and_flush();
enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, me);
load_sp0(t, &current->thread);
/*
* Initialize the TSS. Don't bother initializing sp0, as the initial
* task never enters user mode.
*/
set_tss_desc(cpu, t);
load_TR_desc();
load_mm_ldt(&init_mm);
clear_all_debug_regs();
@ -1596,7 +1621,6 @@ void cpu_init(void)
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct task_struct *curr = current;
struct tss_struct *t = &per_cpu(cpu_tss, cpu);
struct thread_struct *thread = &curr->thread;
wait_for_master_cpu(cpu);
@ -1627,9 +1651,13 @@ void cpu_init(void)
initialize_tlbstate_and_flush();
enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, curr);
load_sp0(t, thread);
/*
* Initialize the TSS. Don't bother initializing sp0, as the initial
* task never enters user mode.
*/
set_tss_desc(cpu, t);
load_TR_desc();
load_mm_ldt(&init_mm);
t->x86_tss.io_bitmap_base = offsetof(struct tss_struct, io_bitmap);

121
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
/* Declare dependencies between CPUIDs */
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
struct cpuid_dep {
unsigned int feature;
unsigned int depends;
};
/*
* Table of CPUID features that depend on others.
*
* This only includes dependencies that can be usefully disabled, not
* features part of the base set (like FPU).
*
* Note this all is not __init / __initdata because it can be
* called from cpu hotplug. It shouldn't do anything in this case,
* but it's difficult to tell that to the init reference checker.
*/
const static struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
{ X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
{ X86_FEATURE_XSAVES, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
{ X86_FEATURE_PKU, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
{ X86_FEATURE_MPX, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
{ X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
{ X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT, X86_FEATURE_FXSR },
{ X86_FEATURE_XMM, X86_FEATURE_FXSR },
{ X86_FEATURE_XMM2, X86_FEATURE_XMM },
{ X86_FEATURE_XMM3, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_XMM4_1, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_XMM4_2, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_XMM3, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_PCLMULQDQ, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SSSE3, X86_FEATURE_XMM2, },
{ X86_FEATURE_F16C, X86_FEATURE_XMM2, },
{ X86_FEATURE_AES, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SHA_NI, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_FMA, X86_FEATURE_AVX },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX2, X86_FEATURE_AVX, },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512F, X86_FEATURE_AVX, },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512IFMA, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512PF, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512ER, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512CD, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512DQ, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512VBMI, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
{ X86_FEATURE_GFNI, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
{ X86_FEATURE_VAES, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
{ X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VNNI, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BITALG, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
{}
};
static inline void clear_feature(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int feature)
{
/*
* Note: This could use the non atomic __*_bit() variants, but the
* rest of the cpufeature code uses atomics as well, so keep it for
* consistency. Cleanup all of it separately.
*/
if (!c) {
clear_cpu_cap(&boot_cpu_data, feature);
set_bit(feature, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared);
} else {
clear_bit(feature, (unsigned long *)c->x86_capability);
}
}
/* Take the capabilities and the BUG bits into account */
#define MAX_FEATURE_BITS ((NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS) * sizeof(u32) * 8)
static void do_clear_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int feature)
{
DECLARE_BITMAP(disable, MAX_FEATURE_BITS);
const struct cpuid_dep *d;
bool changed;
if (WARN_ON(feature >= MAX_FEATURE_BITS))
return;
clear_feature(c, feature);
/* Collect all features to disable, handling dependencies */
memset(disable, 0, sizeof(disable));
__set_bit(feature, disable);
/* Loop until we get a stable state. */
do {
changed = false;
for (d = cpuid_deps; d->feature; d++) {
if (!test_bit(d->depends, disable))
continue;
if (__test_and_set_bit(d->feature, disable))
continue;
changed = true;
clear_feature(c, d->feature);
}
} while (changed);
}
void clear_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int feature)
{
do_clear_cpu_cap(c, feature);
}
void setup_clear_cpu_cap(unsigned int feature)
{
do_clear_cpu_cap(NULL, feature);
}

18
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
View File

@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
static int get_nr_ram_ranges_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
static int get_nr_ram_ranges_callback(struct resource *res, void *arg)
{
unsigned int *nr_ranges = arg;
@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static int elf_header_exclude_ranges(struct crash_elf_data *ced,
return ret;
}
static int prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
static int prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback(struct resource *res, void *arg)
{
struct crash_elf_data *ced = arg;
Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static int prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
ehdr = ced->ehdr;
/* Exclude unwanted mem ranges */
ret = elf_header_exclude_ranges(ced, start, end);
ret = elf_header_exclude_ranges(ced, res->start, res->end);
if (ret)
return ret;
@ -518,14 +518,14 @@ static int add_e820_entry(struct boot_params *params, struct e820_entry *entry)
return 0;
}
static int memmap_entry_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
static int memmap_entry_callback(struct resource *res, void *arg)
{
struct crash_memmap_data *cmd = arg;
struct boot_params *params = cmd->params;
struct e820_entry ei;
ei.addr = start;
ei.size = end - start + 1;
ei.addr = res->start;
ei.size = resource_size(res);
ei.type = cmd->type;
add_e820_entry(params, &ei);
@ -619,12 +619,12 @@ out:
return ret;
}
static int determine_backup_region(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
static int determine_backup_region(struct resource *res, void *arg)
{
struct kimage *image = arg;
image->arch.backup_src_start = start;
image->arch.backup_src_sz = end - start + 1;
image->arch.backup_src_start = res->start;
image->arch.backup_src_sz = resource_size(res);
/* Expecting only one range for backup region */
return 1;

11
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
View File

@ -249,6 +249,10 @@ static void __init fpu__init_system_ctx_switch(void)
*/
static void __init fpu__init_parse_early_param(void)
{
char arg[32];
char *argptr = arg;
int bit;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no387"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FPU);
@ -266,6 +270,13 @@ static void __init fpu__init_parse_early_param(void)
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
if (cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg,
sizeof(arg)) &&
get_option(&argptr, &bit) &&
bit >= 0 &&
bit < NCAPINTS * 32)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit);
}
/*

43
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
View File

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
/*
* Although we spell it out in here, the Processor Trace
@ -36,6 +37,19 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
"unknown xstate feature" ,
};
static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
X86_FEATURE_FPU,
X86_FEATURE_XMM,
X86_FEATURE_AVX,
X86_FEATURE_MPX,
X86_FEATURE_MPX,
X86_FEATURE_AVX512F,
X86_FEATURE_AVX512F,
X86_FEATURE_AVX512F,
X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
X86_FEATURE_PKU,
};
/*
* Mask of xstate features supported by the CPU and the kernel:
*/
@ -59,26 +73,6 @@ unsigned int fpu_user_xstate_size;
void fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps(void)
{
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX2);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512F);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512IFMA);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512PF);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512ER);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512CD);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512DQ);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MPX);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512VBMI);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PKU);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ);
}
/*
@ -726,6 +720,7 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
static int on_boot_cpu __initdata = 1;
int err;
int i;
WARN_ON_FPU(!on_boot_cpu);
on_boot_cpu = 0;
@ -759,6 +754,14 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
goto out_disable;
}
/*
* Clear XSAVE features that are disabled in the normal CPUID.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xsave_cpuid_features); i++) {
if (!boot_cpu_has(xsave_cpuid_features[i]))
xfeatures_mask &= ~BIT(i);
}
xfeatures_mask &= fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask();
/* Enable xstate instructions to be able to continue with initialization: */

5
arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
View File

@ -212,9 +212,6 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
#endif
.Ldefault_entry:
#define CR0_STATE (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_ET | \
X86_CR0_NE | X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM | \
X86_CR0_PG)
movl $(CR0_STATE & ~X86_CR0_PG),%eax
movl %eax,%cr0
@ -402,7 +399,7 @@ ENTRY(early_idt_handler_array)
# 24(%rsp) error code
i = 0
.rept NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS
.ifeq (EXCEPTION_ERRCODE_MASK >> i) & 1
.if ((EXCEPTION_ERRCODE_MASK >> i) & 1) == 0
pushl $0 # Dummy error code, to make stack frame uniform
.endif
pushl $i # 20(%esp) Vector number

41
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
View File

@ -38,11 +38,12 @@
*
*/
#define p4d_index(x) (((x) >> P4D_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_P4D-1))
#define pud_index(x) (((x) >> PUD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PUD-1))
#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV) || defined(CONFIG_XEN_PVH)
PGD_PAGE_OFFSET = pgd_index(__PAGE_OFFSET_BASE)
PGD_START_KERNEL = pgd_index(__START_KERNEL_map)
#endif
L3_START_KERNEL = pud_index(__START_KERNEL_map)
.text
@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ L3_START_KERNEL = pud_index(__START_KERNEL_map)
.code64
.globl startup_64
startup_64:
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
/*
* At this point the CPU runs in 64bit mode CS.L = 1 CS.D = 0,
* and someone has loaded an identity mapped page table
@ -89,6 +91,7 @@ startup_64:
addq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
jmp 1f
ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
/*
* At this point the CPU runs in 64bit mode CS.L = 1 CS.D = 0,
* and someone has loaded a mapped page table.
@ -133,6 +136,7 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
movq $1f, %rax
jmp *%rax
1:
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
/* Check if nx is implemented */
movl $0x80000001, %eax
@ -150,9 +154,6 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
1: wrmsr /* Make changes effective */
/* Setup cr0 */
#define CR0_STATE (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_ET | \
X86_CR0_NE | X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM | \
X86_CR0_PG)
movl $CR0_STATE, %eax
/* Make changes effective */
movq %rax, %cr0
@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
pushq %rax # target address in negative space
lretq
.Lafter_lret:
ENDPROC(secondary_startup_64)
END(secondary_startup_64)
#include "verify_cpu.S"
@ -247,6 +248,7 @@ ENDPROC(secondary_startup_64)
*/
ENTRY(start_cpu0)
movq initial_stack(%rip), %rsp
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
jmp .Ljump_to_C_code
ENDPROC(start_cpu0)
#endif
@ -266,26 +268,24 @@ ENDPROC(start_cpu0)
.quad init_thread_union + THREAD_SIZE - SIZEOF_PTREGS
__FINITDATA
bad_address:
jmp bad_address
__INIT
ENTRY(early_idt_handler_array)
# 104(%rsp) %rflags
# 96(%rsp) %cs
# 88(%rsp) %rip
# 80(%rsp) error code
i = 0
.rept NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS
.ifeq (EXCEPTION_ERRCODE_MASK >> i) & 1
.if ((EXCEPTION_ERRCODE_MASK >> i) & 1) == 0
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
pushq $0 # Dummy error code, to make stack frame uniform
.else
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
.endif
pushq $i # 72(%rsp) Vector number
jmp early_idt_handler_common
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
i = i + 1
.fill early_idt_handler_array + i*EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE - ., 1, 0xcc
.endr
ENDPROC(early_idt_handler_array)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=16
END(early_idt_handler_array)
early_idt_handler_common:
/*
@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ early_idt_handler_common:
pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
cmpq $14,%rsi /* Page fault? */
jnz 10f
@ -327,8 +328,8 @@ early_idt_handler_common:
20:
decl early_recursion_flag(%rip)
jmp restore_regs_and_iret
ENDPROC(early_idt_handler_common)
jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
END(early_idt_handler_common)
__INITDATA
@ -362,10 +363,7 @@ NEXT_PAGE(early_dynamic_pgts)
.data
#ifndef CONFIG_XEN
NEXT_PAGE(init_top_pgt)
.fill 512,8,0
#else
#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV) || defined(CONFIG_XEN_PVH)
NEXT_PAGE(init_top_pgt)
.quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
.org init_top_pgt + PGD_PAGE_OFFSET*8, 0
@ -382,6 +380,9 @@ NEXT_PAGE(level2_ident_pgt)
* Don't set NX because code runs from these pages.
*/
PMDS(0, __PAGE_KERNEL_IDENT_LARGE_EXEC, PTRS_PER_PMD)
#else
NEXT_PAGE(init_top_pgt)
.fill 512,8,0
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL

40
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
View File

@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ static int parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall(char *arg)
early_param("no-kvmclock-vsyscall", parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data, apf_reason) __aligned(64);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_steal_time, steal_time) __aligned(64);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED(struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data, apf_reason) __aligned(64);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED(struct kvm_steal_time, steal_time) __aligned(64);
static int has_steal_clock = 0;
/*
@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static void kvm_register_steal_time(void)
cpu, (unsigned long long) slow_virt_to_phys(st));
}
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, kvm_apic_eoi) = KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED;
static DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED(unsigned long, kvm_apic_eoi) = KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED;
static notrace void kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write(u32 reg, u32 val)
{
@ -426,9 +426,42 @@ void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)
wrmsr(MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME, 0, 0);
}
static inline void __set_percpu_decrypted(void *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
early_set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) ptr, size);
}
/*
* Iterate through all possible CPUs and map the memory region pointed
* by apf_reason, steal_time and kvm_apic_eoi as decrypted at once.
*
* Note: we iterate through all possible CPUs to ensure that CPUs
* hotplugged will have their per-cpu variable already mapped as
* decrypted.
*/
static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
{
int cpu;
if (!sev_active())
return;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
__set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(apf_reason, cpu), sizeof(apf_reason));
__set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(steal_time, cpu), sizeof(steal_time));
__set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(kvm_apic_eoi, cpu), sizeof(kvm_apic_eoi));
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
{
/*
* Map the per-cpu variables as decrypted before kvm_guest_cpu_init()
* shares the guest physical address with the hypervisor.
*/
sev_map_percpu_data();
kvm_guest_cpu_init();
native_smp_prepare_boot_cpu();
kvm_spinlock_init();
@ -496,6 +529,7 @@ void __init kvm_guest_init(void)
kvm_cpu_online, kvm_cpu_down_prepare) < 0)
pr_err("kvm_guest: Failed to install cpu hotplug callbacks\n");
#else
sev_map_percpu_data();
kvm_guest_cpu_init();
#endif

67
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
View File

@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
#include <asm/reboot.h>
#include <asm/kvmclock.h>
@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ early_param("no-kvmclock", parse_no_kvmclock);
/* The hypervisor will put information about time periodically here */
static struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *hv_clock;
static struct pvclock_wall_clock wall_clock;
static struct pvclock_wall_clock *wall_clock;
struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va(void)
{
@ -64,15 +65,15 @@ static void kvm_get_wallclock(struct timespec *now)
int low, high;
int cpu;
low = (int)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock);
high = ((u64)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock) >> 32);
low = (int)slow_virt_to_phys(wall_clock);
high = ((u64)slow_virt_to_phys(wall_clock) >> 32);
native_write_msr(msr_kvm_wall_clock, low, high);
cpu = get_cpu();
vcpu_time = &hv_clock[cpu].pvti;
pvclock_read_wallclock(&wall_clock, vcpu_time, now);
pvclock_read_wallclock(wall_clock, vcpu_time, now);
put_cpu();
}
@ -249,11 +250,39 @@ static void kvm_shutdown(void)
native_machine_shutdown();
}
static phys_addr_t __init kvm_memblock_alloc(phys_addr_t size,
phys_addr_t align)
{
phys_addr_t mem;
mem = memblock_alloc(size, align);
if (!mem)
return 0;
if (sev_active()) {
if (early_set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)__va(mem), size))
goto e_free;
}
return mem;
e_free:
memblock_free(mem, size);
return 0;
}
static void __init kvm_memblock_free(phys_addr_t addr, phys_addr_t size)
{
if (sev_active())
early_set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)__va(addr), size);
memblock_free(addr, size);
}
void __init kvmclock_init(void)
{
struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *vcpu_time;
unsigned long mem;
int size, cpu;
unsigned long mem, mem_wall_clock;
int size, cpu, wall_clock_size;
u8 flags;
size = PAGE_ALIGN(sizeof(struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info)*NR_CPUS);
@ -267,21 +296,35 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void)
} else if (!(kvmclock && kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE)))
return;
printk(KERN_INFO "kvm-clock: Using msrs %x and %x",
msr_kvm_system_time, msr_kvm_wall_clock);
mem = memblock_alloc(size, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!mem)
wall_clock_size = PAGE_ALIGN(sizeof(struct pvclock_wall_clock));
mem_wall_clock = kvm_memblock_alloc(wall_clock_size, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!mem_wall_clock)
return;
wall_clock = __va(mem_wall_clock);
memset(wall_clock, 0, wall_clock_size);
mem = kvm_memblock_alloc(size, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!mem) {
kvm_memblock_free(mem_wall_clock, wall_clock_size);
wall_clock = NULL;
return;
}
hv_clock = __va(mem);
memset(hv_clock, 0, size);
if (kvm_register_clock("primary cpu clock")) {
hv_clock = NULL;
memblock_free(mem, size);
kvm_memblock_free(mem, size);
kvm_memblock_free(mem_wall_clock, wall_clock_size);
wall_clock = NULL;
return;
}
printk(KERN_INFO "kvm-clock: Using msrs %x and %x",
msr_kvm_system_time, msr_kvm_wall_clock);
if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT))
pvclock_set_flags(PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT);

16
arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@ -295,8 +296,8 @@ out:
return error;
}
asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
unsigned long bytecount)
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(modify_ldt, int , func , void __user * , ptr ,
unsigned long , bytecount)
{
int ret = -ENOSYS;
@ -314,5 +315,14 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
ret = write_ldt(ptr, bytecount, 0);
break;
}
return ret;
/*
* The SYSCALL_DEFINE() macros give us an 'unsigned long'
* return type, but tht ABI for sys_modify_ldt() expects
* 'int'. This cast gives us an int-sized value in %rax
* for the return code. The 'unsigned' is necessary so
* the compiler does not try to sign-extend the negative
* return codes into the high half of the register when
* taking the value from int->long.
*/
return (unsigned int)ret;
}

2
arch/x86/kernel/pmem.c
View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
static int found(u64 start, u64 end, void *data)
static int found(struct resource *res, void *data)
{
return 1;
}

8
arch/x86/kernel/process.c
View File

@ -49,7 +49,13 @@
*/
__visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss) = {
.x86_tss = {
.sp0 = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK,
/*
* .sp0 is only used when entering ring 0 from a lower
* privilege level. Since the init task never runs anything
* but ring 0 code, there is no need for a valid value here.
* Poison it.
*/
.sp0 = (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)) + 1,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
.ss0 = __KERNEL_DS,
.ss1 = __KERNEL_CS,

6
arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
View File

@ -284,9 +284,11 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
/*
* Reload esp0 and cpu_current_top_of_stack. This changes
* current_thread_info().
* current_thread_info(). Refresh the SYSENTER configuration in
* case prev or next is vm86.
*/
load_sp0(tss, next);
update_sp0(next_p);
refresh_sysenter_cs(next);
this_cpu_write(cpu_current_top_of_stack,
(unsigned long)task_stack_page(next_p) +
THREAD_SIZE);

5
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
View File

@ -274,7 +274,6 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
struct inactive_task_frame *frame;
struct task_struct *me = current;
p->thread.sp0 = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_SIZE;
childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
fork_frame = container_of(childregs, struct fork_frame, regs);
frame = &fork_frame->frame;
@ -464,8 +463,8 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
*/
this_cpu_write(current_task, next_p);
/* Reload esp0 and ss1. This changes current_thread_info(). */
load_sp0(tss, next);
/* Reload sp0. */
update_sp0(next_p);
/*
* Now maybe reload the debug registers and handle I/O bitmaps

4
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
View File

@ -380,8 +380,10 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
* If SME is active, this memory will be marked encrypted by the
* kernel when it is accessed (including relocation). However, the
* ramdisk image was loaded decrypted by the bootloader, so make
* sure that it is encrypted before accessing it.
* sure that it is encrypted before accessing it. For SEV the
* ramdisk will already be encrypted, so only do this for SME.
*/
if (sme_active())
sme_early_encrypt(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
initrd_start = 0;

3
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
View File

@ -963,8 +963,7 @@ void common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* Stack for startup_32 can be just as for start_secondary onwards */
irq_ctx_init(cpu);
per_cpu(cpu_current_top_of_stack, cpu) =
(unsigned long)task_stack_page(idle) + THREAD_SIZE;
per_cpu(cpu_current_top_of_stack, cpu) = task_top_of_stack(idle);
#else
initial_gs = per_cpu_offset(cpu);
#endif

9
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
View File

@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#include <asm/trace/mpx.h>
#include <asm/mpx.h>
#include <asm/vm86.h>
#include <asm/umip.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
@ -141,8 +142,7 @@ void ist_begin_non_atomic(struct pt_regs *regs)
* will catch asm bugs and any attempt to use ist_preempt_enable
* from double_fault.
*/
BUG_ON((unsigned long)(current_top_of_stack() -
current_stack_pointer) >= THREAD_SIZE);
BUG_ON(!on_thread_stack());
preempt_enable_no_resched();
}
@ -518,6 +518,11 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP)) {
if (user_mode(regs) && fixup_umip_exception(regs))
return;
}
if (v8086_mode(regs)) {
local_irq_enable();
handle_vm86_fault((struct kernel_vm86_regs *) regs, error_code);

366
arch/x86/kernel/umip.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
/*
* umip.c Emulation for instruction protected by the Intel User-Mode
* Instruction Prevention feature
*
* Copyright (c) 2017, Intel Corporation.
* Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
*/
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/umip.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "umip: " fmt
/** DOC: Emulation for User-Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP)
*
* The feature User-Mode Instruction Prevention present in recent Intel
* processor prevents a group of instructions (sgdt, sidt, sldt, smsw, and str)
* from being executed with CPL > 0. Otherwise, a general protection fault is
* issued.
*
* Rather than relaying to the user space the general protection fault caused by
* the UMIP-protected instructions (in the form of a SIGSEGV signal), it can be
* trapped and emulate the result of such instructions to provide dummy values.
* This allows to both conserve the current kernel behavior and not reveal the
* system resources that UMIP intends to protect (i.e., the locations of the
* global descriptor and interrupt descriptor tables, the segment selectors of
* the local descriptor table, the value of the task state register and the
* contents of the CR0 register).
*
* This emulation is needed because certain applications (e.g., WineHQ and
* DOSEMU2) rely on this subset of instructions to function.
*
* The instructions protected by UMIP can be split in two groups. Those which
* return a kernel memory address (sgdt and sidt) and those which return a
* value (sldt, str and smsw).
*
* For the instructions that return a kernel memory address, applications
* such as WineHQ rely on the result being located in the kernel memory space,
* not the actual location of the table. The result is emulated as a hard-coded
* value that, lies close to the top of the kernel memory. The limit for the GDT
* and the IDT are set to zero.
*
* Given that sldt and str are not commonly used in programs that run on WineHQ
* or DOSEMU2, they are not emulated.
*
* The instruction smsw is emulated to return the value that the register CR0
* has at boot time as set in the head_32.
*
* Also, emulation is provided only for 32-bit processes; 64-bit processes
* that attempt to use the instructions that UMIP protects will receive the
* SIGSEGV signal issued as a consequence of the general protection fault.
*
* Care is taken to appropriately emulate the results when segmentation is
* used. That is, rather than relying on USER_DS and USER_CS, the function
* insn_get_addr_ref() inspects the segment descriptor pointed by the
* registers in pt_regs. This ensures that we correctly obtain the segment
* base address and the address and operand sizes even if the user space
* application uses a local descriptor table.
*/
#define UMIP_DUMMY_GDT_BASE 0xfffe0000
#define UMIP_DUMMY_IDT_BASE 0xffff0000
/*
* The SGDT and SIDT instructions store the contents of the global descriptor
* table and interrupt table registers, respectively. The destination is a
* memory operand of X+2 bytes. X bytes are used to store the base address of
* the table and 2 bytes are used to store the limit. In 32-bit processes, the
* only processes for which emulation is provided, X has a value of 4.
*/
#define UMIP_GDT_IDT_BASE_SIZE 4
#define UMIP_GDT_IDT_LIMIT_SIZE 2
#define UMIP_INST_SGDT 0 /* 0F 01 /0 */
#define UMIP_INST_SIDT 1 /* 0F 01 /1 */
#define UMIP_INST_SMSW 3 /* 0F 01 /4 */
/**
* identify_insn() - Identify a UMIP-protected instruction
* @insn: Instruction structure with opcode and ModRM byte.
*
* From the opcode and ModRM.reg in @insn identify, if any, a UMIP-protected
* instruction that can be emulated.
*
* Returns:
*
* On success, a constant identifying a specific UMIP-protected instruction that
* can be emulated.
*
* -EINVAL on error or when not an UMIP-protected instruction that can be
* emulated.
*/
static int identify_insn(struct insn *insn)
{
/* By getting modrm we also get the opcode. */
insn_get_modrm(insn);
if (!insn->modrm.nbytes)
return -EINVAL;
/* All the instructions of interest start with 0x0f. */
if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] != 0xf)
return -EINVAL;
if (insn->opcode.bytes[1] == 0x1) {
switch (X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.value)) {
case 0:
return UMIP_INST_SGDT;
case 1:
return UMIP_INST_SIDT;
case 4:
return UMIP_INST_SMSW;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* SLDT AND STR are not emulated */
return -EINVAL;
}
/**
* emulate_umip_insn() - Emulate UMIP instructions and return dummy values
* @insn: Instruction structure with operands
* @umip_inst: A constant indicating the instruction to emulate
* @data: Buffer into which the dummy result is stored
* @data_size: Size of the emulated result
*
* Emulate an instruction protected by UMIP and provide a dummy result. The
* result of the emulation is saved in @data. The size of the results depends
* on both the instruction and type of operand (register vs memory address).
* The size of the result is updated in @data_size. Caller is responsible
* of providing a @data buffer of at least UMIP_GDT_IDT_BASE_SIZE +
* UMIP_GDT_IDT_LIMIT_SIZE bytes.
*
* Returns:
*
* 0 on success, -EINVAL on error while emulating.
*/
static int emulate_umip_insn(struct insn *insn, int umip_inst,
unsigned char *data, int *data_size)
{
unsigned long dummy_base_addr, dummy_value;
unsigned short dummy_limit = 0;
if (!data || !data_size || !insn)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* These two instructions return the base address and limit of the
* global and interrupt descriptor table, respectively. According to the
* Intel Software Development manual, the base address can be 24-bit,
* 32-bit or 64-bit. Limit is always 16-bit. If the operand size is
* 16-bit, the returned value of the base address is supposed to be a
* zero-extended 24-byte number. However, it seems that a 32-byte number
* is always returned irrespective of the operand size.
*/
if (umip_inst == UMIP_INST_SGDT || umip_inst == UMIP_INST_SIDT) {
/* SGDT and SIDT do not use registers operands. */
if (X86_MODRM_MOD(insn->modrm.value) == 3)
return -EINVAL;
if (umip_inst == UMIP_INST_SGDT)
dummy_base_addr = UMIP_DUMMY_GDT_BASE;
else
dummy_base_addr = UMIP_DUMMY_IDT_BASE;
*data_size = UMIP_GDT_IDT_LIMIT_SIZE + UMIP_GDT_IDT_BASE_SIZE;
memcpy(data + 2, &dummy_base_addr, UMIP_GDT_IDT_BASE_SIZE);
memcpy(data, &dummy_limit, UMIP_GDT_IDT_LIMIT_SIZE);
} else if (umip_inst == UMIP_INST_SMSW) {
dummy_value = CR0_STATE;
/*
* Even though the CR0 register has 4 bytes, the number
* of bytes to be copied in the result buffer is determined
* by whether the operand is a register or a memory location.
* If operand is a register, return as many bytes as the operand
* size. If operand is memory, return only the two least
* siginificant bytes of CR0.
*/
if (X86_MODRM_MOD(insn->modrm.value) == 3)
*data_size = insn->opnd_bytes;
else
*data_size = 2;
memcpy(data, &dummy_value, *data_size);
/* STR and SLDT are not emulated */
} else {
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* force_sig_info_umip_fault() - Force a SIGSEGV with SEGV_MAPERR
* @addr: Address that caused the signal
* @regs: Register set containing the instruction pointer
*
* Force a SIGSEGV signal with SEGV_MAPERR as the error code. This function is
* intended to be used to provide a segmentation fault when the result of the
* UMIP emulation could not be copied to the user space memory.
*
* Returns: none
*/
static void force_sig_info_umip_fault(void __user *addr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
siginfo_t info;
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
tsk->thread.cr2 = (unsigned long)addr;
tsk->thread.error_code = X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_WRITE;
tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
info.si_addr = addr;
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk);
if (!(show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV)))
return;
pr_err_ratelimited("%s[%d] umip emulation segfault ip:%lx sp:%lx error:%x in %lx\n",
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), regs->ip,
regs->sp, X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_WRITE,
regs->ip);
}
/**
* fixup_umip_exception() - Fixup a general protection fault caused by UMIP
* @regs: Registers as saved when entering the #GP handler
*
* The instructions sgdt, sidt, str, smsw, sldt cause a general protection
* fault if executed with CPL > 0 (i.e., from user space). If the offending
* user-space process is not in long mode, this function fixes the exception
* up and provides dummy results for sgdt, sidt and smsw; str and sldt are not
* fixed up. Also long mode user-space processes are not fixed up.
*
* If operands are memory addresses, results are copied to user-space memory as
* indicated by the instruction pointed by eIP using the registers indicated in
* the instruction operands. If operands are registers, results are copied into
* the context that was saved when entering kernel mode.
*
* Returns:
*
* True if emulation was successful; false if not.
*/
bool fixup_umip_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int not_copied, nr_copied, reg_offset, dummy_data_size, umip_inst;
unsigned long seg_base = 0, *reg_addr;
/* 10 bytes is the maximum size of the result of UMIP instructions */
unsigned char dummy_data[10] = { 0 };
unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
void __user *uaddr;
struct insn insn;
char seg_defs;
if (!regs)
return false;
/* Do not emulate 64-bit processes. */
if (user_64bit_mode(regs))
return false;
/*
* If not in user-space long mode, a custom code segment could be in
* use. This is true in protected mode (if the process defined a local
* descriptor table), or virtual-8086 mode. In most of the cases
* seg_base will be zero as in USER_CS.
*/
if (!user_64bit_mode(regs))
seg_base = insn_get_seg_base(regs, INAT_SEG_REG_CS);
if (seg_base == -1L)
return false;
not_copied = copy_from_user(buf, (void __user *)(seg_base + regs->ip),
sizeof(buf));
nr_copied = sizeof(buf) - not_copied;
/*
* The copy_from_user above could have failed if user code is protected
* by a memory protection key. Give up on emulation in such a case.
* Should we issue a page fault?
*/
if (!nr_copied)
return false;
insn_init(&insn, buf, nr_copied, user_64bit_mode(regs));
/*
* Override the default operand and address sizes with what is specified
* in the code segment descriptor. The instruction decoder only sets
* the address size it to either 4 or 8 address bytes and does nothing
* for the operand bytes. This OK for most of the cases, but we could
* have special cases where, for instance, a 16-bit code segment
* descriptor is used.
* If there is an address override prefix, the instruction decoder
* correctly updates these values, even for 16-bit defaults.
*/
seg_defs = insn_get_code_seg_params(regs);
if (seg_defs == -EINVAL)
return false;
insn.addr_bytes = INSN_CODE_SEG_ADDR_SZ(seg_defs);
insn.opnd_bytes = INSN_CODE_SEG_OPND_SZ(seg_defs);
insn_get_length(&insn);
if (nr_copied < insn.length)
return false;
umip_inst = identify_insn(&insn);
if (umip_inst < 0)
return false;
if (emulate_umip_insn(&insn, umip_inst, dummy_data, &dummy_data_size))
return false;
/*
* If operand is a register, write result to the copy of the register
* value that was pushed to the stack when entering into kernel mode.
* Upon exit, the value we write will be restored to the actual hardware
* register.
*/
if (X86_MODRM_MOD(insn.modrm.value) == 3) {
reg_offset = insn_get_modrm_rm_off(&insn, regs);
/*
* Negative values are usually errors. In memory addressing,
* the exception is -EDOM. Since we expect a register operand,
* all negative values are errors.
*/
if (reg_offset < 0)
return false;
reg_addr = (unsigned long *)((unsigned long)regs + reg_offset);
memcpy(reg_addr, dummy_data, dummy_data_size);
} else {
uaddr = insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
if ((unsigned long)uaddr == -1L)
return false;
nr_copied = copy_to_user(uaddr, dummy_data, dummy_data_size);
if (nr_copied > 0) {
/*
* If copy fails, send a signal and tell caller that
* fault was fixed up.
*/
force_sig_info_umip_fault(uaddr, regs);
return true;
}
}
/* increase IP to let the program keep going */
regs->ip += insn.length;
return true;
}

15
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
View File

@ -271,12 +271,15 @@ static bool is_prefix_bad(struct insn *insn)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < insn->prefixes.nbytes; i++) {
switch (insn->prefixes.bytes[i]) {
case 0x26: /* INAT_PFX_ES */
case 0x2E: /* INAT_PFX_CS */
case 0x36: /* INAT_PFX_DS */
case 0x3E: /* INAT_PFX_SS */
case 0xF0: /* INAT_PFX_LOCK */
insn_attr_t attr;
attr = inat_get_opcode_attribute(insn->prefixes.bytes[i]);
switch (attr) {
case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_ES):
case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_CS):
case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_DS):
case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_SS):
case INAT_MAKE_PREFIX(INAT_PFX_LOCK):
return true;
}
}

3
arch/x86/kernel/verify_cpu.S
View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
verify_cpu:
ENTRY(verify_cpu)
pushf # Save caller passed flags
push $0 # Kill any dangerous flags
popf
@ -139,3 +139,4 @@ verify_cpu:
popf # Restore caller passed flags
xorl %eax, %eax
ret
ENDPROC(verify_cpu)

20
arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
View File

@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/vm86.h>
#include <asm/switch_to.h>
/*
* Known problems:
@ -94,7 +95,6 @@
void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval)
{
struct tss_struct *tss;
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct vm86plus_struct __user *user;
struct vm86 *vm86 = current->thread.vm86;
@ -146,12 +146,13 @@ void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval)
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
}
tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss, get_cpu());
preempt_disable();
tsk->thread.sp0 = vm86->saved_sp0;
tsk->thread.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS;
load_sp0(tss, &tsk->thread);
update_sp0(tsk);
refresh_sysenter_cs(&tsk->thread);
vm86->saved_sp0 = 0;
put_cpu();
preempt_enable();
memcpy(&regs->pt, &vm86->regs32, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
@ -237,7 +238,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(vm86, unsigned long, cmd, unsigned long, arg)
static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus)
{
struct tss_struct *tss;
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct vm86 *vm86 = tsk->thread.vm86;
struct kernel_vm86_regs vm86regs;
@ -365,15 +365,17 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus)
vm86->saved_sp0 = tsk->thread.sp0;
lazy_save_gs(vm86->regs32.gs);
tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss, get_cpu());
/* make room for real-mode segments */
preempt_disable();
tsk->thread.sp0 += 16;
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP))
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP)) {
tsk->thread.sysenter_cs = 0;
refresh_sysenter_cs(&tsk->thread);
}
load_sp0(tss, &tsk->thread);
put_cpu();
update_sp0(tsk);
preempt_enable();
if (vm86->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);

2
arch/x86/lib/Makefile
View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ lib-y := delay.o misc.o cmdline.o cpu.o
lib-y += usercopy_$(BITS).o usercopy.o getuser.o putuser.o
lib-y += memcpy_$(BITS).o
lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o
lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o
lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o
lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o

1364
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

88
arch/x86/mm/fault.c
View File

@ -29,26 +29,6 @@
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
/*
* Page fault error code bits:
*
* bit 0 == 0: no page found 1: protection fault
* bit 1 == 0: read access 1: write access
* bit 2 == 0: kernel-mode access 1: user-mode access
* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected
* bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch
* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
*/
enum x86_pf_error_code {
PF_PROT = 1 << 0,
PF_WRITE = 1 << 1,
PF_USER = 1 << 2,
PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
PF_PK = 1 << 5,
};
/*
* Returns 0 if mmiotrace is disabled, or if the fault is not
* handled by mmiotrace:
@ -150,7 +130,7 @@ is_prefetch(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long addr)
* If it was a exec (instruction fetch) fault on NX page, then
* do not ignore the fault:
*/
if (error_code & PF_INSTR)
if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
return 0;
instr = (void *)convert_ip_to_linear(current, regs);
@ -180,7 +160,7 @@ is_prefetch(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long addr)
* siginfo so userspace can discover which protection key was set
* on the PTE.
*
* If we get here, we know that the hardware signaled a PF_PK
* If we get here, we know that the hardware signaled a X86_PF_PK
* fault and that there was a VMA once we got in the fault
* handler. It does *not* guarantee that the VMA we find here
* was the one that we faulted on.
@ -205,7 +185,7 @@ static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_code, siginfo_t *info, u32 *pkey)
/*
* force_sig_info_fault() is called from a number of
* contexts, some of which have a VMA and some of which
* do not. The PF_PK handing happens after we have a
* do not. The X86_PF_PK handing happens after we have a
* valid VMA, so we should never reach this without a
* valid VMA.
*/
@ -698,7 +678,7 @@ show_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
if (!oops_may_print())
return;
if (error_code & PF_INSTR) {
if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) {
unsigned int level;
pgd_t *pgd;
pte_t *pte;
@ -780,7 +760,7 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
*/
if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) {
tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | PF_USER;
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | X86_PF_USER;
tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
@ -898,7 +878,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
/* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
if (error_code & PF_USER) {
if (error_code & X86_PF_USER) {
/*
* It's possible to have interrupts off here:
*/
@ -919,7 +899,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
* Instruction fetch faults in the vsyscall page might need
* emulation.
*/
if (unlikely((error_code & PF_INSTR) &&
if (unlikely((error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) &&
((address & ~0xfff) == VSYSCALL_ADDR))) {
if (emulate_vsyscall(regs, address))
return;
@ -932,7 +912,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
* are always protection faults.
*/
if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
error_code |= PF_PROT;
error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
@ -993,11 +973,11 @@ static inline bool bad_area_access_from_pkeys(unsigned long error_code,
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
return false;
if (error_code & PF_PK)
if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
return true;
/* this checks permission keys on the VMA: */
if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE),
(error_code & PF_INSTR), foreign))
if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE),
(error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
return true;
return false;
}
@ -1025,7 +1005,7 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
int code = BUS_ADRERR;
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */
if (!(error_code & PF_USER)) {
if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
no_context(regs, error_code, address, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR);
return;
}
@ -1053,14 +1033,14 @@ static noinline void
mm_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
unsigned long address, u32 *pkey, unsigned int fault)
{
if (fatal_signal_pending(current) && !(error_code & PF_USER)) {
if (fatal_signal_pending(current) && !(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
no_context(regs, error_code, address, 0, 0);
return;
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die: */
if (!(error_code & PF_USER)) {
if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER)) {
no_context(regs, error_code, address,
SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR);
return;
@ -1085,16 +1065,16 @@ mm_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)
{
if ((error_code & PF_WRITE) && !pte_write(*pte))
if ((error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) && !pte_write(*pte))
return 0;
if ((error_code & PF_INSTR) && !pte_exec(*pte))
if ((error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) && !pte_exec(*pte))
return 0;
/*
* Note: We do not do lazy flushing on protection key
* changes, so no spurious fault will ever set PF_PK.
* changes, so no spurious fault will ever set X86_PF_PK.
*/
if ((error_code & PF_PK))
if ((error_code & X86_PF_PK))
return 1;
return 1;
@ -1140,8 +1120,8 @@ spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
* change, so user accesses are not expected to cause spurious
* faults.
*/
if (error_code != (PF_WRITE | PF_PROT)
&& error_code != (PF_INSTR | PF_PROT))
if (error_code != (X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_PROT) &&
error_code != (X86_PF_INSTR | X86_PF_PROT))
return 0;
pgd = init_mm.pgd + pgd_index(address);
@ -1201,19 +1181,19 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
* always an unconditional error and can never result in
* a follow-up action to resolve the fault, like a COW.
*/
if (error_code & PF_PK)
if (error_code & X86_PF_PK)
return 1;
/*
* Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform
* faults just to hit a PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
* faults just to hit a X86_PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
* page.
*/
if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE),
(error_code & PF_INSTR), foreign))
if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE),
(error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
return 1;
if (error_code & PF_WRITE) {
if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) {
/* write, present and write, not present: */
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
return 1;
@ -1221,7 +1201,7 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
}
/* read, present: */
if (unlikely(error_code & PF_PROT))
if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_PROT))
return 1;
/* read, not present: */
@ -1244,7 +1224,7 @@ static inline bool smap_violation(int error_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
return false;
if (error_code & PF_USER)
if (error_code & X86_PF_USER)
return false;
if (!user_mode(regs) && (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC))
@ -1297,7 +1277,7 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
* protection error (error_code & 9) == 0.
*/
if (unlikely(fault_in_kernel_space(address))) {
if (!(error_code & (PF_RSVD | PF_USER | PF_PROT))) {
if (!(error_code & (X86_PF_RSVD | X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_PROT))) {
if (vmalloc_fault(address) >= 0)
return;
@ -1325,7 +1305,7 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
if (unlikely(kprobes_fault(regs)))
return;
if (unlikely(error_code & PF_RSVD))
if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_RSVD))
pgtable_bad(regs, error_code, address);
if (unlikely(smap_violation(error_code, regs))) {
@ -1351,7 +1331,7 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
*/
if (user_mode(regs)) {
local_irq_enable();
error_code |= PF_USER;
error_code |= X86_PF_USER;
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
} else {
if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
@ -1360,9 +1340,9 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
if (error_code & PF_WRITE)
if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (error_code & PF_INSTR)
if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION;
/*
@ -1382,7 +1362,7 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
* space check, thus avoiding the deadlock:
*/
if (unlikely(!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem))) {
if ((error_code & PF_USER) == 0 &&
if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER) &&
!search_exception_tables(regs->ip)) {
bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, NULL);
return;
@ -1409,7 +1389,7 @@ retry:
bad_area(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
if (error_code & PF_USER) {
if (error_code & X86_PF_USER) {
/*
* Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug.
* The large cushion allows instructions like enter

10
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
View File

@ -1426,16 +1426,16 @@ int __meminit vmemmap_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int node)
#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG_SPARSE) && defined(CONFIG_HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE)
void register_page_bootmem_memmap(unsigned long section_nr,
struct page *start_page, unsigned long size)
struct page *start_page, unsigned long nr_pages)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)start_page;
unsigned long end = (unsigned long)(start_page + size);
unsigned long end = (unsigned long)(start_page + nr_pages);
unsigned long next;
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int nr_pmd_pages;
struct page *page;
for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
@ -1482,9 +1482,9 @@ void register_page_bootmem_memmap(unsigned long section_nr,
if (pmd_none(*pmd))
continue;
nr_pages = 1 << (get_order(PMD_SIZE));
nr_pmd_pages = 1 << get_order(PMD_SIZE);
page = pmd_page(*pmd);
while (nr_pages--)
while (nr_pmd_pages--)
get_page_bootmem(section_nr, page++,
SECTION_INFO);
}

113
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
View File

@ -27,6 +27,11 @@
#include "physaddr.h"
struct ioremap_mem_flags {
bool system_ram;
bool desc_other;
};
/*
* Fix up the linear direct mapping of the kernel to avoid cache attribute
* conflicts.
@ -56,17 +61,59 @@ int ioremap_change_attr(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size,
return err;
}
static int __ioremap_check_ram(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
void *arg)
static bool __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
{
unsigned long start_pfn, stop_pfn;
unsigned long i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; ++i)
if ((res->flags & IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM) != IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM)
return false;
start_pfn = (res->start + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
stop_pfn = (res->end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (stop_pfn > start_pfn) {
for (i = 0; i < (stop_pfn - start_pfn); ++i)
if (pfn_valid(start_pfn + i) &&
!PageReserved(pfn_to_page(start_pfn + i)))
return 1;
return true;
}
return 0;
return false;
}
static int __ioremap_check_desc_other(struct resource *res)
{
return (res->desc != IORES_DESC_NONE);
}
static int __ioremap_res_check(struct resource *res, void *arg)
{
struct ioremap_mem_flags *flags = arg;
if (!flags->system_ram)
flags->system_ram = __ioremap_check_ram(res);
if (!flags->desc_other)
flags->desc_other = __ioremap_check_desc_other(res);
return flags->system_ram && flags->desc_other;
}
/*
* To avoid multiple resource walks, this function walks resources marked as
* IORESOURCE_MEM and IORESOURCE_BUSY and looking for system RAM and/or a
* resource described not as IORES_DESC_NONE (e.g. IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES).
*/
static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
struct ioremap_mem_flags *flags)
{
u64 start, end;
start = (u64)addr;
end = start + size - 1;
memset(flags, 0, sizeof(*flags));
walk_mem_res(start, end, flags, __ioremap_res_check);
}
/*
@ -87,9 +134,10 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
unsigned long size, enum page_cache_mode pcm, void *caller)
{
unsigned long offset, vaddr;
resource_size_t pfn, last_pfn, last_addr;
resource_size_t last_addr;
const resource_size_t unaligned_phys_addr = phys_addr;
const unsigned long unaligned_size = size;
struct ioremap_mem_flags mem_flags;
struct vm_struct *area;
enum page_cache_mode new_pcm;
pgprot_t prot;
@ -108,13 +156,12 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
return NULL;
}
__ioremap_check_mem(phys_addr, size, &mem_flags);
/*
* Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
*/
pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
last_pfn = last_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (walk_system_ram_range(pfn, last_pfn - pfn + 1, NULL,
__ioremap_check_ram) == 1) {
if (mem_flags.system_ram) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "ioremap on RAM at %pa - %pa\n",
&phys_addr, &last_addr);
return NULL;
@ -146,7 +193,15 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
pcm = new_pcm;
}
/*
* If the page being mapped is in memory and SEV is active then
* make sure the memory encryption attribute is enabled in the
* resulting mapping.
*/
prot = PAGE_KERNEL_IO;
if (sev_active() && mem_flags.desc_other)
prot = pgprot_encrypted(prot);
switch (pcm) {
case _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC:
default:
@ -422,6 +477,9 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
* areas should be mapped decrypted. And since the encryption key can
* change across reboots, persistent memory should also be mapped
* decrypted.
*
* If SEV is active, that implies that BIOS/UEFI also ran encrypted so
* only persistent memory should be mapped decrypted.
*/
static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
unsigned long size)
@ -458,6 +516,11 @@ static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
case E820_TYPE_NVS:
case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
/* For SEV, these areas are encrypted */
if (sev_active())
break;
/* Fallthrough */
case E820_TYPE_PRAM:
return true;
default:
@ -581,7 +644,7 @@ static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
unsigned long flags)
{
if (!sme_active())
if (!mem_encrypt_active())
return true;
if (flags & MEMREMAP_ENC)
@ -590,12 +653,13 @@ bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
return false;
if (sme_active()) {
if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size))
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
return false;
}
return true;
return !memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size);
}
/*
@ -608,17 +672,24 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
unsigned long size,
pgprot_t prot)
{
if (!sme_active())
bool encrypted_prot;
if (!mem_encrypt_active())
return prot;
encrypted_prot = true;
if (sme_active()) {
if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size))
prot = pgprot_decrypted(prot);
else
prot = pgprot_encrypted(prot);
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
encrypted_prot = false;
}
return prot;
if (encrypted_prot && memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size))
encrypted_prot = false;
return encrypted_prot ? pgprot_encrypted(prot)
: pgprot_decrypted(prot);
}
bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size)

101
arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
View File

@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
extern struct range pfn_mapped[E820_MAX_ENTRIES];
static p4d_t tmp_p4d_table[PTRS_PER_P4D] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
static int __init map_range(struct range *range)
{
unsigned long start;
@ -31,8 +33,10 @@ static void __init clear_pgds(unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
/* See comment in kasan_init() */
unsigned long pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK;
for (; start < end; start += PGDIR_SIZE) {
for (; start < pgd_end; start += PGDIR_SIZE) {
pgd = pgd_offset_k(start);
/*
* With folded p4d, pgd_clear() is nop, use p4d_clear()
@ -43,29 +47,61 @@ static void __init clear_pgds(unsigned long start,
else
pgd_clear(pgd);
}
pgd = pgd_offset_k(start);
for (; start < end; start += P4D_SIZE)
p4d_clear(p4d_offset(pgd, start));
}
static inline p4d_t *early_p4d_offset(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr)
{
unsigned long p4d;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL))
return (p4d_t *)pgd;
p4d = __pa_nodebug(pgd_val(*pgd)) & PTE_PFN_MASK;
p4d += __START_KERNEL_map - phys_base;
return (p4d_t *)p4d + p4d_index(addr);
}
static void __init kasan_early_p4d_populate(pgd_t *pgd,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end)
{
pgd_t pgd_entry;
p4d_t *p4d, p4d_entry;
unsigned long next;
if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
pgd_entry = __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_p4d));
set_pgd(pgd, pgd_entry);
}
p4d = early_p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
do {
next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
if (!p4d_none(*p4d))
continue;
p4d_entry = __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pud));
set_p4d(p4d, p4d_entry);
} while (p4d++, addr = next, addr != end && p4d_none(*p4d));
}
static void __init kasan_map_early_shadow(pgd_t *pgd)
{
int i;
unsigned long start = KASAN_SHADOW_START;
/* See comment in kasan_init() */
unsigned long addr = KASAN_SHADOW_START & PGDIR_MASK;
unsigned long end = KASAN_SHADOW_END;
unsigned long next;
for (i = pgd_index(start); start < end; i++) {
switch (CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS) {
case 4:
pgd[i] = __pgd(__pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pud) |
_KERNPG_TABLE);
break;
case 5:
pgd[i] = __pgd(__pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_p4d) |
_KERNPG_TABLE);
break;
default:
BUILD_BUG();
}
start += PGDIR_SIZE;
}
pgd += pgd_index(addr);
do {
next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
kasan_early_p4d_populate(pgd, addr, next);
} while (pgd++, addr = next, addr != end);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
@ -102,7 +138,7 @@ void __init kasan_early_init(void)
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++)
kasan_zero_pud[i] = __pud(pud_val);
for (i = 0; CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >= 5 && i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++)
for (i = 0; IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL) && i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++)
kasan_zero_p4d[i] = __p4d(p4d_val);
kasan_map_early_shadow(early_top_pgt);
@ -118,12 +154,35 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
#endif
memcpy(early_top_pgt, init_top_pgt, sizeof(early_top_pgt));
/*
* We use the same shadow offset for 4- and 5-level paging to
* facilitate boot-time switching between paging modes.
* As result in 5-level paging mode KASAN_SHADOW_START and
* KASAN_SHADOW_END are not aligned to PGD boundary.
*
* KASAN_SHADOW_START doesn't share PGD with anything else.
* We claim whole PGD entry to make things easier.
*
* KASAN_SHADOW_END lands in the last PGD entry and it collides with
* bunch of things like kernel code, modules, EFI mapping, etc.
* We need to take extra steps to not overwrite them.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
void *ptr;
ptr = (void *)pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd_offset_k(KASAN_SHADOW_END));
memcpy(tmp_p4d_table, (void *)ptr, sizeof(tmp_p4d_table));
set_pgd(&early_top_pgt[pgd_index(KASAN_SHADOW_END)],
__pgd(__pa(tmp_p4d_table) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
}
load_cr3(early_top_pgt);
__flush_tlb_all();
clear_pgds(KASAN_SHADOW_START, KASAN_SHADOW_END);
clear_pgds(KASAN_SHADOW_START & PGDIR_MASK, KASAN_SHADOW_END);
kasan_populate_zero_shadow((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START,
kasan_populate_zero_shadow((void *)(KASAN_SHADOW_START & PGDIR_MASK),
kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)PAGE_OFFSET));
for (i = 0; i < E820_MAX_ENTRIES; i++) {

297
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
View File

@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include "mm_internal.h"
static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
static char sme_cmdline_on[] __initdata = "on";
static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
@ -41,6 +43,10 @@ static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
*/
u64 sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
static bool sev_enabled __section(.data);
/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
@ -63,7 +69,6 @@ static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
if (!sme_me_mask)
return;
local_flush_tlb();
wbinvd();
/*
@ -190,8 +195,238 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
/* Update the protection map with memory encryption mask */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
if (sev_active())
swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;
}
static void *sev_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *dma_handle,
gfp_t gfp, unsigned long attrs)
{
unsigned long dma_mask;
unsigned int order;
struct page *page;
void *vaddr = NULL;
dma_mask = dma_alloc_coherent_mask(dev, gfp);
order = get_order(size);
/*
* Memory will be memset to zero after marking decrypted, so don't
* bother clearing it before.
*/
gfp &= ~__GFP_ZERO;
page = alloc_pages_node(dev_to_node(dev), gfp, order);
if (page) {
dma_addr_t addr;
/*
* Since we will be clearing the encryption bit, check the
* mask with it already cleared.
*/
addr = __sme_clr(phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page)));
if ((addr + size) > dma_mask) {
__free_pages(page, get_order(size));
} else {
vaddr = page_address(page);
*dma_handle = addr;
}
}
if (!vaddr)
vaddr = swiotlb_alloc_coherent(dev, size, dma_handle, gfp);
if (!vaddr)
return NULL;
/* Clear the SME encryption bit for DMA use if not swiotlb area */
if (!is_swiotlb_buffer(dma_to_phys(dev, *dma_handle))) {
set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, 1 << order);
memset(vaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE << order);
*dma_handle = __sme_clr(*dma_handle);
}
return vaddr;
}
static void sev_free(struct device *dev, size_t size, void *vaddr,
dma_addr_t dma_handle, unsigned long attrs)
{
/* Set the SME encryption bit for re-use if not swiotlb area */
if (!is_swiotlb_buffer(dma_to_phys(dev, dma_handle)))
set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr,
1 << get_order(size));
swiotlb_free_coherent(dev, size, vaddr, dma_handle);
}
static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
{
pgprot_t old_prot, new_prot;
unsigned long pfn, pa, size;
pte_t new_pte;
switch (level) {
case PG_LEVEL_4K:
pfn = pte_pfn(*kpte);
old_prot = pte_pgprot(*kpte);
break;
case PG_LEVEL_2M:
pfn = pmd_pfn(*(pmd_t *)kpte);
old_prot = pmd_pgprot(*(pmd_t *)kpte);
break;
case PG_LEVEL_1G:
pfn = pud_pfn(*(pud_t *)kpte);
old_prot = pud_pgprot(*(pud_t *)kpte);
break;
default:
return;
}
new_prot = old_prot;
if (enc)
pgprot_val(new_prot) |= _PAGE_ENC;
else
pgprot_val(new_prot) &= ~_PAGE_ENC;
/* If prot is same then do nothing. */
if (pgprot_val(old_prot) == pgprot_val(new_prot))
return;
pa = pfn << page_level_shift(level);
size = page_level_size(level);
/*
* We are going to perform in-place en-/decryption and change the
* physical page attribute from C=1 to C=0 or vice versa. Flush the
* caches to ensure that data gets accessed with the correct C-bit.
*/
clflush_cache_range(__va(pa), size);
/* Encrypt/decrypt the contents in-place */
if (enc)
sme_early_encrypt(pa, size);
else
sme_early_decrypt(pa, size);
/* Change the page encryption mask. */
new_pte = pfn_pte(pfn, new_prot);
set_pte_atomic(kpte, new_pte);
}
static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long vaddr,
unsigned long size, bool enc)
{
unsigned long vaddr_end, vaddr_next;
unsigned long psize, pmask;
int split_page_size_mask;
int level, ret;
pte_t *kpte;
vaddr_next = vaddr;
vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = vaddr_next) {
kpte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level);
if (!kpte || pte_none(*kpte)) {
ret = 1;
goto out;
}
if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K) {
__set_clr_pte_enc(kpte, level, enc);
vaddr_next = (vaddr & PAGE_MASK) + PAGE_SIZE;
continue;
}
psize = page_level_size(level);
pmask = page_level_mask(level);
/*
* Check whether we can change the large page in one go.
* We request a split when the address is not aligned and
* the number of pages to set/clear encryption bit is smaller
* than the number of pages in the large page.
*/
if (vaddr == (vaddr & pmask) &&
((vaddr_end - vaddr) >= psize)) {
__set_clr_pte_enc(kpte, level, enc);
vaddr_next = (vaddr & pmask) + psize;
continue;
}
/*
* The virtual address is part of a larger page, create the next
* level page table mapping (4K or 2M). If it is part of a 2M
* page then we request a split of the large page into 4K
* chunks. A 1GB large page is split into 2M pages, resp.
*/
if (level == PG_LEVEL_2M)
split_page_size_mask = 0;
else
split_page_size_mask = 1 << PG_LEVEL_2M;
kernel_physical_mapping_init(__pa(vaddr & pmask),
__pa((vaddr_end & pmask) + psize),
split_page_size_mask);
}
ret = 0;
out:
__flush_tlb_all();
return ret;
}
int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
{
return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, false);
}
int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
{
return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, true);
}
/*
* SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
* times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
* sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this. When a
* distinction isn't needed, the mem_encrypt_active() function can be used.
*
* The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before
* paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV
* will access all memory as encrypted. So, when APs are being brought
* up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
* the trampoline area must be encrypted.
*/
bool sme_active(void)
{
return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_active);
bool sev_active(void)
{
return sme_me_mask && sev_enabled;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
static const struct dma_map_ops sev_dma_ops = {
.alloc = sev_alloc,
.free = sev_free,
.map_page = swiotlb_map_page,
.unmap_page = swiotlb_unmap_page,
.map_sg = swiotlb_map_sg_attrs,
.unmap_sg = swiotlb_unmap_sg_attrs,
.sync_single_for_cpu = swiotlb_sync_single_for_cpu,
.sync_single_for_device = swiotlb_sync_single_for_device,
.sync_sg_for_cpu = swiotlb_sync_sg_for_cpu,
.sync_sg_for_device = swiotlb_sync_sg_for_device,
.mapping_error = swiotlb_dma_mapping_error,
};
/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
{
@ -201,7 +436,23 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
pr_info("AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) active\n");
/*
* With SEV, DMA operations cannot use encryption. New DMA ops
* are required in order to mark the DMA areas as decrypted or
* to use bounce buffers.
*/
if (sev_active())
dma_ops = &sev_dma_ops;
/*
* With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions.
*/
if (sev_active())
static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
pr_info("AMD %s active\n",
sev_active() ? "Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)"
: "Secure Memory Encryption (SME)");
}
void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
@ -529,37 +780,63 @@ void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
{
const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
unsigned long feature_mask;
bool active_by_default;
unsigned long me_mask;
char buffer[16];
u64 msr;
/* Check for the SME support leaf */
/* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */
eax = 0x80000000;
ecx = 0;
native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
if (eax < 0x8000001f)
return;
#define AMD_SME_BIT BIT(0)
#define AMD_SEV_BIT BIT(1)
/*
* Check for the SME feature:
* CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
* Secure Memory Encryption support
* CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
* Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
* Set the feature mask (SME or SEV) based on whether we are
* running under a hypervisor.
*/
eax = 1;
ecx = 0;
native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
feature_mask = (ecx & BIT(31)) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT;
/*
* Check for the SME/SEV feature:
* CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX]
* - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support
* - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support
* CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX]
* - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
*/
eax = 0x8000001f;
ecx = 0;
native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
if (!(eax & 1))
if (!(eax & feature_mask))
return;
me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
/* Check if SME is enabled */
/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
if (feature_mask == AMD_SME_BIT) {
/* For SME, check the SYSCFG MSR */
msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
} else {
/* For SEV, check the SEV MSR */
msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED))
return;
/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
sme_me_mask = me_mask;
sev_enabled = true;
return;
}
/*
* Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running

120
arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/sysctl.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
#include <asm/mman.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/mpx.h>
@ -61,123 +62,6 @@ static unsigned long mpx_mmap(unsigned long len)
return addr;
}
enum reg_type {
REG_TYPE_RM = 0,
REG_TYPE_INDEX,
REG_TYPE_BASE,
};
static int get_reg_offset(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs,
enum reg_type type)
{
int regno = 0;
static const int regoff[] = {
offsetof(struct pt_regs, ax),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, cx),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, dx),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, bx),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, sp),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, bp),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, si),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, di),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r8),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r9),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r10),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r11),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r12),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r13),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r14),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r15),
#endif
};
int nr_registers = ARRAY_SIZE(regoff);
/*
* Don't possibly decode a 32-bit instructions as
* reading a 64-bit-only register.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && !insn->x86_64)
nr_registers -= 8;
switch (type) {
case REG_TYPE_RM:
regno = X86_MODRM_RM(insn->modrm.value);
if (X86_REX_B(insn->rex_prefix.value))
regno += 8;
break;
case REG_TYPE_INDEX:
regno = X86_SIB_INDEX(insn->sib.value);
if (X86_REX_X(insn->rex_prefix.value))
regno += 8;
break;
case REG_TYPE_BASE:
regno = X86_SIB_BASE(insn->sib.value);
if (X86_REX_B(insn->rex_prefix.value))
regno += 8;
break;
default:
pr_err("invalid register type");
BUG();
break;
}
if (regno >= nr_registers) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "decoded an instruction with an invalid register");
return -EINVAL;
}
return regoff[regno];
}
/*
* return the address being referenced be instruction
* for rm=3 returning the content of the rm reg
* for rm!=3 calculates the address using SIB and Disp
*/
static void __user *mpx_get_addr_ref(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr, base, indx;
int addr_offset, base_offset, indx_offset;
insn_byte_t sib;
insn_get_modrm(insn);
insn_get_sib(insn);
sib = insn->sib.value;
if (X86_MODRM_MOD(insn->modrm.value) == 3) {
addr_offset = get_reg_offset(insn, regs, REG_TYPE_RM);
if (addr_offset < 0)
goto out_err;
addr = regs_get_register(regs, addr_offset);
} else {
if (insn->sib.nbytes) {
base_offset = get_reg_offset(insn, regs, REG_TYPE_BASE);
if (base_offset < 0)
goto out_err;
indx_offset = get_reg_offset(insn, regs, REG_TYPE_INDEX);
if (indx_offset < 0)
goto out_err;
base = regs_get_register(regs, base_offset);
indx = regs_get_register(regs, indx_offset);
addr = base + indx * (1 << X86_SIB_SCALE(sib));
} else {
addr_offset = get_reg_offset(insn, regs, REG_TYPE_RM);
if (addr_offset < 0)
goto out_err;
addr = regs_get_register(regs, addr_offset);
}
addr += insn->displacement.value;
}
return (void __user *)addr;
out_err:
return (void __user *)-1;
}
static int mpx_insn_decode(struct insn *insn,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
@ -290,7 +174,7 @@ siginfo_t *mpx_generate_siginfo(struct pt_regs *regs)
info->si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info->si_errno = 0;
info->si_code = SEGV_BNDERR;
info->si_addr = mpx_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
info->si_addr = insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
/*
* We were not able to extract an address from the instruction,
* probably because there was something invalid in it.

4
arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
View File

@ -1781,8 +1781,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
unsigned long start;
int ret;
/* Nothing to do if the SME is not active */
if (!sme_active())
/* Nothing to do if memory encryption is not active */
if (!mem_encrypt_active())
return 0;
/* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */

16
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
View File

@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
@ -370,7 +371,11 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
* as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away
* from memory allocators anyway.
*/
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, _PAGE_RW)) {
pf = _PAGE_RW;
if (sev_active())
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, pf)) {
pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the first page!\n");
return 1;
}
@ -413,6 +418,9 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
if (sev_active())
flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags))
pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
@ -539,6 +547,9 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
if (sev_active())
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
}
@ -590,6 +601,9 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
if (sev_active())
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
}
}

3
arch/x86/realmode/init.c
View File

@ -64,8 +64,9 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
/*
* If SME is active, the trampoline area will need to be in
* decrypted memory in order to bring up other processors
* successfully.
* successfully. This is not needed for SEV.
*/
if (sme_active())
set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
memcpy(base, real_mode_blob, size);

7
arch/x86/um/ldt.c
View File

@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <os.h>
@ -369,7 +370,9 @@ void free_ldt(struct mm_context *mm)
mm->arch.ldt.entry_count = 0;
}
int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr, unsigned long bytecount)
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(modify_ldt, int , func , void __user * , ptr ,
unsigned long , bytecount)
{
return do_modify_ldt_skas(func, ptr, bytecount);
/* See non-um modify_ldt() for why we do this cast */
return (unsigned int)do_modify_ldt_skas(func, ptr, bytecount);
}

9
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
View File

@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static struct trap_array_entry trap_array[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
{ machine_check, xen_machine_check, true },
#endif
{ nmi, xen_nmi, true },
{ nmi, xen_xennmi, true },
{ overflow, xen_overflow, false },
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
{ entry_INT80_compat, xen_entry_INT80_compat, false },
@ -811,15 +811,14 @@ static void __init xen_write_gdt_entry_boot(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry,
}
}
static void xen_load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss,
struct thread_struct *thread)
static void xen_load_sp0(unsigned long sp0)
{
struct multicall_space mcs;
mcs = xen_mc_entry(0);
MULTI_stack_switch(mcs.mc, __KERNEL_DS, thread->sp0);
MULTI_stack_switch(mcs.mc, __KERNEL_DS, sp0);
xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
tss->x86_tss.sp0 = thread->sp0;
this_cpu_write(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0, sp0);
}
void xen_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask)

77
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
View File

@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ __visible pmd_t xen_make_pmd(pmdval_t pmd)
}
PV_CALLEE_SAVE_REGS_THUNK(xen_make_pmd);
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 4
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
__visible pudval_t xen_pud_val(pud_t pud)
{
return pte_mfn_to_pfn(pud.pud);
@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static void xen_set_p4d(p4d_t *ptr, p4d_t val)
xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_MMU);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 4 */
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
static int xen_pmd_walk(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd,
int (*func)(struct mm_struct *mm, struct page *, enum pt_level),
@ -580,21 +580,17 @@ static int xen_p4d_walk(struct mm_struct *mm, p4d_t *p4d,
int (*func)(struct mm_struct *mm, struct page *, enum pt_level),
bool last, unsigned long limit)
{
int i, nr, flush = 0;
nr = last ? p4d_index(limit) + 1 : PTRS_PER_P4D;
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
int flush = 0;
pud_t *pud;
if (p4d_none(p4d[i]))
continue;
pud = pud_offset(&p4d[i], 0);
if (p4d_none(*p4d))
return flush;
pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
if (PTRS_PER_PUD > 1)
flush |= (*func)(mm, virt_to_page(pud), PT_PUD);
flush |= xen_pud_walk(mm, pud, func,
last && i == nr - 1, limit);
}
flush |= xen_pud_walk(mm, pud, func, last, limit);
return flush;
}
@ -644,8 +640,6 @@ static int __xen_pgd_walk(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd,
continue;
p4d = p4d_offset(&pgd[i], 0);
if (PTRS_PER_P4D > 1)
flush |= (*func)(mm, virt_to_page(p4d), PT_P4D);
flush |= xen_p4d_walk(mm, p4d, func, i == nr - 1, limit);
}
@ -1176,22 +1170,14 @@ static void __init xen_cleanmfnmap(unsigned long vaddr)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
unsigned int i;
bool unpin;
unpin = (vaddr == 2 * PGDIR_SIZE);
vaddr &= PMD_MASK;
pgd = pgd_offset_k(vaddr);
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, 0);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
if (p4d_none(p4d[i]))
continue;
xen_cleanmfnmap_p4d(p4d + i, unpin);
}
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(0));
xen_cleanmfnmap_free_pgtbl(p4d, unpin);
}
if (!p4d_none(*p4d))
xen_cleanmfnmap_p4d(p4d, unpin);
}
static void __init xen_pagetable_p2m_free(void)
@ -1692,7 +1678,7 @@ static void xen_release_pmd(unsigned long pfn)
xen_release_ptpage(pfn, PT_PMD);
}
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >= 4
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static void xen_alloc_pud(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long pfn)
{
xen_alloc_ptpage(mm, pfn, PT_PUD);
@ -2029,13 +2015,12 @@ static phys_addr_t __init xen_early_virt_to_phys(unsigned long vaddr)
*/
void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)
{
phys_addr_t size, new_area, pt_phys, pmd_phys, pud_phys, p4d_phys;
phys_addr_t size, new_area, pt_phys, pmd_phys, pud_phys;
unsigned long p2m_pfn, p2m_pfn_end, n_frames, pfn, pfn_end;
int n_pte, n_pt, n_pmd, n_pud, n_p4d, idx_pte, idx_pt, idx_pmd, idx_pud, idx_p4d;
int n_pte, n_pt, n_pmd, n_pud, idx_pte, idx_pt, idx_pmd, idx_pud;
pte_t *pt;
pmd_t *pmd;
pud_t *pud;
p4d_t *p4d = NULL;
pgd_t *pgd;
unsigned long *new_p2m;
int save_pud;
@ -2045,11 +2030,7 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)
n_pt = roundup(size, PMD_SIZE) >> PMD_SHIFT;
n_pmd = roundup(size, PUD_SIZE) >> PUD_SHIFT;
n_pud = roundup(size, P4D_SIZE) >> P4D_SHIFT;
if (PTRS_PER_P4D > 1)
n_p4d = roundup(size, PGDIR_SIZE) >> PGDIR_SHIFT;
else
n_p4d = 0;
n_frames = n_pte + n_pt + n_pmd + n_pud + n_p4d;
n_frames = n_pte + n_pt + n_pmd + n_pud;
new_area = xen_find_free_area(PFN_PHYS(n_frames));
if (!new_area) {
@ -2065,22 +2046,14 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)
* To avoid any possible virtual address collision, just use
* 2 * PUD_SIZE for the new area.
*/
p4d_phys = new_area;
pud_phys = p4d_phys + PFN_PHYS(n_p4d);
pud_phys = new_area;
pmd_phys = pud_phys + PFN_PHYS(n_pud);
pt_phys = pmd_phys + PFN_PHYS(n_pmd);
p2m_pfn = PFN_DOWN(pt_phys) + n_pt;
pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
new_p2m = (unsigned long *)(2 * PGDIR_SIZE);
idx_p4d = 0;
save_pud = n_pud;
do {
if (n_p4d > 0) {
p4d = early_memremap(p4d_phys, PAGE_SIZE);
clear_page(p4d);
n_pud = min(save_pud, PTRS_PER_P4D);
}
for (idx_pud = 0; idx_pud < n_pud; idx_pud++) {
pud = early_memremap(pud_phys, PAGE_SIZE);
clear_page(pud);
@ -2120,21 +2093,9 @@ void __init xen_relocate_p2m(void)
early_memunmap(pud, PAGE_SIZE);
make_lowmem_page_readonly(__va(pud_phys));
pin_pagetable_pfn(MMUEXT_PIN_L3_TABLE, PFN_DOWN(pud_phys));
if (n_p4d > 0)
set_p4d(p4d + idx_pud, __p4d(_PAGE_TABLE | pud_phys));
else
set_pgd(pgd + 2 + idx_pud, __pgd(_PAGE_TABLE | pud_phys));
pud_phys += PAGE_SIZE;
}
if (n_p4d > 0) {
save_pud -= PTRS_PER_P4D;
early_memunmap(p4d, PAGE_SIZE);
make_lowmem_page_readonly(__va(p4d_phys));
pin_pagetable_pfn(MMUEXT_PIN_L4_TABLE, PFN_DOWN(p4d_phys));
set_pgd(pgd + 2 + idx_p4d, __pgd(_PAGE_TABLE | p4d_phys));
p4d_phys += PAGE_SIZE;
}
} while (++idx_p4d < n_p4d);
/* Now copy the old p2m info to the new area. */
memcpy(new_p2m, xen_p2m_addr, size);
@ -2361,7 +2322,7 @@ static void __init xen_post_allocator_init(void)
pv_mmu_ops.set_pte = xen_set_pte;
pv_mmu_ops.set_pmd = xen_set_pmd;
pv_mmu_ops.set_pud = xen_set_pud;
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >= 4
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pv_mmu_ops.set_p4d = xen_set_p4d;
#endif
@ -2371,7 +2332,7 @@ static void __init xen_post_allocator_init(void)
pv_mmu_ops.alloc_pmd = xen_alloc_pmd;
pv_mmu_ops.release_pte = xen_release_pte;
pv_mmu_ops.release_pmd = xen_release_pmd;
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >= 4
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
pv_mmu_ops.alloc_pud = xen_alloc_pud;
pv_mmu_ops.release_pud = xen_release_pud;
#endif
@ -2435,14 +2396,14 @@ static const struct pv_mmu_ops xen_mmu_ops __initconst = {
.make_pmd = PV_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_make_pmd),
.pmd_val = PV_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_pmd_val),
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >= 4
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
.pud_val = PV_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_pud_val),
.make_pud = PV_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_make_pud),
.set_p4d = xen_set_p4d_hyper,
.alloc_pud = xen_alloc_pmd_init,
.release_pud = xen_release_pmd_init,
#endif /* CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 4 */
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
.activate_mm = xen_activate_mm,
.dup_mmap = xen_dup_mmap,

17
arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
View File

@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
* single-threaded.
*/
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
@ -294,12 +295,19 @@ cpu_initialize_context(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
#endif
memset(&ctxt->fpu_ctxt, 0, sizeof(ctxt->fpu_ctxt));
/*
* Bring up the CPU in cpu_bringup_and_idle() with the stack
* pointing just below where pt_regs would be if it were a normal
* kernel entry.
*/
ctxt->user_regs.eip = (unsigned long)cpu_bringup_and_idle;
ctxt->flags = VGCF_IN_KERNEL;
ctxt->user_regs.eflags = 0x1000; /* IOPL_RING1 */
ctxt->user_regs.ds = __USER_DS;
ctxt->user_regs.es = __USER_DS;
ctxt->user_regs.ss = __KERNEL_DS;
ctxt->user_regs.cs = __KERNEL_CS;
ctxt->user_regs.esp = (unsigned long)task_pt_regs(idle);
xen_copy_trap_info(ctxt->trap_ctxt);
@ -314,8 +322,13 @@ cpu_initialize_context(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
ctxt->gdt_frames[0] = gdt_mfn;
ctxt->gdt_ents = GDT_ENTRIES;
/*
* Set SS:SP that Xen will use when entering guest kernel mode
* from guest user mode. Subsequent calls to load_sp0() can
* change this value.
*/
ctxt->kernel_ss = __KERNEL_DS;
ctxt->kernel_sp = idle->thread.sp0;
ctxt->kernel_sp = task_top_of_stack(idle);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
ctxt->event_callback_cs = __KERNEL_CS;
@ -327,10 +340,8 @@ cpu_initialize_context(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
(unsigned long)xen_hypervisor_callback;
ctxt->failsafe_callback_eip =
(unsigned long)xen_failsafe_callback;
ctxt->user_regs.cs = __KERNEL_CS;
per_cpu(xen_cr3, cpu) = __pa(swapper_pg_dir);
ctxt->user_regs.esp = idle->thread.sp0 - sizeof(struct pt_regs);
ctxt->ctrlreg[3] = xen_pfn_to_cr3(virt_to_gfn(swapper_pg_dir));
if (HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_initialise, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), ctxt))
BUG();

2
arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S
View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ xen_pv_trap debug
xen_pv_trap xendebug
xen_pv_trap int3
xen_pv_trap xenint3
xen_pv_trap nmi
xen_pv_trap xennmi
xen_pv_trap overflow
xen_pv_trap bounds
xen_pv_trap invalid_op

11
arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <asm/boot.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/page_types.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
#include <xen/interface/elfnote.h>
#include <xen/interface/features.h>
@ -20,6 +21,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
__INIT
ENTRY(startup_xen)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
cld
/* Clear .bss */
@ -34,21 +36,24 @@ ENTRY(startup_xen)
mov $init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP
jmp xen_start_kernel
END(startup_xen)
__FINIT
#endif
.pushsection .text
.balign PAGE_SIZE
ENTRY(hypercall_page)
.skip PAGE_SIZE
.rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
.skip 32
.endr
#define HYPERCALL(n) \
.equ xen_hypercall_##n, hypercall_page + __HYPERVISOR_##n * 32; \
.type xen_hypercall_##n, @function; .size xen_hypercall_##n, 32
#include <asm/xen-hypercalls.h>
#undef HYPERCALL
END(hypercall_page)
.popsection
ELFNOTE(Xen, XEN_ELFNOTE_GUEST_OS, .asciz "linux")

21
include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
View File

@ -688,7 +688,7 @@
#define BUG_TABLE
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER
#ifdef CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC
#define ORC_UNWIND_TABLE \
. = ALIGN(4); \
.orc_unwind_ip : AT(ADDR(.orc_unwind_ip) - LOAD_OFFSET) { \
@ -778,6 +778,24 @@
#define INIT_RAM_FS
#endif
/*
* Memory encryption operates on a page basis. Since we need to clear
* the memory encryption mask for this section, it needs to be aligned
* on a page boundary and be a page-size multiple in length.
*
* Note: We use a separate section so that only this section gets
* decrypted to avoid exposing more than we wish.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
#define PERCPU_DECRYPTED_SECTION \
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); \
*(.data..percpu..decrypted) \
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
#else
#define PERCPU_DECRYPTED_SECTION
#endif
/*
* Default discarded sections.
*
@ -816,6 +834,7 @@
. = ALIGN(cacheline); \
*(.data..percpu) \
*(.data..percpu..shared_aligned) \
PERCPU_DECRYPTED_SECTION \
VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__per_cpu_end) = .;
/**

7
include/linux/ioport.h
View File

@ -271,11 +271,14 @@ extern int
walk_system_ram_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
void *arg, int (*func)(unsigned long, unsigned long, void *));
extern int
walk_mem_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *));
extern int
walk_system_ram_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
int (*func)(u64, u64, void *));
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *));
extern int
walk_iomem_res_desc(unsigned long desc, unsigned long flags, u64 start, u64 end,
void *arg, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *));
void *arg, int (*func)(struct resource *, void *));
/* True if any part of r1 overlaps r2 */
static inline bool resource_overlaps(struct resource *r1, struct resource *r2)

2
include/linux/kexec.h
View File

@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ struct kexec_buf {
};
int __weak arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf,
int (*func)(u64, u64, void *));
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *));
extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */

7
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
View File

@ -23,11 +23,14 @@
#define sme_me_mask 0ULL
static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
static inline bool sme_active(void)
static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void)
{
return !!sme_me_mask;
return sme_me_mask;
}
static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void)

2
include/linux/mm.h
View File

@ -2496,7 +2496,7 @@ void vmemmap_populate_print_last(void);
void vmemmap_free(unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
#endif
void register_page_bootmem_memmap(unsigned long section_nr, struct page *map,
unsigned long size);
unsigned long nr_pages);
enum mf_flags {
MF_COUNT_INCREASED = 1 << 0,

6
include/linux/mmzone.h
View File

@ -1151,13 +1151,17 @@ struct mem_section {
#define SECTION_ROOT_MASK (SECTIONS_PER_ROOT - 1)
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME
extern struct mem_section *mem_section[NR_SECTION_ROOTS];
extern struct mem_section **mem_section;
#else
extern struct mem_section mem_section[NR_SECTION_ROOTS][SECTIONS_PER_ROOT];
#endif
static inline struct mem_section *__nr_to_section(unsigned long nr)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME
if (!mem_section)
return NULL;
#endif
if (!mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)])
return NULL;
return &mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)][nr & SECTION_ROOT_MASK];

15
include/linux/percpu-defs.h
View File

@ -172,6 +172,21 @@
#define DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(type, name) \
DEFINE_PER_CPU_SECTION(type, name, "..read_mostly")
/*
* Declaration/definition used for per-CPU variables that should be accessed
* as decrypted when memory encryption is enabled in the guest.
*/
#if defined(CONFIG_VIRTUALIZATION) && defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)
#define DECLARE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED(type, name) \
DECLARE_PER_CPU_SECTION(type, name, "..decrypted")
#define DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED(type, name) \
DEFINE_PER_CPU_SECTION(type, name, "..decrypted")
#else
#define DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED(type, name) DEFINE_PER_CPU(type, name)
#endif
/*
* Intermodule exports for per-CPU variables. sparse forgets about
* address space across EXPORT_SYMBOL(), change EXPORT_SYMBOL() to

2
kernel/extable.c
View File

@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
* mutex protecting text section modification (dynamic code patching).
* some users need to sleep (allocating memory...) while they hold this lock.
*
* Note: Also protects SMP-alternatives modification on x86.
*
* NOT exported to modules - patching kernel text is a really delicate matter.
*/
DEFINE_MUTEX(text_mutex);

5
kernel/kexec_file.c
View File

@ -406,9 +406,10 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_bottom_up(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
return 1;
}
static int locate_mem_hole_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
static int locate_mem_hole_callback(struct resource *res, void *arg)
{
struct kexec_buf *kbuf = (struct kexec_buf *)arg;
u64 start = res->start, end = res->end;
unsigned long sz = end - start + 1;
/* Returning 0 will take to next memory range */
@ -437,7 +438,7 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg)
* func returning non-zero, then zero will be returned.
*/
int __weak arch_kexec_walk_mem(struct kexec_buf *kbuf,
int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
{
if (kbuf->image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH)
return walk_iomem_res_desc(crashk_res.desc,

76
kernel/resource.c
View File

@ -397,9 +397,32 @@ static int find_next_iomem_res(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
res->start = p->start;
if (res->end > p->end)
res->end = p->end;
res->flags = p->flags;
res->desc = p->desc;
return 0;
}
static int __walk_iomem_res_desc(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
bool first_level_children_only,
void *arg,
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
{
u64 orig_end = res->end;
int ret = -1;
while ((res->start < res->end) &&
!find_next_iomem_res(res, desc, first_level_children_only)) {
ret = (*func)(res, arg);
if (ret)
break;
res->start = res->end + 1;
res->end = orig_end;
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Walks through iomem resources and calls func() with matching resource
* ranges. This walks through whole tree and not just first level children.
@ -415,29 +438,15 @@ static int find_next_iomem_res(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
* <linux/ioport.h> and set it in 'desc' of a target resource entry.
*/
int walk_iomem_res_desc(unsigned long desc, unsigned long flags, u64 start,
u64 end, void *arg, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
u64 end, void *arg, int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
{
struct resource res;
u64 orig_end;
int ret = -1;
res.start = start;
res.end = end;
res.flags = flags;
orig_end = res.end;
while ((res.start < res.end) &&
(!find_next_iomem_res(&res, desc, false))) {
ret = (*func)(res.start, res.end, arg);
if (ret)
break;
res.start = res.end + 1;
res.end = orig_end;
}
return ret;
return __walk_iomem_res_desc(&res, desc, false, arg, func);
}
/*
@ -448,25 +457,33 @@ int walk_iomem_res_desc(unsigned long desc, unsigned long flags, u64 start,
* ranges.
*/
int walk_system_ram_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
{
struct resource res;
u64 orig_end;
int ret = -1;
res.start = start;
res.end = end;
res.flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
orig_end = res.end;
while ((res.start < res.end) &&
(!find_next_iomem_res(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true))) {
ret = (*func)(res.start, res.end, arg);
if (ret)
break;
res.start = res.end + 1;
res.end = orig_end;
}
return ret;
return __walk_iomem_res_desc(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true,
arg, func);
}
/*
* This function calls the @func callback against all memory ranges, which
* are ranges marked as IORESOURCE_MEM and IORESOUCE_BUSY.
*/
int walk_mem_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
{
struct resource res;
res.start = start;
res.end = end;
res.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
return __walk_iomem_res_desc(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true,
arg, func);
}
#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_WALK_MEMORY)
@ -508,6 +525,7 @@ static int __is_ram(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, void *arg)
{
return 1;
}
/*
* This generic page_is_ram() returns true if specified address is
* registered as System RAM in iomem_resource list.

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