ipv4: provide stronger user input validation in nl_fib_input()
Alexander reported a KMSAN splat caused by reads of uninitialized field (tb_id_in) from user provided struct fib_result_nl It turns out nl_fib_input() sanity tests on user input is a bit wrong : User can pretend nlh->nlmsg_len is big enough, but provide at sendmsg() time a too small buffer. Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -1083,7 +1083,8 @@ static void nl_fib_input(struct sk_buff *skb)
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net = sock_net(skb->sk);
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nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
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if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
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if (skb->len < nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(*frn)) ||
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skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
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nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*frn))
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return;
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