Revert "net: ptr_ring: otherwise safe empty checks can overrun array bounds"
This reverts commit bcecb4bbf8
.
If we try to allocate an extra entry as the above commit did, and when
the requested size is UINT_MAX, addition overflows causing zero size to
be passed to kmalloc().
kmalloc then returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR with a subsequent crash.
Reported-by: syzbot+87678bcf753b44c39b67@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
parent
84328342a7
commit
9fb582b670
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@ -466,12 +466,7 @@ static inline int ptr_ring_consume_batched_bh(struct ptr_ring *r,
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static inline void **__ptr_ring_init_queue_alloc(unsigned int size, gfp_t gfp)
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{
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/* Allocate an extra dummy element at end of ring to avoid consumer head
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* or produce head access past the end of the array. Possible when
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* producer/consumer operations and __ptr_ring_peek operations run in
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* parallel.
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*/
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return kcalloc(size + 1, sizeof(void *), gfp);
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return kcalloc(size, sizeof(void *), gfp);
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}
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static inline void __ptr_ring_set_size(struct ptr_ring *r, int size)
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