x86/elf: Add table to document READ_IMPLIES_EXEC
Add a table to document the current behavior of READ_IMPLIES_EXEC in preparation for changing the behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200327064820.12602-2-keescook@chromium.org
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@ -281,6 +281,25 @@ extern u32 elf_hwcap2;
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/*
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* An executable for which elf_read_implies_exec() returns TRUE will
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* have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically.
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*
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* The decision process for determining the results are:
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*
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* CPU: | lacks NX* | has NX, ia32 | has NX, x86_64 |
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* ELF: | | | |
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* ---------------------|------------|------------------|----------------|
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* missing PT_GNU_STACK | exec-all | exec-all | exec-all |
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* PT_GNU_STACK == RWX | exec-all | exec-all | exec-all |
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* PT_GNU_STACK == RW | exec-none | exec-none | exec-none |
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*
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* exec-all : all PROT_READ user mappings are executable, except when
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* backed by files on a noexec-filesystem.
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* exec-none : only PROT_EXEC user mappings are executable.
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*
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* *this column has no architectural effect: NX markings are ignored by
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* hardware, but may have behavioral effects when "wants X" collides with
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* "cannot be X" constraints in memory permission flags, as in
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* https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190418055759.GA3155@mellanox.com
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*
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*/
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#define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, executable_stack) \
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(executable_stack != EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
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